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Upsetting the Offset engages critically with the political economy of  carbon mar-
kets. It presents a range of  case studies and critiques from around the world, show-
ing how the scam of  carbon markets affects the lives of  communities. But the book 
doesn’t stop there. It also presents a number of  alternatives to carbon markets which 
enable communities to live in real low-carbon futures.
‘This book is a very constructive and rigorous critique of  CDM offset approaches to 
deal with carbon footprints. I recommend this book to any student, policy maker or 
administrator of  climate change complexities in developed or developing countries.’ 
Professor Anil Gupta, Indian Institute of  Management - Ahmedabad, India
‘If  you wondered whether capitalism could ever produce the perfect weapon of  its 
own destruction, try this heady mix of  carbon fuels, the trade in financial derivatives, 
and more than a dash of  neo-colonialism, and boom! But this book is far from re-
signed to that fate. After examining the case against carbon trading… the book turns 
to alternatives, to hope, to sanity, and to the future.’ Professor Stefano Harney, Queen 
Mary, University of  London, UK
‘The politics of  carbon trading is a subject far too important to be left to politicians, 
industrialists and technocrats. This is an issue that is affecting everyone on the planet. 
In this important book, a series of  well known commentators explain the perverse 
economics that lies behind the impossible idea of  trading our future for profit.’ 
Professor Martin Parker, University of  Leicester, UK
‘Anyone concerned about the future of  the planet (is anyone not?) should read this 
book. The contributors give powerful evidence and argument to show that the car-
bon trading regimes favoured by the world’s elites will not work – and are, indeed, set 
to make things worse. But the message is not negative. There are alternatives, both 
effective and desirable.’ Professor Ted Benton, University of  Essex, UK
Steffen Böhm is Reader in Management at Essex Business School, University of  Es-
sex, UK. Siddhartha Dabhi is a researcher at Essex Business School, University of  
Essex, UK.
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Foreword 
The Business of Carbon is Different 
Sunita Narain  
Climate change is clearly the biggest challenge our world has ever faced. It is 
now clear that if the world does not find ways of reducing its emissions of 
greenhouse gases drastically, it is faced with deadly catastrophe. What is also 
clear is that this task is not easy, because the emissions are linked to growth. The 
challenge, therefore, is to reinvent economic growth so that it does not cost us 
the earth. 
This is why the world needs the business of carbon. It is a business, which 
works to reduce the carbon intensity of economies across the world. It is also a 
business, where it makes sense to ‘avoid’ pollution, not to first pollute and then 
clean up. In other words, the business is about investing in the opportunities, 
which re-engineer growth so that it is more efficient and less dependent on 
fossil fuels. 
But this business of carbon, we must remember, is not about business as 
usual. It is about ensuring that the world takes effective steps to reduce 
emissions. This will mean that the business must not fall into the trap of cheap 
or corrupt emissions reduction deals. It must not become (as is the current 
practice) a simple market mechanism – an agreement between private parties 
looking to make a fast buck. I believe that the design of the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) is flawed because it promotes really creative carbon 
accounting projects. It is also designed to keep prices low and so it forces the 
South to discount its advantage in reducing emissions. It is designed to invest in 
the small change and not in high end technological options which would 
drastically reduce pollution. In this way, it does little to seriously or effectively 
combat climate change. This is unacceptable. 
If the corporate world has to be part of the solution, as I believe it must, 
then it must partner in the idea of the new tomorrow, which is both equitable 
and sustainable. Let us be clear, climate change teaches us that there are limits to 
growth as we know it. It also teaches us that the world is one; if the rich world 
pumped excessive quantities of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere yesterday, 
the emerging rich world will do so today. It also tells that we must build 
technological and economic futures which will share the benefits of growth with 
all. Without fairness and equity, cooperation will not be possible. The bottom 
line is that if climate change is the market’s biggest failure, then the market (as it 
works today) cannot be the solution.  
   2 
Foreword 
Offsets Under Kyoto: A Dirty Deal for the South 
Kevin Smith 
In Western Panama, the Naso and Ngobe peoples are fighting against the 
construction of four hydroelectric dams being built on the land of Indigenous 
Peoples, saying that they will destroy their homelands. In Okhla, India, 
members of the local community have been turning up in large numbers to 
protest against the construction of a waste incinerator in a residential area. 
Across Indonesia, small farmers are being driven from their land to expand 
palm oil plantations, with the palm oil finding its way to the refinery in Riau 
owned by PT Murini Samsam. 
All of these projects are receiving, or are in the process of being approved 
for carbon financing through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). This 
controversial and increasingly discredited finance mechanism, which enables 
countries and companies in the Global North to buy offset credits from projects 
in the Global South, has become an emblem of the wider climate injustice being 
exacerbated by the Kyoto Process. 
There is a widespread crisis of confidence in the CDM. All but the most 
dogmatically market oriented NGOs are no longer willing to entertain it as 
being any part of the solution. In 2008, the US Government Accountability 
Office, the ‘audit, evaluation and investigative arm of Congress,’ released a 
detailed report that questions the credibility of the scheme. A statement from 
the International Forum of Indigenous Peoples on Climate Change to the UN 
climate talks in Bali testified that CDM projects were being carried out ‘without 
the free prior and informed consent of Indigenous Peoples.’ 
Upsetting the Offset is yet another voice in the mounting chorus of criticism of 
the CDM, which is supposed to serve three purposes under the Kyoto Protocol: 
assist in the achievement of sustainable development, contribute to attaining the 
environmental goals of the broader climate change treaty, and assist Northern 
countries in complying with their emissions reduction commitments. 
The first two objectives have been abysmal failures. The third has been a 
resounding success, but paradoxically so. The CDM has largely been rewarding 
big industrial polluters in the global South that contribute nothing towards 
sustainable development. Meanwhile numerous studies have cast profound 
doubt on the ability of the CDM to bring climate benefits. A 2008 study from 
Stanford’s Energy and Sustainability Program suggested that up to two thirds of 
CDM projects didn’t bring about any emissions cuts. 
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The CDM has provided a means for Northern governments and companies 
to ‘outsource’ their responsibility for taking necessary steps towards a low-
carbon economy. This aspect of the CDM’s ‘success’ highlights the climate 
injustice underpinning the system. The winners are energy intensive companies, 
whose profit margins have benefited enormously in the short term through the 
lucrative trade in the credits themselves. Because of fundamental flaws in the 
design of the CDM, industry has been able to buy cheap carbon credits to meet 
their emissions commitments and avoid the cost of shifting to low carbon 
technologies. Add these savings to potential windfalls from new trading options 
in derivatives and other exotic financial services and it’s no surprise there is such 
a ‘gold rush’ for this lucrative market. 
Conversely, Southern countries have lost out enormously. Many projects, 
such as the waste incinerator in India, have been imposed on communities 
without their prior, informed consent. CDM financing has entrenched dirty 
development by acting as a financial subsidy for big industrial polluters such as 
chemical factories, coal fired power stations and pulp and paper mills. The 
CDM has been promoted at the expense of an existing adaptation fund and the 
truly clean technology transfer that is so urgently needed. 
In 1997, the CDM was initially presented in a ‘lump it or leave it’ manner in 
lieu of the more substantial funds that had been proposed by Southern 
countries. The CDM and the other flexible mechanisms were included as a 
condition to get the US to commit to binding emissions targets, which they then 
refused to ratify anyway. 
Aside from the emissions reductions targets undertaken by the Global 
North, the Convention in 1997 also acknowledged the principle of ‘ecological 
debt’ in putting the historic responsibility for climate change on Northern 
countries and committing them as a result to providing funds for mitigation, 
adaptation and technology transfer. 
One of the biggest frustrations for the G-77 countries in the negotiations has 
been the failure of the Northern countries in making progress on these 
commitments. More than a decade later as we approach Copenhagen, almost 
nothing has been seen in the way of hard cash.  
More substantial sums have been pledged in Climate Investment Funds, but 
these are to be administered through the World Bank, an institution with an 
appalling human rights and environmental track record that increased its lending 
to fossil fuel projects by 94 percent over the course of 2008. In addition the vast 
majority of this money will be administered in the form of loans rather than as 
outright grants, and many commentators foresee that the US-dominated Bank 
will again be used as a tool of political agency in the relationship between 
Northern and Southern countries. 
Instead of developing climate funds with representative governance that 
have substantial, obligatory and automatic finance and that are accessible to the 
most vulnerable, the many years of wrangling within the negotiations have 
resulted in a market based mechanism that is only benefiting the North and a 
handful of Southern industrial elites. 
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While Northern governments do what they can to avoid making 
commitments to the necessary adaptation and technology transfer funds, the 
World Bank and industry lobby groups such as the International Emissions 
Trading Association (IETA) will be out in force in Copenhagen extolling the 
virtues of the CDM and looking for opportunities to expand and deregulate the 
market. In Poznan, a World Bank representative took the floor in a plenary and 
said that ‘in order to maintain the successes of the CDM, we need to expand it 
and make it more flexible.’ The demand for offsets credit is increasingly 
dramatically in order to meet national commitments and for countries and 
institutions that are taking part in various existing and proposed carbon markets, 
and so the expansion and deregulation of the CDM process will be necessary in 
order to meet that demand. 
The proposed expansions include technologies that are controversial, such as 
nuclear power, and unproven, such as Carbon Capture and Storage, while IETA 
has presented a set of recommendations to the CDM Executive Board with the 
intention of speeding up the approval process and relaxing rules around 
‘additionality’ and ‘absolute assurance’. And even industry insiders are frightened 
at the impact that the enormous volume of potential credits under the various 
REDD schemes being proposed could have on the carbon market. 
Maintaining the ‘successes’ of the CDM through these proposals will 
inevitably mean even more Southern communities facing unwelcome projects 
that threaten their livelihoods, and it will mean more opportunities for project 
developers and carbon traders to profit from bogus operations. 
With the climate talks mired in political stalemate and hijacked by corporate 
interests, the most positive sign in the post-Copenhagen landscape is what could 
be the most articulate expression yet of climate justice in social movements and 
organizations rejecting the false solution of carbon trading. Upsetting the Offset is 
informed by, and informing this, struggle to expose the corrupt, market-
obsessed and ineffective reality of carbon trading and offsetting. The invisible 
hand of the free market is not going to neatly sweep up the mess that it has 
created in the first place, the transition to a low carbon planet is only going to 
happen through the scale of political will and intervention that we saw 
characterize the financial crisis. 
Across the world, communities are engaged in struggles to halt the 
expansion of the fossil fuel frontier – from indigenous communities in Peru 
blockading oil companies, to the alliance of First Nation activists and 
environmentalists fighting against the devastation of tar-sands in Canada, to 
mass-mobilizations in Europe shutting down coal-fired power stations, to 
peasant organizations fighting for the right to maintain existing low-carbon 
lifestyles. Any hope for a sustainable and just future lies in the success of these 
struggles rather than in the boardrooms and balance sheets of carbon brokers 
and bureaucrats. 
   5 
Foreword 
Carbon Markets: A Fatal Illusion 
Walden Bello 
Carbon trading, also known as the ‘cap-and-trade’ system, was introduced in the 
Kyoto negotiations as a mechanism for regulating carbon emissions mainly to 
please the United States. Despite the fact that the US did not sign up to Kyoto, 
carbon trading as a mechanism to manage greenhouse gas emissions was able to 
get its foot in the door and eventually dominated the mitigation agenda, 
marginalizing more direct and drastic measures such as carbon taxes. 
Carbon trading is now the preferred scheme, with the prominent climate 
economist Nicholas Stern envisaging a global cap and trade system in place by 
2020. This reliance on the market to deal with the most threatening problem of 
our time is incongruous, given the massive market failures of the last decade, in 
international finance, in dealing with poverty, in promoting development. The 
salience of carbon markets owes more to corporate lobbying than to any proof 
of superiority over state-imposed regulations. The most ambitious effort at 
carbon trading so far, the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), has been 
a patent failure. A very damaging verdict on this scheme has been delivered by 
the New Labor academic Anthony Giddens, an analyst that one cannot accuse 
of being anti-market: 
A lot of money has changed hands within the ETS, but the scheme has been 
ineffective for the purposes for which it was set up. Early on in its history, the 
carbon price reached as much as 31 euros per tonne. Later it dropped so 
dramatically that it was worth .001 of that sum. It lost its value completely as it 
became clear that there was a large surplus of allowances because of the slack 
built into the national allocation plans. In addition, some power generating 
companies made windfall profits by passing onto consumers the price of carbon 
credits, even though they were allocated free of charge.1 
With heavy corporate lobbying to make the ‘cap and trade’ scheme currently 
before the US Senate as friendly to corporations as possible, it is difficult to 
imagine a different fate for it as that which befell the ETS. Both are likely to go 
down as classic cases of regulatory capture by powerful interests that were 
meant to be regulated. 
The articles in this volume provide a formidable and comprehensive critique 
of carbon trading. They underline the fact that the ideological fetishism of the 
market is one of the greatest obstacles to coming up with a viable global strategy 
to deal with global warming. 
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Carbon trading is one of those mechanisms, just like biofuels, carbon 
sequestration, clean coal, and nuclear power, which climate activists have called 
false solutions to climate change. It is an approach associated with a perspective 
that posits that there can be a relatively painless transition to a post-carbon 
economy, one that will not significantly affect the bottom line of all of those 
interests that have benefited from the fossil fuel civilization. This perspective 
assumes that market-fixes and techno-fixes on the energy side will allow 
production and consumption to proceed with the minimum of disruption.  
These are comforting illusions, especially to people in the North, many of 
whom believe that their lifestyle is not, to quote George W. Bush, ‘up for 
negotiation’. But they are dangerous illusions, and we can ill afford to hang on 
to them at a time that the future of the planet hangs in the balance. 
Notes 
1 Giddens, A. (2009) The Politics of Climate Change. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 199. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Part I of this book carbon markets are introduced, 
focusing specifically on the logic of the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), which is one of 
the most prominent carbon markets administered 
and controlled by the United Nations. The first 
introductory chapter by Steffen Böhm and 
Siddhartha Dabhi gives a broad overview of the most 
recent climate change science and the political steps 
taken so far towards its mitigation. The main aim of 
this chapter is to form a premise for why we might 
want to ‘Upset the Offset’ and engage in a critique of 
carbon markets. The second introductory chapter by 
Larry Lohmann talks about the formation of carbon 
markets and how they commodify the atmosphere, 
creating perverse incentives for money making and 
exploitation. 
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Upsetting the Offset: An Introduction 
Steffen Böhm and Siddhartha Dabhi 
Why ‘Upset the Offset’? 
It seems to be widely accepted nowadays that global climate change is one of 
the biggest and most urgent problems the world is currently facing. Yet, despite 
this urgency, which most scientists tell us is needed to address and deal with 
climate change, all we seem to have been able to do since the groundbreaking 
Kyoto summit in 1997 is to try to set up a few carbon markets – for example, 
the European Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) – which have been working 
at a sub-optimal level, to say the very least. Why sub-optimal? Because there is 
now growing evidence that these markets haven’t achieved what they were set 
out to do: reduce global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Many critics would 
go further and argue that these carbon markets have been completely counter-
productive, as they have helped to legitimize the actual growth of carbon 
emissions. And if there are some countries that are on the road to meet their 
Kyoto targets for reducing emissions, then only because there is a lot of creative 
accounting involved.  
One of these creative accounting systems, it seems, is the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), which allows countries and companies to 
offset their GHG emissions, in order to meet their Kyoto obligations and 
targets. The CDM’s logic is that, if a country or company is not able to meet 
their emissions reduction targets efficiently at home – that is, it would cost them 
too much to change their own production processes – then they are able to buy 
special permits from countries of the ‘Global South’, i.e. those underprivileged 
countries that are sometimes referred to as ‘developing countries’ or even the 
‘third world’. The idea of the CDM is for the rich countries of the ‘Global 
North’ to pay poorer states to implement clean or cleaner technologies that 
would reduce the overall carbon emissions of the world. As the name ‘clean 
development mechanism’ suggests, the logic is for these countries to develop 
along ‘clean’ or ‘cleaner’ lines with the help of the rich, polluting North, which 
would provide finances and technologies. Hence, the CDM not only tries to be 
a vehicle to reduce carbon emissions, but also contribute to an agenda of 
‘sustainable development’. 
Now, a host of critiques of the CDM has emerged over recent years. That is, 
a lot of data and evidence has been compiled by analysts and activists from 
around the world, showing that the CDM has failed to both reduce overall 
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GHG emissions and promote sustainable development goals in the South. For 
example, in India, which is one of the countries with most CDM projects 
registered, the journal Mausam has emerged, documenting, what they call, the 
‘CDM scam’.1 In The Netherlands, the Transnational Institute has been running 
a project called Carbon Trade Watch, which has compiled a lot of evidence of 
CDM failures from around the world.2 And already in 2006, Larry Lohmann, 
one of the most renowned experts and critics of carbon markets, published a 
book, outlining the case against carbon markets.3 The present volume builds on 
this excellent work, while updating and extending it. Given that the first Kyoto 
compliance period didn’t start until 2008, a lot of new data has emerged over 
the past two or three years, providing fresh evidence for the failures of the 
CDM and carbon markets in general.  
This book thus aims to provide the most up-to-date cases and critiques of 
carbon markets, with a particular focus on the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), as it is this tool that has the most profound implications for the global 
order and climate change mitigation agenda. Given that most rich countries of 
the North will not come anywhere near meeting their Kyoto obligations – or, as 
in the case of the USA, as the world’s biggest polluter, they haven’t signed up to 
the Kyoto Protocol in the first place – the CDM is likely to play an even more 
significant role in any post-Kyoto agreement. It is therefore of utmost 
importance to compile these cases and critiques and make them available to a 
wide variety of people around the world, for everyone to see what is being done 
– often in our names – in terms of meeting the immense climate change 
challenges. 
For us, the introduction of carbon markets has been a big delaying tactic, 
introduced by the world’s biggest polluters in the North, in order for them to 
continue with their ‘way of life’, to recall the famous maxim of the George W. 
Bush dynasty, ‘The American way of life is not up for negotiation’. Needless to 
say, of course, that it is exactly this ‘way of life’ that has brought us into this 
desperate situation in the first place. But we can go further. As the cases in this 
book show, carbon markets, and particularly the CDM and other carbon 
offsetting instruments, have also presented new money making opportunities 
for the elites in both North and South, benefiting those countries and 
corporations that can be labelled the most unsustainable. All this has meant that 
we have effectively lost a decade – if not more – in the fight against climate 
change. By introducing the complex – and many would argue unworkable – web 
of carbon markets, we have lost valuable time to switch to a fossil-fuel-free 
economy and society. Carbon markets simply don’t address the underlying and 
root causes of climate change, which is an over-consumption of finite fossil 
fuels. We are addicted to oil, gas, coal and a whole range of other fossil fuels, 
which, when burned for heating, electricity generation or other usages, release 
greenhouse gases. It is now time to make up for the lost decade, starting to deal 
with our underlying reliance on fossil fuels. 
Upsetting the Offset 
  11 
What are Carbon Markets? 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
through the Kyoto Protocol, prepared the ground for establishing a range of 
carbon markets. The whole idea behind creating carbon markets is to achieve 
maximum possible emissions reductions at the lowest possible cost.4 This 
follows, as Lohmann shows in detail,5 the nowadays mainstream economic 
theory that human behaviour is determined by the relation between rational 
ends and scarce resources. So, GHG emissions – that is, pollution – are made 
into an economically scarce resource, which is supposed to maximize the 
efficiency in which this pollution is reduced on a global basis.  
In order to do this, you need to create a market for GHG emissions 
reductions, which are called ‘Certified Emissions Reductions’ (CERs) in the case 
of the CDM. These CERs can then be traded between countries, companies or 
even individuals. The idea is that if somebody in the polluting North cannot 
reduce their GHG emissions efficiently – that is, it would cost them too much – 
then they could simply buy some CERs from a country or company in the 
South which would have a comparative cost advantage in implementing GHG 
emissions cuts. For example, one ton of emissions reduction in China is thought 
to be equivalent to one ton of emissions reduction in the USA. So, basically the 
assumption is that the atmosphere doesn’t care where cuts are made, as long as 
the cuts take place. But what is hoped is that carbon markets deliver efficient 
emission cuts, because cutting emissions in China might be cheaper (because of 
the low cost of labour in that country, for example) than say in the USA. Hence, 
by turning GHG emissions into a commodity, ‘efficiency gains’ can be made in 
terms of how these emissions are cut at a global level. 
The Kyoto Protocol aims to reduce six greenhouse gases (GHG), namely 
carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulphur hexafluoride, 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), and perfluorocarbons (PFCs). In order to reduce 
all of these GHG, they have to be turned into one commodity that can be 
traded globally. This is achieved by creating equivalents of greenhouse gases 
with respect to carbon dioxide. For instance, 1 ton of HFC-23 is equivalent to 
11,700 tons of carbon dioxide. Hence, all greenhouse gases can now be 
calculated in terms of the equivalent power to pollute the earth in comparison to 
carbon dioxide, or ‘carbon’ in short, and all of these gases – at least this is the 
idea – can be cut in an ‘efficient’ way across the globe. 
The Kyoto Protocol introduced and legitimized the set up of three market 
mechanisms for emissions reduction:  
! Emissions Trading (ET) 
! Joint Implementation (JI) 
! Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
The first two mechanisms are currently operational only in the developed 
countries (Annex I countries), and the CDM allows the developing countries 
(non-Annex I) and developed countries to jointly reduce emissions.6 Now, there 
is also something called ‘voluntary carbon offset market’, which is more or less 
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similar to the CDM and also aimed at reducing carbon emissions. However, this 
voluntary market is not governed by the Kyoto Protocol. As the name suggests, 
it is voluntarily set up and run, and it is not formally controlled by governments 
or international bodies such as the UNFCCC. Let us now introduce these 
carbon markets in a bit more detail. 
Emissions Trading and the European Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS) 
Emissions trading works on the principle of ‘cap and trade’. For example, if a 
government has obligations – set by the Kyoto Protocol – to reduce a country’s 
GHG emissions, then emissions trading provides a tool for introducing a ‘cap’ 
on all GHG emissions. So, the government would then give out allowances to 
certain industries and big polluters, effectively saying: ‘you are allowed to emit x 
number of tons of GHG, but not more’. Hence this ‘cap’ acts as an upper limit 
to which a company or entire industry is allowed to pollute. The idea is that if 
this cap is sufficiently low, there would be an incentive and need for this 
company or industry to introduce changes to its production processes (e.g. 
adopt green technologies). However, if these changes could not be made 
efficiently, that is, it would comparatively cost a lot of money to invest in green 
technologies, for example, then this company or industry would be allowed to 
buy extra allowances in order to meet its obligations. Equally, if a company finds 
it very easy to change its production processes, that is, it can reduce its GHG 
emissions far beyond the allowances it has been given, then it would be able to 
sell these allowances, also called ‘carbon credits’, to other polluters. Hence, the 
‘trade’ of carbon credits and pollution allowances is introduced with the overall 
aim of efficient cuts of GHG emissions in an industry or country and ultimately 
at a global level. 
The underlying assumption of this system is to achieve maximum possible 
emissions reduction at the lowest possible cost by: first, quantifying emissions 
caused by industrial activities; second, setting a cap on all GHG emissions; and, 
third, incentivizing companies and entire industries to make decisions on how to 
meet their caps in the cheapest possible way. They could do this by bringing in 
‘green technologies’ or by buying credits/allowances from other polluters or, in 
fact, from offsetting schemes (see below). The ‘cap and trade’ system assumes 
that cuts made anywhere are globally equivalent (which is technically speaking 
and from a climate science point of view correct, but in a wider socio-economic 
sense does not hold true). Hence, this carbon market could allow a company or 
industry to continue in its polluting business-as-usual ways, as long as it keeps 
buying allowance or carbon credits from other sources. 
The EU-ETS, which is based on the ‘cap and trade’ system, is today the 
world’s largest multi-national emissions trading system. Currently, 15 EU 
countries are part of the ETS, covering more than 10,000 industrial installations. 
Their aim is to collectively reduce their emissions by 8% below the 1990 levels 
during the first Kyoto compliance period between 2008 and 2012. 
Upsetting the Offset 
  13 
Joint Implementation (JI) 
JI was established under Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol. Under JI an Annex I 
(developed) country, which is not able to reduce its emissions efficiently, i.e. at a 
sufficiently low cost, can invest in an emissions reduction project in some other 
Annex I country where the GHG reductions can be implemented comparatively 
cheaply. Most JI projects are being implemented in ‘economies in transition’, 
such as Russia and Ukraine, which fall under Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol.7 
In many ways JI is very much similar to CDM, with the only difference that 
projects take place strictly among developed countries that are legally bound 
under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Voluntary Carbon Offset Markets 
The CDM was introduced under pressure from the US delegation during the 
final week of the Kyoto negotiations. The idea of a CDM was based on a 
Brazilian proposal for a ‘clean development fund’, which would collect penalties 
from nations that fail to meet their targets for emissions reduction, and this 
fund would then be used to help developing nations to fund the introduction of 
technologies necessary for climate change mitigation. But some Annex I parties, 
especially the USA, were not happy with the idea of penalizing countries which 
are not able to meet their targets. Hence, the USA proposed the CDM, where 
countries that are not able to meet their emissions reduction targets ‘cost 
effectively’, could invest in ‘green technologies’ in the South and thus help 
developing countries to mitigate climate change.8  
The idea behind the creation of the CDM was to create a ‘win-win’ situation 
both for the North and South, where, on one hand, developed countries could 
meet their emissions targets relatively cheaply by investing in the developing 
world (where, labour and other costs are usually lower), and, at the same time, 
the South would benefit from the transfer of ‘clean technologies’. In the 
subsequent negotiations two very important conditions were introduced without 
which no CDM project would be given the go-ahead by the UNFCCC: First, all 
CDM projects need to be ‘additional’, i.e., they should not be ‘business-as-usual’. 
In other words, no CDM project should have been possible without the 
investment coming in from the North. Second, all projects need to show how 
they contribute to sustainable development.9 
Voluntary carbon offsetting is to some extent very similar to the CDM, the 
main difference being that it has developed independently from the Kyoto 
process and is therefore not controlled by governmental or inter-governmental 
institutions, such as the UNFCCC. The voluntary markets do not normally aim 
to meet any binding targets, and anyone (corporations, NGOs, individuals) can 
participate in them – although there are some voluntary offset markets that are 
legally binding and have self-imposed emissions reduction targets, like the 
Chicago Climate Exchange.10  
The basic idea behind voluntary offset markets is to enable individuals or 
companies to offset their carbon emissions by investing in green projects 
outside the formal Kyoto-based mechanisms, such as the EU-ETS and CDM. 
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So, if you are, for example, a business person flying a lot and you would like to 
do something about your carbon emissions (without changing your travelling 
habits), then you can go onto one of the many carbon offsetting websites, where 
you pay a few pounds to offset your, say, one-way trip from London Heathrow 
to New York’s JFK airport (which comes to 0.7 tons of carbon dioxide, and you 
can offset this by paying between £5 to £14 depending on the type of offsetting 
project11). This money would then be spent by the carbon offsetting company 
or broker on green projects around the world. These projects can range from 
the usual tree planting in Scotland or Brazil to reducing landfill gas emissions in 
the developing world.12 
Voluntary offset markets, which have been labelled the ‘wild west’ of carbon 
trading,13 have attracted a good deal of controversy precisely because all sorts of 
‘rogue traders’ have started to enter carbon markets, trying to make a quick 
buck. As a result, many dubious claims about offsetting projects and their 
emissions reduction and contributions to sustainable development have been 
made. In response to these ‘cowboys’ and the completely unregulated nature of 
voluntary carbon offsets, a range of different standards have emerged, trying to 
introduce some level of regulation and quality control. One of the best known 
ones is the so-called ‘Gold Standard’,14 which is supported by a large number of 
NGOs. Yet, many critics argue that even these standards will not ‘address the 
more fundamental problem of paying others to clean up after us’.15 
Carbon offsetting, in the guise of the CDM or the voluntary market, is a 
mushrooming business. Currently there are 1815 registered CDM projects, 
producing about 315,582,965 CERs annually, and there are more than 4200 
CDM projects in the pipeline.16 Equally, the voluntary carbon offsetting market 
doubled in size in 2008 alone and was then worth about $700 million.17 This is 
projected to become a multi-billion industry over the next few years, already 
attracting large market entrants, such as the bank JP Morgan Chase, which 
recently bought the offset provider Climate Care.18  
Precisely because of this exponential growth, it becomes very important to 
analyze what is actually going on in these carbon offsetting markets. Are these 
markets really leading to cuts in GHG emissions? Who is benefiting from the 
money raised? Are claims of sustainable development met by the realities on the 
ground? It is these and other questions that need to be asked, if the creators and 
proprietors of these carbon markets want to be seen as credible. This is exactly 
what this book sets out to do, by collecting the most up-to-date cases and 
critical engagements with carbon offsetting markets. 
Critiques of Carbon Markets 
There is nothing new about critiques of carbon markets, as they must be seen in 
connection to a wider process of commodification and expansion of capitalist 
markets, which has marked the neo-liberal project for the past two to three 
decades.19 At the most basic level, the ideology of carbon markets, claiming that 
they are the most efficient way of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, 
has been attacked. Critics have shown that, by turning GHG into a commodity, 
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you might create an incentive to horde and speculate with this commodity, and 
you hence might encourage more pollution, because with pollution one can now 
earn money.20 This is very much in line with recent critiques of the sub-prime 
mortgage market that has led to the implosion of the global financial system in 
2008 and 2009. There, too, a commodity – or rather a string of commodities – 
was created literally out of nothing, leading to a huge speculative bubble. When 
a trader bought a credit derivative, s/he could not know, by default, the real, 
underlying mortgage deal(s). S/he was only interested in making a quick buck by 
creating complex financial arrangements that could be sold in the financial 
markets. In the end nobody seemed to be able to understand the underlying 
risks involved, leading to the implosion of the sub-prime bubble – and the rest 
is history, as they say (see Lang in this volume). 
Critics argue that this is precisely the future that will await us, if the current 
expansion of carbon markets continues (see, for example, the next chapter by 
Lohmann in this volume).21 The only problem is that this time we are 
speculating with the future of the planet, as the climate cannot be bailed out 
even by a concerted effort of all governments put together. There comes a stage 
when climate change will be irreversible; hence drastic action is needed now. 
Instead, what we are seeing is carbon market speculation. Take, for example, 
HFC-23, one of the most potent GHG, which is equivalent to 11,700 tons of 
CO2. Precisely because of this extraordinarily high CO2 equivalent, and the 
associated high earning potential associated with it, it is now feared that new 
HFC-23 production facilities are being set up in places like China only to profit 
from the sale of CERs.22 That is, rather than ‘efficiently’ reducing the 
production of this highly potent GHG, the newly created carbon markets have 
introduced a perverse incentive to produce and emit even more GHG. 
Another fundamental critique of carbon markets is that they have failed to 
bring about structural changes in the countries and industries of the rich North 
for three main reasons:  
First, the introduction of ‘cap and trade’ systems, such as the EU-ETS, have 
suffered from lack of political will and heavy industry lobbying, which resulted 
in the over-allocation of emissions allowances. When the EU and its 
participating countries/ governments first introduced the EU-ETS, quite 
generous allowances or caps were distributed to the big polluters, which 
provided no incentive whatsoever for them to reduce their GHG emissions. On 
the contrary, as has been widely reported, big polluters have enjoyed windfall 
profits by selling these carbon credits in the marketplace.23  
This has meant, second, that the creation of an economic scarcity of carbon 
hasn’t actually taken place, resulting in a drastic fall of the price of carbon 
allowances. For example, the price of the EU-ETS allowances was around !30 
until April 2006, but it fell to !10 in May 2006, further declining to !0.10 in 
September 2007. It seems obvious, as many critics argue that such prices and 
price volatilities don’t provide any incentive to reduce emissions by bringing in 
the much needed structural changes. All in all, many critics have raised serious 
doubts over the effectiveness and seriousness of the EU-ETS, arguing that it is 
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very questionable that any actual emissions reduction have taken place at all.24 
Instead, what seems to have happened is that the newly created markets have, 
besides generating windfall profits for the big polluters, incentivized companies 
and countries of the North to continue with ‘business-as-usual’, which, as 
history shows, hasn’t been particularly sustainable.  
Third, with the inclusion of the Kyoto trading mechanisms, JI and CDM, 
Northern companies and countries can also offset their emissions by buying 
cheap overseas credits, again contributing to the failure of not bringing about 
real structural changes in the industry and the economy at large.25  
Yet, the underlying problem of carbon offsetting markets is an ethical and 
political one. As with the CDM and voluntary offset markets the burden of 
emissions reduction is shifted from the North to the South, the North is 
enabled to continue in its polluting ‘way of life’, while developing countries are 
supposed to become ‘clean’. Here we have to bear in mind that the 
overwhelming majority of people who live in developing countries (that is, the 
majority of the world population) emit only a fraction of GHG compared to 
those people living in the rich North (see Dutta in this volume). Do developed 
countries not have a moral duty to realize that ‘their way of life’ has got us into 
the current climate change mess in the first place, and does this not mean that it 
is the rich who have to do something about climate change mitigation first? This 
introduces the dimension of history into this debate, which doesn’t feature very 
often, unfortunately. Is it, possible, one could ask, for example, to offset the 
North’s carbon emissions over a period of the past say 200 years?26 And if so, 
perhaps any discussion of carbon offsetting should start with such a premise 
(see Bond in this volume).  
But most contributions to this book deal with the here and now, 
documenting the often disastrous effects of carbon offsetting projects on 
communities and eco-systems in the ‘Global South’. These range from 
monoculture tree plantations to polluted water sources, from air pollution to the 
loss of employment opportunities. What the cases and critiques of carbon 
offsetting schemes collected in this book show is that climate change mitigation 
and the reduction of greenhouse gases (GHG) is not simply a number 
crunching game – this is not just about counting and the accounting of carbon 
emissions. This always involves questions of accountability as well, which, in 
most cases seems to be missing. 
The CDM is explicitly geared towards sustainable development. One way to 
account for this is by involving the local community, which would be, in most 
cases, the most knowledgeable about local issues of sustainability and 
development. Hence, the CDM registration process requires a report on 
community involvement, which, unfortunately doesn’t seem to be taken very 
seriously (see, for example, Dabhi in this volume). Once a CDM has been given 
the go-ahead, often without the knowledge of a broad spectrum of the local 
population, there doesn’t seem to be a transparent system in place for a 
continuous involvement of those communities who are affected by the CDM 
projects. If people want to raise any issues, they are confronted with a web of 
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technical jargon, such as CERs, PDDs, DOEs, DNAs, COP/MOPs, SBIs, and 
SBSTAs, which is extremely off-putting, if not outright elitist. This web 
effectively suppresses the general public from participating in climate 
discussions and decision making.27  
In addition, although the website of the UNFCCC, which is the governing 
body of the carbon markets and overall responsible for the functioning of the 
CDM, includes a string of documentation for each project, it seems to be 
extremely difficult to obtain real figures from the companies involved in these 
CDM projects. In fact, the UNFCCC does not even want to take the 
responsibility for monitoring and has left this to the governments in the 
developing countries, which have, by and large, embraced the CDM as a 
business opportunity that they do not want to see hampered by complicated 
local democratic processes. As a result, several researchers contributing to this 
book have reported that there seems to be a veil of secrecy and opaqueness that 
surrounds many CDM projects, which is hard to understand, given that this is 
an official UN process, dealing with one of humankind’s most urgent problems, 
namely climate change.  
But perhaps this lack of transparency in the CDM process is quite 
understandable, given the manifold human rights violations and negative social, 
economic, political as well as environmental implications associated with many 
CDM projects around the world. The pattern that seems to be emerging from 
the cases collected in this book is that the CDM has been a welcome boost for 
local business elites in developing countries, enabling them to increase their 
profits from their existing production processes. This often involves extremely 
big and powerful companies that have had an extremely questionable social, 
economic and environmental track record in the past. Hence, the CDM in its 
current form is, unfortunately, nothing more than a money making opportunity 
for polluting industries, rather than a tool for climate change mitigation. Kevin 
Smith quotes the managing director of SRF, which is a big chemical and 
technical textiles manufacturing company in India, who told the Economic 
Times that 
strong income from carbon trading strengthened us financially, and now we are 
expanding into areas related to our core strength of chemical and technical 
textiles business.28  
It is statements like these that confirm the real impact of the CDM. Rather than 
contributing to the clean and sustainable development of developing countries, 
they have become a money making tool that is used primarily to expand existing 
and polluting productions. Needless to say that the CDM profits that are used 
for the expansion of existing businesses will be turned into GHG emissions – 
bearing in mind that the whole point of this process is for Northern companies 
and countries to offset their increased carbon emissions. So, one quickly realizes 
that the CDM doesn’t actually work; by default it cannot achieve its main goal 
of reducing global GHG emissions, because of a design fault. Rather than 
incentivizing the reduction of GHG emissions, carbon markets seem to do the 
opposite. Hence, carbon markets seem to have enabled and legitimized the 
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continuation of an agenda of business-as-usual with two main resulting 
outcomes: no progress with global climate change mitigation – some might even 
talk about regress; and the solidification of unequal and unjust relations between 
North and South, leading to the continued suffering of poor communities in 
developing countries. 
Running Out of Time: What Climate Change Scientists Tell Us 
Leaving the grave consequence of ill thought out and implemented CDM 
projects for communities in the South to one side for the moment, why is it so 
important to make urgent progress with reducing global greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions anyway? The answer is: because this is what the overwhelming 
majority of climate change scientists tell us we need to do! 
In 1869 the Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius was the first to put forward 
the theory that accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere by human 
activities would lead to warming.29 One and a half centuries later this is not a 
theory anymore. In 2007 The Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which is the world’s prime 
scientific body that deals with climate change issues, states:  
Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from 
observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, 
widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea level.30  
The increase in global temperatures is leading to melting of glaciers at the poles, 
rise in sea water levels in turn threatening human and animal life and 
biodiversity around coastal regions. It is leading to increased floods, cyclones, 
heat waves, droughts, ocean acidification, change in seasonal patterns, and 
changes in life cycle events like blooming and insect emergence, and the plant 
and animal ranges are shifting towards the poles which eventually is affecting 
the food chain and specially the species that are on top of the food chain, 
including human beings. Global warming will also lead to faster spread of 
diseases and species extinction as well as the loss of biodiversity. 
Global warming, which leads to climatic changes of various types, many of 
which are still unforeseeable, is caused by both climatic drivers (climatic 
variations like Pacific Decadal Oscillation, El Nino-Southern Oscillation and 
North Atlantic Oscillation) and non-climate drivers of change, such as 
industrialization, urbanization, agriculture and land use as well as pollution that 
influences the climate both directly as well as indirectly.31 But according to the 
IPCC, human activities (industrialization, urbanization, etc.) are primarily 
responsible for global warming and climate change. The IPCC clearly states that 
global GHG emissions due to human activities have grown since pre-industrial 
times, with an increase of 70% between 1970 and 2004... Global atmospheric 
concentrations of CO2, CH4 and N2O have increased markedly as a result of 
human activities since 1750 and now far exceed pre-industrial values determined 
from ice cores spanning many thousands of years. Global increases in CO2 
concentrations are due primarily to fossil fuel use, with land-use change 
providing another significant but smaller contribution. It is very likely that the 
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observed increase in CH4 concentration is predominantly due to agriculture and 
fossil fuel use. The increase in N2O concentration is primarily due to 
agriculture.32  
According to estimates by NASA, fossil fuel burning roughly contributes to 5.5 
gigatons of carbon33 per year (giga = 1 billion); other activities like land use, 
such as deforestation and agriculture, contribute roughly 1.6 gigatons of carbon 
per year. Since 1957 human activities have approximately contributed to 7.1 
gigatons of carbon per year, of which approximately 3.2 gigatons of carbon 
remains in the atmosphere, resulting in an increase of atmospheric carbon 
dioxide. In addition, the oceans absorb roughly 2 gigatons of carbon. Scientists 
are not yet sure about where the remaining 1.9 gigatons of carbon go. But 
evidence suggests that it might be getting absorbed by the land surface. 
However, there is no consensus on this yet.34  
So, what happens with the 3.2 gigatons of carbon in the atmosphere? 
Amongst all the greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide has the longest (atmospheric) 
life.35 The carbon dioxide produced today sticks around in the atmosphere for 
almost a century, but 20% of this will still exist for almost another 800 years. It 
seems clear that whatever we are doing to the atmosphere today will continue to 
be a problem for our children, grandchildren and many more generations to 
come.36 Some even argue that the climate change we cause today will be ‘largely 
irreversible for 1000 years after emissions stop’.37 
Another way of looking at the global carbon cycle is to see it as a ‘sink’ 
where all the waste is disposed, or as a ‘pool’ where carbon keeps flowing in, 
constantly. But then there is a point when this ‘pool’ is full and no more carbon 
can be absorbed. This is the point when things start to go wrong. For example, 
the pre-industrial levels of carbon dioxide were 280 ppm which has now gone 
up to approximately 387 ppm.38 Many scientists now argue that, in order for us 
to have any hope of avoiding the most dangerous effects of run-away climate 
change, we need to get below 350 ppm. It is this figure which has hence inspired 
a political campaign in the run-up to the climate change summit in Copenhagen 
in December 2009.39 
The Problem is Our Addiction to Fossil Fuels 
Given the scientific facts about the longevity of carbon in the atmosphere and 
the grave situation we are facing in terms of the carbon pool of the earth being 
full, the only solution is to identify and deal with the root causes of ‘human 
induced’ global warming. Now, the IPCC, which is the world’s primary scientific 
body dealing with climate change issues, says it clearly: the root cause is our 
over-usage of fossil fuels.  
The problem with fossil fuels is that their use is like a ‘one-way street’. Once 
fossil fuels are brought out of the ground and are used, they start circulating in 
the active carbon pools, such as the air, oceans, vegetation and soil. The second 
problem with fossil fuels is that it is comparatively easy to drill them out and 
burn them, but it takes millions of years for the earth to create them.40 Hence, 
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the climate crisis we are facing is not really a crisis created by ‘natural’ climatic 
factors; it is a human induced fossil fuel crisis.  
According to the World Energy Council, currently there are about 847.5 
billion tons of coal left in the ground, which would last for about 150 years, 
considering the current rate of production. Crude oil accounts for 36.4% of the 
world’s primary energy and the ‘Estimated Ultimate Recovery’ (EUR) at the end 
of 2005 was 387 billion tons. So far 47% total reserves of conventional oil 
discovered have been consumed. Within the next 10 to 20 years half of the 
EUR will have been recovered, and afterwards a decline in the production of 
conventional oil is inevitable. Global reserves of natural gas are 177,000 billion 
cubic metres.41 Others would be more radical and argue that we have, in fact, 
already gone beyond ‘peak oil’, meaning that we are already witnessing a decline 
in global oil production. Given that it is oil we are mostly dependent on, it is 
grassroots movements such as the Transition Town Network that urges us to 
increase the resilience of communities by becoming less dependent on fossil 
fuels.42 
Now, if all of our fossil fuel reserves are burnt, it would produce roughly 
2800 gigatons of carbon dioxide, which would heat up the earth by about 3°C,43 
bearing in mind that this is a very conservative estimate. Given that the IPCC 
urges us to limit the increase of the global average of surface temperatures to 
2°C, then we can afford to use only 22% of the current reserve of fossil fuels 
between now and 2050.44 And if we add non-conventional types of fossil fuels, 
such as tar sands, oil shales, bitumens and methane hydrates, then the amount 
of fossil fuels we could afford to use would be even less.45 All this means that 
we better start becoming less addicted to fossil fuels soon. 
The Failure of Carbon Markets 
All the data and evidence presented in this book, as well as many other 
publications, suggest that carbon markets will not help us to reduce our 
addiction to fossil fuels. In fact, they seem to have the opposite effect, providing 
an incentive for business-as-usual and the continued growth of fossil fuel usage. 
The key to understand this apparent failure of carbon markets is in analyzing 
the connections between climate change science, carbon emissions and the 
political economy of development. The first thing for us to realize about these 
connections is that climate change can be understood as earth having a fever.46 
That is, climate change is not the main problem; it is a symptom of a much 
deeper problem, which is to do with our lifestyle and our addiction to fossil 
fuels. As we have argued, carbon markets don’t address these root problems; 
instead, they try to offset the problem to either poorer communities or future 
generations. Is this what we are doing when we run a fever ourselves? When our 
body is run down and our natural immune system isn’t coping anymore, then we 
need to rest and let our body recover from the strain we have put it under. We 
certainly don’t want to continue to go to work or live a hectic lifestyle; and we 
certainly can’t ask somebody else or our children to rest for us. We have to do it 
ourselves.  
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Given the dominant ideology of the current politico-economic system, our 
earth doesn’t seem to be allowed to get a rest. As most economic policies seem 
to be, more than ever, plagued into a logic of continued and relentless economic 
growth, what we are effectively doing is to keep our earthship working hard, 
while it is already running a high fever. Carbon markets, with all of their rhetoric 
of market efficiencies and cost and benefit analyses, are seemingly the 
continuation of a system that has got the earth-body into the situation it is in at 
the moment. With all the hustling about the technical and economic ways of 
introducing carbon markets we are given the impression that something is really 
being done about climate change. Unfortunately, this doesn’t seem to be more 
than an illusion. In fact it is worse; carbon markets are the emperor’s new ‘green 
clothes’. Hence, they are not just about ‘buying time’ in order to delay the 
introduction of the necessary structural changes needed to ‘our way of life’. 
Instead, they are the active attempt to provide a new system of legitimation and 
accumulation that enables the status quo of capitalism to continue during an era 
when humankind is extremely concerned about climate change and other grave 
environmental as well as social degradations.  
It should therefore become obvious that larger things are at stake here. 
Carbon markets and climate change mitigation are not merely about the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Instead, we have to talk about wider 
issues of social, economic, environmental and climatic justice. The key problem 
is that, through the commodification of carbon, climate change is turned into a 
numbers game, inviting all sorts of creative accounting techniques that don’t 
actually correspond with the reality on the ground. As business school 
academics, we know that accounting can be used to make all sorts of claims 
about reality. The problem is that the reality often looks different.  
So, if anything, this book calls on us to start facing reality. Climate change is 
already affecting millions of people’s lives around the world in very real terms. 
What can we do to help them? What can we do to reduce our fundamental 
addiction to fossil fuels? What techniques do we have at our disposal to bring 
about radical changes to the way we run our economies and societies, given that 
without fossil fuel most ‘developed’ nations would simply collapse? It is 
questions like these that we need to start to address, realizing that climate 
change is an immense social, economic and political issue. Carbon markets are 
merely a ‘market fix’, and, as Larry Lohmann points out, ‘fixes do no fix’.47 We 
need to start dealing with the underlying symptoms of climate change. 
A Ray of Hope and a Call to Action 
What is often forgotten in the hustling and extremely technical discourse of the 
science and political economy of climate change is that there are many 
alternatives to a fossil fuel centred economy that are already functioning in many 
communities around the world. That is, we don’t need to reinvent the wheel 
here. Humanity has, by at large, lived fairly sustainably alongside the world’s 
ecosystems for many thousands of years. Perhaps there is something we can 
learn from our ancestors and the way they have engaged with nature. Perhaps 
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we need to dare looking to the past, in order to learn something for our own 
future.  
Of course, the danger is that this looking to the past is simply labelled – by 
the carbon elites – as a regressive step, accusing everybody who actively decides 
to live without a car, for example, to be some kind of ecological primitivist who 
wants us all to go back into the woods (see Land in this volume). We must not 
allow this stereotypical labelling to take place. What the contributions to the 
‘Alternatives’ section of this book show is that even in fossil fuel dependent 
economies of the North, low impact communities are sustainable alternatives to 
sprawling urban conglomerations. That is, real alternatives to the dominant ‘way 
of life’ that has got us into the current climatic mess are possible, and they are 
existing in many parts of the world, if we dare to look for them. 
In fact, reading Andrew’s chapter at the end of the book, we can realize that 
there is an excess of creativity and resilience that people and communities show. 
The sustainable campaigns, initiatives and practices Andrew lists are not part of 
some kind of sci-fi novel; they are really happening and are already working for 
many communities around the world. If we follow their lead, we can deal with 
the structural changes needed to mitigate climate change and deal with the 
socio-economic and other environmental factors that are closely connected with 
it. There is hope, and we have hope that the world can come together to do 
something constructive about climate change. And we hope that this book will 
contribute to such a project of hope. 
But hope is not enough. There might be already many alternatives to the 
fossil fuels centred ‘way of life’, practiced by millions of people around the 
world. But these alternative and more sustainable ‘ways of life’ have to be 
extended, and brought into the mainstream, so to say, in order for the earth to 
notice any effect. This can only happen through action and struggle. That is, it 
won’t happen all by itself. We need to actively make a different world possible, 
otherwise there will be plenty of fossil fuelled elites who will shape the world in 
their mirror image. We must not allow this to happen, and hence we hope this 
book is, more than anything, a call to action.  
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2 
Neoliberalism and the Calculable World: 
The Rise of Carbon Trading" 
Larry Lohmann 
Introduction 
Neoliberalism can be a vague, even incoherent concept when it becomes 
entangled in the false dichotomies between market and state that are habitually 
thrown up by its adherents. It is often said, for example, that neoliberalism 
promotes free markets and reins in the state; yet, as Karl Polanyi pointed out 
long ago, laissez faire itself is an interventionist state project (‘laissez faire was 
planned; planning was not’).1 It is said, too, that neoliberalism looks to 
economic growth rather than the state to solve many social problems; yet the 
quantifiable entity called ‘the economy’ was created in the 20th century largely 
by reorganizing and redistributing knowledge and embedding new practices of 
description and calculation in governmental practice, and can at no point be 
sharply marked off from official coercion, state corruption and ‘non-economic’ 
institutions.2 Similarly, the neoliberal attempt to simulate efficient market 
outcomes by deploying cost-benefit analysis in policymaking depends on 
calculation and regulation undertaken by the state.3  
Nowhere is the state/market dichotomy more misleading than in the analysis 
of one of the last, most ambitious manifestations of neoliberalism – the carbon 
markets that began to emerge in the 1990s as the main international policy 
response to climate change. While carbon markets are typically defended using 
neoliberal rhetoric (‘What is the best way to tackle climate change? If we have a 
global carbon price, the market sorts it out’;4 ‘Carbon trading is seen as a 
market-based alternative to either direct taxation or a “command and control 
approach”‘ 5), the commodity in which the biggest carbon markets trade owes its 
very existence to government fiat and regulation. In tracing the causes of the 
havoc carbon markets are in the process of creating and abetting, it is useful to 
look beyond the misleading market/state, choice/coercion, 
efficiency/inefficiency dualisms commonly used to justify them. This chapter 
focuses instead on the power dynamics implicated in abstraction, 
commensuration and commodification as the features of the neoliberal 
approach to climate change that will most repay study. In so doing, it hopes to 
provide an introduction to one of neoliberalism’s potentially greatest class 
projects: the attempt to privatize the climate itself. 
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What is Carbon Trading? 
First proposed in the 1960s, pollution trading was developed by US economists 
and derivatives traders in the 1970s and 1980s and underwent a series of failed 
policy experiments in that country before becoming the centrepiece of the US 
Acid Rain Programme in the 1990s at a time of deregulatory fervour. In 1997, 
the Bill Clinton 2 regime successfully pressed for the Kyoto Protocol to become 
a set of carbon trading instruments (Al Gore, who carried the US ultimatum to 
Kyoto, later became a carbon market actor himself). In the 2000s Europe 
picked up the initiative to become the host of what is today the world’s largest 
carbon market, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) – although under 
Barack Obama the US may soon take over that position. Carbon markets now 
trade over US$100 billion yearly, and are projected to rival the financial 
derivatives market, currently the world’s largest, within a decade. Pioneered by 
figures such as Richard Sandor of the Chicago Board of Trade and Ken 
Newcombe, who relinquished leadership of the World Bank’s carbon funds to 
become a carbon trader at firms such as Goldman Sachs, carbon markets have 
recently become a magnet for hedge funds, banks, energy traders and other 
speculators.  
Carbon trading treats the safeguarding of climatic stability, or the earth’s 
capacity to regulate its climate, as a measurable commodity. After being granted 
or auctioned off to private firms or other polluters, the commodity can then be 
allocated ‘cost-effectively’ via market mechanisms. Obviously, the 
commoditized capacity in question was never produced for sale. Rather than 
being consumed, it is continually reused. Although difficult to define or even 
locate, the capacity forms part of the background ‘infrastructure’ for human 
survival. Framing it as a commodity, moreover, involves complex contradictions 
and blowbacks.6 Current efforts to assemble carbon markets are likely, when 
carried beyond a certain point, to engender systemic crises. The earth’s climate-
regulating capacity is thus a quintessential Polanyian ‘fictitious commodity’. 
Accordingly, illuminating comparisons and contrasts can be drawn with 
Polanyi’s original ‘fictitious commodities’ of land, labour and money, as well as 
with other candidates for ‘fictitious commodity’ status that have been proposed 
since, including knowledge, health, genes and uncertainty. 
The attempt to build a climate commodity proceeds in several steps (see 
BOX). First, the goal of maintaining the earth’s capacity to regulate its climate is 
conceptualized in terms of numerical greenhouse gas emissions reduction 
targets. Governments determine – although currently more on explicitly political 
than on climatological grounds – how much of the world’s physical, chemical 
and biological ability to regulate its own climate should be enclosed, 
‘propertized’, privatized and made scarce. They then give it out (or, sometimes, 
sell it) to large polluters, before ‘letting the market decide’ on its final 
distribution.7  
Making climate benefits and disbenefits into quantifiable ‘things’ opens them 
up to the possibility of exchange. For example, once climate benefit is identified 
with emissions reductions, an emission cut in one place becomes climatically 
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‘equivalent’ to, and thus exchangeable with, a cut of the same magnitude 
elsewhere. An emissions cut owing to one technology becomes climatically 
equivalent to an emissions cut that relies on another. An emissions cut that is 
part of a package that brings about one set of social effects becomes climatically 
equivalent to a cut associated with another set of social effects. Where emissions 
permit banking is allowed, an emission cut at one time becomes climatically 
equivalent to a cut achieved at another. Once all these identities are established, 
it becomes possible for a market to select for the emissions reductions (and, 
ipso facto, the climate benefits) that can be achieved most cheaply.  
Carbon market construction in brief 
Step 1: The goal of overcoming fossil fuel dependence by entrenching a new 
historical pathway is changed into the goal of placing progressive numerical limits on 
emissions (cap).  
Step 2: A large pool of ‘equivalent’ emissions reductions is created through 
regulatory means by abstracting from place, technology, history and gas, making a 
liquid market and various ‘efficiencies’ possible (cap and trade).  
Step 3: Further tradeable emissions reductions ‘equivalents’ are invented through 
special compensatory projects, usually in regions not covered by any cap, for 
additional corporate cost savings, and added to the commodity pool for enhanced 
liquidity and further ‘efficiencies’ (offsets). 
Step 4: Project bundling, securitization, financial regulation, rating agencies, 
‘programmatic CDM’ etc. add new layers of obscurity and complexity. 
 
At first glance, these equivalences may seem uncontroversial. Market 
proponents tend to repeat, with the air of someone airing a tautology, that (for 
example) ‘a carbon dioxide molecule released in Samarkand has the same 
climatic effect as one released in Sandusky’. A moment’s reflection will show, 
however, that, in producing such equivalences, carbon traders are already 
drifting away from the climate problem. That problem consists mainly of the 
challenge of initiating a new historical pathway that leads away from dependence 
on fossil fuels, which are by far the major contributor to human-caused climate 
change. Once taken out of the ground and burned, coal, oil and gas add to the 
carbon burden cycling between the atmosphere and the oceans, soil, rock and 
vegetation. This transfer is, for human purposes, irreversible: once mined and 
burned, fossil carbon cannot be locked away safely underground again in the 
form of new deposits of coal, oil or gas, or in the form of carbonate rock, for 
millions of years. The transfer is also unsustainable: there is simply not enough 
‘space’ in above-ground biological and geological systems to park safely the 
huge mass of carbon that is coming out of the ground without carbon dioxide 
building up catastrophically in the air and the seas. As biologist Tim Flannery 
puts it, ‘There is so much carbon buried in the world’s coal seams [alone] that, 
should it find its way back to the surface, it would make the planet hostile to life 
as we know it’.8 Most un-mined coal, oil and gas, in other words, is going to 
have to stay in the ground. Accordingly, industrialized societies, currently 
‘locked in’ to fossil fuels, need instead to ‘lock in’ non-fossil energy, transport, 
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agricultural and consumption regimes within at most a few decades. Because 
this shift is structural, the first steps need to be undertaken immediately to 
minimize future dangers and costs.9 
It follows that short-term actions can be assessed for their climatic 
effectiveness only by determining the part they play in a longer-term shift away 
from reliance on fossil fuels. For example, the choice of technology used in 
making a short term billion-ton emissions cut will make a large difference to 
long-term climatic outcomes. If the technology is one that reinforces overall 
societal addiction to fossil fuels, it will be more climatically damaging than one 
which contributes toward a pathway that keeps most remaining fossil fuels in 
the ground. Similarly, a billion-ton reduction in one place may have social 
effects which have a different impact on long-term fossil fuel use (and thus on 
future reductions) than a supposedly ‘identical’ billion-ton reduction in another 
place. Workable climate solutions, in short, are embedded in future history. 
A commodity approach, by contrast, abstracts from where, how, when and 
by whom the cuts are made, disembedding climate solutions from history and 
technology and re-embedding them in neoclassical economic theory, trade 
treaties, property law, risk management and so forth. For example, carbon 
trading gives emissions-reduction technologies that are likely to result in 
unquantifiable but important ‘spillovers’10 leading to radically-lessened long-
term dependence on fossil fuels equal weight with technologies lacking such 
effects, as long as both achieve the same numerical emissions reduction over the 
short term in a particular locality. While carbon trading encourages ingenuity in 
inventing measurable ‘equivalences’ between emissions of different types in 
different places, it does not select for innovations that can initiate or sustain a 
historical trajectory away from fossil fuels (the effectiveness of which is less easy 
to measure). Indeed, once the carbon commodity has been defined, merely to 
weigh different long-range social and technological trajectories or evaluate and 
‘back-cast’ from distant goals is to threaten the efficiency imperative.  
A commodity approach also functions to detach the global warming 
problem from climatological uncertainties and indeterminacies. This is because 
the sum of fungible greenhouse gas pollution rights that governments create and 
distribute for purposes of trade are implied to approach, in principle if not in 
practice, an economically optimal, ‘climatically safe’ level of overall greenhouse 
gas pollution. As work by the Harvard economist Martin Weitzman and others 
suggests, this move engenders a degraded conception of the climate problem: 
the commensuration process inherent in multi-equation, computerized 
Integrated Assessment Models that aggregate economic growth with simple 
climate dynamics heightens systemic hazards by ‘presenting a cost-benefit 
estimate for what is inherently a fat-tailed situation with potentially unlimited 
downside exposure as if it is accurate and objective’.11 
Disembedding: A Second Stage 
The disembedding/re-embedding process inherent in carbon trading then 
ramifies and proliferates through a succession of further acts of 
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commensuration and abstraction. After the state creates a divisible, tradeable 
commodity whose ‘efficient’ allocation in the form of pollution rights can 
become a coherent, ‘apolitical’ programme for action (‘cap and trade’), its status 
as asset, grant, or financial instrument is engineered to fit various accounting 
standards.12 Grants of pollution rights are made to industrialized countries 
(under the Kyoto Protocol) or private firms or other polluters (under the EU 
ETS), according to their existing pollution levels. Due to industrial lobbying 
efforts and measurement difficulties, these grants are often more generous than 
the polluters need to cover their existing level of emissions. Corporations 
receiving EU ETS grants are then allowed to pass on to their customers the 
nominal market cost of the asset they have received for free. (Auctioning may 
become more common in the future, but so far has not been widespread.) In 
this way, the bulk of the earth’s carbon-cycling capacity is in effect made into 
property and distributed to the industrialized North, and in particular to the 
heaviest corporate polluters.  
A second class of measurable, thing-like climate-benefit units called ‘offsets’ 
is then developed to be pooled together with ‘reductions’ for further ‘efficiency’ 
gains. These offsets are manufactured by special projects requiring special 
expertise, most located in the global South, that are claimed to result in less 
greenhouse gases accumulating in the atmosphere than would be the case in the 
absence of carbon finance, such as tree plantations (which are supposed to 
absorb carbon dioxide emissions) or fuel switches, wind farms and hydroelectric 
dams (which are argued to reduce or displace fossil energy). Schemes for 
generating still more saleable greenhouse gas pollution licenses – including 
projects involving agrofuels, biochar, nuclear energy, forest conservation and 
the capture, liquefaction and storage of carbon dioxide from coal-fired power 
plants – are also under consideration. Such ‘project-based’ credits, no matter 
what their origin, are designed to be fungible with the emissions allowances 
created and distributed by governments in the industrialized North. Indeed, in 
an act of commensuration-by-fiat, the Kyoto Protocol stipulated in Articles 3 
and 12 that these offset credits are emissions reductions, thus legislating into 
existence a new, abstract, non-situated, omnibus category of reductions/offsets. 
It thus helped open a niche for a new corps of specialists and consultants – 
analogous to the ‘quants’ who helped develop advanced financial derivatives – 
to seek profits working out the needed commensuration procedures. Such 
‘carbon quants’ produce calculations claiming, for example, that reducing 
carbon emissions from a power plant in Britain is ‘the same as’ building a wind 
farm in India or Brazil because the wind farm displaces fossil fuel use.  
Since the carbon dioxide resulting from fossil fuel combustion is only one of 
many greenhouse gases, it is possible to create still more equivalences, making 
possible yet further supposed ‘efficiencies’ in attaining any particular cap. In the 
1990s, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) devised a new 
abstraction called ‘global warming potential’ that commensurates an entire 
basket of climate-forcing gases according to how they compare to carbon 
dioxide in their climate impact. That ultimately enabled corporations to arrange 
to make spectacular savings in meeting emissions targets under the EU 
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Emissions Trading Scheme. Instead of cutting its own carbon dioxide 
emissions, for example, the German-based generating firm RWE could plan on 
investing in United Nations-certified ‘offset’ projects destroying small amounts 
of nitrous oxide (a greenhouse gas stipulated to be 298 times more powerful 
than carbon dioxide over a 100-year time horizon) at factories in Egypt and 
South Korea and even smaller amounts of HFC-23 (a climate-forcing gas with a 
‘global warming potential’ set at 14,800 times that of carbon dioxide over a 100-
year horizon) at chemical plants in China.13 It could also explore the possibility 
of buying carbon credits from projects that would capture and burn methane 
(yet another greenhouse gas stipulated to be more harmful than carbon dioxide, 
especially over the short term) from landfills and coal mines in China and 
Russia. Commensurating all these gases was hard work, since they vary in their 
effects along many different axes and time scales. In one reflection of the un-
clarities and disputes involved, in 2007 the IPCC increased the 100-year factor 
for HFC-23 by over 23 per cent, enabling at a keystroke the production of 
millions of tons more carbon credits.  
Using offsets to achieve increased liquidity and ‘efficiency’ distances carbon 
markets from the global warming problem not only because it ignores the 
importance of achieving a transition away from fossil fuels, but also because it 
tends to suppress, in a class- and culturally-biased way, concrete practices likely 
to play a significant part in those solutions. Carbon offset accounting necessarily 
frames the political question of what would have happened without carbon 
projects as matter of expert prediction in a deterministic system, while at the 
same time framing (usually wealthy) project proponents non-deterministically, as 
free decision-makers whose initiatives are capable of changing ‘business as 
usual’. Activists in Minas Gerais, Brazil, called attention to this contradiction 
early on when they contested an attempt by a local charcoal and pig iron 
company, Plantar (see Chapter 9 in this volume), to get carbon credits for the 
environmentally-destructive eucalyptus plantations it had established on seized 
land: ‘The argument that producing pig iron from charcoal is less bad than 
producing it from coal is a sinister strategy … What we really need are 
investments in clean energies that at the same time contribute to the cultural, 
social and economic wellbeing of local populations’.14 After insisting that ‘the 
claim that without carbon credits Plantar …would have switched to coal as an 
energy source is absurd,’ the activists went on to characterize the accounting 
procedure as a ‘threat’: ‘It is comparable to loggers demanding money, otherwise 
they will cut down trees’.15  
Typically, offset income supports conventional developments that harm local 
low-carbon livelihoods and sources of agricultural knowledge while at the same 
time doing little if anything for local transitions to a non-fossil society. In the 
mountainous river valleys of Uttaranchal, India, for example, scores of dam 
projects in line to be part-financed through selling carbon credits to Northern 
industry are damaging local low-carbon irrigation systems. In China, 763 
hydroelectric dams have applied or are planning to apply to the United Nations 
to be allowed to sell more than 300 million tons of carbon dioxide pollution 
rights to Northern industry through the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development 
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Mechanism, yet they do not replace fossil-fuelled generation, but merely 
supplement it, and were arguably going to be built anyway.16 In November 2008, 
the US Government Accountability Office warned that such carbon projects 
can allow industries in the North ‘to increase their emissions without a 
corresponding reduction in a developing country’.17  
Nigeria’s oil-extraction zone offers another good example of carbon 
markets’ tendency to encourage private corporations and technical experts to 
expend ingenuity on inventing novel, geographically far-flung market 
‘equivalents’ for emissions reductions rather than finding ways to implement a 
structural shift away from fossil fuels. For 50 years, energy companies operating 
in the Niger Delta have burned off the great bulk of the methane they find in 
underground oil reservoirs. Although methane is a valuable fuel, it is cheaper for 
corporations such as Shell and Chevron simply to flare it on site than to use it in 
power plants or reinject it underground. As a result, local people are subjected 
to continuous noise, light and heat, acid rain, retarded crop yields, corroded 
roofs, and respiratory and skin diseases.18 Although flaring is prohibited by law 
in Nigeria (in 2005 the Nigerian Federal High Court confirmed that gas flaring 
was illegal and a gross violation of human rights), oil companies have so far 
contented themselves with paying penalties for non-compliance. In this context, 
one focus of local and international environmental activism is simply to insist on 
the rule of law. The Clean Development Mechanism, however, takes breaches 
of the law in Nigeria as the ‘baseline’ for carbon accounting. The Italian oil 
corporation Eni-Agip, for example, plans to buy some 1.5 million tons per year 
of cheap carbon dioxide equivalent pollution rights from a project at an oil-gas 
installation at Kwale that was registered with the UN in November 2006.19 Eni-
Agip and its validator, the Norwegian consultant DNV, claim that the project 
will be reducing emissions by putting gas which would otherwise be flared to 
productive use (although it is difficult to verify whether the gas in question will 
come from oil wells or dedicated gas extraction operations also present in the 
region, whose production is not flared). The core of the calculation is that  
whilst the Nigerian Federal High Court recently judged that gas flaring is illegal, 
it is difficult to envisage a situation where wholesale changes in practice in 
venting or flaring, or cessation of oil production in order to eliminate flaring will 
be forthcoming in the near term.20  
Accordingly, the project creates a new incentive for the Nigerian authorities to 
replace legal sanctions with prices and the rule of law with markets for 
environmental services. It would be difficult to imagine a purer expression of 
neoliberal doctrines. Isaac Osuoka, the joint coordinator of the Gulf of Guinea 
Citizens Network, believes that ‘carbon trading reflects one of the worst forms 
of neoliberal fanaticism and attempts at re-legitimating corporate rule 
experienced in the past decades’.21  
Current proposals to allow industrialized countries and their corporations to 
compensate for continued fossil fuel use by pressing millions of hectares of land 
in the global South into service as biotic carbon stores or dumps further 
highlight carbon offsets’ tendency toward regressive redistribution. In one 
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proposed scheme, REDD (‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation’), billions of dollars would be invested in acquiring and preserving 
carbon in the world’s native forests, which would then be traded for permission 
to continue greenhouse gas pollution elsewhere. Land grabs have already begun 
in central Africa, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea in order to feed the 
expected need for forested land of the US’s proposed carbon trading system 
under the Waxman-Markey Act. State forestry departments, conservation 
organizations, local authorities, indigenous communities or logging or plantation 
companies would serve as onsite security staff for this global carbon warehouse. 
REDD advocates include ex-World Bank chief economist Nicholas Stern, who 
sees it, ton for ton, as one of the cheapest ways of keeping carbon dioxide 
molecules out of the atmosphere; Wall Street firms such as Merrill Lynch (now 
owned by Bank of America), which see high potential in trading such new 
‘carbon assets’; the Food and Agriculture Organization, which welcomes it as an 
opportunity to expand its political role; and, often in the forefront, carbon 
consultants, forest scientists, technicians and master planners with careers in 
forest conservation, who are working on the ground in countries such as 
Indonesia to secure local authorities’ consent to the schemes. The large sums of 
money potentially on offer have split indigenous peoples’ movements, some of 
whom see REDD as an opportunity for advancement, others of whom see it as 
an enclosure movement; and environmentalists, who divide between large, 
Washington-based proponents such as Conservation International and The 
Nature Conservancy and less well-funded opponents who see REDD as 
disempowering forest peoples in favour of acquisitive corporations and state 
agencies.22 Although its role and political nature are often misunderstood by 
traders and activists alike, commensuration is again central to this struggle: for 
trading to be possible, emissions arising from the combustion of fossil carbon 
must be made quantitatively comparable with tree carbon. This becomes an 
endless task due to the different roles played by fossil and biotic carbon in the 
climate system, as well as uncertainties and unpredictabilities in forest carbon 
absorption, which are being exacerbated by global warming itself.23 
Finance and Securitization 
A final step in the carbon markets’ abstraction from the climate problem comes 
with securitization. Financial market actors have always been prominent in the 
carbon trade and today dominate the buyers’ side of the credit market. Among 
the financial institutions that have set up desks to speculate in carbon permits 
are Deutsche Bank, Morgan Stanley, Barclays Capital, Rabobank, BNP Paribas 
Fortis, Sumitomo, Kommunalkredit, and Cantor Fitzgerald. JP Morgan Chase 
has snapped up the carbon offset firm Climate Care, while Credit Suisse has 
acquired a stake in the troubled carbon consultancy and accumulator 
EcoSecurities and Goldman Sachs has announced plans to buy Constellation 
Energy’s carbon trading business. By 2008 there were about 80 carbon 
investment funds set up to finance offset projects or buy carbon credits, most 
oriented more toward speculation than toward helping companies comply with 
regulated carbon caps. Trading companies are also active, including Vitol, a 
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major energy-market speculator, and while ENRON, an early enthusiast for the 
Kyoto Protocol carbon market, is no longer in business, some of the firm’s ex-
staff have moved into the carbon sector. Before the financial crash, even certain 
industrial companies, such as Arcelor Mittal (the world’s largest steelmaker), 
opened departments specifically to seek profits in the carbon trade, just as 
companies such as General Electric opened finance divisions in the 1990s.24 As 
with financial derivatives, a host of specialized new institutions have also been 
set up that deal in the commodity, with names like Sindicatum Carbon Capital, 
NatSource Asset Management, New Carbon Finance, Carbon Capital Markets, 
Trading Emissions plc, South Pole Carbon Asset Management, Noble Carbon, 
and so forth.  
One of the tasks of such firms is to bundle together various types of small 
offset projects for buyers. With increased investment, securitization is likely to 
follow. Already in November 2008, Credit Suisse announced a securitized 
carbon deal that would bundle together carbon credits from 25 offset projects at 
various stages of UN approval, sourced from three countries and five project 
developers. The bank then split these assets into three tranches, allegedly 
representing different risk levels, before marketing them to investors. In this 
way, products which already had only the most tenuous relation to the climate 
problem they were designed to tackle, and had been further disconnected from 
underlying values through a cascade of contested commensuration processes, 
were transformed through yet further disaggregation and reassembly. Evaluation 
of such securities, whether by credit rating agencies or regulators, is certain to be 
even more challenging, and even less amenable to modeling, than was the 
evaluation of the mortgage-backed securities that played such an important part 
in the onset of the financial crisis. If carbon permit products are ‘toxic’ to 
climate change mitigation policy, they may prove to be no less so to financial 
stability, given the projected trillion-dollar scale of the market. The dangers of 
what Friends of the Earth analyst Michelle Chan calls ‘subprime carbon’ are 
obvious.25  
Insofar as it is aimed merely at improving carbon market practice rather than 
at fossil fuel use, and relies on a theory-practice dualism, regulation tends to 
become yet another moment in the neoliberal disembedding/re-embedding 
process, adding further layers of attempted calculation to an unstable structure 
and further concealing the problematic nature of the underlying abstractions. A 
case in point is the continuing attempt of the Clean Development Mechanism’s 
Executive Board and government regulators in various countries to tackle the 
riddle of ‘additionality’ in offset markets (that is, how to prove that a project 
goes beyond business as usual), to which, as carbon trader Mark Trexler noted 
years ago, there is no correct answer.26 Constantly manufacturing and 
reaffirming the notion that offset projects’ shortcomings are due either to 
imperfect methodology or incorrect implementation, ten years of regulatory 
effort have only further skewed the political economy of the offset markets 
further in favour of corporations locked into fossil fuel use, since it is only they 
who have the resources necessary for navigating the regulatory mazes that the 
additionality debate has made ever more intricate. Ironically, of course, this is an 
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effect which, logically speaking, should itself enter into calculations of carbon 
saved and lost – one more example of the ‘moving horizon’ characteristic of the 
market-environmentalist project of ‘internalizing externalities’. The recent 
establishment of a private carbon rating agency, as well as proposals for 
‘programmatic’ and ‘sectoral’ carbon credits, which would help sidestep 
impossible ‘additionality’ requirements, reflect a continuing commitment to 
‘better calculation’ in the face of irresolvable tensions between the needs for 
high-volume, predictable carbon credit output and for market credibility. 
Conclusion 
Like the neoclassical shibboleths (the efficient markets hypothesis, rational 
expectations and the like) that have so picturesquely come to grief during the 
financial crisis, the carbon credit prices flashing on electronic screens in trading 
rooms on Wall Street or in the City of London reflect a complex political 
movement to reorganize and redistribute knowledge and power. Spelling out 
another notable chapter in the political history of commensuration27, they form 
a part of one of neoliberalism’s last and greatest class projects: the attempt to 
appropriate the climate itself. Carbon trading thus takes its place alongside other 
movements of recent decades that have invented new possibilities of 
accumulation through the creation of fresh objects of calculation and the 
intensified commodification of some of the more hidden aspects of the 
infrastructure of human existence. Examples include attempts to expand credit 
by mathematizing and privatizing an unprecedented variety of uncertainties 
through derivatives markets28, to privatize creativity through global intellectual 
property rights, and to transform health, health care and even biological species 
into measurable, tradeable commodities.29 
All these efforts to appropriate involve abstraction and commensuration as 
part of wider processes involving deregulation, banking and land law, treaty 
negotiation, structural adjustment, police work, mapping, resource seizures, 
export subsidies and so on. This abstraction and commensuration can never be 
completed any more than politics or the evolution of a language can be 
completed. As Mitchell observes, internalizing all externalities would make 
exchange impossible.30 Ideals of calculability, continually being developed and 
undermined in the course of attempts to carpenter together new structures of 
property and trade, are part of conflicted processes that can generate both 
profits and crisis. The largely unchecked pursuit of liquidity in risk markets, 
furthered by the achievements of quants, led in the end to a financial stampede 
for the exits and a drying up of liquidity, and may eventually do the same in the 
carbon markets. An unrestrained quest to ‘internalize’ the benefits of innovation 
leads in the end to the sapping of innovative forces and resources.31 Cost-
benefit analysis’s attempt to isolate an uncontroversial basis for social choice in 
the calculation of individual preferences itself generates heightened controversy. 
Headlong attempts to implement ‘market solutions’ for global warming end up 
exacerbating the climate crisis as well as social dislocations of diverse kinds and 
wide geographical reach.  
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The troubled trajectory of such initiatives hints at the continuing relevance 
of earlier traditions of crisis analysis: Polanyi’s32 observation that the complete 
commodification of land would result in the ‘demolition of society’; Marx’s 
descriptions of the ‘contradictions’ of capitalism; Keynes’s warning about 
finance’s ‘fetish of liquidity’ that ‘there is no such thing as liquidity of 
investment for the community as a whole’.33 Yet, as this chapter’s sketch of 
carbon trading has suggested, analytical space must also be made for newer 
concepts such as Michel Callon’s ‘overflows’,34 Timothy Mitchell’s treatment of 
the theory/practice divide as a mode of modern power, and science scholars’ 
emphasis on nonhuman agents, whether the recalcitrant rainforest trees now 
being pressed into service as carbon stores or the ‘black swans’ and ‘monsters’ 
of nonlinearity now routinely referred to by both financial analysts and 
climatologists.35 Study of the arcane particularities of manifestations of 
neoliberalism such as carbon trading can both inform and transform analyses of 
contemporary politics generally. As Lydgate famously observed in Middlemarch, 
there must be a ‘systole and diastole in all inquiry’ aimed at ‘continually 
expanding and shrinking between the whole human horizon and the horizon of 
an object-glass’. 
The unfolding disaster of carbon trading prefigures the disintegration of the 
picture of a thoroughly calculable world to which neoliberalism clings more 
stubbornly than any state socialist project of the past. The important question is 
how this disintegration is to be effected politically. What sort of alliances can be 
fashioned among, for example, grassroots resisters of offset projects in the 
South, environmental justice movements battling fossil fuel extraction and 
pollution, and a Northern public frustrated at the largesse being lavished by 
their governments and the United Nations on the creation of yet another 
dysfunctional speculative market? The answers are not yet clear, but here as 
elsewhere the fall of neoliberalism will be something to be achieved through 
patient movement-building and a long series of political struggles, not 
something automatically given by the mechanics of yet another crisis. 
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II 
CASES 
Part II of the book comprises a range of case studies 
from Thailand to Chile, from Uruguay to India, 
presenting rich details of the often negative effects of 
CDM and voluntary offset projects on local 
communities in the ‘Global South’. Part II begins 
with papers by Melissa Checker, Tamra Gilbertson, 
Cristián Alarcón and Isaac ‘Asume’ Osuoka, showing 
how ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries and their 
respective governments, corporations and local 
communities are interlocked in a complex web of 
carbon market relations, which, rather than 
promoting sustainable development, help to increase 
inequalities between North and South. The next set 
of chapters – written by Ricardo Carrere, Raquel 
Nuñez, Rafael Kurter Flores and colleagues, and 
Steffen Böhm – are aimed at breaking our illusion of 
considering industrial tree plantations to be real 
forests that would help us fight climate change. The 
last set of cases – written by Soumitra Ghosh, Hadida 
Yasmin, Siddhartha Dabhi, Nishant Mate and 
Soumya Dutta – come from India, which is one of 
the largest hosts of CDM and voluntary offset 
projects. 
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Double Jeopardy: Pursuing the Path of Carbon 
Offsets and Human Rights Abuses" 
Melissa Checker 
Introduction 
On the East Coast of Scotland, one of Europe’s largest oil refineries flares 
excess gas into the sky, sending sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide and other 
particles into the nearby town of Grangemouth.1 Six thousand miles away in 
eastern Brazil, the villagers of Sao Jose do Buriti struggle as their water sources 
dry up and the plants they have subsisted on for generations disappear. Several 
years ago, NGOs, the Transnational Institute Environmental Justice Project and 
Carbon Trade Watch sent representatives to these two disparate places to help 
their inhabitants create a documentary film. Each community created a video 
diary that detailed their daily efforts to cope with the industries surrounding 
them and then shared it with the other. Residents found that their struggles had 
much in common – pollution in Grangemouth and water shortages in Sao Jose 
do Buriti were intimately linked through carbon offsets.2 
In the late 1990s, British Petroleum (BP), then owners of the Grangemouth 
refinery, launched a major effort to ‘green’ their image, in part by offsetting their 
carbon emissions through investments in projects that reduce the production of 
greenhouse gases. Around the same time, a foundry near Sao Jose do Buriti 
publicized its plan to switch from using charcoal to carbon-intensive coal, due 
to a dwindling supply of charcoal-producing eucalyptus trees. Enter the World 
Bank, which gathered funding from various sources including BP, and initiated a 
project to expand the foundry’s eucalyptus forest and generate carbon offsets. 
In addition to providing a renewable raw material, the trees would absorb 
carbon in the atmosphere. Each ton of carbon absorbed would then offset, or 
neutralize, a ton of carbon dioxide produced in Scotland. Only, this formula left 
out one very important factor – human beings. Not only did the plan allow the 
oil refinery to continue emitting noxious chemicals in Grangemouth, but the 
enormous roots of the carbon-absorbing, charcoal-producing trees in Brazil also 
drained local water resources, essential to the lives and livelihoods of nearby 
villagers.  
Drawing on this and similar cases, this essay argues that rather than 
balancing out carbon emissions, carbon offset projects create equal measures of 
human injustice, for the communities that host them and for the communities 
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surrounding the facilities that buy them. I also argue that offsets set off a chain 
reaction, creating multiple harms to human beings, in both the near and long 
term. I base my argument on three case studies. Each one focuses on a project 
meant to generate carbon offset credits and then tracks those credits to the 
industry whose emissions they were supposed to have counterbalanced. In so 
doing, I demonstrate that the path from offset credit producer to offset credit 
consumer is strewn with violations to both human rights and the environment.  
Since their inception in the late 1990s, proponents of carbon offset projects 
have promoted them as a win-win scenario. Carbon-producing industries can 
make up for their emissions by investing in activities that reduce greenhouse 
gases, and at the same time, those greenhouse gas-reducing activities stimulate 
sustainable development.3 However, over the past few years, a growing body of 
academic and popular literature contends that the premises behind carbon 
offsets are inherently flawed.4 For example, on a scientific level, emissions 
equivalences are difficult to measure. Economically, when the value of carbon 
credits falls (as it has over the past year), incentives to generate them are 
drastically reduced. On a broader level, many critics of offsets focus on the 
problem of additionality, or the degree to which offset monies fund new 
emissions reductions versus projects that would have been done anyway.  
Only recently, have researchers begun to gather evidence delineating the 
social costs of offset projects, including the ways in which they sometimes 
generate development that is more harmful than it is sustainable for local 
communities. This chapter combines existing and new research to build on such 
human-centered critiques and take them a step further. More specifically, in 
each of my three case studies, I first compile published data to describe how a 
carbon offset project has negatively affected the local community hosting it. 
Then, I gather data from web sites, newspapers, magazine articles and 
governmental and non-governmental reports to follow the offsets to the 
industry that benefited from them. This juxtaposing of offset producers and 
consumers places the compounded costs of carbon offsets schemes in stark 
relief. In the end, I find that, from a human rights perspective, carbon offsetting 
creates a double-jeopardy in terms of both space and time. On a short-term, 
geographic level offset projects exacerbate poor environmental, economic, 
political and/or social conditions for local communities in both the Global 
South and the Global North. On a longer term level, offset projects diminish 
human rights in several more indirect ways: First, in boosting the fiscal success 
of the corporations participating in them, they facilitate any unsustainable 
practices a corporation might sponsor. Second, an emphasis on greenhouse gas 
emissions has ignored the fact that offset projects sometimes produce highly 
toxic, non-greenhouse gas pollutants. Third, the profitability and positive 
publicity surrounding offset programs provides a disincentive for governments 
and corporations to develop practices that would significantly reduce (rather 
than just neutralize) carbon emissions. Fourth, because offsets are designed to 
balance out greenhouse gas emissions they ultimately exacerbate global 
warming, which in turn threatens the lives of economically and socially 
vulnerable communities.5 On a more optimistic note, however, I conclude this 
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chapter by arguing that once clarified, connections between communities 
surrounding offset producers and consumers open new opportunities for 
transnational alliance-building and opposition to carbon trading emerge. 
Carbon Offsets Come of Age  
In 2005, the Kyoto Protocol went into force, obligating its signers to cut their 
greenhouse gas emissions to a combined 5% of 1990 levels. To facilitate those 
goals, Kyoto negotiators established offsets, or mechanisms by which industries 
in developed nations could cut their emissions indirectly, by investing in 
programs that reduce, avoid, or sequester CO2 or other greenhouse gases in 
some other place. For Kyoto signers, offsetting is largely conducted through the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), a process supervised by various arms 
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
CDM projects usually take place in developing countries and can include 
implementing alternative energy sources, ‘green’ technology designed to reduce 
CO2 emissions, the trapping or destroying of greenhouse gases or, to a limited 
extent, programs that trap carbon through forest growth. Once certified, such 
programs earn Certified Emissions Reduction (CER) credits. Credits may be 
awarded to a specific project investor and applied towards reducing that 
investor’s carbon footprint, or traded on a carbon market. Today, experts 
predict that CDM-generated offsets will deliver more than half of the European 
Union’s planned carbon reductions to 2020.6 
Those not obligated by Kyoto can partake in the emerging, self-regulated 
voluntary carbon market. Thanks in part to the extraordinary success of the 
2006 film, An Inconvenient Truth, the voluntary carbon market reached $705 
million in 2008.7 Approximately 5% of this self-regulated market comes from 
individuals wishing to assuage their guilt over carbon intensive activities such as 
airplane travel. The rest is comprised of businesses entities. Some of those 
include eco-conscious entertainers such as Leonardo DiCaprio, the band 
Coldplay and makers of the film Syriana, all of which famously offset airline 
travel and other carbon emissions generated by their professional projects or 
pursuits.  
But, the bulk of offsets are bought by businesses wishing to bolster and 
‘green’ their image.8 At the end of 2009, for example, Dell Computers 
announced (or claimed) that it had achieved 100 percent carbon-neutrality, 
mostly by purchasing offsets. The U.S. National Football League used offsets to 
help ‘neutralize’ the carbon generated by the last two Superbowls. And in 
January 2009, Motorola unveiled what it called the world’s first carbon neutral 
phone; besides making the phone of recycled plastic, the company vowed to 
offset the carbon produced during the phone’s manufacture, distribution and 
operation.9  
Certainly, national, individual and/or corporate concern for the planet is 
laudable, and corporations that go green might as well generate some good 
publicity for it along the way. The problem is that using offsets to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions is like trying to lose weight by paying someone else to 
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go on a diet and then claiming the weight loss as your own. In other words, 
when EU countries count up their emissions reductions, they include those that 
happened in foreign places (which is the whole point of offsetting). If they only 
counted local emissions reductions, the numbers would obviously be quite 
different. For instance, the European Commission highlights the fact that EU 
emission levels fell approximately 3.6% between 2007 and 2008. In large part 
these decreases can be attributed to declines in manufacturing as a result of the 
economic downturn and to the roughly 1,500 projects registered in the CDM.10 
In contrast, a recent study by law professor and energy expert at Stanford 
University’s Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, Michael Wara, 
estimated that accounting for offsets, European emissions were actually about 
1% higher in 2008 than they were in 1990.  
The real danger here is that many experts agree that offset projects lead to 
questionable reductions at best. For instance, a November 2008 report by the 
U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO) examined the CDM and found that 
its effects on greenhouse gas emissions are uncertain, largely because it is ‘nearly 
impossible’ to determine the level of emissions that would have occurred in the 
absence of each project.11 A report by Germany’s Institute for Applied Ecology 
found that 40 percent of CDM projects registered by 2007 represented ‘unlikely 
or at least questionable’ emissions cuts, partly because many offset projects 
would happen even without offset funding.12 Currently, the UN contracts third-
party consultants to verify a project’s additionality – however, between 
November 2008 and September 2009, the UN suspended the accreditation of 
the world’s two largest auditors of CDM projects for not properly vetting 
projects before approving them.13 
Again, there are many excellent articles detailing these and other reasons why 
offsets fail to live up to their promises in terms of delivering real greenhouse gas 
reductions. My purpose here is to look beyond questions of efficacy and explore 
the human costs of offsets, across the globe. In so doing, I call attention to some 
of the most urgent reasons to oppose the use of offsets. For, mounting evidence 
shows that as offset projects play out ‘on the ground’, and as corporations use 
offsets to continue business as usual, they are having immediate and dire 
consequences for local communities.  
Mount Elgon, Uganda/Appalachian Mountains, United States 
Mount Elgon, Uganda offers one of the most well-documented and most 
violent examples of an offset project gone awry. In 1990, the Dutch Electricity 
Generating Board vowed to surpass Kyoto Treaty goals and reduce its carbon 
emissions to 1989 levels by 1994-1995 with a further 3–5% reduction by the 
year 2000. The board aimed to accomplish its goals by improving energy 
efficiency at its plants, developing new technologies, and by compensating for 
emissions through ‘cost effective’ measures.14 To implement the last of these 
strategies, the power board established the Forests Absorbing Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions (Face) Foundation, a nonprofit corporation dedicated to 
‘establish[ing], maintain[ing], and/or enhance[ing], forest vegetation’ in order to 
absorb carbon dioxide.15 The forests also earn carbon credits for the CO2 they 
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ostensibly sequester.16 The foundation (which in 2002 spun off from the power 
companies) could then sell the credits and reinvest the proceeds in further forest 
projects. In 1994, Face partnered with the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) to 
plant 25,000 hectares of trees inside Mount Elgon National Park. In exchange 
for financing the planting of the trees, Face received the rights to the carbon 
sequestered by those trees – estimated at 2.11 tons of CO2 over 100 years.17 
While the trees have thrived (especially in areas where agriculture had been 
encroaching on them), a number of research reports have found that the people 
surrounding the tree plantations have had the opposite experience. 
A year before the Face-UWA project began the Ugandan government 
declared Mount Elgon a National Park. In so doing, it evicted approximately 
6,000 people (some of whom had been living there for 40 years), giving them 
nine days to vacate their homes.18 A year later, UWA took over management of 
the Park, which entailed protecting the biodiversity of the area, managing the 
carbon plantations and securing the park’s borders.19 Evicted villagers, who 
were left homeless and without access to land to graze their cattle or grow 
subsistence crops, attempted to continue using park land. When UWA rangers 
responded with violence, local villagers organized to regain their land. In 1998, 
they filed land claims against the UWA and the Ugandan government. Several 
NGOs and universities heard about the situation on Mount Elgon and launched 
their own investigations, which corroborated villagers’ claims. For instance, a 
World Rainforest Movement report published in 2006 details villagers’ 
descriptions of UWA rangers committing rape, arson, shootings and other 
violent acts. According to the report, villagers retaliated by throwing stones, 
burning trees, and sabotaging rangers’ vehicles.20  
Another reason for local antipathy towards the Face project is that, 
according to villagers, the forest project has not lived up to its promises of 
sustainable development. Initially, project leaders promised to employ local 
people to work in the national park and tree nurseries and as tree planters. 
However, the World Rainforest Movement quotes local council officials who 
contend that the project employs very few people and most of the jobs are only 
available during the planting period.21 To this day, the UWA continues to 
prevent local people from using the land, and violence and retaliations continue, 
despite a 2005 court ruling that an area of the national park should be set aside 
for villagers to live on and continue farming.22 To be fair, land disputes on 
Mount Elgon predated the FACE Foundation’s offset project, and the UWA 
maintains that the offset forest has nothing to do with its conflict with 
surrounding villagers. At the same time, the funding generated by the project 
likely provided additional incentives and justifications to administer evictions 
and violently patrol the area.  
If we follow some of that funding and track the carbon credits generated on 
Mount Elgon, we find a maze of corporations, subsidiaries, and carbon-emitting 
ventures. Indeed, one of the major criticisms commonly leveled at carbon 
trading schemes is that they create an opaque web of financial instruments ripe 
for corruption.23 For example, the FACE Foundation is a non-profit 
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organization, but the offset reductions generated by its projects are marketed by 
a Dutch for-profit partner, known as the Climate Neutral Group (CNG). CNG 
sells credits to over 500 businesses. It also partners with another for-profit 
company, Green Seat, which sells offsets (including those created on Mt. Elgon) 
exclusively to individuals and corporations wishing to balance out emissions 
from airline travel.  
After several major news outlets reported on the violence on Mt. Elgon in 
2007, Green Seat posted a notice on its website claiming that neither it nor 
CNG used offsets from Uganda forestry projects any longer. The Face 
Foundation also claimed to have stopped planting trees in the park and to be 
disengaging from the project. ‘At this stage we don’t get any carbon credits for 
this project’, Denis Slieker, director of the Face Foundation, told the LA Times 
in 2007, ‘We do not plan to expand anymore in Mount Elgon before these 
matters are resolved.’24 Yet a recent visit to the Face Foundation’s website 
describes the Mount Elgon project as ‘on going.’  
After 2007, it is unclear exactly what kinds of carbon-producing projects the 
Mount Elgon project offset. It is certain, however, that it has enabled the 
building of at least several coal-fired power plants. First, the FACE Foundation 
was initially established to offset emissions from a new 600 MW coal-fired 
power station in the Netherlands. Second, Climate Neutral Group customer, 
Enesco is one of the top three energy companies in the Netherlands. Enesco is 
considered to be a particularly ‘green’ energy company – in 2008, Greenpeace 
ranked it the ‘cleanest’ power company in the Netherlands,25 and on January 1, 
2008, the company proclaimed that its internal business operations were ‘100% 
climate-neutral’.26 Yet, my research revealed that 61.2% of the company’s energy 
supply comes from natural gas, a fossil fuel, and 19.7% – nearly one-fifth – 
comes from coal.27 Importantly, one quarter to one third of all carbon dioxide 
emissions worldwide come from burning coal.28 In addition to high levels of 
carbon dioxide, coal plants also produce sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, carbon 
monoxide, mercury and arsenic (among other pollutants).29 
Even if the Ugandan project were able offset the climate harm generated by 
coal-fired power plants, it would not be able to offset their human costs. In fact, 
in 1974 the Netherlands closed all of its coal mines due to their dangerous 
conditions; yet, in 2008, the country imported 3.6 million short tons of coal 
from the U.S. making it one of the world’s top coal importers.30 The global 
demand for coal has expanded a controversial method of coal extraction, known 
as mountaintop removal, which uses explosives to blast away a mountain peak 
and expose coal seams. While coal companies claim the practice is safer and 
more efficient than traditional shaft mining, critics contend that it has already 
ruined more than 500 mountains while dumping tons of toxic waste into 
streams and valleys, and that its blasts are driving nearby residents (those who 
can afford to move) from their homes. A U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) study estimated that by 2012, mountaintop removal projects in 
Appalachia will have destroyed or seriously damaged an area larger than 
Delaware and buried more than 1,000 miles of mountain streams.31 
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Without foliage and natural layers of soil, the land is rendered unable to 
retain water. As a result, floods have increased and their waters carry highly 
toxic debris. For instance West Virginia resident Maria Gunnoe’s home sits 
directly below a 10-story valley fill that contains two toxic ponds of coal mine 
waste. Before mining began, Gunnoe’s property was not prone to flooding, but 
since the mine became operational, her property has flooded seven times, 
covering her land with toxic coal sludge. In 2007, Gunnoe and her colleagues at 
the Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition (OVEC) won a federal lawsuit against 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that repealed mountaintop removal valley fill 
permits in southern West Virginia granted without adequate environmental 
consideration, and banned the issuance of new permits. But the Corps defied 
the federal judge’s orders and granted permits to construct two new valley fills 
above Gunnoe’s community.32  
Today, the battle over mountaintop removal continues. During his campaign 
U.S. President Barack Obama expressed concern about mountaintop removal 
projects. However, in late May 2009, the U.S.EPA stated that it would not block 
42 of 48 mine projects under review, including some of the most controversial 
mountaintop mines.33 Obama has also been a proponent of so-called ‘clean’ coal 
technology, which captures the carbon released by coal-fired power plants. 
Importantly, however, this technology does not address the immediate dangers 
of the mining process itself. In the meantime, thanks in part to the publicity 
surrounding clean coal as a viable climate change solution, the coal industry 
remains strong. In fact, international coal lobbyists are currently working to 
establish clean coal projects as certified carbon reduction programs. 
For the Mount Elgon community, the ramifications of carbon offsetting are 
clear – the offset forest intensified existing land disputes and accelerated 
displacement, violence and impoverishment among local villagers. Then, if we 
then follow some of the offset credits generated by the project to their buyers, 
we find Dutch energy companies whose energy portfolios include coal-fired 
power plants. Pursuing the path of the credits even further, we arrive at the 
Appalachian region of the U.S., which supplies the Netherlands with most of its 
coal, at great cost to local communities. In sum, this example demonstrates how 
the trail of carbon offsets–in this case, from Uganda to Appalachia – is lined 
with threats to human rights to health, safety and well being. 
Rural Sri Lanka/ The Pacific Northwestern United States 
Another early offset project similarly exemplifies both the direct and indirect 
ways in which offsets can violate the rights of everyday people. In the late 
1990s, the U.S. state of Oregon instituted groundbreaking laws curtailing carbon 
emissions. Around that time, the city of Klamath Falls proposed building a 500-
megawatt natural gas fired power station. But to comply with the new state laws, 
the city would need to find a way to offset the greenhouse gases generated by 
the plant. Eventually, local officials decided to partner with PacifiCorp Power 
Marketing, Inc., (PPM), a non-regulated affiliate of energy giant, PacifiCorp. 
PPM promised to spend $3.1 million on off-site carbon mitigation projects. 
$500,000 of that went into a revolving loan program to equip remote 
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households in India, Sri Lanka and China with photovoltaic systems. Based on 
solar power, the new systems would replace the carbon-emitting kerosene lamps 
commonly used by households that are ‘off the grid.’ Project developers 
estimated that over thirty years, the solar systems would prevent the release of 
1.34 million tons of CO2. The power plant would then be allowed to emit that 
same amount of CO2.34  
To implement the project, PPM contracted SELCO, a US-based solar 
electric company. SELCO piloted the project in Sri Lanka, targeting tea 
plantations. At the time, 90% of the tea workers were without grid-based 
electricity and 66% were considered illiterate. Ostensibly, workers earned 
average wages of $1.58/day; however for most, their wages went to repay debts 
in a system left-over from British colonial rule. The system of indenture meant 
that SELCO had to cooperate with the plantation owners in order to launch the 
project. Those owners, who were struggling to maintain profits under a newly 
privatized system, offered solar loans exclusively to tea plantation workers, and 
then further indebted them.35  
In addition to exacerbating poor economic conditions, the program also 
exacerbated social tensions. For instance, in one test case, solar loans were first 
offered to people living in a particular area, most of who were Tamil. This 
excluded the Sinhalese, a neighboring ethnic group which already had tense 
relations with Tamils. Furthermore, the solar panel program angered local 
politicians, who had historically used promises of getting villagers ‘on the grid’ 
as a means to win elections. Some began issuing threats to discourage villagers 
from entering into the loan program. Other villagers feared that, if too many 
people bought the solar systems, the village would never get on the grid, which 
in turn would prevent small business and economic development opportunities. 
In fact, shortly after some families acquired the solar panels, those without them 
started throwing stones at those who had them. Yet, these problems went 
largely unpublicized – rather, reports about the project upheld it as a major 
success story.36  
Meanwhile back in Oregon, the City of Klamath Falls and PPM completed 
the cogeneration plant in 2001. The plant came online to much acclaim, winning 
awards and notoriety for being ‘the cleanest fossil-fueled power plant ever 
constructed in the U.S. in terms of greenhouse gas emissions,’ according to the 
website for PPM’s current owner, Spanish energy company, Iberdrola 
Renewables. Certainly, the plant did pioneer advancements in energy efficiency 
by co-generating electricity and steam, and by relying heavily on wastewater. 
Overall, the plant is estimated to attain a net energy efficiency of 54% – 20% 
higher than conventional coal-fired electric generation plants. But beyond those 
savings, one-quarter of the plant’s much-touted emissions reductions come 
from offsets.37 In fact, the project’s innovative use of offsets is as much hailed 
as its new technology. As part of this success, Klamath Falls granted plant 
owners permission to expand. Shortly after it came online, PPM built a 
secondary, peaking plant and this spring, the city approved a permit to increase 
the plant’s generating capacity.38 
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Although the Klamath Falls cogeneration plant, itself has not directly 
garnered opposition, natural gas-fired power plants present problems on several 
levels. First, they emit nitrous oxide, particulate matter and other pollutants, as 
well as noise pollution. Second, they bring a risk of pipeline explosions. Third, 
because natural gas is a fossil fuel, these plants contribute to climate change. In 
this case, the city of Klamath Falls spent millions of dollars (including a $9.4 
million upgrade to its waste water treatment plant39) to build a fossil-fuel based 
(albeit efficient) energy source rather than devoting similar resources to the 
development of renewable energy alternatives.  
Ultimately, the plant’s copious awards and positive publicity bolstered the 
value of several companies, illustrating the tangled webs that international 
power companies weave. In 2000, the British company, ScottishPower acquired 
PacifiCorp, including PPM. In 2006, Warren Buffet’s MidAmerican Energy 
Holdings Company bought PacifiCorp for $5.1 billion in cash, minus PPM, 
which remained under the ownership of ScottishPower.40 That same year, 
Iberdola announced that it was buying ScottishPower for $22.5 billion, creating 
one of Europe’s largest utilities.41 All of these companies now lay claim to 
Klamath Falls’ landmark, ‘green’ cogeneration project, made possible in part by 
the Sri Lankan solar loan program. In turn, the positive publicity awarded to 
these companies helps gloss over the fact that each has its own mixed 
environmental and social records. 
For example, although according to its website, PacifiCorp’s motto includes 
‘Responsible environmental management’, it has long been embroiled in 
controversy over its hydroelectric dams. While the company claims that the 
dams are sources of renewable energy, environmentalists and Native tribes 
maintain that they have led to the loss of natural fish habitats that offer 
subsistence to Native tribes and have diminished water quality in the Klamath 
basin. Moreover, environmentalists claim that these dam reservoirs create high 
concentrations of toxic algae and (ironically) release 104 million metric tons of 
methane annually, the single largest source of human-related methane emissions 
on the planet. Scientists have made preliminary estimates based on water quality 
conditions on the Klamath, and found that up to 1/8 of the carbon emissions 
displaced by the Klamath Hydro Project are regained from methane emissions.42 
PPM’s current owner, ScottishPower is one of the world’s five largest power 
companies and has also recently been criticized by environmental groups. 
ScottishPower owns Longannet, the second largest coal-fired power station in 
the UK, as well as the Cockenzie power station. Like the Grangemouth plant 
mentioned at the beginning of this article, both power stations sit on the Firth 
of Forth. Both were also set to close in 2015 due to their noxious emissions. 
However, ScottishPower recently made significant upgrades to Longannet, 
extending its life beyond 2015.43 It has proposed another major upgrade for 
Cockenzie, which would transform it into a natural gas-fired power station. 
However, environmentalists contend that such upgrades would not only 
prolong a reliance on fossil fuels, but also that such expansions would be 
unnecessary if more resources were devoted to developing renewable sources 
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such as wind, wave and tidal power. 44 On a more immediate level, 
ScottishPower came under fire earlier this year for having raised its consumer 
fees along with increases in energy costs and then reluctantly lowered them 
again even though energy costs had reduced.45 
In this case, tracking offsets from rural Sri Lanka to the Pacific 
Northwestern U.S. illuminates both the short and long-term implications of 
carbon offsetting for human lives. In the short term, the solar power project in 
Sri Lanka intensified social and economic tensions for the local villagers it was 
meant to serve. Offsets also provided a way for Klamath Falls to adhere to state 
greenhouse gas emission limits and build a fossil fuel-based power plant that 
emits carbon as well as other pollutants. In the longer term, offsets allowed 
project developers to claim that the plant was ‘carbon neutral’. In turn, this 
positive publicity had a doubly negative effect. First, it boosted the value of the 
companies, increasing their power and influence over workers, local politicians 
and local communities. Second, upholding offsets as being able to ‘zero out’ 
carbon emissions circumvented investment in more sustainable energy 
resources. In sum, this case exemplifies the labyrinthine trail that carbon offsets 
wend – from corporate beneficiary to corporate benefit – paths covered with a 
‘greenwash’ that hides their real environmental and human costs. 
Grangemouth, Scotland/Sao do Buriti, Brazil 
This essay’s last example returns to the case with which it began. This case 
clearly demonstrates the direct, negative impacts of offset projects on local 
communities, as well as the ways in which the benefits that offsets offer to 
industries indirectly lead to human rights abuses. Yet this case also emphasizes 
that, while offsets have the potential to bring harm to local communities, they 
also offer an opportunity for new kinds of transnational alliances that can 
challenge world leaders to find more sustainable solutions to climate change.  
To review the case, in 2002 Plantar (see also Chapter 9 in this volume), an 
iron foundry company with operations in Brazil threatened to switch from 
burning charcoal to coal in order to increase its capacity. The switch would also 
significantly increase the foundry’s greenhouse emissions, so the World Bank 
offered to help Plantar expand the eucalyptus plantations that provide its 
charcoal. The Bank financed the Brazilian project through its Carbon Fund, into 
which British Petroleum (BP) had invested substantial amounts of money to 
offset emissions from some of its operations such as the Grangemouth oil 
refinery on Scotland’s east coast. Thus, after receiving carbon credits from the 
project, BP was able to continue to operate Grangemouth without significantly 
reducing the plant’s emissions.  
However, a 2008 report by the Sustainable Energy and Economy Network’s 
co-director, Janet Redman, states that the eucalyptus trees’ enormous roots 
almost immediately began to soak up vast amounts of water in and around their 
environs. Villagers now had to travel increasingly far to find water, as well as 
traditional subsistence and medicinal plants. In addition, the tree plantation 
relied on herbicides and pesticides, which local farmers claim killed crops and 
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poisoned streams. Furthermore, the water shortage destroyed some small 
businesses that had been in families for generations. Finally, Redman writes, 
‘Perhaps more seriously, groups allege that Plantar pressured local residents to 
sign letters of support for the project or forfeit employment at the plantations.’46 
Those residents who did publicly oppose Plantar claim that they and their family 
members were threatened and/or hired to work at the plantation.47  
Meanwhile, Grangemouth, which is one of Europe’s largest oil refineries, 
emits sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide and small particulate matter into the air. 
In addition, officials at the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) 
have cited the refinery as ‘one confirmed source’ of an oil slick covering several 
square miles of the Firth of Forth.48 Grangemouth residents have long 
complained about high rates of asthma, as well as the smells and noise coming 
from the plant.  
The refinery has a similarly noxious track record on a social level. In late 
April 2008, the Unite union (Grangemouth’s workers’ union) became embroiled 
in a dispute with the refinery’s current owner, INEOS, over pension policies. 
The union accused the company of buying assets and then cutting costs by 
introducing new working practices, lowering wages, and terminating pension 
schemes.49  
INEOS has also come under fire for its involvement in another carbon 
offset project with its own set of human rights violations. Briefly, in 2005, 
INEOS partnered with GFL (see also Chapter 12 in this volume), which 
produces HCFC 22, a refrigerant gas for air conditioning units and refrigerators. 
GFL wanted to institute a program to capture and recycle HFC 23, a potent 
greenhouse gas that is a byproduct of producing HCFC 22. INEOS supplied the 
technology for the program, and both companies received the right to claim the 
carbon offsets. However, residents of Gujarat, where the GFL factory is 
located, claim that the factory has made them sick with joint aches, bone pains, 
unexplained swellings, throat and nerve problems and temporary paralysis. A 
recent investigation by the UK’s Daily Mail found ‘dangerously high levels of 
fluoride and chloride – fluoride in the water was more than twice the 
international acceptable limit. All the water fell well below any safe drinking 
standards and the soil had worryingly high levels of these chemicals.’50 But these 
chemicals do not contribute to global warming. Thus, those monitoring the 
program considered it successful in so far as it reduced greenhouse gas 
emissions.  
Thanks in part to this myopia, the CDM Executive Board approved the 
Gujarat project in 2005 and awarded INEOS and GFL an undisclosed number 
of Certified Emission Reduction units (CERs) over time (INEOS’ website 
predicts that together with a second, similar project in Korea, the Gujarat 
project will generate 3 million tons of CERs annually). Both companies were 
then free to sell those credits to industries falling short of their national 
emissions caps. For instance, in 2006, GFL made news for doubling its sales 
revenue by selling a record number of carbon credits to Noble Carbon Credits 
group of Singapore, Rabobank Nederlands and Sumitomo Corporation,51 most 
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of which resold the credits mainly to large industries needing to comply with 
Kyoto Protocols, including power and oil companies.52 According to some 
reports, some of the proceeds from GFL’s sales went to build a Teflon and 
caustic soda manufacturing facility which uses processes known to be massively 
polluting.53  
This example thus illustrates another way in which carbon credit schemes 
violate human rights – by creating dangerously perverse incentives for polluters 
to continue to pollute. First, carbon offset schemes reward corporations for 
lowering greenhouse gas emissions while allowing other highly, and deadly, toxic 
emissions. Second, GFL’s handsome profits from capturing HFC-23 have 
inspired other HCFC-22 manufacturers to follow suit, drastically lowering its 
cost. Experts predict that soon, a global over-reliance on the chemical, itself a 
powerful greenhouse gas, will result.54  
This case thus well demonstrates the ramifications of carbon offset projects 
for human rights across the globe. Most directly, offsets allowed the continued 
pollution of the Grangemouth community, and they introduced new hardships 
for people in Sao Jose do Buriti. More indirectly, the notion that Grangemouth’s 
emissions were being neutralized made it an attractive asset that increased the 
profitability of its various owners, enabling them to invest in other toxic 
projects. In the case of INEOS, I propose that purchasing Grangemouth made 
it an even more powerful player in the petrochemicals industry which in turn 
made it better able to fight off opposition from workers or local communities, 
or perhaps to lobby for the certification of new kinds of CERs. As well, the 
acquisition may have bolstered the company’s ability to continue financing its 
investments in other offset projects such as the HFC-23 program.  
At the same time, this case also demonstrates how awareness about carbon 
offset projects’ trails of tears can connect communities in very tangible ways and 
catalyze collective action. For instance, in 2003 activists opposed to the Sao Jose 
do Buriti project attracted the attention of global NGOs, which helped local 
activists disseminate information about their situation. Eventually, Carbon 
Trade Watch (a project of the Transnational Institute) initiated a project to 
connect residents of Sao Jose do Buriti and Grangemouth through the exchange 
of video diaries. As the resulting documentary film depicts, residents of both 
communities reacted powerfully to a new awareness of their connected plights 
and spoke of newfound determination to continue their local struggles. In 
Scotland, the video diaries inspired one participant first to become an activist 
with Friends of the Earth and then to run for local office.  
Thus, while offsets link communities around the globe in extended chains of 
emiseration, they also bring new opportunities for transnational alliances and 
partnerships to challenge market-based solutions to climate change. Fostering 
such opportunities, though, requires a concerted and well publicized stripping of 
the green veneer in which offsets are currently washed. Only then can we reveal 
the ecological and social tarnish hidden beneath and implement alternative 
solutions. 
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Conclusions  
Certainly, not all offset projects violate human rights in as direct a manner as 
some of the cases presented here. At the same time, some carefully documented 
accounts of the ways in which offset projects fail to benefit local communities 
are beginning to emerge. As they do, we find that offset projects have great 
potential to do more harm than good. By taking such reports a step further and 
tracking the offsets to the industries they advantage, this essay reveals multiple 
consequences for human rights and human lives. Yet at the same time, offsets 
create new opportunities for transnational alliances and partnerships to 
challenge those consequences. In order to create such opportunities, though, we 
must further strip the veneer from the greenwash that accompanies offsets and 
reveal the ecological and social tarnish hidden beneath. As this essay also makes 
clear, the need for widespread opposition to the human rights violations 
wrought by offsets is urgent. The examples presented here likely represent the 
tip of an impending iceberg – carbon markets now trade over US $1 billion 
annually, and the climate bill currently under debate in the US Congress could 
send those numbers skyrocketing.55 This December, world leaders will gather in 
Copenhagen to revisit and renew elements of the Kyoto Protocol. Under 
consideration is the certification of new ways to generate carbon offset credits, 
including biofuels and forest conservation. Although these programs appear 
environmentally and socially sound, their efficacy at reducing climate change is 
questionable, especially as they are intended only to zero-out industrial 
emissions. More immediately, like the programs described here, these initiatives 
commodify natural resources and thus have the potential to disempower local 
communities caught in the middle of land-grabs, or to exacerbate inter-group 
tensions as communities compete for offset dollars.56 Today we have a narrow 
but important window of opportunity to redirect the course of climate change 
mitigation. Myriad non-market based solutions to climate change exist which 
promote, rather than violate, human rights. Given the human stakes of the 
system currently in place, we have no choice but to establish more humane and 
effective alternatives. 
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4 
How Sustainable are Small-Scale Biomass 
Factories? A Case Study from Thailand" 
Tamra Gilbertson 
Tell me which industry you can call clean, I have never seen one. (Sunthorn 
Yensook, Nam Song resident) 
Introduction 
Carbon offsets are not reductions. For each project that is developed in the 
South, an equivalent level of pollution from fossil-fuel power stations or heavy 
industry is permitted to continue in the global North. In addition, the system 
typically funds the expansion and building of new industrial and power projects 
which are insensitive to the needs of local communities. The implications of 
such projects on health, land use and water resources are rarely addressed. In 
this respect offset projects reinforce an unsustainable development paradigm.  
The majority of CDM projects are predominantly run by large, highly-
capitalized firms or agencies, since they are the companies best placed to hire 
expensive carbon consultants and accountants, liaise with officials and pay the 
fees needed for UN registration. The result is a system that subsidizes some of 
the most polluting companies in the world.  
The CDM is presented as a system that helps the spread of renewable 
energy. However, the definition of ‘renewable’ projects does not automatically 
indicate environmentally sustainable or socially just.  
This photo essay is a story of two Thai communities fighting for their 
livelihoods. It aims to highlight the experiences of two communities that fought 
for rights to their lands and health and to demonstrate that even small-scale 
biomass energy projects – which are often seen as among the ‘better’ offset 
projects – can be detrimental to the lives and livelihoods of local residents.  
A.T. Biopower and the CDM1 
There are currently 24 registered CDM projects in Thailand and close to 100 
projects in various stages of the pipeline. In 2007, the Thai government 
established the Thailand Greenhouse Gas Organization in order to fast-track 
CDM projects after investors complained that the Office of Environmental 
Policy and Planning (the original Designated National Authority (DNA) was too 
slow, and could thus jeopardize Thailand’s opportunity to sell profitable CDM 
credits.  
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In 2001, A.T. Biopower put forward a plan to build five rice husk-burning 
biomass power stations with the objective to bundle them and acquire CDM 
financing. The A.T. Biopower project was the first CDM project registered in 
Thailand, and among the first five for which baseline methodologies were 
approved by the CDM Executive Board.2 The first power station was built in 
Pichit near the fertile banks of the Nan River in north-central Thailand. The 
Pichit station is a 22 megawatt capacity thermal power plant located next to the 
community of Sa Luang in Hor Krai subdistrict in the province of Pichit, about 
200 kilometres north of Bangkok. The plant is located 1 kilometre from the Nan 
River and has a daily fuel requirement of 500 metric tons and a daily water 
requirement of approximately 2,200 cubic metres. The station burns in its 
entirety rice husks. The power station is surrounded by a 12 metre high fence 
comprised of newly planted eucalyptus and pine trees.3 
The credits generated by the project are bought by Japan Mitsubishi UFJ 
Securities, a financial services group, and Chubu Electric, a Japanese power 
company which is registered in The Netherlands to minimize its corporate tax 
obligations. Chubu interestingly owns a 34 per cent stake in A.T. Biopower, 
allowing the company to use the Thai project to avoid its domestic emissions 
reduction obligations in Japan. 
 
 
What ‘Waste’? 
Biomass is often touted as a renewable resource which provides benefits for 
local communities and reduces the demand on fossil fuels. Defining what a 
waste product is can be very complicated for local communities because often 
resources and ‘waste’ are used and reused in a continual cycle with benefits to 
the environment. Far too often the waste in question already has a purpose 
within a local economy.  
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The staple crop grown in the region is rice which depending on the season 
and rains will produce two or three crops per year in the fertile soils. The rice is 
then brought to a de-husking facility to separate the kernels from the husk. The 
kernels are sold on to vendors or stored by the community. The husks have 
been used for centuries to absorb animal droppings, mostly from chickens. The 
resultant product is used as an agricultural fertilizer as well as for brick 
manufacturing. The rice husk and manure mixture is a natural fertilizer that 
releases minerals into the soil and builds soil content. Rice husks therefore play 
a vital role in agriculture.  
Local farmers in the region commented that they will have to replace this 
natural fertilizer with chemical fertilizers now because demand from the power 
plant has driven up the price of rice husks, meaning they are no longer 
affordable.4 Local chicken farms and brick factories have to go further away to 
source rice husks, destroying a once self-sufficient system. 
 
 
A truck piled with bags of rice husks on its way to the Pichit power station. 
 
The A.T. Biopower project claims to be replacing power generation which 
would otherwise require oil, coal and natural gas. It also claims that the resulting 
ash by-product will be used for cement production, further reducing the 
environmental impact. No mention is made of existing uses for rice husks, 
which are presented merely as waste products. This fiction is elaborated on by 
the project validator, Det Norske Veritas (DNV), which claims that 
uncontrolled burning or dumping of rice husk, without utilizing it for energy 
purposes, is the predominant current practice.5 No supporting evidence is 
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offered to back this up, and the wording is simply copied from a standardized 
text that DNV applies to all such projects.6 
By assuming that the burning of rice husks is climate neutral, talking up the 
‘sustainability’ of the project and talking down the local environmental impacts, 
the project developers are able to maximize the number of Certified Emissions 
Reductions (CER, the carbon credits issued as part of the CDM) issued to A.T. 
Biopower. Over a period of seven years, it is projected that 495,405 CER will be 
issued. When sold on the market, these might plausibly fetch between $10 and 
$30 each, with each CER claimed to represent a metric ton of carbon emissions. 
 
 
Heath Risks 
The residents near the Pichit power station have complained about respiratory 
problems and aggravation felt in their skin and lungs. ‘While my harvest has 
nearly returned to normal, health problems from the dust have persisted. 
Residents, especially children, have developed skin rashes and breathing 
difficulties, which is why we’ve closed up our windows and doors’, a local 
resident explains.7 
Silica (SiO2) is the main mineral component of RHA (85-90 per cent). It 
carries serious health risks, particularly to the respiratory system.8 Silicosis is an 
irreversible lung disease which is normally found in workers at mining 
operations or rock quarries, but it can also be caused by inhaling RHA.9 A few 
years ago certain villages in Northern Thailand were dubbed ‘villages of widows’ 
because of the large number of pestle-and-mortar-making workers who died 
from silicosis. China reports 24,000 deaths per year due to silicosis.10 Villagers 
living next to the Pichit plant keep their doors and windows closed or the ash 
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piles up on everything. These health risks have not been addressed by the 
company and like most villagers living next to a factory or power station, they 
fear complaining. 
 
 
 
The villagers complained of noise pollution when the power station was being 
built. The engine was so loud in the first month of operation that residents 
living opposite the power station complained of having to shout in order to be 
heard by each other. Instead of slowing operations or modifying the engine, the 
company responded by offering the villagers ear plugs. Each time the villagers 
have complained about the station, the standard response has been to offer 
them gifts to stay quiet. (Local residents asked to remain anonymous.) 
 
Resistance to the A.T. Biopower Station 
In 2001, A.T. Biopower was still in planning stages and the company was 
considering sites in which to build its five factories. One of the sites being 
considered was located in Nam Song, a river-dependent community in the 
Phayuha Khiri district, Nakhon Sawan province of Thailand. This community is 
located about 50 kilometres from the now functioning Pichit plant. It is located 
on the fertile flood plain of the Chao Phraya River, just downstream from where 
two tributaries merge at Nakhon Sawah (Heavenly City).  
After six years of struggle against the site proposal the Nam Song 
community successfully deterred the developers from building on their lands.  
 
Cases 
 62 
 
 
Across the road from the Pichit plant the company has started dumping the biomass waste next to 
homes of local residents. According to a local resident near the Pichit plant, they were offered ‘as 
much ash as they wanted for free because the company does not want it.’ 
 
Suraphol Pan-ngam shows his neighbor’s aquaculture operation located on the banks of the Chao 
Phraya River. The fish are raised for community consumption and for sale in the local market. 
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The main source of livelihoods is agriculture, which has been developed in a 
way that turns the seasonal floods into a resource. When the water subsides in 
the dry season, the fertile banks are planted with cabbage, broccoli and other 
seasonal vegetables. When the water is high in the rainy season, it is used to 
flood rice paddies and aquaculture facilities are assembled on the river’s edge. 
Nam Song residents were immediately concerned about the impacts a new 
power plant could have and visited a community impacted by a similar rice-husk 
burning station in Wat Sing district, Chainat province, about 40 kilometres 
southwest of Nakhon Sawan, owned by another company. One community 
leader reasoned that ‘The developers only told us positive sides about the power 
station and we are uneducated so we needed to find out about the negative sides 
too.’ Residents of Nam Song then travelled to Wat Sing, where the local 
community was living with the affects of a biomass power station. After talking 
to the residents in Wat Sing the residents and understanding the levels of 
pollution they live with the residents from Nam Song were committed to form 
their own opposition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The community forests are also an important resource, providing food, building materials, high 
ground for livestock, traditional practices and medicines. 
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Moving Forward 
After months of information gathering, the Nam Song residents experienced a 
major setback when the local tambon (subdistrict) government illegally agreed 
to install the power station in Nam Song. The Thai government requires 
developers to have a public hearing process with residents before proceeding. 
At the public meeting the local government officials and the company 
consultants met with the community and asked them to sign their names on a 
piece of paper labelled ‘consultant meeting’. The consultants and local 
government officials added names of villagers who were not in attendance. The 
company showed the list of names to the local authority, stating that 88% of the 
528 villagers who attended the meeting agreed to the power plant being built. In 
the meantime, A.T. Biopower placed a deposit on the plot of land they planned 
to develop in Nam Song. 
This incident provoked the villagers to send a grievance letter to the local 
government. Initially, they were divided over whether the power station should 
be built, which caused strife in daily life as well as between family members. 
Eventually, they resolved to end their divisions. The entire community of Nam 
Song agreed to sign the letter stating their objections to the meeting and to the 
proposed station. The villagers then created the Nam Song Conservation Club 
to co-ordinate a full-scale campaign against the project.  
 
 
 
Banner reads, ‘Stop the Electricity Plant A.T.B’. 
Reaching Out 
The Nam Song Coservation Club then began gathering research with the aid of 
other movements and organizations. The villagers sought to show that the rice 
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field was on a flood plain and an inappropriate power plant site, and that 
building it so close to where they lived constituted a threat to the health of the 
people and the river. The campaign grew over time including several rallies of 
over 700 people outside the provincial government headquarters, door-to-door 
organizing and on-going meetings.  
The developers used several tactics that are common in such situations in 
their attempts to stop the protests. Members of a community in the nearby 
Pichit province, who were also facing the possibility of a new biomass power 
station, were sent by the company to bribe the village leaders, offering them 
compensation to stop protesting. All of the village leaders were told by 
developers and local government they could be in danger if they continued the 
campaign. Various threats were made, large bribes were offered, and the 
villagers were repeatedly lied to in attempts to destroy their unity. 
 
 
Site of proposed A.T. Biopower plant near Nam Song during the seasonal floods. 
Bribery and Coercion 
The project developers invested a lot of time and energy in their attempts to 
persuade the Nam Song community that the project was beneficial, but they 
were not convinced. ‘We do not need factories or development, we live with 
nature and we like the way things are’, stated Jongkol Kerdboonma, a member 
of the club. Another resident stated ‘We knew the power plant was bad because 
it involved money’. The company promised the community a development fund 
and a new health fund in an attempt to smooth over relations, but the local 
leaders remained sceptical. ‘Which doctor will tell us that we are sick from the 
pollution if the doctor is hired by the company?’, they asked.11 
Cases 
 66 
Interestingly, the Nam Song community was never offered any electricity 
from the power plant, not even at a subsidized rate. Each household pays 300 
baht per month to the national grid. The Nam Song Conservation Club states 
three main reasons for their opposition to the rice husk power plant: 
! We have lived self-sufficiently on this river for generations, so why would we 
want to destroy the land with pollution that would be bad for the people and 
the environment? 
! We already knew they would dump the ash into our river, and that it would 
pollute the river and the fish. 
! Rice husks are not an agricultural waste product to begin with. We use them for 
the chicken pens, and after they have absorbed the chicken waste we use this as 
a fertilizer. If the station was built here rice husks would be too expensive to use 
as a fertilizer, and we would have to switch to other fertilizers.  
Essential Roles of Women 
The women in the village played an essential role in fundraising, organizing and 
maintaining trust within the community. The women made handicrafts and 
sweets to fundraise for the campaign. They sold t-shirts and sweets at meetings, 
which provided an opportunity to talk with others about the struggle and build 
trust. They canvassed an area of 10 km2 and gathered 4,000 signatures for one 
of the rallies at the government headquarters.  
 
 
 
Women from Nam Song creating handicrafts for fundraising for the campaign. 
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The success of the women’s work was such that they too were targeted and 
harassed by the project developers. The developers lied to the women, telling 
them that the men in the village were receiving bribes from the company. They 
were then further questioned about why they would want to keep supporting 
the men if they themselves were not receiving money as well. The women’s 
awareness that this tactic was being used in an attempt to derail their organizing 
confirmed to them the importance of their work for continuing their struggle.  
 
 
 
Jongkol Kerdboonma in her garden collecting vegetables for cooking. 
Organizing Together 
An open and democratic organizing process helped the community maintain its 
stamina. One resident stated, ‘We made all of our decisions together at 
meetings, which prevented internal conflicts from arising.’ The residents 
acknowledged that there were disagreements and tensions during the difficult 
phases of the struggle. ‘We would scrutinize each other, even watch each other 
and everyone was very tense’. However, the community continued to organize, 
reach out for support and demonstrate. They received solidarity and help from 
other community movements, NGOs and the Assembly of the Poor, the largest 
grassroots movement in Thailand involving tens of thousands villagers who are 
affected by unjust policy and development. The Nam Song residents said they 
‘learned a lot from each others’ struggles’ and maintained their unity so that no 
one accepted the bribes or backed down from the threats. 
After six years of struggle, and with the help of several outside solidarity 
organizations, they were able to approach the National Human Rights 
Commission (NHRC) to request an official investigation. In 2007, the NHRC 
recommended that the power plant should not be built on the grounds that it 
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was inappropriate to build on the flood plain, and that it would violate human 
rights by polluting the river and damaging the villagers’ livelihoods.  
We can not rely on any laws to protect us, which are no better than a piece of 
paper, so we had better protect ourselves, stated Soontan Yentosuk.  
And while for the moment Nam Song residents are protected from developers 
they still fear that other power plants will try to build on this particular site. The 
Nam Song Conservation Club remains committed to protecting their 
community from development projects because they are aware they may need to 
build another campaign at any moment.  
 
 
 
The Nam Song Conservation Club kept very good records of its campaign, including photos and 
notes from meetings. 
Conclusions 
Carbon offset projects follow pre-packaged designs that do not deal with the 
real complexities and intricacies of communities and livelihoods. In the case of 
A.T. Biopower, rice husks that were used for agricultural purposes are now 
burnt, showing a considerable insensitivity to the context in which the project 
has been developed. In both villages, in fact, the proposed biomass power 
plants threatened to undermine local struggles and low-carbon livelihoods, and 
subvert existing practices that have potential to be applied elsewhere as everyday 
solutions to tackling climate change. This was compounded by bribery and 
threats on the part of the company, as is so often an accompaniment of 
infrastructure projects conducted in the name of ‘development’. The bribery and 
coercion perpetuated mistrust and division between the two communities. In 
the case of Nam Song, a strong and concerted campaign of local organizing was 
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able to resist the advances of the company – benefiting too from solidarity with 
other local organizations.  
In the case of Sa Luang, however, the station was developed – with A.T. 
Biopower now brushing aside the concerns and health of local residents. CDM 
project designs are based on the principle of ‘additionality’, which means that 
they should prove that they provide a saving in relation to current ‘business-as-
usual’. As Lambert Schneider of Germany’s Öko Institute puts it, ‘If you are a 
good storyteller you get your project approved. If you are not a good storyteller 
you don’t get your project through’.12 
 
 
 
Members of the Nam Song Environmental Conservation Club 
 
The local population loses considerably. The increased reliance on synthetic 
fertilizers carries with it increased health risks, as does the production of rice 
husk ash at the site, which can cause silicosis – a fatal respiratory condition. 
Despite A.T. Biopower’s claim that this ash would be recycled for use in cement 
production, there is clear evidence at the site that it has been dumped next to 
the residents’ houses. Further health and environmental risks could result from 
the combustion of the rice husks within the power plant itself, since this process 
also generates sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, carbon monoxide and other dust 
particles. There is also a significant risk of local water pollution – along similar 
lines to those documented in the NHRC recommendation not to build a rice 
husk biomass power station in Nam Song.  
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More generally, the legacy of such development projects is that they pit 
communities against each other, and encourage divides within them too. When 
encountering local protest, the common response of the company has been to 
resort to a range of bullying tactics – including threats, lies and bribery. Further, 
what was deemed as a Human Rights Violation in one village is ignored and not 
applied to another village 50 kilometres away. 
The experience of Nam Song, however, shows that local resistance can be 
effective when there is a strong basis for unity. An open decision making 
process, and the central involvement of women in the campaign, were 
important conditions for this. 
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The potential and limits of rice husk to prepare relatively pure activated silica were 
investigated. For the activated silica, rice husk samples were submitted to a chemical pre-and 
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5 
Politics of  Methane Abatement and CDM Projects 
based on Industrial Swine Production in Chile"  
Cristián Alarcón 
Introduction  
Once the urgent need for facing climate change – which, let’s not forget, has 
been caused by a historical process of  capitalist industrialization highly based 
and dependent on the overconsumption of  forest resources and fossil fuels – is 
established, and once the extremely grave consequences of  this process are 
widely acknowledged at those centres where a lot of  global political power is 
concentrated, the question about what to practically do about climate change 
and which measures to take remains a tremendous global problem. One of  the 
roots of  such a problem is that, even if  some countries accept their 
responsibilities in the global climatic crisis, they try to keep their favorable 
positions in a world extremely divided in terms of  the distribution of  
consumption and production. Partly because of  that there are many reasons to 
be extremely concerned in relation to the negotiations prior to the United 
Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in 2009 (COP15). In fact, 
at the last G8 summit in Italy it was recognized that ‘a temperature increases of  
2% ought to be avoided’ and that this could be done by ‘achieving at least a 50% 
reduction of  global emissions by 2050’.1 While this reduction of  emissions is 
presented as a big step forward in terms of  facing climate change, it nonetheless 
contradicts scientific evidence telling us about the necessity of  much more 
radical cuts of  emissions. That is, the IPCC recommends that greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions must be globally reduced by 80-90% by 2050.2 Moreover, the 
IPCC Chairman Rajendra Pachauri highlighted the lack of  an agreement in the 
G8 to peak emissions in 2015.3 However, right after the G8 meeting Jose 
Manuel Barroso, representing the EU, reaffirmed the EU’s commitment in 
terms of  a 50% reduction of  emissions by 2050 declaring that ‘this is what 
science tells us’.4 As shown above, science actually tells us something else than 
what Barroso wants us to believe.  
So, we are facing a double exposure to both the dangers of  climate change 
and a dangerous global ruling class that in opposition to what climate change 
science tells us is simply trying to preserve the status quo. This also configures 
one of  the greatest divergences of  our time: what should be one of  the most 
important political questions of  our time, leading to massive political 
mobilization, becomes reduced to a question of  selecting ‘options’ and making 
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‘choices’ within the logic of  a capitalist market, which are then communicated to 
the public and transformed into possibilities for investments. ‘The market will 
solve it’, seems to be the tenor.  
This is to a great degree the logic of  the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) established in the Kyoto Protocol (KP), which is aimed at creating 
investment projects that, and this is the hope, would reduce global GHG 
emissions and promote sustainable development in the ‘developing world’ at the 
same time. However, criticisms of  the CDM have been widespread. The 
Financial Times (FT), for example, started a semi-critical article about the CDM 
as follows:  
What do Latin American pig farms, Chinese refrigerant factories and explosives 
makers in South Africa have in common? The answer is that they all qualify for 
carbon credits under the Kyoto Protocol.5  
The FT quoted acknowledgments made by the representative of  the KP Ivo de 
Boer about several failures of  the CDM. Yet, the article finishes stating that 
‘The need to keep up, and expand, investment flows to poor countries to help 
them cut their emissions, is a key reason why Mr de Boer is adamant that any 
post-2012 agreement must include “a toolbox” by which countries can cut their 
emissions, and which would include trading in carbon credits’. Two aspects of  
this statement are interesting to note here: First, the insistence on carbon 
trading in the post-Kyoto regime, and, second, the discourse on ‘investment 
flows to poor countries’. Despite all the documented problems with the CDM, 
it seems that carbon markets are here to stay.  
The Kyoto Protocol and the Clean Development Mechanism’s Multiple 
Objectives  
As we know, the KP and the CDM have two main declared objectives: 
reductions of  GHGs and achievement of  sustainable development. Obviously, 
both objectives are a matter of  definition. Within the IPCC, for example, 
references to the CDM can be found in several parts; for example, the Glossary 
of  the IPCC’s report from 2007 says:  
Defined in Article 12 of  the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM is intended to meet two 
objectives: (1) to assist parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable 
development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of  the convention; 
and (2) to assist parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their 
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments6  
A third CDM goal is to lower the cost of  compliance for Annex I parties.7 The 
two main goals of  the CDM reproduced above are bounded to two kinds of  
definitions: while the goal of  reducing emissions rests purely on an agreement 
about how many future emissions of  GHGs should be reduced, the second goal 
of  sustainable development makes reference to something rather undefined and 
even fuzzy. This question about the meaning of  sustainable development within 
the KP and its mechanisms has raised doubts in many places.8 It is now quite 
evident that ‘sustainable development’ must be seen as a kind of  ‘empty 
signifier’, which has been added to the Kyoto mix out of  discursive 
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considerations. But in the end it seems to mostly mean the continuation of  
‘capitalist development’. Similarly, only to say that GHG emissions have to be 
reduced without making any reference to what climate change science tells us 
needs to be done, has been critiqued widely. Hence, it has been argued that the 
KP has simply failed and it has to be ditched.9 Other critiques of  the CDM can 
be found in papers by Wara and Victor.10 These authors argue that,  
We doubt the CDM is an effective means of  engaging developing countries for 
two reasons. First, fundamentally, the CDM works mainly by encouraging 
countries to avoid broader commitments and thus rewards exactly the opposite 
behavior that should govern the long-term efforts to build an effective regime 
for regulating emissions of  greenhouse gases. Second, the CDM does not seem 
to be working well.11… the CDM, as currently structured, has serious problems 
with both the cost-effectiveness of  its interventions in developing countries and 
with the credibility of  the reductions these interventions produce.12  
Another critique has to do with the fact that GHGs considered within the CDM 
are various, different and caused by a disparity of  production and consumption 
processes. Because of  this multiplicity, GHGs are made equivalent to each other 
by inventing a measure called ‘CO2-equivalent’. So, methane emissions, for 
example, and depending on the approach used, can be conceived as having 21 
or 25 times more global warming potential (GWP) than CO2. This fix has been 
a core element within the technical implementation of  the CDM. But here 
resides also one of  the most criticized outcomes of  the CDM: the fact that a 
large portion of  Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) via the CDM are 
generated through the management of  GHGs other than CO2. In some cases 
such non-CO2 gases are possible to manage in cheaper ways than CO2. Wara, 
for example, shows how the relation between HFC-22 production and HFC-23 
abatement provides what he denominates ‘perverse economic incentives’ 
through the CDM (see also Chapter 12 in this volume). Wara and Victor 
therefore doubt that the CDM delivers any significant reduction of  emissions.  
The failure of  the CDM in achieving development goals can be found in 
many places as well. A detailed analysis and evaluation of  how development 
goals are achieved in CDM projects is offered in a report for the International 
Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), which analyzed more than 200 
CDM projects.13 Through applying certain development criteria the study found 
that the best project gets only 58 points out of  a maximum of  100. Hultman et 
al. (2009) have shown the same fact, and they emphasize the crucial factor of  
national government deciding sustainable development criteria:  
Sustainable development, being a politically central but poorly executed tenet in 
the CDM, is currently not incorporated into its core incentive structure. In the 
current system, any additional, noncarbon specific requirements are likely to 
increase costs. Similarly, it is logical that private investors focus their efforts on 
countries that pose lower political and economic risks for their projects, or who 
impose weak sustainable development criteria, and the CDM is no different in 
this regard from other forms of  foreign investments.14  
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Yet, these criticisms often remain ideologically attached to the logic of  ‘the 
market’. Prins and Rayner, for example, still argue that the problem of  the KP is 
its top-down implementation of  markets and therefore a bottom-up process of  
market-creation would be necessary. For Chafe and French, after stating that the 
carbon market will be a significant feature of  the global economy landscape in 
the years and decades ahead, one of  the most important benefits of  carbon 
markets is political: ‘They are creating powerful economic constituencies that 
favor stricter international action to stabilize Earth’s climate’.15  
In this chapter I argue that there is a need to go beyond such ‘internal 
critiques’ and offer a more totalizing critique of  the CDM, a critique that 
considers broader aspects of  the political ecology and political economy implied 
by climate change. 
Case Study  
A focus on CO2 emission that created by the burning of  fossil fuels captures an 
important portion of  the discussions on climate change. Yet, another crucial 
dimension of  the problem is industrial livestock production and its generation 
of  other GHGs in form of  byproducts. Industrial livestock relates to a massive 
production and consumption of  food, involving a very lucrative business that is 
mostly shared by a few large companies and oligopolies.16 On the other hand, 
food scarcity is deepened in many countries,17 and industrial production of  food 
has become associated with several social and environmental conflicts. 
A report by the Food Agriculture Organization (FAO), ‘Livestock’s long 
shadow: Environmental issues and options’,18 shows that the process of  
industrial pig production and the management of  pigs’ manure is a major source 
of  GHGs. ‘At a global level, emissions from pig manure represent almost half  
of  total livestock manure emissions. Just over a quarter of  the total methane 
emission from managed manure originates from industrial systems’.19 And 
‘Nitrogen concentration is highest in hog manure (76.2 g/N/kg dry weight)’.20 
The report also points out that  
globally, methane emissions from anaerobic decomposition of  manure have been 
estimated to total just over 10 million tonnes, or some 4 percent of  global 
anthropogenic methane emissions (US-EPA, 2005). Although of  much lesser 
magnitude than emissions from enteric fermentation, emissions from manure are 
much higher than those originating from burning residues and similar to the 
lower estimate of  the badly known emissions originating from rice cultivation. 
The United States has the highest emission from manure (close to 1.9 million 
tonnes, United States inventory 2004), followed by the EU. As a species, pig 
production contributes the largest share, followed by dairy.21  
Moreover, pig farms are major consumers of  water: ‘In particular, pigs require a 
lot of  water when kept in ‘flushing systems’; in this case service water 
requirements can be seven times higher than drinking water needs’.22 Pigs are 
fed with fishmeal which contributes to the overexploitation of  fish stocks. For 
example, ‘nearly 38,000 tons of  fishmeal are used in UK pig rations each year. 
This represents around 14% of  the 270,000 tons of  fishmeal consumed 
annually in the UK’.23 In a global context, FAO’s report states that ‘demand for 
Cases 
 76 
fishmeal from the pig production sector continues to increase (from 20 percent 
of  global fishmeal supply in 1988 to 29 percent in 2000)’.24 A Life Cycle 
Assessment (LCA) of  Danish pig production shows, for example, that: ‘The 
environmental impacts were 3.77 kg CO2 eq. global warming potential, 319 g 
NO3 eq. eutrophication potential, 59 g SO2 eq. acidification potential, and 1.27 
g ethene eq. photochemical smog potential per kg Danish pork delivered to 
Harwich Harbour’.25 In addition to all these environmental consequences, we 
can add that the spreading of  diseases, such as human influenza, has become 
associated to industrial pig production. At a time when swine flu had not 
reached the pandemic status we are facing today, Mike Davis had already 
exposed the deep connections between new types of  human influenza and 
industrial pig production.26  
Pig producers in Latin America can take advantage of  the CDM since the 
abatement of  GHGs caused by pig production in a Non-Annex B country can 
generate carbon credits to be traded within carbon markets. The Chilean 
company Agrosuper is the world’s eighth largest pork producer. Using vertical 
integration, cutting-edge corporate communication systems and even web pages 
in Japanese and English, the company is a global player in the food industry.27 
The company has produced and exchanged carbon credits from swine manure 
management by registering several CDM projects, and it has recently submitted 
another CDM project. After an evaluation process Agrosuper’s CDM projects 
have been accepted. (One project was rejected by the CDM board, but it has 
since been re-submitted for approval). Once accepted, Agrosuper’s credits have 
been successfully traded in the carbon market.28 The first operation was 
formally signed in the Regional offices of  FAO in 2004 with attendance of  the 
Chilean ministers of  energy, economics and environment as well as companies’ 
representatives. The national media announced this operation as one of  the 
biggest sales of  carbon credits at that time, and a corporate film about this 
CDM project can even be found on YouTube.29  
The CDM projects of  Agrosuper are labeled either as methane capture and 
combustion from swine manure treatment or as advanced swine manure 
treatment.30 The technologies used in the projects have been developed by 
Agrosuper and basically consist of  the capture and burning of  methane, which 
means that methane is converted into CO2, a GHG that has a lower GWP. 
Agrosuper presents its participation in carbon trading as follows: ‘Voluntarily 
decreasing the emission of  greenhouse gases, Agrosuper has become the first 
agro-industrial company to generate Certified Greenhouse Gas Reductions 
(Carbon bonuses).’ 31 
The Japanese Tepco and the Canadian TransAlta Corporation, two 
companies32 operating in Annex I countries and needing to offset their 
emissions to accomplish KP goals in their countries, purchased Agrosuper’s 
credits. TransAlta announced the operation in the following terms: ‘With 
emission trades like this one, TransAlta is able to cost effectively take action 
now to reduce greenhouse gas emissions’.33 In the case of  Tepco, this carbon 
offset operation is presented in its ‘Sustainability report 2008’34 as a case of  
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‘international cooperation activities’. Tepco justifies carbon trading by stating 
that: ‘Japan is among the most energy-efficient countries in the world. 
Compared to other countries, there is little room left for cost-effective domestic 
measures. Therefore, TEPCO is actively working to achieve its CO2 reduction 
target, by employing the Kyoto Mechanisms to even more efficiently reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions while contributing to sustainable development in 
developing countries’. In other words, Tepco ensures to Japanese consumers 
that they can continue using energy and keeping their production and 
consumption levels as usual because reduction of  emissions is being achieved 
among other places in Chile.  
What is meant by the reduction of  emissions is the amount of  methane 
abated in Chile. We can analyze these CDM projects following KP’s two 
objectives: 
Reduction of  Emissions 
In line with the KP, one of  the CDM’s goals is fulfilled. In fact, the baselines 
used in such CDM projects show that without the technique used the methane 
would have been released to the atmosphere. However, as these emissions are 
caused by an export oriented pig production, what are the real costs involved 
here? The fact is that a big part of  these emissions are deeply rooted in pig meat 
trade and export from Chile to other markets. In addition, and as the business 
goes very well for the company, production increases in order to satisfy demand 
and so are also emissions. A circle becomes evident here: as the export of  pig 
meat increases, more methane is produced and more carbon credits can be 
generated. However, as we will see below, this process has both environmental 
and human dimensions not accounted for in the CDM. And also, a 
contradictory effect can be noticed: as mentioned earlier, methane has a higher 
GWP than CO2. On the other hand, CO2 lasts much longer in the atmosphere 
than methane which has a long-life of  12 years (IPCC). This point is crucial to 
understand the politics of  methane abatement as a way of  facing climate 
change. On a broader and global scale, this can even be seen from a cost 
effectiveness point of  view:  
Given the relatively short life-time of  the temperature response of  methane 
reductions and that the target will be met beyond the middle of  this century the 
shadow price of  methane will be relatively low compared to what is found in the 
cost-benefit analysis or to its GWP value calculated over 100 years. The case is 
different for carbon dioxide since it has an almost irreversible effect on the 
temperature. Hence, given a cost-effectiveness approach (with a 2 K target) the 
use GWP overvalues the importance of  reducing methane in year 2020, and 
correspondingly, relatively more economic resources should be devoted to 
reduce long-lived greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide.35  
Sustainable Development 
According to the CDM, Agrosuper’s projects should contribute to sustainable 
development goals. What the projects say in order to fulfill such a requirement is 
for example: ‘The project activity can be stated as a relevant improvement for 
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sustainable development, distressing local (odors) and global environmental 
pressures. This advanced system minimizes the odors related to swine manure 
management, because organic matter is stabilized through an aerobic process.’36 
The same claims about sustainable development are repeated word by word in 
all the other CDM projects of  Agrosuper. But besides the general negative 
patterns and consequences of  industrial pig production presented above, we can 
add some local socio-environmental issues connected to these CDM projects: 
! The company has had several and serious negative impacts on the local 
environments where it has been operating. The Chilean environmental 
assessment system has registered a large number of  violations of  
environmental regulations, which range from illegal discharge of  sewage into 
rivers to illegal overloaded of  manure in lagoons; from dust pollution to 
illegal extraction of  water. In 2008 the environmental NGO Terram reported 
that, according to a study by the Chilean maritime authority, Agrosuper’s 
activities close to a lake caused serious pollution.  
! Another grave case took place in the El Yali wetland, which is a Ramsar site 
into which sewage from Agrosuper was discharged. In addition to the 
pollution of  the wetland caused by Agrosuper, the firm obtains subterranean 
water from that wetland. Agrosuper is one of  the main users of  these water 
sources, which has been estimated to have negative impacts on the wetland.  
! In another part of  the country characterized by water scarcity, the company 
has a large project of  industrial pig production and also has plans to build a 
private port for production purposes. Not surprisingly, water issues have 
become the subject of  conflict there.37 Not surprisingly either, this project is 
also aimed at producing CERs within the CDM. Table 1 shows some of  the 
violations of  environmental regulations attributed to Agrosuper in facilities 
linked to CDM projects (‘fine’ shows how little the company would have to 
pay for these violations.38 The ‘date’ shows that the violations are fairly 
recent and hence occur in plants that have been approved as part of  the 
CDM): 
 
Plants linked 
to a CDM 
project 
Violations Fine 
(Approx. 
Chilean 
Pesos) 
Date 
Corneche a) unauthorized construction of  new 
lagoon to storage RILES39 without 
impermeabilizacion measures 
b) Unilateral change of  point of  
discharge of  sewage  
16,362,000 24 July 
2007  
Huasco Non-authorized extraction of  water 8,667,000 7 Feb 
2008 
Huasco Non-compliance in control of  dust 
pollution from its facilities  
16,103,000 27 April 
2007 
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Plants linked 
to a CDM 
project 
Violations Fine 
(Approx. 
Chilean 
Pesos) 
Date 
La Manga Unauthorized construction of  a well 
for disposal waste. A well many times 
bigger than the authorized  
Warning 17 June 
2008 
Huasco Illegal construction of  two lagoons 
for water storage (size bigger than 
50,000 m3) related to pig farms 
17,403,500 30 April 
2008 
Maintenlahue Spill over of  sewage (Liquid 
Industrial Residues) to the 
Maintenlahue marsh, storage of  non 
treated purines40 in furrows non 
considered in the project  
16,023,000 8 Aug 
2006 
Maintenlahue Non reforestation of  5,39 ha 
required in the management plant  
Maintenance of  untreated purines in 
a lagoon of  61,000 m3 
9,661,800 
 
16 April 
2007 
Peralillo Maintenance of  untreated purines 
Unauthorized construction of  a 
waste lagoon 
16,135,500 8 March 
2007 
La Manga Unauthorized spill over and 
discharge of  liquid residues; 
Non notice to authorities of  spill 
over of  residues; 
Unauthorized discharge of  sewage 
into a stream that leads to a wetland 
(A Ramsar site and also a national 
natural reservoir)  
16,362,000 18 July 
2007 
Ramirana Discharge of  sewage into a stream 
not considered for this purposes in 
the environmental authorization 
15,138,500 22 Feb 
2005 
 
! Along with this environmental record, an outbreak of  listeria was detected in 
2009 at one of  the company’s plants. Listeria was caused by bad sanitary 
conditions, and the company was forced by the authorities to close the plant 
down temporarily.  
! Furthermore, the company has been involved in serious conflicts with 
workers at its facilities. Agrosuper employs about 17,000 workers, and there 
have been a string of  bad working conditions, anti-unions practices, low 
wages and violations of  labor rights. In 2007 more than 600 workers were 
striking at the Rosario and Lo Miranda pig processing plants with the goal of  
obtaining the right of  collective bargaining and better salaries. As a 
consequence, the company fired the workers en masse. Today, at least 200 
workers are still in the courts trying to obtain their rights. Aware of  the 
consequences of  sanitary conditions within food processing plants, some 
workers and unions have been active whistleblowers even at the risk of  
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losing their jobs. This was the case at Agrosuper’s Huechuraba plant where 
bad meat, which was still supposed to be sold on the market, was exposed by 
workers. 
As has been pointed above, a big part of  Agrosuper’s pig production is aimed at 
export with a considerable portions going to Japanese consumers. In 2008 the 
Japanese authorities alerted the public about considerable levels of  dioxin 
contained in pork entering the Japanese market from Chile.41 A temporal ban on 
pork imported from Chile was declared. One of  the companies affected by the 
ban was Agrosuper.42 In other words, the very same industrial pig farming that 
enabled Japanese consumers to keep up their energy consumption through the 
CDM was banned because of  dioxins found in the pork meat. Interestingly, 
Tepco, one of  the buyers of  the CERs created by Agrosuper, has a no less 
dubious environmental record. In 2002 Tepco was at the center of  a scandal 
related to safety conditions at its nuclear power plants, and it became known 
that the company had been falsifying security tests at its plants. In this case, also 
a whistleblower permitted to discover the practices of  Tepco.43 
Gas Commodity Fetishism and Unequal Exchange 
Tepco’s and TransAlta’s clients are probably not thinking about pig manure or 
the socio-environmental consequences of  industrial pig production in Chile 
when they switch on their electricity. Nor do they think about workers getting 
fired, trying to better their working conditions. This is not very surprising, given 
that under capitalism people are alienated from places, resources and producers. 
The process of  exchange of  commodities within capitalist markets conceals the 
social relations underpinning the process of  creating exchange value from use 
values. In this regard, Marx clarifies that it is not only labor which is the source 
of  use value and wealth:  
Labor is not the source of  all wealth. Nature is just as much the source of  use 
values (and it is surely of  such that material wealth consists!) as labor, which 
itself  is only the manifestation of  a force of  nature, human labor power.44  
Harvey points out that commodity fetishism also conceals geographical 
relations interwoven in the process of  capitalist production and exchange.45 In 
Marx’s analysis of  capitalist, production and consumption are dialectically 
linked, and commodity fetishism is that which conceals the real material 
dynamics of  such a dialectical process of  capitalist exchange. Mass consumption 
(particularly in the North) has been the attempt by capital to keep social control 
and integrate workers into, and legitimize, its system of  accumulation, bearing in 
mind though that this takes place in parallel with ongoing unequal exchange – 
both in social and ecological terms – in other parts of  the world. For, a part of  
the workers in countries that have accumulated more capital, to consume cheap 
commodities depends on production allocated somewhere else. Within this 
context, sustainable development under capitalism is also a way of  continuing 
the dialectical process of  development and underdevelopment associated with 
differences between countries and within countries. Carbon markets, which 
Upsetting the Offset 
  81 
supposedly aim to reduce GHG emissions, are one expression of  this global 
dynamic.  
Yet, the nature and conceptualization of  a market for carbon credits 
challenges our theoretical imagination. But with this carbon commodity, what is 
really produced and consumed here?46 The first thing to realize here is that these 
markets are very much government driven – so much about the neoliberal 
ideology of  ‘free markets’. For a company in a country like Chile, for example, 
the process of  entering into the carbon market is not that difficult, as there is a 
whole governmental framework to take advantage of  the KP and the CDM. 
That is, companies get support all the way before selling their credits and hence 
profiting from these markets, not to mention the generous support industrial 
pig production companies receive in general terms. But, of  course, we are 
dealing here with global neoliberal contexts, involving companies and 
consumers in Japan and Canada as well. The point is that climate change implies 
a politics where tales of  environmentalism, cooperation and development are 
rooted in global structures of  political ecology and political economy. That is, 
the attempt to deal with climate change through logics of  cost effectiveness 
must be understood as an expression of  the global structures of  political 
ecology and political economy of  capitalism. In short, it is historically specific. 
Some people have named our era ‘anthropocene’ because ‘we’ have had the 
global social power to change the climate.47 One should add, though, that the 
social power to create such an era lies within the dynamics of  production and 
consumption shaped by capitalism worldwide. In fact, to root the economic 
system to a great extent in fossil fuels is a specific feature of  capitalism. And the 
organization of  massive and increasing consumption beyond biophysical limits, 
based on the overuse of  raw materials, ecosystems and foodstuffs, must also be 
understood as a specific feature of  capitalism. Therefore, we cannot miss the 
fact that climate change is a matter of  global social power and its relation to 
local and global ecosystems. Any attempt, I would argue, to truly understand the 
core of  the ecosystems-society relationship under capitalism must deal with the 
dialectical relation between production and consumption. Equally, any attempt 
to think of  truly sustainable human-nature relationships needs to radically 
rethink and transform both the mode of  production and the mode of  
consumption. Tragically, the solutions mostly favored today are those shaped by 
the ruling capitalist elites. That is, capitalist market mechanisms and cost-based 
strategies are strongly internalized as the only ways to solve climate change, 
reinforcing commodity fetishism through carbon trading. It is illustrative to note 
here that the IPCC’s reports have somehow reflected this logic in the rationale 
of  cost-based proposals, which have been favored to environmental targets. 
Actually, this issue goes back to the First Assessment Report (FAR), as one 
author points out:  
Although the IPCC involves thousands of  participants, there are scientists who 
are marginalized by core group members of  the IPCC. For example, during the 
drafting process of  the FAR, a study that based analysis of  response options on 
environmental targets was excluded by IPCC WG3 as basis for the formation of  
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emission scenarios as its effects-based logic ran counter to the IPCC’s cost-based 
assessment of  strategies.48  
As we know, the whole process of  negotiating a climate change regime is based 
on the recognition of  an environmental crisis. When it comes to the idea of  
crisis, the critics of  capitalism tend to feel as if  they are navigating in a fertile 
territory, and hence quick conclusions are made in terms of  hopes and social 
mobilizations. But hopes for what? Development? What the climate crisis 
teaches us is that in parallel to the efforts of  agreeing the radical measures 
needed to face climate change properly, we also need to consider development 
and unequal global social relations, because both are part of  the same capitalist 
coin that has produced the climate crisis in the first place. 
Conclusions 
The CDM projects critiqued in this paper connect the industrial production of  
pigs in Chile to electricity consumption in Japan and Canada. This case has 
unveiled some basic flaws of  the CDM logic: the persistence of  unequal 
exchange in both flows of  energy and labor terms, and a myth of  technology 
transfer through the global KP regime. The technology in this case was basically 
developed in Chile, which is inherently connected to the goal of  exporting more 
and more pig meat to international markets. This pig production in Chile can be 
conceived as a typical example of  a process of  underdevelopment, enriching the 
local capitalist class through a process of  degradation of  local environments and 
exploitation of  local workers. What is new is that this underdevelopment 
process is now made possible through discourses of  climate change mitigation 
and ‘sustainable development’, which, in fact, has the only aim of  maintaining 
high levels of  energy production and consumption in both Canada and Japan, 
hence cementing these countries’ privileged positions in the world system. 
Besides, these reductions of  emissions can be conceived as illusory, as they are 
based on a questionable baseline. The logic of  the CDM is this: the same 
company that with one hand affects both environments and people negatively 
gets money and makes windfall profits for supposedly helping to mitigate 
climate change with the other. 
It is now clear that the ideological construction of  neoliberalism is aimed at 
convincing people that we can face the challenges of  climate change within the 
capitalist systems. In responding radically to climate change, we cannot forget, 
as David Harvey has insisted on, that the neoliberal project is a class project, 
and as such carbon trading must be understood within the category of  the 
trans-national capitalist class. In a broader context, human ecologist Alf  
Hornborg49 has recently put it this way:  
We are not all sitting in the same boat, as the metaphor goes. We are sitting in at 
least two different boats, but one is pulling us all toward disaster. There are 
definitely powerful social groups who have very much to gain – at least within 
the anticipated time-frame of  their own lifetimes – from the current organization 
of  global society.50  
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The CDM is just one expression of  such a global pattern, and we have to 
criticize it as such. But it is not enough to just keep the spirit of  critique alive 
and to produce the best analysis of  capitalism if  we are not moving into the 
direction of  social changes. Here resides the challenge of  a full recovery of  the 
somehow missing link between the critique of  capitalism and the performative 
goal of  starting to create a different world here and now. Making stronger the 
critique of  the Kyoto Protocol without imposing a new path is futile today. 
Thus, any attempt of  thinking about the sustainability of  ecosystems on earth 
must be concerned with how production and consumption are materially 
organized. In my view, the starting point for such a new path would be social, 
rational, non-profit and truly eco-based planning, as opposed to capitalist 
markets and capitalist class organization of  the world economy.  
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Paying the Polluter? The Relegation of Local 
Community Concerns in ‘Carbon Credit’ 
Proposals of Oil Corporations in Nigeria 
Isaac ‘Asume’ Osuoka 
Introduction 
While the reduction in fossil fuels production and usage is central to the 
discourse on climate change, the neoliberal mechanisms for climate change 
mitigation have been widely critiqued. In the case of oil producing regions of 
the Global South, key socio-economic and environmental concerns of ‘host’ 
communities to hydrocarbon exploitation remain unaddressed. Carbon trading 
schemes may in fact worsen the social dynamic of dispossession and 
disempowerment of local communities by the state/corporation alliance as it 
occurs in Nigeria. I examine the proposals for ‘carbon credit’ within the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) as made by transnational oil and gas 
corporations involved with the West African Gas Pipeline and Eni-Agip’s 
Kwale gas project. Both projects claim that utilization of natural gas from the 
Niger Delta for export and marketing to power plants would contribute to 
reducing the greenhouse gas emissions associated with routine flaring of 
associated gas. A look at the proposals and the responses of ‘stakeholders’ such 
as the government, World Bank Group, and local civil society groups exposes 
not just the inherent flaws in the proposals, but the CDM itself, and shows how 
carbon trading may relegate community concerns about local pollution, 
livelihoods and ‘resource control’. 
The methodologies of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allow for 
carbon credits to be awarded to projects aimed at reducing gas flaring. 
Corporations involved in oil production in Nigeria have made applications in 
relation to investments for reducing associated gas flaring. However, from the 
point of view of communities in Nigeria’s Niger Delta, the prospect of these 
corporations making additional profits from selling or gaining carbon credits is 
tantamount to adding insult to injury. For fifty years the corporations, with the 
connivance of colonial and independent governments, have organized crude 
exploitation in ways that have destroyed local livelihoods and turned the Delta 
area, as indeed the country, into a war zone characterized by massacres of whole 
communities and widespread dislocation. But now the corporations largely 
responsible for the problems of oil production, which have failed to stop the 
dangerous flaring of oil’s associated gas, are seeking some extra pay. This they 
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would do simply with the presentation of some paperwork indicating how they 
hope to solve a bit of the problem they have created. Perhaps unsurprisingly, in 
the last few decades, we have been told that the market solves all problems, 
including cleaning up its own mess. But does it? 
Gas flared in Nigeria contains high amounts of methane and carbon dioxide 
– major greenhouse gasses that are contributors to global warming. Gas flaring 
from the Niger Delta oil fields produces emissions that are more than the 
combined emissions of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa.1 While no reliable data 
have been provided by the government and corporations, one estimate is that 
oil corporations in Nigeria were flaring 2.5 billion standard cubic feet of 
associated gas daily in 2004. This represents 70 million metric tons of CO2 
emissions per year.2 Global outrage over continuing flaring in Nigeria and the 
acceptance of projects that reduce the practice for credits within the CDM 
system have resulted in applications from oil corporations. 
This chapter concerns how oil corporations operating in countries like 
Nigeria try to exploit these schemes. We shall examine the character of 
hydrocarbon exploitation in the country and how the state, from colonial times, 
has condoned the flaring of associated gas and other acts of pollution. This is in 
spite of evidence of environmental damage and wastage of national energy 
resources. A critical look at how associated gas is generated would help expose 
the inadequacies of flaring data presented by industry and government, which 
are often used to justify claims that gas infrastructure projects would lead to 
reduction in flaring. These would explain inherent flaws in the applications by 
oil corporations for carbon credits; in showing how futile the CDM is, beyond 
just providing fresh profit opportunities corporations. We shall end by pointing 
out the way towards alternatives from the actions of the people themselves in 
resisting fossil fuels exploitation. 
Marketing the Atmosphere 
The crisis of neoliberal globalization, currently expressed in financial meltdown 
with socio-economic reverberations, offers us another opportunity to examine 
the problems that were created by an enforced obsession with the ‘market’. In 
most sectors states were pushed to deregulate so that corporations would self-
regulate. Laws and institutions were restructured in a form that tended to 
weaken citizens while further empowering corporations.3 We have seen how 
attempts have been made to replace liability and the idea of ‘the polluter pays’ 
with schemes of ‘corporate social responsibility’. Here states and multilateral 
institutions like the United Nations endorsed voluntary mechanisms that 
suggested a kind of superiority of corporations over national laws and local 
systems. Some international ‘civil society’ organizations joined up with 
corporations to promote schemes and voluntary principles on everything from 
human rights practice of corporations to how companies may (s)elect to consult 
with local people.  
As the global impact of climate change was increasingly becoming a serious 
issue for world governments, the market paradigm and the predilection towards 
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corporate voluntarism came to define official solutions. In the area of carbon 
reduction, such market mechanisms were promoted via carbon trading schemes, 
epitomized under the Kyoto Protocol that emerged from the third Conference 
of Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) in 1997. Carbon Trading and its sister Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) were part of Kyoto’s ‘flexible’ market based mechanisms 
which are supposed to help reduce greenhouse gas emissions by allowing the 
major emitting industrialized countries to be granted emissions permits up to 
limits accepted by the protocol, calculated in units of carbon dioxide (one ton of 
carbon dioxide equals one Certified Emission Reduction). The governments 
could trade these permits onto the industries in their countries. Fuzzy cap and 
trade systems have since emerged that allow companies that have not used up all 
of their permits or that want to continue polluting to sell or purchase excess 
carbon credits to or from other companies.  
Specifically, the CDM is a system for generating credits. Corporations can 
present investments in projects in developing countries of the South that will 
supposedly reduce emissions and thus generate new credits. The companies 
could use this credit to ‘offset’ its emissions of greenhouse gases over the 
permitted levels in their home country. Or sell such credits for profit in the 
carbon market. 
Citizens groups and their networks such as Oilwatch and the Durban Group 
have since challenged these market based mechanisms for ‘instead of 
materializing the objectives of the Climate Change Convention through 
concrete and effective measures...by changing patterns of production and 
reducing fossil fuel consumption, transfer responsibility for emissions 
reductions onto third parties and create new business opportunities for the 
polluters.’4 For Oilwatch, such mechanisms are mere palliatives that allow 
corporations and countries with the most emissions to do ‘too little’ and 
reinforce the marginalization of the peoples of the Global South.  
Though the United States was to pull out of Kyoto under George W. Bush, 
European Union countries championed it with an Emissions Trading Scheme 
(ETS) launched in January 2005. However, their ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol was the beginning of ‘scandals and market mishaps’ as the whole 
system was bedevilled with ‘intrinsic problem in setting an artificially-generated 
market price for carbon’.5 Existing carbon trading systems do not provide any 
clear and adequate measurements of emissions and ‘carbon offsets’ nor 
mechanisms for global enforcement. No wonder the markets are crashing along 
with the edifices of global neoliberalism. 
Efficiency and cost effectiveness became major considerations with 
neoliberalism. With the CDM, it was assumed that by reducing emissions in a 
developing country cheaply, instead of concrete actions in the developed 
countries, corporations can achieve benefits for the global climate in a more 
cost effective manner. However, as it has been pointed out elsewhere in this 
volume, the real cost of achieving such reductions in the developing countries in 
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the form of loss of land and livelihoods, human rights abuses of local people 
etc. are not calculated.  
In the examples of the gas flare reduction projects that have been presented 
for the CDM, sponsors’ claims for carbon credit fail to account for all the costs 
that have been forced on Nigerian communities through all stages of oil and gas 
exploitation – from exploration to transportation and refining.  
Petroleum and Exploitation 
Petroleum exploitation is considered as one of the most environmentally 
damaging of all human activities. When extracted from the tropics, negative 
impacts commence from the exploration to production stages. In Nigeria’s 
Niger Delta area, communities are confronted by the industry directly at the 
level of production (seismic exploration, drilling, forest and farmlands clearing 
for pipeline construction). They face direct loss of land rights by the 
instrumentality of military era decrees. The absence of enforcement of state 
regulations have meant that oil corporations pay only lip service to 
environmental and social standards with the results of pollution of all sorts. 
Communities continue to face discrimination in the way profits and revenues 
from extracted resources are used and are subjected to unfair compensation, 
and they suffer violence on their persons and their communities whenever they 
sought to protest or demand justice.  
Post independence the Nigerian state has tended to retain the character of 
the colonial; that of facilitating exploitation of (petroleum) resources for export 
and depending on oil rents. It is not surprising, therefore, that little or no action 
has been taken to address the problem of associated gas flaring over fifty years 
after the first oil well was drilled at Oloibiri in the Niger Delta.  
Crude Oil and Gas Flaring in Nigeria 
Of particular concern to us here is associated gas flaring by the oil corporations, 
which produces continuous noise, rise in temperature in communities close to 
flare sites, acid rain and retarded crop yield, corroded roofs, respiratory and skin 
diseases. In addition, many communities suffer the impact of the ‘perpetual 
light’ with the unnatural illumination from gas flares at night.6  
Gas flares don’t just happen. It is a consequence of ill conceived and badly 
regulated exploitation for crude oil. In Nigeria’s Niger Delta area, both onshore 
oil fields contain very large amounts of ‘associated gas’ that are mixed with 
crude oil in an area that has been described as a ‘gas colony’. Under British 
colonial rule, Shell had prospected for and discovered these petroleum deposits 
in large quantities. In tune with the norm of the colonialist that engaged in 
resource extraction purely for export and profit expropriation, the corporation 
and their government at that time considered only the crude oil as valuable, as 
there was a ready ‘market’ in Europe. However, in drilling for crude oil, gas that 
was mixed with the crude in the reservoir also comes out. This is called 
associated gas in the industry. From 1956, Shell decided to collect the crude, 
while treating the associated gas as a waste product – burning it off. This is what 
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is referred to as ‘gas flaring’, which received particular critique with the rise of 
Ogoni resistance. It is done at flow stations, which are huge installations where 
crude oil is collected from a network of pipelines (flowlines) that transport oil 
from the numerous oil wells. At the flow stations, associated gas is burnt off in 
huge stacks that produce giant flames. Waste water from the oil wells are often 
emptied into pits near the stations while the treasured crude oil is collected and 
pumped into pipelines that take oil to the coastal export terminals.  
In 1956 other options that could have been considered by the developers to 
avoid the local pollution of associated gas flaring was to reinject into the 
reservoir or to build gas powered power plants to provide electricity to the 
Niger Delta region and shore up the Nigerian grid. But local people did not 
constitute a profitable market and the extra investments for reinjection were 
considered too expensive in comparison to the cheaper option of burning into 
the natural environment. And Shell and the British administration were not 
oblivious of the consequences of associated gas flaring, as has been exposed in 
comments made by a British officials a few years after Nigeria gained flag 
independence. In 1963, Mr. J.S. Sadler, the British Trade Commissioner in 
Nigeria made the following comments in a memo to British Foreign Office in 
London: 
Shell/BP’s need to continue, probably indefinitely, to flare off a very large 
proportion of the associated gas they produce will no doubt give rise to a certain 
amount of difficulty with Nigerian politicians, who will probably be among the 
last people in the world to realise that it is sometimes desirable not to exploit a 
country’s natural resources and who, being unable to avoid seeing the many gas 
flares around the oilfields, will tend to accuse Shell/BP of conspicuous waste of 
Nigeria’s ‘wealth’. It will be interesting to see the extent to which the oil 
companies feel it necessary to meet these criticisms by spending money on 
uneconomic methods of using gas.7  
To better understand the problem of gas flaring in the Niger Delta area (and 
expose the lies of later day carbon credit seeking corporations), it is important to 
indicate that apart from the crude oil fields that contain associated gas, there are 
also many pure natural gas deposits. This gas is referred to by the industry as 
non-associated gas. Oil corporations in Nigeria have built large Liquefied 
Natural Gas (LNG) plants in Bonny while others are planned. These ‘gas 
utilization’ projects like Chevron’s Escravos Gas plant have been build to be fed 
with mainly non-associated gas, the production of which does not affect the rate 
of oil’s associated gas production and flaring.8  
One estimate is that Nigeria has 124 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of proven gas 
reserves (of which about 50% is non-associated gas), making it the ninth among 
the countries with the largest proven gas reserves globally.9 However, there are 
several of such estimates. One presented by government officials suggest that 
Nigeria has the seventh largest proven gas reserves with 182 tfc.10 Yet figures 
concerning oil and gas production in Nigeria are widely held to be manipulated 
and exploited for a range of reasons: For multinationals to avoid taxes, in order 
to justify an increase in Nigeria’s OPEC quota (which are allocated on the basis 
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of proven reserves). Other reasons for this are to mask the real volume of 
associated gas flaring, and most recently, to gain carbon credits.  
Indeed, in the light of disclosures that Shell had overstated its proven 
reserves in Nigeria to fraudulently boost is share value in the US and UK, 
discrepancies in the figures presented above seem to reflect a more widespread 
practice – wherein data disclosure on production figures serves business 
strategy.11 
Gas Flaring and the CDM 
As the local complaints about associated gas flaring became louder, oil 
corporations and Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) have 
occasionally presented bizarre claims and figures to show how they are acting to 
reduce the problem. Most of these involve manipulation of associated and non-
associated gas production volumes. For, example, in NNPC’s official data for 
gas production and flaring in 2007, the actual mix of associated and non-
associated gas is concealed – leading to a misrepresentation, as shown below. 
 
Volume of in BSCF 
Gas produced in 2007 2,415.65 
Gas utilized (for liquefied natural 
gas) 
1,626.10 (67.32%) 
Gas flared 789.55 (32.68%) 
 
Table 1: Nigeria Gas Flaring and Utilization (Source: Nigeria National Petroleum 
Corporation 2007 Annual Statistical Bulletin)12 
 
While the above figures released by the government’s NNPC suggest that the 
rate of gas flaring by all the oil companies operating in Nigeria was 32.68% in 
2007, data that presents the volume of associated gas produced side by side 
non-associated gas in a particular period would show a more accurate rate of 
flaring.  
With the dearth of complete data from the industry, my estimation based on 
available crude oil production figures arrives at different figures. It is the 
common understanding that every million barrel of crude oil produced in 
Nigeria contains about a billion standard cubic feet of associated gas. In 2007, 
the NNPC reports that the combined crude oil production was 803 million 
barrels. This should contain about 803 billion standard cubic feet of associated 
gas. Based on this estimate, we have presented an alternative table as a more 
accurate estimate of volume and percentage of gas flaring in 2007. 
 
 in BSCF  
(unless otherwise stated) 
Crude oil production in 2007 803 mil barrels 
Estimated associated gas generated from crude oil 
production in 2007 
803 
Total volume of gas produced in 2007 (sum of 
associated and non-associated gas) 
2,415.65 
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 in BSCF  
(unless otherwise stated) 
Estimated volume of non-associated gas produced 
in 2007 (obtained by deducting associated gas 
estimate from the total gas production for 2007) 
1,612.65 
Volume of gas utilized (for liquefied natural gas)  1,626.10 
Volume of gas flared 789.55 
Estimate of associated gas flared in 2007 98.33% 
 
Table 2: Independent estimate of volume and percentage of gas flaring in 2007 
This expanded table, which takes associated gas into consideration, gives a more 
accurate view of gas flaring in 2007 – producing estimates of 98%. This 
percentage figure appears more consistent with oil industry history and 
continuing practices such as the near total utilization of non-associated gas for 
LNG and other commercial gas projects. Before non-associated gas fields were 
developed by oil corporations for LNG and other gas export ventures, over 
90% of all associated gas was flared, as shown in official government data. 
NNPC records reveals that 98.45% and 98.27% of all gas produced was flared 
respectively in 1969 and 1975. The high percentage of flaring in those years in 
NNPC data (compared to 32.68% in 2007) is because there were no non-
associated gas developments at that time. Later, the non-associated gas fields 
were developed for utilization in LNG and other gas export projects. By 
presenting figures of gas utilization out of the sum of associated and non-
associated gas, the corporations and the NNPC could show a reduced 
percentage of flaring. To further buttress this point, we will take another look at 
NNPC’s 2007 ‘summary of gas production and utilization’ of all oil corporations 
operating in Nigeria. This summary shows that Texaco and Addax flared 
97.69% and 86.34% of all the gas they produced during the year. In the same 
table, Shell and Elf (Total) are reported to have flared 12.58% and 15.24% of all 
the gas it produced in 2007.13 My conclusion is that the low flaring figures 
recorded for Shell and Elf is because of the very high volume of non-associated 
gas developments for the Bonny LNG. On the other hand, neither Texaco nor 
Addax was involved in non-associated gas production for LNG, resulting in a 
more realistic figure for flaring by these corporations.  
Rather than developing programmes to capture associated gas, and reduce 
flaring, oil corporations have continued to develop new non-associated gas 
fields that, in fact, account for the 10.69% increase in gas production 2007, as 
compared to 2006 figures provided by the NNPC.14 
Major oil corporations in Nigeria have used the LNGs and other non-
associated gas projects to attempt to justify such claims of reduction of gas 
flaring. But this would only be true if all gas produced in Nigeria are associated 
with crude oil. To show how disingenuous the oil companies have been, even 
the World Bank, their traditional supporter, rejected Shell’s earlier claim that the 
Bonny LNG would contribute to gas flare reduction. The Bank revealed that 
initial plants (called trains) of the Bonny LNG were designed to utilize unflared 
non-associated gas. This meant that the project at the early stages did not 
contribute to the flaring of associated gas as Shell claimed.15  
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The case of the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) in a further 
demonstration of how proposed projects in the CDM have been employed to 
claim credits for future reductions in gas flaring by multinationals. As one of the 
region’s largest trans-boundary investments the WAGP, which is incorporated 
in Bermuda, is a 681 km onshore and offshore pipeline meant to transport 
natural gas from gas fields in the western Niger Delta of Nigeria to selected 
consumers in Benin Republic, Togo and Ghana. Construction on the WAGP 
started in 2004 and was ‘substantially completed’ in 2007. Project promoters, 
including Chevron and Shell, stated that WAGP will reduce carbon emissions, 
provide cheaper, more reliable and environmentally friendly energy, and foster 
economic development and integration in Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria. But 
the WAGP was linked to a previously existing Escravos-Lagos Pipeline (ELP), 
which collects gas from Chevron’s Escravos Gas Plant that was built to process 
unflared non-associated gas.  
It remains unclear how the WAGP would reduce flaring, when it is intended 
to process not the ‘waste’ gas associated with crude oil that has been flared for 
decades, but rather the newer non-associated gas reserves often developed for 
export. So the question is how Chevron, Shell, the Nigerian government and 
other sponsors of the WAGP can explain how to end associated gas flaring by 
building a pipeline to transport non-associated gas? Interestingly, when this 
author and other citizen-activists confronted Chris Miller, a Chevron official 
and project manager of the WAGP face to face with this question, Miller 
admitted that projections on greenhouse gas emissions reduction from the 
WAGP were ‘theoretical’.16 But such assumptions did not stop Chevron from 
continuing to mount a spirited campaign to justify its request for carbon credits 
on account of the WAGP.  
Such theoretical estimations of emissions reductions is commonplace in the 
industry, and should disqualify carbon credit seeking corporations for failing to 
meet measurability criteria of the CDM. Indeed, the corporations would fail on all 
other criteria of the CDM including additionality, sustainable development, 
Environmental Impact Assessment and community consultation. 
In Nigeria, gas flaring is also already prohibited and companies like Chevron 
and Shell have been paying a penalty for non-compliance. So, oil industry 
projects like the WAGP claiming to reduce gas flaring cannot be said to provide 
any additionality.17 Also, oil and gas production rarely contributes to economic 
development in developing countries. Fifty years of oil and gas development in 
Nigeria have resulted in mass impoverishment, as a result of pollution and 
mismanagement of oil rents. Dependence on rent from oil and gas have resulted 
in the abandonment of other sectors of the economy like agriculture and 
manufacturing that contribute more to GDP.  
Communities in Nigeria and Ghana protested the inadequate processes and 
content of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for the WAGP. The draft 
EIA was not made available to community people for comments. Copies of the 
draft EIA supposed to be on public display at the Lagos State Ministry of 
Environment were hidden in the office of the Permanent Secretary, away from 
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the reach of community people, contrary to the mandatory provisions of the 
Nigerian Environmental Impact Assessment Act No 86 of 1992. Community 
members expressed serious reservations which culminated in a legal challenge of 
the project at the Federal High Court of Nigeria.  
After the WAGP, other Nigerian oil operators have continued to make 
carbon credit claims, presenting the same flawed arguments as did Chevron. 
Significantly, Eni-Agip, an Italian transnational oil corporation, attempts to 
disapprove Nigerian law in its presentation to the CDM, maintaining that ‘whilst 
the Nigerian Federal High Court recently judged that gas flaring is illegal, it is 
difficult to envisage a situation where wholesale changes in practice in venting 
or flaring, or cessation of oil production in order to eliminate flaring will be 
forthcoming in the near term.’18 Eni-Agip blames, ‘commercial and industrial 
risks and political uncertainty’ for failures to make ‘investments’ to end 
associated gas flaring. However, what is lacking in Eni-Agip’s argument is the 
analysis of their own role in promoting instability and local dislocation, or how 
new gas infrastructure projects would contribute to exacerbating local tensions 
as issues of resource control and community land rights have not been resolved. 
Like the WAGP, Eni-Agip presents an application to the CDM for its 
projects for the recovery of associated gas that would otherwise be flared at the 
Kwale oil-gas processing plant by the ‘capture and utilization of the majority of 
associated gas previously sent to flaring at the Kwale plant (Kwale OGPP).’ 
According to the Eni-Agip, ‘large portion’ of associated gas produced from the 
five oil fields in Oil Mining Lease 60 (Ahaka, Beniku, Okpai, Kwale, Irri-Isoko) 
has been flared upon separation from the oil at the Kwale flow station. This 
practice according to the company is due to the ‘absence of any economically 
viable, commercial or other outlet for this gas.’ Eni-Agip claims that its Kwale 
gas plant ‘will not increase GHG emissions in Nigeria’.19 
But questions that Eni-Agip, like Chevron (on WAGP), cannot answer are 
the actual mix of associated and non associated gas that is transported by the 
network of pipelines and flowlines at Oil Mining Lease 60 or that is actually to 
be processed at the Kwale gas complex. As mentioned above, a gas complex 
contains gas gathering and processing infrastructure. As oil fields (with 
associated gas) exist side by side with non-associated gas fields, gas processing 
plants could collect both associated and non-associated gas. Lack of clarity of 
the actual mix of associated and non-associated gas makes it impossible to 
validate claims that projects would lead to reduction of associated gas flaring. In 
fact, apart from the mention of 170,000 barrels of oil per day produced by Eni-
Agip, there are no figures of current gas production and flaring in Ahaka, 
Beniku, Okpai, Kwale and Irri-Isoko area (OML 60) in Eni-Agip’s 
documentation related to the CDM. 
Conclusion 
Oil companies and the Nigerian government obfuscate data on associated gas 
flaring by presenting mixed figures of associated and non-associated gas. While 
figures provided by the government suggest a reduction of gas flaring, the actual 
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reality on the ground and a closer examination of flaring data, as I have 
presented, show that flaring volumes have increased over the years. This 
situation means that there is no credibility to claims by corporations seeking 
carbon credit through the CDM. Applications by oil corporations operating in 
Nigeria expose how corporate entities continue to manipulate carbon trading 
schemes by presenting inaccurate and ‘theoretical’ assessments of emissions 
reduction. 
In many cases, as in oil and gas exploitation, the emission of greenhouse 
gasses are significant not only in causing global climate change; but the 
processes leading to generation of emissions involve major destruction to the 
local environment, livelihoods and communities. In the case of crude oil’s 
associated gas flaring in Nigeria’s Niger Delta (as elsewhere), there has to be an 
account for air contamination, as well as oil spills and other manifestations of 
pollution in a fragile tropical wetlands ecosystem. The WAGP and the Kwale 
gas plant which have been presented as possible CDM projects fail to account 
for the human rights abuses, the loss of local resource control and negative 
distortions to socio-economic life experienced at the local and national levels as 
a result of oil and gas developments. These examples indicate how emissions 
reductions schemes are being employed to further the oil and gas frontier rather 
than limit it and as a means of further disenfranchising local populations.  
Rather than a discussion of how oil corporations and the government will 
respect their laws and pronouncements of the courts, we are seeing, with this 
carbon credit trading, how systems are being created to compensate the 
polluters and maximize their already colossal profits in ways that are reminiscent 
of corporate administered colonial rule.  
Indeed, carbon credit trading reflects one of the worst forms of the 
neoliberal fanaticism and attempt at re-legitimating corporate rule as 
experienced in the past decades. In different ways, carbon credit trading 
attempts to entrench the rights and privileges of big polluters against local 
communities by providing rich countries and corporations the framework to 
delay making structural changes towards low-carbon technologies; therefore 
allowing the worst polluters to secure huge blocks of pollution rights, to buy 
more rights; providing compensation to large (oil) corporations while not 
considering issues of justice for victims of local pollution and allowing so much 
impunity for historical emissions.  
As the current moment presents an opportunity for a deeper reflection on 
the inadequacies of the market mechanisms to addressing climate and the 
neoliberal paradigm that informs them, we should also take a look at the local 
and global forces massing to challenge this system. In the Niger Delta, as in 
other parts of the world, movements of the people are challenging corporate 
rule in the streets and creeks and are reclaiming spaces of community power. 
The Ogoni chased Shell away from their territory and over a decade later 
community members continue to insist on keeping the oil underground. Even 
as the state is negotiating to have another oil company re-enter the Ogoni area, 
some groups, like the Ogoni Solidarity Forum (OSF) are mobilizing against 
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renewed extraction. Other citizens groups in Nigeria (and the Department of 
Petroleum Resources) have demanded the shutting down of all oil fields that 
continue to flare gas in the country. Rather than giving carbon credit to 
polluting oil corporations, corporations should be responsible for compensating 
local victims for fifty years of associated gas flaring and other abuses. 
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Carbon Sink Plantation in Uganda:  
Evicting People for Making Space for Trees 
Ricardo Carrere  
The UK-based New Forests Company1 is establishing tree plantations in 
Uganda. The company states that ‘whilst based on commercial forestry 
economics, our projects are underwritten by carbon credits … in compliance 
with the Clean Development Mechanism’.2 This means that its profits from the 
sale of wood will be increased by selling ‘carbon credits’ to polluting industries 
in the North. It also means that companies buying these carbon credits should 
be also held responsible for the impacts of these plantations on local peoples 
and the environment. 
The story starts in 2004, when New Forests Company leased two plots of 
land from the Ugandan National Forest Authority: an area of 9,000 hectares in 
Namwasa Central Forest Reserve in Mubende district and 8,000 hectares in 
Luwunga Forest Reserve in Kiboga district. In both cases, local people 
(Ugandans) were living in the area and obtained their means of livelihood from 
its natural resources. However, government officials defined them as 
‘encroachers’ and the managing director of the National Forest Authority, 
appealed to the government to help them out with the ‘encroachers’ and 
declared that once the encroachers were ‘dealt with’ they [the New Forests 
Company] would plant trees at Luwunga.3  
It is interesting to note that the official document presented to the Executive 
Board of the CDM does not mention the fact that thousands of people would 
need to be displaced from the area to make way to the company’s plantations.4  
In the case of Kiboga, a 2008 news article5 reported that at least 2,500 
residents received eviction orders from the National Forest Authority (NFA). 
Kiboga Resident District Commissioner James Sserunjogi described the 
situation as follows: ‘NFA officials have already destroyed crops belonging to 
people who are living in the forest reserves without informing us area leaders. 
This is totally wrong because NFA is there to ensure the well being of 
Ugandans.’ He asked: ‘Why do they evict them without our knowledge?’  
Some of the affected residents claimed that they had lived on the land since 
1975 and that it was wrong for NFA to evict them without first getting them 
alternative land: We should be given somewhere to go. We shall not just go 
away because we have nowhere to go with our families and cattle, an elderly 
man who identified himself as Mr William Butera said. 
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A NFA official in Kiboga, who refused to be named, said they had given the 
residents enough time to leave the forest reserves but that they refused to 
comply. ‘What can we do now because the land in question was given to a 
company called New Forest Company to plant pine trees? The company wants 
to start work,’ he said. 
The district chairman, Mr Kizito Nkugwa, said over 4,000 residents in 
Kiboga District were landless due to evictions and that the issue was likely to 
result into insecurity in the district.6  
In the case of Mubende, the following quotes from an article published in 
2009,7 provides evidence on how the New Forests Company’s activities are 
impacting on local people. According to the article, residents in the villages of 
Kyamukasa, Kyato, Kicucula, Kisiita, Mpologoma, and Kanaamire denounced 
that armed groups were beating people, abducting them and destroying their 
crops and houses. Such actions were meant ‘to subdue them to leave their land, 
which they have occupied for decades’, so that the New Forest Company could 
plant its trees. ‘My banana plantation on three acres has been destroyed by the 
people who are trying to evict us. They even took 10 bags of maize from me,’ 
Jessica Nyinamatama, a 56-year-old widow, who is taking care of nine orphans, 
said.  
The local land committee chairman, William Mpamira stated that ‘Two of 
our neighbours were abducted by armed people who are trying to evict us’, 
adding that ‘Richard Twahirwa was arrested on June 26 and Cyprian Munyagaju 
was arrested on July 13. Up to now, we don’t know their whereabouts.’  
According to Mpamira, the population is suffering night attacks and as a 
result most residents have resorted to sleeping in the bushes. He also added that 
‘we doubt whether the intention of the company is to plant trees and protect the 
environment,’ because ‘since 2005, they have been cutting down trees which we 
had preserved for commercial timber.’ 
As a result of the situation they were suffering, the villagers decided to go to 
Kampala, where they petitioned the lands minister, Omara Atubo, to stop the 
evictions. In response, the minister vowed to stop the investor from evicting the 
residents and said: As a ministry in charge of land, we are saddened by what has 
happened to you. It is important to respect your rights irrespective of whether 
you occupy the land legally or not. There is no need for your colleagues to 
disappear, your property to be stolen or crops to be destroyed, Atubo said as the 
villagers applauded.  
The minister said he would summon the resident district commissioner and 
the company officials to respond to the reports. Atubo also promised to lead a 
team of investigators to Kitumbi on a fact-finding mission.  
‘This is an urgent case because it is about life and death. These acts against 
our citizens should stop immediately. Investment is only good if the residents 
benefit from it. Human beings are more important than trees,’ he stated. 
The above should be sufficient to disqualify the company, but there is yet 
more to be said about its activities, which the company defines as ‘sustainable 
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and socially responsible forestry’. The meaning of this is shown clearly in the 
pictures and short text on its own web site,8 which show that the ‘responsible’ 
process begins with the destruction of local biodiversity in two steps: 1) manual 
‘bush clearing’ 2) ‘chemical spraying’. Once the local vegetation – shown in the 
pictures – has been totally eliminated and the environment polluted with 
chemical herbicides, it is substituted by two fast-growing alien tree species 
(eucalyptus and pine) planted as monocultures over large areas of land. These 
green deserts are the ‘New Forests’ from where this company takes its name. In 
its presentation to the CDM, the company even dares to say that the conversion 
of what it claims to be ‘degraded grassland and unproductive or not sustainably 
used agricultural lands’ to pine and eucalyptus plantations will result in 
‘improving the local water flow’ – when it is a well know fact that such 
plantations deplete water resources. 
Evidence about how ‘socially responsible’ the company can be is also 
provided in the above mentioned pictures. Two of them show a few women 
working in very uncomfortable conditions in a makeshift tree nursery. Another 
photo shows a 16-strong ‘clearing team’ without appropriate protective clothing 
for the task. Finally, the 12 workers of the ‘chemical spraying’ team are shown 
from too far away to assess if they have been provided with the necessary 
protective gear and clothing.  
Given that the company does not provide any information on the figure of 
1800 workers that it says are ‘expected’ to work in the plantation,9 one can only 
guess that most of them will be employed in tree planting and dismissed once 
that activity is completed.  
But even in the impossible case that all the 1800 workers were to be 
employed on a permanent basis, the company fails to mention that over 10,000 
residents of Mubende and at least 2,500 people in Kiboga have been or will be 
evicted to make way to its plantations. Which means that on balance at least 
10,700 people will be in a far worse condition than before the company’s arrival.  
In spite of the above, on 25 May 2009 the company received Forest 
Stewardship Council certification which, according to this organization, enables 
‘consumers and businesses to make purchasing decisions that benefit people 
and the environment’.10 Information on this company in the FSC web page is 
extremely scant, only stating the name of the certification company (SGS), the 
certificate code (SGS-FM/COC-006224) and the number of certified hectares 
(12,607).11 
Given that this company plans to sell carbon credits within the CDM 
mechanism, the FSC certificate provides it with the necessary credentials for 
achieving CDM approval. FSC therefore has a two-fold responsibility: it is 
telling both wood consumers and carbon credit buyers that these plantations 
‘benefit people and the environment’, which is clearly not true. 
Additionally, in this case the ‘carbon sink’ capacity of these plantations is 
more than dubious, because the displacement of all those people may result in 
many more emissions than those allegedly ‘captured’ by the plantations. As 
Larry Lohmann clearly explained almost a decade ago ‘any communities 
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displaced from carbon plantations … would have to have their activities 
monitored closely for (say) a century, no matter where they had migrated to, to 
determine precisely to what extent they were encroaching on forests or 
grasslands elsewhere, and thus releasing the carbon stored in those ecosystems 
to the atmosphere.’12  
Given FSC’s past record in providing its label to socially and 
environmentally damaging plantations, we don’t expect it to withdraw this 
certificate, but we at least demand a United Nations body such as the CDM to 
look seriously into what’s happening with this company’s plantations in Uganda 
and to reject its carbon project. 
But what matters most is to highlight the suffering of the local people that 
are being harassed and evicted under the accusation of ‘encroaching’ on this 
company’s lands. Who is the real ‘encroacher’? The local people who need to 
make a living in their own country or a UK company that wants to make profits 
out of those peoples’ lands? The answer is quite obvious for anyone who agrees 
that ‘human beings are more important than trees’. 
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Tree Plantations, Climate Change and Women" 
Raquel Nuñez and GenderCC  
Introduction 
The impacts of monoculture tree plantations in countries around the world have 
been widely documented for many years now. It’s a common trait that wherever 
they are established, local struggles arise against them.  
The large-scale pattern of tree plantations resulting from an aggressive and 
thorough transformation of the landscape is far from a forest. Usually consisting 
of thousands or even millions of trees of the same species – often exotic – bred 
for rapid growth, uniformity and high yield of raw material and planted in even-
aged stands, they require intensive preparation of the soil, fertilization, planting 
with regular spacing, selection of seedlings, weeding using machines or 
herbicides, use of pesticides, thinning, mechanized harvesting, and in some cases 
pruning. They typically occupy areas already being used in various ways by local 
people where they compete for the water and soil nutrients needed by other 
crops or by livestock. They can also cut off sunlight to crops planted in or near 
plantations.1  
The high and huge blocks of fast-growing trees can boost species of either 
mammals, birds and insects, fungi and viruses species whose numbers had 
previously remained small but can rapidly become pests when large 
monocultural plantations are introduced. All these impacts have catastrophic 
effects in the environment and livelihood of rural communities.  
Though the evidence of the pervasive impacts of tree plantations is now 
overwhelming, they continue to be promoted with a string of false claims: that 
‘plantations are forests,’ that ‘they protect forests’, that ‘they create jobs,’ that 
they bring about ‘development for local communities’.2 
Tree Plantations and Climate Change  
Climate change has become the most threatening issue for humankind. 
However, the leaders of the present world business era have been smart and 
irresponsible enough to turn it into a commercial opportunity.  
The huge volumes of carbon emissions caused by wasteful consumption – 
that are at the root of climate change – can be compensated, say the modern 
carbon neutral ‘magicians’. So the ‘carbon offset’ was born. The idea is: you 
emit CO2, we store it and we charge you for the service. How do we store 
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it? By, for example, planting trees. As if the carbon released through the use 
of fossil fuels – which has not been part of the functioning of the biosphere for 
millions of years – could be returned to its original underground storage place 
by performing other activities such as tree planting!3  
The Kyoto Protocol adopted in December 1997 as part of the United 
Nations Convention on Climate Change, enables industrialized countries to 
‘compensate’ their carbon dioxide emissions, for example with the 
establishment of tree plantations in low-industrialized countries under the Clean 
Development Mechanism. The Kyoto Protocol has thus become another 
important actor in the promotion of large-scale tree plantations, endorsing the 
creation of an international emissions millionaire trading market for ‘carbon 
credits’ – an additional subsidy for the promotion of tree plantations.  
Tree plantations are being publicized as carbon sinks. However, they have 
yet to prove this role. For one thing, many forests and other ecosystems are 
destroyed to make place for tree plantations, thereby releasing more carbon than 
that which the growing plantation can capture, even in the long run.4  
And yet another crucial issue: will these plantations be harvested or not? If 
harvested, then they would at best be no more than temporary sinks, releasing 
most of the captured carbon as the paper or other products from the plantation 
are destroyed. If not harvested, then large scale tree plantations would be 
occupying millions of hectares of land at the expense of food production or of 
other ecosystems that contribute to the general environmental balance of the 
earth. Tree plantations also displace local communities and deprive them of 
their livelihoods, thus increasing social disintegration and the numbers of 
the hungry.5  
The agrofuel business is yet another turn of the screw in the promotion of 
industrial tree plantations, creating another market outlet for oil palm as raw 
material for agrodiesel and likely to span other tree plantations, such as 
eucalyptus – including transgenic trees – for the production of cellulosic 
ethanol.6  
Another new drive in the UNFCCC process is the proposed scheme on 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation (and possibly degradation) in 
Developing Countries, known as REDD. It aims at operating as a financial 
incentive for reducing deforestation rates by paying Southern countries with 
tropical forests for doing so. 
Apart from the many dangerous implications of this proposal, there is one 
that has to do with tree plantations: the definition of forests used by the 
UNFCCC – following FAO’s – includes tree plantations. Thus, REDD monies 
may be used for the expansion of industrial tree plantations disguised as forests.7 
The carbon offset market and other mechanisms that include tree 
plantations are false solutions to climate change. They just serve those who try 
to avoid implementing real changes to a high-carbon consuming economy that 
is socially inequitable and has led to the present environmental destruction.  
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Planting millions of hectares of trees in Southern countries not only is by no 
means a substitute for cutting emissions at the source but also has negative 
impacts on local communities, with differentiated effects on women and men.  
Impacts of Industrial Tree Plantations on Women  
When large agroindustrial operations such as monoculture tree plantations 
destroy the natural base of traditional communities, everybody is subject to 
material and cultural losses that lead to changes in their roles and status but 
women are generally left in a more vulnerable position than men.  
Within indigenous, rural and peasant communities, women play a 
fundamental role as caretakers and food providers for their families and 
communities. Subsistence farming, fetching water and fire, keeping and 
exchanging seeds, collecting herbs and taking care of the children and the elders 
as well as cooking, washing and doing the cleaning are among the several tasks 
carried out by women.8  
The arrival of large scale tree plantations deprive women from the access to 
the natural resources on which their livelihoods depend whether by destroying 
or depriving them from accessing to land, water, food, forest. Women are no 
longer able to fulfil their families’ and own needs. The destruction of 
subsistence economies increases women’s work overload as they have to work 
inside and outside the house for cash. 
They usually end-up working as labourers for plantation companies in a 
male-dominated system occupying a marginalized position. They are forced into 
a hard survival struggle. Industrial tree plantations usually mean rural 
displacement, family and community break up, unemployment, low salaries and 
economic slavery.  
What follows are some cases from around the world that reflect the impacts 
of large-scale monoculture tree plantations on women.  
In Ecuador, the Dutch FACE Programme for Forestation in Ecuador S.A., 
or PROFAFOR project – promoted under the slogan of: ‘Let us save the 
climate!’ – attempts to ‘sequester’ carbon with pine plantations grown in the 
Andean Paramo region. A research on the impacts of those monoculture tree 
plantations on indigenous and peasant communities9 shows that the Paramo 
soils store a great quantity of carbon in a thick layer. The loss of organic matter 
caused by a change in land use, such as the establishment of plantations of fast-
growing species – pine and eucalyptus – is not compensated by an input of new 
litter: ‘There is concern that because of its rapid growth it [the plantation] will 
need much water and therefore dry out the soil. With a drier soil some of the 
organic matter will disappear, not to be compensated by litter fall, because it is 
cuticulous, homogenous and foreign to the soil fauna. Thus there is a fixation of 
carbon by the trees above the soil, but a loss of carbon in the soil’.10 
The FACE PROFAFOR forestry scheme has been established through 
forestation contracts signed between the company and land holders or local 
indigenous communities in exchange for the offer of an income from forestry 
activities. Under the contract the communities provided free labour force, went 
Upsetting the Offset 
  105 
into debt to purchase seedlings and land and assumed all of the risks involved in 
the creation and maintenance of the plantations. The field research has shown 
that ‘incentives provided by the company are insufficient to cover expenses that 
the communities have to incur to complete the establishment of the plantations. 
This means that less than six years after signing the contract the Paramo 
communities have already had to devote their own productive activities and 
institutions – such as grazing and social resources such as the Minga – to the 
service of PROFAFOR’.11 
The disappearance of sources of water in the area was soon felt. Agricultural 
production, biodiversity, and the daily lives of the people, particularly women 
were affected. Before the arrival of the pines, water flowed from the springs to 
drink and to cook, give to the animals and use for the crops. Now, everything 
has changed for the worse. A field research on the impacts of tree plantations 
on women12 gathered the testimony of a woman from the Sierra Paramo: 
We women are the ones who have to give water to the animals at noon and in 
the evening. We have to search for water to take to the cows because the spring 
has dried up, and sometimes the river is 40 or 50 minutes away. When we 
prepare food we have to fetch water and we have to take the kids with us, to get 
water from the streams, or else we have to dig deep down with a hoe where 
there have been no pines. 
According to research carried out in Brazil13 ‘the impacts of monoculture 
plantations in Rio Grande do Sul are already visible: the serious drought in the 
south of the state, where eucalyptus production is most prevalent; the abrupt 
changes in temperature; the disappearance of the Pampa or temperate grassland 
biome, leading to the loss of extraordinary biodiversity; the decrease in food 
production; the drying up of water sources; the pollution and reduced water 
level in rivers; and the reduced fertility of the soil. Some cities have had to begin 
rationing water to make up for the shortage’. 
In Brazil, where there are currently 5.3 million hectares of monoculture tree 
plantations, women refer to the river as a space to socialize. It has been a place 
for meeting, resting, chatting, sharing experiences and knowledge, reinforcing 
friendships and community ties while washing their bundles of clothes. Women 
from the Tupinikim village of Pau-Brasil, in Espirito Santo, Brazil, recall what 
the river used to be for them: it was like a party on the riverbank, all of them 
washing clothes. It was mostly on Saturdays, and for those who had time, during 
the week. It was one less chore, because there was all of that water in the river, 
and everything was easier, says Maria Helena. And Maridéia adds: ‘We washed 
clothes, we collected water for drinking, for cooking… You could catch fish, 
you could scoop them up with a sieve. All those women… there would be so 
many there together! It was the place to wash clothes. You would finish washing 
clothes, then take a swim and leave, you know?’14  
All those images are just memories after large-scale eucalyptus plantations – 
some 600,000 hectares – were established in the State of Espirito Santo by 
Aracruz Celulose doing away with watercourses that played an essential part in 
the lives of indigenous peoples like the Guaxindiba and Sahy, and the 
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Quilombola communities. Some rivers and streams practically disappeared while 
other became clogged with sediment and/or polluted.15  
In Ecuador, large-scale pine and eucalyptus plantations were established on 
highland plains. The ENDESA-BOTROSA forest company came to destroy the 
native forests and replace them with plantations of fast-growing species. The 
research above mentioned,16 report several testimonies of the impacts of the 
plantations on water resources: 
Now that the pine trees have grown the community is feeling the effects, 
because the water available for consumption and irrigation has gradually 
diminished. The community has a reservoir, but it is shrinking.  
The destruction of primary forests, as in the case of oil palm, or the replacement 
of food-systems such as agriculture or grazing to give way to large scale tree 
plantations bring about food scarcity. Food is no longer available except in 
‘deep forest’ areas where only men can go, thus increasing dependence of 
women on men to collect vegetables from the forest. 
In Papua New Guinea, export-oriented oil palm plantations have cleared 
extensive areas of tropical forests. They have been established under the 
‘Nucleus Estate Smallholder Scheme’ which means that a central company 
having its own plantation also contracts small farmers to supply it with oil palm 
fruit. The oil palm companies only pay the men of the family, although women 
also work in harvesting the oil palm fruit even long hours doing back-breaking 
work for little reward within oil palm plantations.17 
 Fertilizers and highly hazardous pesticides (such as Glufosinate ammonium, 
Glyphosate, cypermethrin, carbofuran, Paraquat, Diuron, Metsulfuron), 
insecticides (such as monocrotophos, methamidophos, carbofuran), and 
fungicides (such as chlorothalonil and maneb) are used in tree plantations. They 
are groundwater contaminants and possible endocrine disruptors and produce 
several health problems both chronic and acute on local populations. In 
Indonesia, women have reported18 that often they had no idea about the 
possible effects of the pesticides they used, especially during the early stages of 
pregnancy. Women who were weeding were sometimes accidentally 
contaminated with sprays used by other workers nearby. Pesticides and 
fertilizers stored in people’s homes presented hazards, particularly to women 
and children who could not read or understand the labels. Empty pesticide 
containers were occasionally used for domestic purposes and pesticides stored 
in containers such as old water bottles.19 
Occupation of territories by industrial tree plantations change communities’ 
livelihoods and thereby women’s role. The Brazilian report demostrates ‘the 
impacts of eucalyptus monocultures on women in the light of the experience of 
Tupinikim and Guaraní indigenous women and Quilombola women in the 
northern region of the state of Espírito Santo, Brazil’. The study shows how ‘the 
disappearance of the majority of indigenous villages and Quilombola 
communities led a part of these populations to group together in the small bits 
of territory remaining of the surviving villages. Others sought out nearby 
regions to start their lives over’. ‘But I would like it if we had the lands to have 
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something better to offer to our grandchildren. To have our own land, to grow 
things, to raise animals, to have more space to live in… that would be good, 
right? Because living crowded together like this is very bad’, said Rosa, from the 
Tupinikim village of Irajá. 20  
In Indonesia, oil palm expansion typically implies occupation of customary 
lands for deforestation and later establishment of oil palm plantations. Local 
communities displaced by oil palm companies usually have to work in the very 
plantations that displaced them or end up in urban slums. The important role of 
women in traditional societies – managing natural resources and maintaining 
sustainable livelihoods – is lost once plantations replace the forests and 
agricultural land.21 
Those profound changes faced by women in the sexual division of labour 
and in the roles they play in the family and the community, have further 
exacerbated their subordinate status. In Brazil, according to the quoted research, 
‘The reduction of the large farms of the past significantly changed women’s 
domestic activities. Women used to take care of their houses and gardens, grow 
herbs for domestic use, and raise small animals, which were also a source of 
food. Their children had enough room to play. Faced with the reduction of their 
territory, many people had to leave the places where they lived to look for work. 
As a result, many women became domestic workers, babysitters, day labourers, 
and washerwomen, among other tasks, often facing racial discrimination. In 
most cases, they work for officials from Aracruz or its subcontractors’. The new 
tasks affect their role as mothers, forcing them to give up breastfeeding their 
children at a very young age or to leave them with others while they are still 
infants, in order to look after the children of urban women.22 
In Ecuador, ‘We used to be able to grow really nice gardens, all of the crops 
came out really good. But now the forests have been destroyed and the land is 
drying up. The people let themselves get talked into the plantations. They told 
us that these wood trees were good, that they would help us, but after the 
plantations the land’s capacity for production dried up, the trees suck up all of 
the nutrients, even the crops planted far away don’t produce anymore’, reports a 
woman from Azuay. Today women have to buy food products sold usually by 
men who receive the money, and so women are now more dependent on their 
husbands, some of whom ‘spend all the money they get.’23 
The social prestige of women in their role as food providers and caretakers 
holding an array of knowledges regarding how to treat diseases with herbs is lost 
as long as the base of their system is eradicated by tree plantations. Women lose 
independence and become disempowered.  
While some jobs are offered by plantation companies, ‘the labour conditions 
of women workers have much in common with those of men – low salaries, bad 
working and living conditions, seasonal work, outsourcing – but some degree of 
differentiation may be established with relation to their work in tree nurseries. 
In the nurseries of two large forestry companies in Minas Gerais, a large 
quantity of reiterated injuries caused by making great efforts have been 
observed, in spite of which women continue to work, many of them with 
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swollen or bandaged hands. They also suffer from rheumatic diseases, probably 
caused by their constant exposure to cold water in the nurseries and to a 
generally cold environment in the wintertime’, are some of the findings of the 
Brazilian report.24  
Women working in oil palm plantations usually help their husbands to meet 
demanding production quotas, often doing unpaid work. They still have to take 
care of the children, elaborate the food and collect firewood and water, which 
now are farther away due to destruction of the forest by the oil palm 
plantations. In case women work on a hired basis, they often receive lower 
wages than men. The abrupt dissapearance of the ecosystems that sustained the 
ways of life of traditional peoples and local communities often disturbs men’s 
role within the family and community/village. Many of them find themselves 
unemployed which in turn leads to rising rates of alcoholism and domestic 
violence bore by women and children, as well as exodus of men from rural 
areas. Quite frequently women have to deal with their home all by themselves.  
Increasing prostitution is a common trait in areas where monoculture 
plantations are most prevalent. Foreign workers drawn by the companies’ 
advertising campaigns and promises of job creation come to the region forming 
groups of workers without families, often unemployed, which has spurred the 
emergence of brothels around agroindustrial operations.  
The life previous to the establishment of tree plantations was felt better for 
many women. For Eni, from the Quilombola community of São Domingos, 
Brazil, the company Aracruz Celulose  
destroyed a part of our life, of our freedom and our culture, our daily life, our 
health. We were happy, but not now, now our lives are unhappy, we have to 
fight for what is ours, for our territories, for everything they took from us, and 
when they took it we lost everything, everything that was ours, and all that’s left 
for us is to protest, right? For us, and for the whole community.25 
Women: From Victims to Champions 
The expansion of monoculture tree plantations has brought about major social 
changes that serve to disempower women even more in relation to men when it 
comes to decision-making at the community level and even within the home.  
However, such disempowerment is becoming a catalyst for a new 
empowerment of women. Once invisible members of the community, they are 
now finding their own voice, and making it heard increasingly louder.  
The 1995 Beijing Conference was the forum where women’s organizations 
from Southern countries criticized the hegemonic development model and 
stressed the responsibility of the North as the leading agent of environmental 
destruction. 
In Brazil, grassroots women’s organizations have emerged and given political 
and organizational response to policies and businesses that have environmental 
impacts on their lives. Since 8 March 2006 – when near 2 thousand peasant 
women from Via Campesina destroyed greenhouses and nearly 8 million 
eucalyptus saplings belonging to the pulp mill company Aracruz Celulose – 
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International Women’s Day has become a day for action against land 
occupation by monoculture eucalyptus plantations carried out at the expense of 
food sovereignty and to the detriment of peasant production. GenderCC – 
Women For Climate Justice – believes that  
the challenges of climate change and gender injustice resemble each other – they 
require whole system change: not just gender mainstreaming but transforming 
gender relations and societal structures. Not just some technical amendments to 
reduce emissions, but real mitigation through awareness and change of 
unsustainable life-styles and the current ideology and practice of unlimited 
economic growth. Not the perpetuation of the current division of resources and 
labour but a responsible cooperative approach to achieving sustainable and 
equitable societies.26  
The urgent need is ‘to stop promoting false solutions that allow the rich to 
avoid the major changes they need to make; which help corporations to increase 
their profits and which have negative knock-on effects on the world’s poor and 
the planet’s ecosystem. We need a just transition to a low-carbon society that 
protects people’s rights, jobs and well-being. Natural resources must be 
conserved for the common good, not privatized and unsustainably exploited. 
Local communities’ sovereignty over land, energy, forests and water must be 
upheld and reclaimed.’27 
Paraphrasing Vandana Shiva, the monocultures of the mind must be 
overcome in the search of a diverse, ecosystemic and loving world. ‘We need to 
question the dominant perspective focusing mainly on technologies and 
markets, and put caring and justice in the centre of the measures and 
mechanisms’, said Ulrike Roehr, of Gender CC.28 
The knowledge, systems and networks of indigenous women for protection 
of biodiversity may well be inspiring. As Anna Pinto, from CORE, India, and 
part of Gender CC said:  
The relationship between fertility and regeneration, between female spirituality 
and the sacredness of the earth and its diversity, between sustainability and 
trusteeship rather than ownership and exploitation is the essence of indigenous 
culture, the essence of the significance of womanhood and women in indigenous 
society. It may also be the only ethic that can preserve and conserve our world 
for the future, any future at all.29 
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Shall We Still Keep Our Eyes Cerrados 1? 
Rafael Kruter Flores, Fabio Silva and Pedro Volkmann 
Introduction 
This chapter condemns the effects of one of the biggest forestry enterprise in 
Brazil. Plantar is one of the main companies trading carbon in Brazil, but it is 
also known for devastating the local environment and economy. The chapter 
will present two versions of the Plantar Project: the version of the Plantar 
Group, which says that the enterprise is helping to save the planet through the 
removal of greenhouse gases (GHG); and the version of the World Rainforest 
Movement,2 which is engaged in uncovering the real effects of this activity, and 
thus shows that the Plantar Project is in fact destroying lives in many ways. 
The Cerrado  
Brazil is the fifth largest country in the World. It is characterized by a rich 
biodiversity spread across six different biomes: the Amazon forest; the Cerrado 
(savannah); the Atlantica forest; the Pantanal (swamp-land); the Caatinga (scrub-
land); and the Pampa (prairie).  
The Plantar project, object of this chapter, is located in the Cerrado region. 
This biome is a grassland ecosystem characterized by small trees that are widely 
spaced. The open canopy allows sufficient light to reach the ground to support 
an unbroken herbaceous layer consisting primarily of grass. 
The Plantar Project 
Plantar S.A. is a holding that brings together companies in the steel area (Plantar 
Siderúrgica S/A, founded in 1985) and eucalyptus monoculture (Plantar S/A 
Reflorestamentos, created in 1967), both located in the state of Minas Gerais, in 
the southeast of Brazil.  
Initially dedicated to environmental engineering projects, in the 1980s 
Plantar S.A. expanded its production activities and became a supplier of iron 
ingots to both internal and foreign market. Today Plantar’s productive activities 
are concentrated on the cultivation and exploitation of eucalyptus, planted in an 
area of approximately 230 Km". Eucalyptus serves as an energy source for the 
production of iron ingots, and it is also sold to companies that use cellulose or 
wood.  
In 2000 Plantar S.A. developed the Plantar Project through a partnership 
with the Prototype Carbon Fund, operated by the World Bank (PCF).3 The 
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company sells part of its carbon credits to the PCF through a financial 
transaction partially subsidized by Rabobank International.4 The Project aims at 
avoiding the emission of almost 13 million tons of GHG in the atmosphere in 
28 years. The financing plan of the project was agreed upon three counterparts: 
US$ 5 million from the Global Environment Fund; US$ 30 million from various 
financial institutions and intermediary institutions; US$ 16 million from the 
Plantar Group.5 The project ensures the use of renewable fuel (charcoal from 
planted forests) instead of fossil fuel (coal) or non-renewable energy (charcoal 
from native forests) in the iron industry. It is based on Article 12 of the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
The Plantar Project is the first Brazilian project to mitigate GHG approved 
by the World Bank, responsible for managing the PCF. It is also the first global 
financial transaction based on carbon credits for reducing CO2 emissions. The 
Plantar Group operates its businesses through two mechanisms of the Kyoto 
Protocol: Emissions Trading and the Clean Development Mechanisms. The 
trade works as follows:  
! all countries have quotas or emission permission;  
! industrialized countries and their firms that don’t want to cut emissions or 
cannot cut them efficiently buy quotas from less polluting countries (as the 
case of Brazil) through the PCF;  
! the quotas are traded through removal units and reduction units of 
greenhouse gases. While the removal units relate to conservation of native 
forest or environmental reforestation (which include the cultivation of 
eucalyptus and pine), the reduction units refers to the implementation of the 
Clean Development Mechanism. 
According to the Plantar Group, the Plantar Project involves four activities, 
partially integrated:6 
! Forestry Activity: CO2 removal and storage on 23.100 ha of sustainable 
eucalyptus plantations, established in place of pastureland – started in 2001. 
! Carbonization Activity: Mitigation of CH4 emissions in the charcoal 
production process (wood carbonization) – started in 2004. Scientific 
research, specifically developed for the project, enabled methane mitigation 
by improving the process efficiency. 
! Iron Ingots Production Activity: Avoidance of CO2 emissions in the iron ingots 
manufacturing process, through using renewable charcoal (carbon neutral) 
instead of coke or non-renewable biomass – started in 2007/2008. 
! Cerrado Restoration Activity: Induced regeneration of 400 ha of native cerrado 
vegetation in non-forested land, beyond legal requirements. 
The Plantar Project increases the Plantar Group’s profits in two integrated ways: 
the commercialization of iron and wood and the sale of carbon credits. The first 
is a traditional way of profiting: the sale of the products produced in forestation 
activity and in the manufacturing of iron. The second is a new way of making 
money: the removal of GHG from the atmosphere made possible by the 
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reduction of GHG emissions by using charcoal from planted forests for the iron 
manufacturing process. 
The Plantar Project and its Effects 
The Plantar Project is known for its innovation in the production of iron ingots 
and its efforts for reducing GHG emissions – particularly by those who are 
enthusiastic supporters of the Kyoto Protocol and carbon markets. However, 
the company is equally well known – particularly by those who are actively 
studying, analyzing and condemning what really occurs behind the discourse of 
the international hegemonic model of reducing the global warming – for the 
damages it has imposed on the local biodiversity and economy, and its 
contribution to exhausting of natural resources.  
Many authors have critiqued the effects of the Plantar Project, for the 
burning of trees;7 the expulsion of farm workers;8 and the contamination of the 
soil and water by herbicides and pesticides.9 
This chapter focuses on the research carried out by the World Rainforest 
Movement (WRM), which has been fighting against the destruction of 
rainforests and the scam of carbon trading with forest for some time.10 
Most forestry companies in Brazil were established in the 1960s and 1970s 
during the military dictatorship which allowed attractive tax incentives. Plantar 
S.A. started to operate in 1967. At that moment, according to the Brazilian law, 
the company could not buy such huge extension of land property from the 
State. Hence, the negotiations were based on fraudulent methods and leasing 
contracts to occupy thousands of hectares of Cerrado. The immediate 
consequence of the introduction of eucalyptus plantations was the land eviction 
of thousands of farmers and Tupinikim and Guarani, the traditional Afro-
descendent communities. Besides that, the plantations have resulted in 
increasing unemployment and the despair of local populations, who were left 
without land, biodiversity and water that enabled them to subsist. 
Plantar S.A. is located at the city of Curvelo. In this area the eucalyptus 
plantations have dried up the rivers and contaminated the local fauna with toxic 
substances used for forestry management. In the state of Minas Gerais nearly 
two million hectares were planted with eucalyptus at the expense of burning 
part of the Atlantica forest and the Cerrado. 
In 2000 the plantation of a tree nursery resulted in the deviation of almost 5 
km of a road traditionally used by numerous inhabitants of the area, in order to 
avoid the ‘dust’ from the road affecting the eucalyptus seedlings being produced 
in the nursery. This had grave effects on students, teachers and the community 
in general, who use this route for walking to school and other places. 
Additionally, to supply its nursery with water, the company built three dams on 
the Boa Morte River, deviating the water consumed by the surrounding 
population and affecting its quality. 
Furthermore, the labor conditions of the company in the production of 
charcoal and eucalyptus include illegal sub-contracting and slave and child labor. 
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The workers have had accidents and health problems, and there have even been 
cases of deaths.  
Also, the new usage of the Cerrado has contributed to a crisis in the local 
economy, which is based on products from that native vegetation. Various food 
factories in Curvelo closed down due to lack of raw material, increasing the 
already high unemployment in the area. 
Despite all of these practices, the company received FSC (Forest 
Stewardship Council) certification in 1998, but only for 4.8% of its land with 
eucalyptus plantations. This was sufficient for Plantar to sell the so-called 
‘carbon credits’. The certification enabled Plantar to submit a project to the PCF 
in which they stated they could help to stop climate change through the 
‘sustainable’ plantation of eucalyptus trees. As a result, the Plantar Project 
started in 2000, ignoring all the ill practices listed above. 
In March of 2003 representatives of citizen movements, churches, 
parliamentarians, city councilors and citizens of the state of Minas Gerais and its 
neighbor states, Espirito Santo, Bahia and Rio de Janeiro, sent a letter to the 
PCF directors stating their concerns over the expansion of large-scale 
monoculture eucalyptus plantations, which has caused a series of negative social, 
economic, environmental and cultural impacts. In April of that same year the 
company also sent a letter to the PCF refuting the concerns of the population 
by stating they had ‘lack of knowledge’. The company then invited the main 
NGOs engaged in the campaign against the Plantar Project, FASE11 and WRM, 
to a meeting at their office. The NGOs representatives stated they wanted to 
meet at the eucalyptus plantations, but this was denied by the company’s 
sustainable development manager who alleged lack of time for that.  
Given the situation, FASE and WRM turned down the company’s invitation 
and visited the area to meet with local people. Here we reproduce their 
testimony on the visit: 
The overall impact of the company’s operations were summarized by a local 
woman who simply said: ‘Plantar finished with all we had.’ The meaning of that 
was made very clear to us by the local people that showed us around the area. 
Within the plantations, the only thing green were the eucalyptus saplings and 
trees. The rest was brown, resulting from the widespread application of the 
herbicide glyphosate (Round-up). The water had either dried up or had been 
contaminated with agrochemicals, thus depriving local people with the fish they 
used to catch and eat. Local fauna – which constituted an important element for 
people’s livelihoods – had also disappeared, making the ‘hunting and fishing 
prohibited’ sign posts a mockery. Hunt and fish what – said an angry local man – 
if the company has killed everything?12 
Conclusions 
Climate change is one of the main and most urgent issues we face. It has been at 
the forefront of the concerns of environmentalists and activists since at least the 
1960s, but it was the Kyoto Protocol that finally gave visibility to it at a world 
stage. Despite all the talk of ‘sustainable development’ in the Kyoto Protocol, it 
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does not consider the economic inequalities between North and South,13 and 
between classes and social groups in national states of the South.  
The Plantar Project shows a perverse confluence of two international 
movements. The first one started in the 1950s with the implementation of large 
scale monocultures of eucalyptus and pine plantations in Brazil and in other 
countries of the South, as a response to the needs of large industrial companies 
which were exhausting their traditional sources of raw material located in the 
North, mainly in Scandinavian countries, Canada and part of the USA. Hence 
we have seen a dramatic increase in large scale tree monocultures in many 
countries of Latin America, where the natural resources and climate offers good 
conditions for the growing of trees. The other movement started with the 
approval of the Kyoto Protocol. Today the trade of carbon credits allows 
countries from the North to keep polluting the air while supporting large scale 
monoculture in the South. Both moments of this perverse confluence are 
supported by a network of international and national agents, particularly 
multinational companies and governmental and inter-governmental institutions.  
According to Misoczky, the large scale monoculture model was, in the 1950s, 
part of the so-called ‘green revolution’. The Food Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) was a key player behind the implementation of the model in the South, 
and in subsequent decades a series of international agents also became 
participants in this process, such as the World Bank, the International Finance 
Corporation and many other international agents. At the national level, the state 
plays an important role, being ultimately responsible for paving the way for the 
implementation of the model. 
The first step is usually to carry out viability studies; a second and crucial step is 
to create or reform legislation to promote direct and indirect incentives in order 
to make the activity more profitable. Usually, Forestry Departments are created 
in order to implement national policies, to manage funds and to disseminate the 
wonders of the model in order to counter criticism from environmental and 
social organizations.14 
The implementation of a foreign model of development is not something new 
in countries of the South. Let us just remember the history of colonization. 
Then and today colonialization demands an economic and political elite that is 
supported (and sometimes directed) from the outside. In our case the adoption 
of the large monoculture model was made possible because of a military 
dictatorship – partially supported from the outside – resulting in a variety of 
repressions of people and classes. Today, the justification of this kind of 
destructive production demands a powerful ideological apparatus, which, 
combined with economic coercion, provides the mechanisms by which the 
national elites reproduce themselves. 
The Kyoto Protocol, with its carbon trade mechanisms, follows the same 
logic, and reinforces it. It is supported by a network of international agents, and 
at the national level it operates through national elites who benefit from 
destroying local economies and apropriating the common goods, such as the 
soil and water. The destruction of small farms, the expulsion of indigenous and 
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afro-descendant people, the deviation of rivers, the sub-contrating of labour – 
all of these actions contribute to keeping local economies in a critical situation 
of poverty and ‘underdevelopment’. At the same time, the economies of the 
North benefit from their allowances to pollute, by keeping their industries, 
which has resulted in their ‘development’ in the first place. The formula, 
‘development of underdevelopment’, conceived by Andre Gunder Frank, may 
be applied here. For him, 
most studies of development and underdevelopment fail to take account of the 
economic and other relations between the metropolis and its economic colonies 
throughout the history of the world-wide expansion and development of the 
mercantilist and capitalist system. Consequently, most of our theory fails to 
explain the structure and development of the capitalist system as a whole and to 
account for its simultaneous generation of underdevelopment in some of its 
parts and economic development in others.15 
The mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, following basic market principles, 
subordinate ecology to the capitalist economy. The Clean Development 
Mechanism allows the Plantar Group to affirm itself as an ecologically friendly 
company, when in fact it is responsible for destroying ecosystems and the life of 
people. In this sense, carbon markets perpetuate the logic of the development of 
the North and the underdevelopment of the South. 
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Clean Conscience Mechanism: A Case from 
Uruguay" 
Steffen Böhm  
Introduction 
In 2007, Eurostar, the Anglo-French high-speed rail company, announced that 
it was ‘proud to offer carbon neutral journeys.’ As part of its ‘Tread Lightly’ 
initiative, Eurostar explained: 
We have made a commitment to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by a further 
25% per traveller journey by 2012. Consequently, we will be making changes 
across all areas of our business, from the big things like energy efficiency, 
paperless ticketing and waste management, through supply chain selection to 
smaller cultural changes like recycling in our offices… Any remaining emissions 
will be offset, at no cost to the traveller, meaning that from November 14th 
2007, the opening day of St.Pancras International, Eurostar is proud to offer 
carbon neutral journeys.1 
The ‘Tread Lightly’ initiative is supported by Friends of the Earth (FoE) UK, 
whose ‘Big Ask Climate Change’ campaign is, in turn, endorsed by Eurostar. 
FoE’s then Executive Director, Tony Juniper, says: ‘Eurostar is leading the way 
by making a real reduction’ in carbon emissions.  
Meanwhile, seven thousand miles away, in the Pampas region in South 
America, local landowners and a handful of multinational pulp and paper 
companies have discovered that the area is suited for growing huge eucalyptus 
tree plantations, which provide the raw material for the production of pulp and 
paper. There are already a number of existing pulp and paper mills in this area, 
and new ones are currently being constructed, turning the Pampas region into a 
growth area for the global wood pulp industry.  
One of these new mills, constructed and operated by Botnia, the Finnish 
multinational pulp and paper company, is currently starting production in Fray 
Bentos, a small Uruguayan town on the banks of the River Uruguay, famous in 
Britain for corned beef and steak pies. The International Finance Corporation 
(IFC), part of the World Bank, which helps to finance this project, says that this 
mill ‘will help the country [Uruguay] move up the value chain beyond the export 
of raw materials, while generating some 2,500 much needed local jobs… The 
plant will generate value added equivalent to 2 percent of Uruguay’s entire 
GDP.’2 Additionally, Botnia is planning to generate environmentally friendly 
electricity from biomass in the power plant which is part of the pulp mill. The 
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IFC claims that the electricity sold by the Botnia mill to the national grid ‘can be 
called green power because it is produced using biomass, which is a renewable 
resource.’ 
What links Eurostar and Botnia is the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), an arrangement under the Kyoto Protocol which allows industrialized 
countries to invest in projects that reduce emissions in developing countries as 
an alternative to making more expensive emissions reduction in their own 
countries.  
When Eurostar says that it will ‘offset’ all those carbon emissions that it 
cannot avoid itself, and when it claims that all Eurostar train journeys are now 
‘carbon neutral’, it means that the company purchases so-called ‘carbon credits’ 
in a number of emerging carbon trading schemes, of which CDM is by far the 
largest. Eurostar (and hence its passengers) finance carbon reduction projects in 
developing countries, such as Botnia’s biomass electricity generation project, in 
the hope that this will reduce the planet’s overall carbon emissions.  
The connection between Eurostar and Botnia’s mill in Uruguay is not direct. 
Capitalist markets are always impersonal: the links between buyers and sellers 
are hidden, as the commodity (‘carbon’ in our case) can be traded from one 
place to the other, concealing the labour that has produced it in the first place – 
as Marx explained in Das Kapital. So, I’m not claiming here that Eurostar directly 
finances a pulp and paper mill in Uruguay. Indeed, this is one of the problems 
with the emerging carbon markets. Often one cannot trace what one’s carbon 
offsetting money is really doing to distant communities around the world; one 
cannot make direct links between carbon sellers and buyers, which means that 
one cannot scrutinize the carbon reduction claims made.  
Nonetheless we have a duty to open the black box of these carbon markets. 
The money that Northern companies, such as Eurostar, spend on being ‘green’ 
and ‘carbon neutral’ can all too easily be used to prop up industries in the South 
which are run by neo-colonial Northern companies such as Botnia, whose 
practices, taken as a whole, may actually increase global greenhouse gas 
emissions.  
Three-Legged Profit Machine 
Botnia’s offsetting project at Fray Bentos financed by the CDM consists of a 32 
Megawatt biomass-based electricity generation plant. Electricity will be 
generated in the pulp mill’s power plant on mill site. About 270 Gigawatt hours 
will be generated annually – enough to supply all the electricity consumed by 
150,000 Uruguayan homes. The project is designed to use black liquor 
(renewable biomass material derived from the pulping process) for steam and 
electricity generation in the recovery boiler. Botnia claims that burning 
eucalyptus to generate electricity emits less greenhouse gas than traditional oil 
and gas-based electricity generation; and that it will sell the surplus electricity to 
Uruguay’s national grid, thus offsetting 68,000 tons of carbon dioxide a year.3 
At first, this sounds like a beneficial arrangement for all concerned. 
Uruguay’s economy is boosted, its consumers get electricity, and the 
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environment is spared. It is also good news for Botnia, which stands to profit 
three times over from its eucalyptus plantations: first, by turning pulp wood into 
paper; second, by selling electricity to the Uruguayan grid, and third, by selling 
carbon credits to polluting countries and companies in the North. It seems to 
prove the point that green and sustainable development is indeed possible, and 
that companies which do ‘good’ can still make a healthy profit. But, as is often 
the case with such mega-developments, all is not quite what it is made out to be.  
Green Soldiers 
The first major problem with the Fray Bentos scheme is that its main raw 
material, eucalyptus, is mass-produced in very harmful ways, leading to an array 
of negative impacts on local communities. Eucalyptus plantations are just as 
problematic as other biofuels grown across the developing world at the 
moment, leading to shortages in many core food categories, not to mention the 
neo-colonial landgrabbing that is a hallmark of large agribusiness operations 
throughout the so called developing world.  
Botnia, for example, through its subsidiary Forestal Oriental SA (FOSA), 
currently has 89,000 hectares of eucalyptus planted, and a further 103,500 acres 
available for future use. The aim is to provide the Fray Bentos mill with 3.5 
million cubic meters of wood annually, 70 per cent of which will come from its 
own plantations and the remaining 30 per cent from farmers contracted to 
Botnia.4 The company, as well as the IFC’s impact studies, claim that these tree 
plantations are fully sustainable, no adverse environmental effects result from 
them, and they create employment for rural people in Uruguay. Additionally, 
Botnia boasts that ‘all of Forestal Oriental’s plantations have received FSC 
certification’.5 That’s alright then.  
However, even if the tree plantations are fully certified, these control 
mechanisms don’t provide a full picture of what is happening on the ground. 
Nor do they explain why eucalyptus plantations are universally detested by those 
who live near them. According to one writer: 
In Brazil, plantations are referred to as ‘green deserts’ due to their reputation for 
destroying biological diversity. In South Africa they are known as ‘green cancer’ 
because of the tendency of the eucalyptus in the plantations to spread wildly into 
other areas. In Chile plantations are called ‘green soldiers’ because they are 
destructive, stand in straight lines, and steadily advance forward.6 
Eucalyptus trees originate from Australia where they thrive in a dry climate, 
developing very deep roots to access water. Plantations have spread around the 
world because they are fast-growing (on the pampas the trees are mature in 
about six to seven years) and eucalyptus is fast growing because it is greedy. 
Each tree consumes up to 100 litres of water per day, so a whole plantation can 
lower the water table which local people rely on. A World Rainforest Movement 
(WRM) study on the impact of monocultures in the backyard of the new Botnia 
plant in Uruguay reported a host of complaints from local residents. A farmer in 
Guichón, whose land is now surrounded by FOSA plantations, complained that 
as a result the Boyado stream, which runs though his farm, had completely dried 
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up. In an area called Paraje Pence in the department of Sorianoto one local man 
stated: ‘All the people here have been left with no water; I have a little bit but 
the well is dirty. Close to here where my father lives there’s no water at all.’ 
Another villager told WRM: ‘I’ve lived here my whole life, and we never had any 
problems with water until they established all these plantations around eight 
years ago. Now we depend on the local government to bring us water.’7 
Eucalyptus plantations are also called ‘green deserts’ because they allow 
nothing else to grow within them; and plantation managers use herbicides and 
pesticides to ensure that their tree plantations remain monocultures. ‘From a 
biological perspective, eucalyptus forests are inferior to other types of 
reforestation, due to their homogeneity and low biodiversity. In this sense, the 
use of the term ‘forest’ for these plantations is misleading, but it continues to be 
manipulated as an ideological tool by the cellulose-producing companies.’8 In 
regions with large-scale eucalyptus plantations ‘the rivers have been degraded by 
pollution caused by wide-spread use of pesticides and a process of desiccation, 
compromising fishing and the quality and quantity of drinking water.’9  
Eucalyptus plantations are likely to become even more artificial if current 
proposals to plant genetically modified trees with reduced levels of lignin 
become a reality. Lignin is a natural glue-like substance that holds wood cells 
together and makes trees strong and inedible. Because lignin causes yellowing of 
paper, any lignin remaining has to be bleached away, so paper made from low-
lignin trees would be less polluting. However, trees with reduced lignin are more 
susceptible to viral infections and pest attack, and therefore require increased 
pesticide use; and there is a risk that reduced-lignin GM trees might cross-
fertilize with other trees and spread these characteristics into the wider forest 
environment.10 
Pulp Affliction 
The renewable electricity generated by Botnia’s mill is only made possible 
because of the pulp processing industry. Thousands of pages of reports, 
commissioned by the IFC and other governmental and extra-governmental 
bodies, have concluded that no adverse social and environmental impacts are 
produced by the new Botnia mill11 – but many local residents and some 
environmental groups from within Uruguay have consistently argued the exact 
opposite. Pulp processing has been labelled ‘one of the three most polluting 
industries of the planet’, because of the following problems, all examined in a 
study on pulp mills carried out by the World Rainforest Movement.12 
! Size and scale: Today’s pulp mills are mega-factories and their very size 
makes them a risk. The effluents from a large 600,000 metric ton plant are 
approximately 1000 litres per second.’ In an industrial process using so many 
toxic chemicals, any small release is magnified because of the scale of the 
factory. Toxic chemical releases may be small compared to the volumes 
processed, yet more than an ecosystem can support. 
! Smell and other emissions: Emissions into the air by pulp mills contain 
carcinogenic chemical compounds causing hormone imbalance, and reduced 
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sulphur compounds which give off a ‘rotten egg’ smell that becomes a 
problem for the surrounding inhabitants’. 
! Bleaching agents: To produce white pulp and paper, bleaching agents are 
needed. ‘Many chemical bleaches are reactive and dangerous to transport and 
for this reason must be made in situ or nearby. This is the case for 21 
chlorine dioxide, an extremely reactive greenish yellow gas that explodes 
easily, representing a major threat to the workers and the neighbouring 
inhabitants in the event of an accident. Another agent used, elemental 
chlorine, is very toxic. It is a greenish gas that is corrosive in the presence of 
dampness.’  
! Effluents and water pollution: ‘The enormous demand for water in pulp 
mills may reduce the level of water and the effluents may increase the 
temperature, a critical issue for the river ecosystem. Generally, mills are 
installed near a watercourse with a good flow where they can get their supply 
(at a lower cost) and also discharge their effluents. Chemical and organic 
residues can combine to produce pollutants that may reduce the oxygen 
levels in the watercourses where they are released and prove lethal to fish. 
Studies have revealed genetic damage, hormone changes, liver alterations, 
cell function problems, changes in blood composition, skin and brachia 
lesions and reactions by the fishes’ immunological system.’ 
! Chlorines: The pulp industry is the world’s second largest consumer of 
chlorine and the greatest source of toxic organochlorines in watercourses. 
Some effluents produced in pulp production may combine to form dioxins, 
furans or other organochlorines which biodegrade slowly and can 
accumulate in the tissues of humans or other living creatures.  
Incidents of contamination have frequently occurred at other locations and 
continue to do so. In Valdivia, Chile, for example, CELCO (the forestry 
subsidiary of the Angelini group) opened its new pulp mill in 2004, five years 
behind schedule because of protests. ‘Less than a month later, the nearby 
communities began complaining about the unbearable smell from the mill.’ But 
bad smells were not the only problem. ‘Faced with repeated complaints, 
environmental and health authorities began to set up inquiries… They found 
categorical evidence establishing that the company had no system for emissions 
abatement, control and monitoring.’13 Serious water contamination from the 
mill, registered in the nearby Nature Sanctuary Carlos Anwandter at the Rio 
Cruces, was linked with the death and sickness of dozens black-necked swans, 
an endangered migratory bird. 
The CELCO plant is designed to produce 550,000 tons of bleached pulp 
annually. When Botnia’s mill is in full production it will have an annual output 
of 1 million tons of bleached eucalyptus pulp, one of the biggest mills of its type 
in the world. To gain an idea of the volume, consider that a factory of this size 
needs to be serviced by over 200,000 HGV journeys a year, or one every 2.5 
minutes, 24 hours per day, every day. The environmental impacts of pulp 
production are likely to get worse with the large scale of plants being built today.  
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It is mainly because of the pollution that the people of the Argentinean town 
of Gualeguaychú, which overlooks Fray Bentos from the other side of the river, 
have been up in arms protesting against the project. The town is an important 
tourist destination, famous for its annual carnival, which draws thousands of 
visitors to the city every year. Tourists also come to Gualeguaychú to enjoy its 
tranquil river shores, fishing and water sports. No one whose livelihood 
depends largely on tourism or agriculture, wants to have a giant pulp mill 
constructed in their back yard. 
Development for the Overdeveloped 
However, while the people of Gualeguaychú look on the construction of the 
Botnia Mill with foreboding, many in people in Fray Bentos and Uruguay 
welcome the investment into the Botnia pulp mill, which constitutes the 
country’s largest foreign direct investment in its history, and will establish the 
country as one of the world’s major pulp exporters. The project is expected to 
generate revenues equivalent to two percent of the country’s GDP, and to 
create 2,500 jobs, of which 300 will be in the mill and the rest in ancillary 
forestry and transport. The project fits in with the World Bank Group’s long-
term strategy for the development of Uruguay, which recommends investments 
in forestry and in the diversification of the country’s export base to increase its 
competitiveness globally.14 
Whether Uruguayans will actually benefit from these revenues is another 
matter. The plant is being built in a Zona Franca – one of the many Free Trade 
Zones installed in developing countries over the past decades. These designated 
areas provide easy investment opportunities for multinational companies 
without burdening them with national taxes and other unwanted costs. The land 
for the pulp mill was rented to Botnia for $20,000 for 30 years – enough to rent 
a flat in London for a year. Botnia does not have to pay any customs duty on 
machinery and equipment imports, most of which is manufactured in Finland, 
nor does it have to pay income tax under the free trade area contract. The 
profits will mainly be given in the form of dividends to foreign shareholders and 
thus exported out of the country; that is, back to Finland. So, it’s actually a 
development of the Finnish economy. Furthermore, the government has: 
provided forestry companies with generous subsidies, soft credits, and tax 
exemptions. Over 12 years, the Uruguayan government’s support for this sector 
exceeded $500 million in tax exemptions and direct disbursements, an amount 
representing almost 4 percent of the country’s annual GDP. To facilitate the 
transportation and export of the wood, the governments of the day made further 
investments in new ports, bridges, roads, and railway lines.15 
While this could all be seen as long-term investment in the economic growth of 
the country, the ‘problem is that future investors will certainly demand equal 
treatment from the state, and the companies will continue to avoid paying taxes. 
A factory of this size, representing Finnish interests is a powerful economic 
agent in a country like Uruguay; granting tax exemptions to encourage foreign 
investment means that this power is transferred to foreign companies’.16  
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These arrangements maintain the unequal power relationships between 
North and South that have been in place ever since the colonization of South 
America 500 years ago. Virtually all of the production of the Botnia mill is for 
export, serving the Northerners’ wasteful consumption of ever more pulp and 
paper. People in the European ‘knowledge economy’ consume up to 430 kg per 
head per year, on everything from junk mail to government reports, compared 
to only about 40-50 kg in the Pampas region.17 This means that the jobs that are 
being created in the South are dependent on the wasteful over-consumption in 
industrialized countries – and will disappear if ever we in the North put our 
house in order. 
What is not taken into account by the IFC and other development 
institutions is the amount of jobs that are being destroyed. Brazil’s Landless 
Workers Movement (MST) says that a corporation such as the huge pulp firm 
Aracruz ‘creates only one job for each 185 hectares planted, while a small farm 
property creates one job per hectare.’ A Via Campesina poster even claims 5 
jobs for every hectare.18  
In effect the eucalyptus plantations perpetuate the South American tradition 
of large latifundia, estates covering vast areas of fertile lands, which originally 
were violently expropriated from indigenous people. As Eduardo Galeano has 
described so vividly in The Open Veins of Latin America, ever since the European 
invasion, Latin America’s lands have served to provide goods in demand in 
Europe. First it was sugar, then coffee, cacao and cotton; today it is soya, maize, 
and eucalyptus. These monocultures were made possible because local elites and 
foreign proprietors owned vast estates, while peasants, forced off the land, have 
been driven into cities such as Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires.  
Resistance 
The plantations have therefore become a focus of resistance for social 
movements such as the peasant organization Via Campesina, and Brazil’s 
Landless Workers Movement (MST). The MST has been engaged in the fight 
against the Aracruz’ eucalyptus plantations in the Brazilian state of Espirito 
Santo, where indigenous communities have been struggling to reclaim 
thousands of hectares of land stolen from them under the Brazilian dictatorship 
in the 1970s. In August 2007 the Tupinikims and Guarani indigenous people 
declared victory when the Brazilian government decided that Aracruz should 
return to them 14,227 hectares of illegally occupied land.19 On 8 March 2006, on 
International Women’s Day, about 2000 women from Via Campesina occupied 
an Aracruz plantation in Rio Grande do Sul, ‘denouncing the social and 
environmental impacts of the growing green desert created by eucalyptus 
monocultures. ‘These social movements campaign for real development, by the 
locals for the locals, where ‘100% of production [is] destined for the tables of 
Brazilian workers’.20  
Resistance against pulp mills and eucalyptus plantations has also been 
inspired by the long struggle of The Citizens’ Environmental Assembly of the 
Argentinian city of Gualeguaychú. The campaign initiated by environmentalists 
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grew to represent a wide cross-section of town’s population from university 
teachers and business professionals to pensioners and farmers.’ They organized 
road blockades, internet campaigns, legal challenges against Uruguay, and other 
more clandestine actions, such as the imitation of the corporate website of 
Botnia.21 Their slogan, ‘No a la papeleras, Si a la vida!’ (No to the cellulose 
plants, Yes to life!) can be seen everywhere in the city: on cars, in shops, in 
restaurants, and on billboards. Their campaign made national news over three 
years and although they didn’t manage to stop the construction of the Botnia 
plant, they have succeeded in delaying the construction of another pulp mill 
planned by ENCE, the Spanish multinational, right next to the Botnia factory. 
ENCE is now looking to build the plant further down the river.  
A Global Scam  
Botnia and its financiers want us to believe that an industry with a long track 
record of pollution, land rights violations and other negative impacts is 
sustainable, and are using the electricity generation side of the project to give it a 
green gloss. But even the claim that the electricity is carbon neutral is spurious, 
because the releases generated by the project as a whole are not taken into 
account. Besides the emissions arising from the construction of the factory, 
there are all the carbon releases resulting from project operation: the emissions 
from the factories producing chemicals associated to pulp production; the 
consumption of fuel by forestry machinery; timber transportation by trucks to 
the factory; port movements; and fuel consumption by ships taking pulp to 
paper factories in Finland and China, etc. A full life cycle analysis of all these 
energy costs would almost certainly show that ‘total releases of greenhouse 
effect gases by Botnia will be higher than those that would have occurred in the 
country without its presence’.22 And the sole purpose of this carbon expenditure 
is to ensure that we in the North can continue to consume ten times as much 
paper as people in Uruguay.  
This kind of greenwashing is not unique to Botnia. Celulose Irani was the 
first Brazilian pulp and paper company to sell carbon credits under the CDM, 
when, in 2006, it sold US$1.2 million worth of credits to Shell, which will use 
them to continue exploring, drilling, flaring, spilling and polluting.23  
Nor is this scam unique to the pulp industry. The single largest project type 
applying for the CDM is hydropower, with more than 400 large dams in China 
alone applying for credits, while biomass power plants like that at Botnia are the 
second biggest project type.24 Like pulp mills, hydro schemes are riddled with 
environmental problems, and are responsible for displacing hundreds of 
thousands of peasants from their land. And like the Botnia power plant, many 
hydro-electric dams are ‘non-additional’ – that is to say that they would have 
been constructed anyway, even if there had been no finance through the CDM, 
so in effect carbon credits are not reducing carbon emissions at all, but simply 
subsidizing ‘business as usual’. 
In the last ten years, carbon has become a new commodity. Carbon trading 
and offsetting is an industry that grows at an alarming rate without any serious 
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checks and balances in place to monitor the real progress in reducing carbon 
emissions worldwide. Already there is overwhelming evidence that the carbon 
markets do not work, in terms of the objective they were created for: reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. Not only have they failed to introduce significant 
carbon reductions; in the case of Botnia, and many similar projects, they have 
the very opposite effect of what they were intended to achieve: they legitimize a 
further increase in greenhouse gas emissions and prolong the introduction of 
the measures that will force the Northern countries that have caused climate 
change to significantly reduce their emissions. 
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India’s ‘Clean Development’" 
Soumitra Ghosh and Hadida Yasmin  
Introduction 
After carbon trading was conceptualized in the Kyoto Protocol, India seems to 
have been the busiest country to put the concept into action. By early August 
2008, India had 355 CDM projects accounting for about 31% of the world’s 
total of 1136 projects registered with the CDM Executive Board of the 
UNFCCC. India’s share is highest among all countries, with China standing 
second with 250 projects. About 2700 million CERs (certified emission 
reductions) are expected to be generated by 2012, if all these hostcountry-
approved projects in India go on stream. By 8 August 2008, a total of 
179,888,442 CERs had been issued to projects worldwide, with India accounting 
for 25.83% and China for the maximum 35.56%. 
If we observe the distribution of all UNFCCC-registered projects by scale, 
there are 611 large-scale projects and 525 small-scale ones, with the energy 
industry (renewable and non-renewable sources) predominating with 796 
projects. Taking into account all projects in various stages – such as those 
already registered, requested for registration, and waiting for validation – the 
total number of CDM projects in India comes to be 1021. These include both 
unilateral and bilateral projects. Projects with involvement of a third party (any 
Annex-I country) are called bilateral. Countries that are financing most of the 
bilateral projects in India are the United Kingdom, Switzerland, the 
Netherlands, and Japan. Other countries involved are Sweden, Germany, Spain, 
Italy, Austria, France, Canada, Denmark, Finland, and so on. 
 
Project Status 
(Including 
bilateral ones) 
Number of 
Projects 
kCO2/ Year* 2012 kCO2/ Year** kCERs 
Issued*** 
Validation 620 41,127 190,132  
Registered 355 31,471 214,572 45,385 
Registration 
Requested 
46 2,303 11,290  
Total 1021 74,901 415,994  
(It will be 808,537 by 2020) 
45,385 
(from 151 
registered 
projects) 
 
Table 1: Overview of CDM Projects in India (as on 9 August, 2008)1 
*Annual reduction claimed in 1000-tons of CO2-equivalent per year 
**Total reduction to be claimed in 1000-tons of CO2-equivalent by 2012 
***Saleable CERs, in 1000-tons of CO2-equivalent, officially issued by the UNFCCC so far 
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By 2012, all these projects are expected to generate a total of 415,994 kCERs 
after registration. The 355 registered projects in India, and the 46 more that 
have requested for registration, are expected to generate 214,572 kCERs by 
2012. Among the registered projects, 151 have been issued 45,385 kCERs 
(Table 1). 
Sector-wise Distribution 
Most CDM projects in India come primarily under four sectors: biomass (293 
projects), energy efficiency (239), wind (208), and hydro (103). Other sectors 
include fossil fuel switch (42), biogas (31), cement (21), landfill gas (17), and 
HFC (6). Though HFC comprises the least number of projects, it is expected to 
generate the maximum quantity of kCERs (78,566 by 2012). Out of the six HFC 
projects, four are registered and they have already been issued 28,814 kCERs. 
Table 2 gives an account of sector-wise emission reductions to be achieved by 
CDM projects in India by 2012. 
State-wise Distribution 
With 153 CDM projects, Maharashtra’s share is the maximum in the country in 
terms of number. Out of these 150-plus projects, 66 are wind energy projects. If 
all of them get registered, they would generate 8548 kCERs by 2012 Registered 
projects across sectors in Maharashtra have already been issued a total of 1245 
kCERs, of which 545 kCERs are from wind and 295 kCERs from hydro, while 
205 kCERs come from cement and 143 kCERs from biogass. Maharashtra with 
its 153 registered projects will generate 5852 kCERs annually and 32,623 kCERs 
by 2012. 
Tamil Nadu comes second in terms of number with 141 CDM projects. At 
6511 kCERs per year, the state is expected to generate 40,810 kCERs by 2012. 
The state now has 36 registered projects, and 14 of them have been issued a 
total of 1444 kCERs. Tamil Nadu has the country’s maximum number of wind 
projects – 69, of which 17 are registered – with 368 kCERs issued and a 
potential to generate 18,459 kCERs by 2012. Five of its nine registered biomass 
projects have been issued a total of 399 kCERs. Tamil Nadu comes third in 
terms of number of biomass projects it hosts (31), after Karnataka (35) and 
Andhra Pradesh (48). 
Gujarat – though it does not have as many CDM projects as Maharashtra, 
Tamil Nadu, and Karnataka – tops the list in terms of CERs issued (18,772 
kCERs) and is also expected to generate the maximum quantity of CERs by 
2012 (97,673 kCERs). This is because of its two HFC projects, which have 
already been issued 17,955 kCERs and are expected to yield 40,459 kCERs by 
2012. Out of the total 108 CDM projects in Gujarat, EE (energy efficiency) 
projects account for 30 and fossil-fuel switch projects for 19. 
Very interestingly, Rajasthan with its 53 CDM projects stands second in 
terms of CERs ‘issued (11,456 kCERs from its 14 registered projects (total 
projects 23) and is expected to be issued another 45,504 kCERs by 2012. Here 
also, just a single HFC project accounts for 10,518 kCERs. In Rajasthan, 50% of 
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the CDM projects are wind energy projects; out of which seven have been 
issued a total of 352 kCERs. 
 
Sector Number of CDM 
Projects 
2012 kCERs* kCERs issued** 
Biogas 31 6,549 304 
Biomass Energy 293 67,395 4,215 
Cement 21 19,599 923 
Energy Efficiency 
(EE) Energy 
Distribution 
1 234 0 
EE households 4 860 0 
EE industry 133 18,935 527 
EE own 
generation 
106 64,962 6,486 
EE service 7 287 2 
EE supply side 16 10,456 159 
Total of EE  95,734 7,174 
Fossil Fuel Switch 42 47,720 794 
Fugitive 
Emissions 
12 4,451 0 
HFCs 6 78,566 28,814 
Hydro Energy 103 34,296 965 
Landfill Gas 
(Waste energy) 
17 4,895 76 
Reforestation 5 1,018 0 
Solar Energy 5 1,280 0 
Transport 2 288 0 
Wind Energy 208 45,848 2,120 
Others 9 8,208 0 
Total 1021 415,994 45,385 
Table 2: Sector-wise emission reductions by 20122 
*Total reduction to be claimed in 1000-tons of CO2-equivalent by 2012 
** Saleable CERs, in 1000-tons of CO2-equivalent, officially issued by the UNFCCC so far 
 
Among hydro projects, both Karnataka and Himachal Pradesh host 25 each, 
Out of the total of 103 in India, Karnataka holds 14 registered hydro projects, 
with 307 issued kCERs. More than 80% of CDM projects in Himachal Pradesh 
are hydro projects. 
The highest number of biomass projects in India is in Andhra Pradesh, with 
48 projects. Out of 24 registered biomass projects in the state, 17 have already 
been issued 2027 kCERs. Karnataka, with 35 biomass projects is expected to 
generate 11,283 kCERs by 2012. 
In West Bengal, out of 44 approved projects, 33 (75%) are EE projects, 
which have been issued 278 kCERs. These EE projects are expected to generate 
9332 kCERs by 2012. 
Emissions Reduction or Business Expansion! 
With the Kyoto Protocol turning emissions reduction – arguably, the most 
important responsibility on humankind today – into profitable ‘business’, 
corporations could not have asked for more. Looking at India’s CDM scenario 
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in terms of corporate participation, we find that the energy sector, including 
HFC, is generating the maximum CERs. 
The unfortunate fact is that big corporations such as Tata, ITC, Reliance, 
Ambuja, Birla, Bajaj, GFL, HFL, NFIL, and many others, who keep on emitting 
millions of tons of carbon dioxide into the biosphere are earning handsome 
returns in the name of ‘clean development mechanism’ (Table 3). The current 
market price of a ton of CO2 reduced and sold in form of CERs in the global 
market is generally between 15 and 20 euros, whereas the most optimists of 
carbon consultants would not have given more than 3.5 euros in 2005! While 
society gains nothing, corporations reap huge benefits from the business of a 
new kind. 
More than 98% kCERs of CDM energy projects are run by big corporations. 
More than 50% of the total kCERs (45,386) issued to India went to its four 
HFC projects by Gujarat Flurochemicals Ltd., Chemplast Sanmar Ltd, Navin 
Fluorine International Ltd, and SRF Ltd. HFC projects will be issued another 
76,212 kCERs by 2012, promising huge monetary returns. 
Out of the total 3770 kCERs issued to India’s biomass projects (up to 6 June 
2008), 3726 kCERs went to the corporate sector. Big corporations also own 
most of the CDM wind projects in India; corporate-owned projects account for 
5824 out of the total 6960 kCERs being generated annually from all wind 
projects in India. In case of fossil-fuel switch projects, all 788 kCERs issued 
went to big corporations. So, as usual, the corporate sector has made new 
fortunes from the CDM regime. 
Some of the profit figures for companies engaged in the carbon trade are 
astounding. Till early 2008, the Jindal group made 11 billion rupees (and perhaps 
more) from selling supposedly ‘reduced emissions’ (1.3 million CERs) at their 
steel plant in Karnataka. Tata Motors sold 163,784 CERs from clean wind 
projects at 15.7 euros/CER in 2007. Tatas’ sponge iron projects in Orissa are 
set to yield 31,762 CERs every year. Reliance publicly boasts of its CDM Kitty – 
with seven projects registered with 88,448 CERs per year (till 2007 December), 
four more CDM projects under validation with 149,533 CERs per year, and 
seven more potential CDM projects to generate about 400,000 CERs per year. 
In 2006/7 alone, the GFCL group’s earning from carbon money was twice its 
total corporate assets. 
The point is not why they are earning so much! The disturbing fact is that 
their PDDs are full of half-truths and lies: claiming something, doing something 
else, and, in the end, showing yet another picture about what they have 
achieved. Most of the CDM projects we studied in Maharashtra are as polluting 
as any other industrial project, besides exhibiting barefaced violations over the 
mandatory social commitments and environmental norms. 
Then, how is it possible to pass off these projects as clean ones? Well, in 
India, the emerging economic superpower, everything is clean; even if you 
discover layers of fly ash in the food you are about eat, it is clean – especially if 
it has emanated from a nearby CDM project run by some big corporation! Or 
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else, how do they even get green prizes – the bigger the corporation, the more 
prestigious the prize! 
RIL (Reliance Industries Ltd), India’s largest private sector entity with 
businesses in the energy and materials value chain, whose group’s annual 
revenues are in excess of US$ 34 billion, has recently received a coveted green 
award. RIL’s Hazira manufacturing division has bagged the Golden Peacock Award 
for Combating Climate Change–2008). According to the jury, headed by former 
chief justice of India and UN Human Rights Commission member P N 
Bhagwati, Reliance grabbed this award for promoting ‘energy efficiency’ as 
much as ‘controlling greenhouse gases’ by initiating various CDM projects. 
 
Owner of CDM 
Project 
Sector Number of 
Projects 
kco2/ 
Year* 
2012 kco2/ 
Year** 
kCERs 
issued*** 
Wind 3 133 836 167 
EE Own 
Generation 
4 663 3521 106 
EE Industry 7 49.7 400 4 
Biomass 
Energy 
1 24 115  
Tata 
Biogas 1 7.2 61 19 
EE Industry 4 18.5 178  Birla 
Cement 1 43 436 18 
Wind 2 108 538  
EE Industry 6 208 1267 115 
Reliance 
Fossil Fuel 
Switch 
1 1169 6041  
REI Agro Wind 3 78 434  
Synergy Global Pvt. 
Ltd 
Wind 11 415 2138  
Loyal Textile Mills 
Ltd. 
Wind 3 74 378  
Wind 1 15 71  
EE Own 
Generation 
3 533 3338  
EE Industry 1 50 265  
Jindal 
Biomass 
Energy 
1 33 162  
Wind 1 19 102  Bannari Amman 
Sugars Ltd. Biomass 
Energy 
3 253 1481  
Enercon Wind 18 1206 6792 349 
EE Own 
Generation 
3 885 6010  
Fossil Fuel 
Switch 
3 885 6010  
Essar Power Ltd. 
EE Industry 1 136 656  
EE Own 
Generation 
1 108 789 182 
EE Industry 1 9 42  
Shri Bajrang 
Power & Ispat 
Biomass 
Energy 
1 34 172  
EE Industry 1 15 80  Satia Paper Mills Ltd. 
Biomass 2 55 324  
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 Energy 
EE Industry 2 9.5 59  
Fossil Fuel 
Switch 
1 11 67  
Indo Rama 
Synthetics 
Cement 1 43 248  
Aditya Birla EE Industry 6 75 429 12 
EE Industry 1 34 135  Haldia Petrochem 
Fossil Fuel 
Switch 
1 131 657  
EE Industry 1 35 167  H&R Johnson 
(India) Ltd. 
Biomass 
Energy 
2 21.5 103  
EE Industry 1 4.6 46  
Cement 3 345 3131  
GACL 
Fossil Fuel 
Switch 
2 108 1046  
EE Industry 2 43 252  Grasim 
Biomass 
Energy 
1 52 402 22 
Mawana Sugars Ltd. Biomass 
Energy 
5 190 1118  
BAJAJ Biomass 
Energy 
6 180 1070  
JCT Biomass 
Energy 
3 102 592 86 
Biomass 
Energy 
2 102 530  Dwarkesh Sugar Ltd. 
Biogas 1 40 192  
Cement 2 69 700 78 Birla Corporation 
Ltd. EE Industry 2 18.5 178  
EE Supply 
Side 
1 4.0 40 13 
Reforestation 1 49 470  
EE Industry 5 108 929 201 
ITC 
Biomass 
Energy 
2 138 1000  
Chemplast Sanmar 
Ltd. 
HFCs 1 539 5392 342 
HFCs 1 3393 51778 12948 Gujarat Fluoro-
chemicals Ltd. Wind 1 52 243  
Hindustan 
Fluorocarbon Ltd 
HFCs 1 464 4644  
Navin Fluorine Int. 
Ltd. 
HFCs 1 2802 28022 1215 
SRF Ltd. HFCs 1 3834 38336 9624 
Acme Tele Power 
Ltd. 
HFCs 1 25 109  
NEG Micon (I) Pvt 
Ltd 
Wind 4 118 821  
 
Table 3: Big Indian Corporations and their CDM Revenues3 
*Annual reduction claimed in 1000-tons of CO2-equivalent per year 
**Total reduction to be claimed in 1000-tons of CO2-equivalent by 2012 
*** Saleable CERs, in 1000-tons of CO2-equivalent, officially issued by the UNFCCC so far 
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With India’s unprecedented thrust on industrialization during the past two 
decades, big companies are increasing their manufacturing process by the day, 
thus increasing their turnover. And while doing so they are adding greenhouse 
gases to the atmosphere like never before. The irony is that they are also making 
bucketful of money simply by putting a so-called ‘clean development’ tag to 
some of their dirtiest projects. 
How the Carbon Markets Work 
All clean development mechanism or CDM projects need to get themselves 
registered with the CDM Executive Board of the UNFCCC. Registration does 
not, however, mean that the projects can go to the market immediately and sell 
their CERs. A project can only sell its CERs ‘officially’ when the UNFCCC 
issues those. Such officially issued CERs fetch the maximum price in the carbon 
market, because it is assumed that the ‘delivery’ is guaranteed, or, in other 
words, the projects are really, beyond any doubt, reducing emissions. Projects 
without UNFCCC issuance certificates (and even without registration) can still 
go to the unregulated offset market, and sell VERs (verified emission 
reductions), which means the validating agency has certified that such projects 
are promoting ‘clean development’. This does not get the same price as a 
UNFCCC-issued CER is known as ‘secondary CERs’ in the market, while CERs 
from a registered project – but not officially issued – are known as ‘primary 
CERs’. Depending on the ability of the broker – and the nature of the 
marketplace – a VER can get anything between 5 to 10 euros. In comparison, 
while CERs can fetch as high as 26 euros (the price peaked in last July), the last 
one-year average stands at around 19 euros. 
Unless there is a prior and direct ERPA (emission reduction purchase 
agreement) with a particular brokerage concern, consultant, or, rarely, an 
European buyer, secondary CERs are usually sold through various 
climate/carbon exchanges in Europe and America, though, of late, Asian 
exchanges have come up, one of them in India. The endbuyer for Indian CERs 
is usually untraceable, and the exchanges give only bulk sales figures and, that 
too, not always. Similarly, unless and until a project declares its CER revenues, 
there is no ‘public’ way to know how much money a particular project makes, 
and whether the figures given by the project-proponents in their red-herring 
prospectus and annual reports are at all correct. 
Most Indian projects are unilateral, which means they do not have a specific 
buyer lined up at the time of registration. Though this apparently increases 
marketing risk, the arrangement seems to suit most Indian companies, who are 
in this game simply for more money. Being tied with no specific buyers gives 
them good bargaining opportunities, and further, to indulge in speculation. 
Indian projects have been repeatedly reported to hoard CERs for higher prices! 
This tendency of hoarding, of course is, not confined to unilateral projects. 
Going by the fact that most of the Indian projects to which CERs have been 
issued so far are bilateral (which means it declared an ‘other party’ from Annex-I 
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countries at the time of registration), it is evident that all Indian projects, small 
and big, unilateral and bilateral, are out for a kill. 
Status Number of 
Registered Projects 
Number of 
Registered Projects 
with CERs issued 
to 
kCERs issued* 
Bilateral 171 134 46,135 
Unilateral 185 20 619 
Total 356 154 46,754 
 
Table 4: Unilateral and Bilateral projects in India with CERs issued to4 
* Saleable CERs, in 1000-tons of CO2-equivalent, officially issued by the UNFCCC so far 
 
One thing has to be said, though: the CDM Executive Board of the UNFCCC 
has so far been consistently niggardly in issuing CERs to unilateral projects. 
Indian unilateral projects have only been issued a paltry 619,000 CERs (up to 26 
August 2008), whereas the bilateral projects got a whopping 46.15 million! Many 
of the bilateral projects, especially the HFCs, have been issued many times, 
whereas only one unilateral project (0112: Nagda Hills Wind Energy Project) 
was issued twice, rest only once. Does it happen because the UNFCCC 
considers such projects to be cleaner? Does the ‘other-party’ involvement in the 
bilateral project have any influence in making the issuance process faster? Why 
the discrimination then, when both unilateral and bilateral projects show a 
characteristic disregard for the declared principles and guidelines of the CDM? 
The lure of easy money has led to a muster of vultures in the carbon market; 
all kinds of speculators, consultants, self-professed carbon gurus, and now the 
hedge funds and private equity funds have set up their own shops in India. 
Futures trading in CERs/VERs has picked up in recent months, which means 
that CDM projects are entering into secure deals with traders who now carry the 
project’s risk burden (the greatest risk is it being rejected by the CDM Executive 
Board, which seldom happens) in lieu of the larger share of sales profits. It is 
quite possible that we will see increased financing of new CDM projects by both 
hedge and private equity players, and given the essentially unregulated, shady, 
and non-transparent nature of their operations, such projects will continue to be 
dirtier and more fraudulent. Already the larger parts of the issued credits from 
Indian projects are being purchased by new carbon finance companies, private 
equities, and banks. A look at the credit buyer section in the UNEP CDM 
Pipeline confirms the presence of big names in the field: Meryl Lynch, BNP-
Paribas, ABN-AMRO, and so on. CDM is a big money game, and big players 
have arrived (Table 5). 
Fraud? Yes, one must clearly use the word, talking about carbon trading in 
general, and Indian CDM projects in particular. The main problem with these 
projects’ tall – and immensely profitable – claims of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions is that there is no credible and definite way to verify these claims. The 
validating agency is an organization paid by the project – not for ‘validating’ the 
project, but precisely for ‘establishing’ what the project is claiming is true. 
Though it ritually invites comments on projects it validates, such comments are, 
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as a rule, ignored. The result is that dirty and utterly ineligible projects sail 
through, and make money, without bothering to clean up their acts. 
 
Credit Buyers Number of 
Projects 
Annual 
kCO2* 
kCO2** kCERs 
issued*** 
Germany (KfW) 14 4243 35328 15 
UK (Cantor Fitzgerald 
Europe) 
10 769 3383 15 
Sweden (Carbon Asset 
Management) 
17 1350 12981 2058 
Switzerland (Ecoinvest 
Carbon) 
9 298 2400 489 
UK (ABN AMRO Bank) 9 226.5 2318 581 
UK (Agrinergy) 52 3268 21879 598 
UK (EcoSecurities) 9 379 2255 187 
UK (Nobel Carbon) 20 225 20130 7554 
UK (EcoSecurities) 9 379 2255 187 
UK (Merrill Lynch) 3 69 624 146 
France (BNP Paribas) 1 35 271 46 
 
Table 5: Major Credit Buyers in Indian Carbon Market5 
*Annual emissions reduction claimed in 1000 tons of CO2-equivalent per year 
**Total reduction to be claimed in 1000-tons of CO2-equivalent by 2012 
*** Saleable CERs, in 1000-tons of CO2-equivalent, officially issued by the UNFCCC so far 
 
The biggest instance of this is the waste-heat-based energy projects, mostly 
located in various sponge iron plants. These projects are legally required to 
operate ESPs (electrostatic precipitators) to ensure that the smoke emitted by 
the plants remain reasonably clean. Because an ESP is an expensive machine to 
run, the plants mostly do not operate it. And, because the ESP remains 
inoperative most of the time, the waste heat project, which is technically 
dependant on continuous running of the machine, does not work. That the 
ESPs do not run is known to everybody – the State Pollution Control Boards, 
the villagers near the plants, and the workers. Yet, the Indian government 
approves these projects’ CDM claims, the validating agency validates, and the 
UNFCCC registers and issues CERs. Quality-wise, there is no difference 
between VERs and CERs from such a project; the pollution caused by it 
continues all the same. The UNFCCC certification means a few more wads of 
paper from the validating agency, and the occasional methodological 
explanations offered by the project proponent. Contrary to the popular belief, 
such papers, however well-written and convincing, prove nothing, least of all, 
the emissions reduction claims. 
Notes 
"  This article was first published in Mausam, 1(1): 19-26.  
1  www.unfccc.org; www.cdmpipeline.org. 
2  www.cdmpipeline.org. 
3  www.cdmindia.nic.in; www.unfccc.org; www.cdmpipeline.org; www.iges.or.jp. 
4  www.unfccc.org. 
5  www.cdmpipeline.org. 
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Where is Climate Justice in India’s First CDM 
Project?" 
Siddhartha Dabhi 
Introduction 
December 1997 saw a historic step taken in the direction of climate change 
mitigation with the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol under the leadership of the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which set binding 
emissions reduction targets for 37 industrialized countries. The Kyoto Protocol 
which has been framed in the shadows of neoliberalism, established a series of 
market mechanisms under the so called label of ‘carbon markets’ to combat 
global warming.1 The basic idea behind carbon markets is to convert carbon 
emissions reductions into a commodity, which could then be traded between 
countries, corporations and even individuals, assuming that the trade leads to 
emissions reduction at the lowest possible cost.2 
In this paper I critically engage with these carbon markets, specifically by 
analyzing the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) project of the Indian 
company Gujarat Fluorochemicals Limited (GFL), which was India’s first and 
one of the biggest. 
Today, more than a decade after the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, the 
CDM is growing in size with more than 4200 projects in the pipeline including 
1822 projects already registered which will be producing more than 
2,900,000,000 CERs (Certified Emission Reduction units) which can be traded 
internationally.3 But with this growth in size, there has also been a growth of 
critiques of the CDM, some of which are collected in this book. This chapter 
adds to this critical literature by providing new evidence showing the inequalities 
created by the GFL CDM project.4 
GFL’s CDM Project 
Gujarat Fluorochemicals Limited (GFL) was founded in 1987, and production 
at the plant started in 1989-90. GFL is located in the state of Gujarat, which is 
in western India. In Gujarat the GFL plant is located in the village of 
Ranjitnagar in the Panchmahal District. It is engaged in the production of 
refrigerant gases like R11, R12, HCFC22, etc. Recently, the company has added 
another product to its repertoire: CERs, which stands for Certified Emission 
Reduction Units, the new commodity created out of the UN controlled Clean 
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Development Mechanism (CDM). This is how the company introduces itself 
and its carbon trading product on its website: 
GFL is amongst India’s largest refrigerant gas manufacturing company. In the 
course of manufacture of HCFC22 (a coolant widely used in air-conditioning 
and refrigeration applications), HFC23 is generated as a waste product, which is 
a potent greenhouse gas, with a global warming potential equivalent to 11700 
MT of carbon dioxide. As a part of GFL’s larger business plan to create a 
sustainable future, it is one of the few companies in India involved in Carbon 
Trading. Of the 15 projects approved by the United Nations Framework of 
Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC) so far, four are Indian and GFL is one 
of them. It has today the technology in place to bring down the emission levels 
of greenhouse gases and sell certified emission reduction credits (CERs) to 
developed countries. GFL is setting up a project for Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Reduction by Thermal Oxidation of HFC 23, at Gujarat in India. This project 
has been registered by the Executive Board of the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), established under the Kyoto Protocol. Apart from being the 
largest project in India, it is also the first Indian & third in the world to be 
registered as a CDM… GFL expects to generate more than 3 million tones of 
CERs annually, which is expected to go up in the future as HCFC22 production 
grows. These CERs can be traded internationally and can be used as a 
compliance tool under the Kyoto Protocol as well as several other trading 
markets like the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. Trade in compliance grade 
emission reductions is expected to grow to ! 10 billion per year by 2008, 
according to industry estimates.5 
GFL’s CDM project is thus to do with the destruction of HFC23, which is a 
very potent greenhouse gas, using the process of thermal oxidation. The 
technology for the thermal oxidation of HFC23 has been imported from a UK 
based company called Ineous Fluor Limited. The other key players involved in 
the CDM project are: Cooperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen Boerenleenbank B.A. 
(Rabobank), Netherlands, Sumitomo Corporation, Japan, and the Government 
of India. Rabobank is the mediator between GFL and the Government of the 
Netherlands for the purchase of CERs produced from the project. Sumitomo 
Corporation provides operations and maintenance assistance through Daikin 
Industries (Japan), and it also facilitates the sale of CERs in Japan. The 
Government of India acts as the Designated National Authority (DNA). The 
Project Design Document (PDD) has been prepared by the Mumbai office of 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). The PDD is the most important publicly 
available document outlining the CDM project’s aims and objectives, including 
its technical design, contribution to emission reductions as well as its 
environmental impact, socioeconomic benefits and contribution to sustainable 
development. 
As far as sustainable development is concerned this is what the PDD has to 
say about the project’s contribution to sustainable development: 
GFL has expressed its strong commitment to the sustainable development 
activities by committing a total fund of Rs. 7 Crores (Euro 1.375 Million) 
approximately for the life of the entire CDM project out of the revenues 
received if the project is approved and once there is revenue stream from sale of 
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CERs. These funds will be used for selected community development activities 
such as education; vocational training; employment; agriculture; sanitation, 
hygiene & environment; water management; medical and animal health, which 
will contribute significantly to the well being of the local population and poverty 
alleviation. Towards water management, for example GFL has estimated that 
under the Panam River Basin Plan (Sardar Patel Jal Plan) the community 
contribution for check dam construction shall work out to Rs. 50 lacs half of 
which is proposed to be provided as a catalytic fund by the project promoters.6 
On paper, then, this looks like a great project: HFC 23, which is one of the most 
potent greenhouse gases, is eliminated from the production; technology and 
capital is transferred from the North to the South; sustainable production and 
employment in the South is safeguarded and even enhanced; overall greenhouse 
gas emissions in the world is reduced. The problem with this official story is that 
it is only a ‘half-truth’. That is, the official, often very technical, information 
presented on the official UNFCCC/CDM website, which is the result of a very 
bureaucratic decision and control mechanism, hides a lot of facts and doubts of 
a range of people about GFL’s CDM project.  
As we know, the devil lies in the details! The problem with this superficial 
analysis provided by the official literature is that it cuts out a lot of information 
about the real environmental, social and economic impact of the GFL plant in 
the local surroundings. Let us therefore present some of this data and 
information that we feel is important to understand the true impact of the GFL 
production and its approved CDM project. 
Socio-economic Geography 
The GFL plant is located in Ranjitnagar village, with Halol, the nearest town, 16 
kilometres away. The villages surrounding the plant are Kankodakoi, Nathkuva, 
Jitpura, Chandranagar, Tarkheda, Arad, and Ranjitnagar. But the villages that are 
mainly affected by GFL are Ranjitnagar, Nathkuva, Kankodakoi and Jitpura. 
To be able to better understand the GFL CDM project and its implication it 
becomes very important to understand the geographic and socio-economic 
constitution of the villages surrounding the plant. 
! The four most affected villages by GFL’s production of potent 
greenhouse gas like HFC23 are within a 2 kilometre radius of the plant. 
! Out of the four villages most affected by the GFL plant, Ranjitnagar, is 
located 1.5 kilometres north west of the plant, which is in the opposite 
direction of the prevailing winds and also opposite to the ground water 
direction, hence it is the least affected by the plant in comparison to the 
other three villages. Ranjitnagar comprises mainly of Patel community 
farmers, which are considered to be rich farmers. Nathkuva, Jitpura and 
Kankodakoi are located within 2 kilometres south west and south east, 
which directly get hit by the emissions coming from the GFL plant as they 
fall in the wind direction as well as in the ground water direction. Amongst 
the four villages Kankodakoi and Nathkuva are the worst hit. Kankodakoi 
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constitutes of one of the most vulnerable communities known as the 
Schedule Tribes. 
! The ‘Pavagadh-Champaner’ World Heritage Site is located less than 10 
kilometres away from the GFL plant. 
The area where the GFL plant is located is considered to be an industrially 
backward area. The villagers are mostly subsistence farmers, with the rest of the 
employed population working as factory workers in GFL or other factories 
located more than 20 kilometres away from their villages. The villages mostly 
consist of the economically backward Kshatriya caste and the Schedule Tribes. 
The population in the four worst hit villages is approximately 1200 people per 
village, and each village constitutes of almost 800 families. The per-capita 
income of most of the families is below the poverty line and the villages lack 
basic amenities like pure water for drinking and irrigation, sanitation facilities, 
energy, proper infrastructure like roads and lighting. The literacy levels are very 
low in the villages. The health services in the region are also not well developed.  
As far as employment is concerned, the main source of employment is 
agriculture. Most of the farmers are subsistence farmers. The main crops they 
cultivate are corn, cotton, rice and maize. They also grow vegetables like onion, 
green peas, etc. Thus the farmers in this area cultivate both, Rabi as well as 
Kharif crops. The average investment per season is around Rupees 5000. The 
average income from agriculture in Jitpura, Nathkuva and Ranjitnagar is 
approximately Rupees 15,000-20,000. The average production level per season is 
around 1500-2000 kilograms. But the villagers of Kankodakoi village, who are 
basically tribal, are subsistence farmers, and hardly earn anything from 
agriculture and thus have to migrate to nearby town or city in search of 
employment. The average land-holdings of these farmers is, around half an acre. 
The other major source of employment is labour in factories. The wages that 
the labourers get in GFL and in the industries in the nearby cities are very low. 
Most of the villagers (90%) are employed as unskilled labourers and are daily-
wagers. The repairing staffs usually get Rupees 75 per day which is less that US$ 
2 per day. Casual labourers earn Rupees 80 per day which again is around US$ 2 
per day. The contract casual labourers earn Rupees 104 per day which is around 
US$ 2.5 per day and the labourers on permanent contract earn Rupees 175 per 
day which is around US$ 4 per day. The labourers are not covered under any 
insurance and there are no health and safety standards practiced in the plants. 
Sustainability? 
The first thing to realize is that even within the CDM process serious doubts 
has been expressed regarding the methodology approved by the CDM 
Executive Board, suggesting that it has serious drawbacks of incomplete 
environmental impact assessment.7 
There has been plenty of evidence that the CDM project of GFL does not 
contribute to sustainable development in the region. Studies by Sutter8 and 
investigations by CSE9 and also by Nandene Ghouri10 provide testimony that 
the GFL CDM project does not contribute to sustainable development. 
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The PDD of GFL claims that the project will lead to employment generation 
of 30-40 direct employees of which 90% is unskilled labour. The first point to 
note is that, on the basis of the data I collected through data survey and 
interviews of villagers, including those working at the GFL plant, it is evident 
that quite a lot of labourers employed at the plant come from other Indian 
states, like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, leading to forced migrations for the local 
villagers. Is this to be considered a sustainable practice? Also, the wages that I 
have reported on above, are they too considered sustainable? 
GFL claims that in its efforts to meet the goals of sustainable development it 
provides the farmers with agricultural assistance every year during the sowing 
season. On further enquiry on this issue, I discovered that GFL provides each 
farmer with 2 bags of urea and 1 bag of DAP every monsoon for farming. But 
this is a very unsustainable practice as the usage of urea and DAP eventually 
make the soil infertile and the use of urea and DAP has to be increased every 
year to maintain the production level. Instead of this highly unsustainable 
practice, GFL could probably have educated the local farmers with techniques 
of producing organic manure using earthworms, as this a very highly sustainable 
farming practice, which helps to increase agricultural produce and moreover it 
could also create self-employment for certain villagers who could engage 
themselves in the production of such organic manure. GFL claimed in its CDM 
project to help improve sanitation services in the villages, but it has been more 
than three years now since GFL started its CDM project, but yet there is no 
evidence of any improvement in the sanitation facilities. 
As far as agriculture, cattle and human health are concerned, they have been 
adversely affected by the industrial activities of GFL and the pollution caused by 
this company. Agriculture is worst hit in the monsoon season, which actually is 
the prime season for agriculture. From the interviews with the farmers I learned 
that the pollution has led to reduced agricultural yield as well as poor quality of 
agricultural produce. The main reason behind this is firstly the air pollution. 
Secondly, there are very high fluorine deposits in the soil and water. Fluorine is 
very damaging for the crops. The vegetation around the GFL plant shows 
abnormal growth. Fruits on the trees in the surrounding region have been found 
to be affected by the fluorine content of the soil and water. The high fluorine 
content in the soil has not just affected agriculture, but it has adversely affected 
human health and cattle. The villagers complain of chronic problems of 
irritation in the eyes, burning of eyes, rashes on skin, skin pigmentation and 
acute pain in the joints. There have been no official records of these complaints 
as far as human health is concerned, as villagers usually end up going to private 
doctors instead of government hospitals – given the poor state of public 
hospitals. Health ailments have also been observed in the cattle in the villages 
surrounding GFL. On 15 September 2004 the villagers undertook an 
independent veterinary test for the cattle from Nathkuva, Ranjitnagar, Jitpura, 
Devpura, Kharkhadi and Kankodakoi. The cattle were diagnosed with ailments 
like reduced milk production, black fever, deformed skeletal system, weakening 
of bones, watering of eyes, tumours in the body, walking ailments, tumours in 
the rib cage and diarrhoea.11 All of these issues have not been considered in the 
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slightest by the official PDD of the GFL CDM project. Hence, the claims of 
sustainable development cannot be trusted. 
Resistance 
There has been a fairly long history of explicit resistance by the people from the 
villages surrounding GFL, which mainly included villagers from Ranjitnagar, 
Jitpura, Nathkuva, and Kankodakoi as well as activists of NGOs like Paryavaran 
Mitra. For instance, the villagers filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) on 20 
April 1996, accusing GFL of causing air and water pollution under the 
provisions of Water Act 1974 and Air Pollution and Environmental Protection 
Act 1986. The Gujarat Pollution Control Board filed an affidavit with a report 
suggesting that the fluorine contents in the water samples has been high, but 
this does not evidently prove that GFL is responsible for it. Moreover, GFL has 
argued that in the Effluent Treatment Plant, the effluents are vaporized and 
hence there is no chance of any effluent disposal in underground water sources, 
which would lead to higher fluorine levels due company’s activities. GFL also 
argues that the fluorine deposits in the region were very erratic, and hence GFL 
can not be held responsible for the fluorine deposits in the region. There have 
been no consistently documented records of hazards to human health due to 
pollution, as the sample test done by the villagers is too small to reach to any 
strong conclusion that would stand up in the courts. Regarding agricultural 
production, reports suggest that agricultural production has been rising 
consistently. Hence on the basis of the evidence put forth, the High Court of 
Gujarat passed the following decision on 3rd July 1996: 
As observed by us earlier, the officer of the Board has visited the plant and 
surrounding places as asked by this court is of the opinion that ‘long time 
scientific study on chronic impact of pollution from the industrial plant on 
plantation, agricultural crop yields, animal and human health in the vicinity of 
these areas are required to be carried out by the experts in these fields’. The 
experts suggested by the petitioners in their report have also stated that they are 
of the opinion that ‘to arrive at definite conclusion, a more detailed study of the 
area with monitoring of certain parameters is essential’. Under the circumstances 
we direct the State Government to appoint a committee of experts who shall 
carry out necessary investigation and shall submit its report to the State 
Government, on the basis of which the State Government shall take appropriate 
action in this matter.12  
Despite losing the High Court case, the local villagers continued to resist GFL, 
as became apparent to me in a number of interviews. One of my interviewees, 
for example, is a resident of Jitpura village. He dropped out of school early, so 
he cannot be regarded as well educated or part of the local elite. After school he 
started working at GFL as an electrician. But then he left his job and started 
working independently, with the support of local NGOs, for developmental and 
environmental issues of the villagers. He has been very active in fighting for the 
poor village peasants who have been affected by the pollution caused by GFL. 
Together with other villagers he has tried to unite the residents of Jitpura, 
Nathkuva, Kankodakoi and Ranjitnagar, organizing many protests against the 
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company. But all these efforts failed because of a lack of unity among the four 
villages, and because GFL was strong enough in breaking down the movements 
against it with the help of political and police pressure. Whenever there was a 
movement, GFL bribed some of the weak villagers and misused their economic 
helplessness to break down the revolt.  
Ever since the company started production at the plant, the villagers have 
been very sceptical about its safety, as the chemicals used in the plant are very 
dangerous, and in an accident they could prove fatal for the villagers. In fact, the 
villagers feel that if there is an accident at the GFL plant, it could have impacts 
similar to the ‘Bhopal Gas Tragedy’. So in 2005, when there was a small blast in 
the plant, the villagers turned violent against the company. The villagers 
attacked the plant and an office inside the plant, protesting against the 
management of the company. Immediately the managers called for the police to 
tackle the situation, and nearly 20 villagers were arrested and put behind the 
bars.  
In addition to dedicated local villagers, a number of NGOs have also been 
active in the resistance against GFL. Paryavaran Mitra is an NGO that works for 
environmental concerns in Gujarat with its office in Ahmedabad. During the 
High Court case it helped the villagers to get veterinary and water tests done, 
and it also worked with local and national media outlets to drum up support for 
the villagers. As a consequence of the failed High Court case, Paryavaran Mitra 
then started to research the CDM process in India in general, and it realized that 
no monitoring of these projects was in place. So, the NGO wrote to the 
UNFCCC asking them about who monitors these CDM projects, and the 
UNFCCC replied that it is the duty of the government of the host country. So, 
the NGO then wrote to the Government of India asking them about the 
monitoring of these projects, and they replied that it was the UNFCCC’s 
responsibility. Hence after many more correspondences and representations, the 
Government of Gujarat was forced to form a committee to monitor the CDM 
projects in Gujarat. This committee is called Gujarat Cleaner Production Centre, 
but I am told that this committee does not function the way it is supposed to, 
and it merely exists for the sake of formality rather than actual monitoring. As a 
result, Paryavaran Mitra has reported to the UNFCCC the poor and corrupt 
implementation of the CDM projects in Gujarat, yet nothing seems to be done 
about it. 
The Centre for Science and Environment (CSE), an NGO that is widely 
known in India and based in Delhi, has also studied the GFL case in some 
detail. For example, it has tried to investigate the price at which GFL sells the 
carbon credits and also who are the major buyers of these credits. However, 
GFL has never disclosed this information under the pretext that it would be a 
breach of contract. This shows the complete lack of transparency at the heart of 
the CDM process. CSE has also studied the Project Design Documents (PDD) 
of GFL and another company called Navin Fluorochemicals Limited, both of 
which were prepared by PricewaterhouseCoopers. Very interestingly, CSE has 
observed that the PDDs of both CDM projects seem to be identical in some 
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places, as in both documents the questions raised by stakeholders are the same 
and the answers to them are also the same, even though the two projects are 
located in two different states of India. Is this a coincidence or further proof of 
the CDM scam going on here? 
Money Making Machine 
As Schwank13 argues, CDM projects involving the destruction of HFC23 create 
perverse money making incentives rather than being a real ‘green’ initiative. The 
cost for CER generation in a HFC23 destruction project is roughly around 0.5 
USD/CO2 which is very much less compared to the current market prices of 
CERs. So the question really arises if CER stands for ‘certified emissions 
reduction’ or ‘certified emissions revenue’. This is evident from the fact that 
GFL earned ! 27 million in the last quarter of 2006, which would have helped 
GFL expand its ‘normal’, that is polluting, industrial activities.14 And mind you 
these are just the official figures. My interview with a GFL employee revealed 
that except for Deepak Asher, who spearheads the CDM division of the 
company and a few other close associates of his within the company, no one 
else in the company has any knowledge of the CDM project and the revenues 
generated from it, not even most of the employees in the accounts department. 
The question is why all this secrecy around the CDM when supposedly it is 
something noble. The perverse incentives arising from the CDM has led to an 
increase in the number of companies in India and China trying to seek 
registration for HFC23 destruction CDM projects – given the high amount of 
CERs generated through this process. This in turn also gives rise to the perverse 
incentive of increasing HCFC22 production (and also setting up new HCFC22 
production plants), which would counteract the Montreal Protocol which calls 
for the phasing out of HCFC22 gas. Another normal day for carbon markets 
then. 
Conclusions 
It is very important to understand that climate change is not merely an issue of 
carbon emissions but one that depends on and involves a wide variety of 
factors. Reducing carbon emissions is not simply a numbers game. Climate 
change, as mentioned in the introduction and also repeatedly in other chapters 
of this book, is a crisis which encompasses a wide range of social, economic, 
political and environmental issues, because emission reductions require a 
structural change of our life styles. So this brings us back to the key issue of the 
title of this chapter: ‘climate justice’. The main conclusion that can be drawn 
from the case of GFL and also from other CDM cases from all around the 
world is that it is not just a matter of carbon emissions, but it is a matter of 
justice and more importantly of climate justice. 
As far as the case of GFL is concerned, for a moment let us assume that the 
thermal oxidation process actually does reduce greenhouse gas emissions (which 
have been questioned by many environmentalists). As this case has shown, there 
are a wide range of other negative factors, such as land and water pollution and 
fluorosis disorders in humans and animals, which this CDM project does 
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nothing about. That is, there is no sustainable development, although this is 
what the CDM is supposedly about. Instead, the profit generated by the sale of 
CERs simply props up very polluting business practices, which has had negative 
impacts on the local population ever since its inception. Should this money, 
which is generated through carbon markets, not be used for the benefit of local 
people, rather than propping up local and national Indian elites? 
Instead of the noble claims about ‘sustainable development’, put forward by 
the GFL CDM PDD, what seems to be really happening on ground is that GFL 
is accumulating enormous profits from the sale of CERs and in this process is 
dispossessing the poor villagers from their rights to clean water, clean air and 
productive soil. 
The conclusions that can be drawn from the CDM project of GFL is that 
the use of market mechanisms for climate change mitigation has been a failure, 
as far as the CDM and its impacts on local people are concerned. What the 
CDM seems to be doing is to provide an incentive to sustain polluting 
production practices, rather than invest into real sustainable development.  
There is next to no control at the local, regional and national level in terms 
of the implementation of CDM projects. Hence, all sorts of spurious claims can 
be made by companies and consultancies which only seem to want to profit 
from carbon markets rather than invest in real clean technologies. As a result, 
industrial dinosaurs, which already have a long track record of pollution, are 
propped up alongside local elites that profit from this global money making 
scheme. But can we really save the climate through these mechanisms? Can we 
really better the lives of those living in poverty, as the CDM claims to do?  
In my view, the solution to the global climate crisis is not some market 
mechanism which commodifies carbon. This seems to simply provide an 
incentive to create more carbon and extent existing polluting practices – in both 
North and South. Instead, the solution lies in finding a green and sustainable 
alternative to fossil fuels and keeping climate and social justice at the centre of 
any climate change mitigation mechanism.  
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The Jindal CDM Projects in Karnataka" 
Nishant Mate and Soumitra Ghosh 
Location 
The JSW Energy Ltd is located adjacent to its parent concern, the JSW Steel 
Ltd, two kilometres from Torangallu village of Bellary district in Karnataka. The 
plant site situated between Bellary and Hospet falls on the state highway 
connecting Bellary and Sandur. 
What the PDD says 
Project Overview 
JSW Energy has been commissioned to generate electricity using imported coal 
and waste gas. The electricity generated is supplied to JSW and the Karnataka 
state grid, the KPTCL (Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited). 
The input fuel to the JSW Energy power plant is sourced from JSW Steel, which 
is generating corex gas and other waste gases from its process and sourcing 
imported coal. The project is supposed to reduce GHG emissions by increasing 
the proportion of waste gas in the fuel configuration for power generation. 
During the initial operation period, the project faced uncertainties about the 
availability and steadiness of supply of the corex gas and other waste gases from 
JSW. Because of these, JSW Energy dropped the plan of utilizing waste gases, 
and had accordingly applied for and obtained the requisite approval from the 
KSPCB (Karnataka State Pollution Control Board) to combust coal exclusively. 
Subsequently, during March 2001, JSW Energy management decided to go for 
the current project activity so that the use of waste gas is maximized in the fuel 
configuration and emissions of GHG is reduced. This decision has seriously 
internalized the potential benefits of CDM. Besides the potential CDM benefits, 
there is no other incentive for JSW Energy to maximize the use of waste gases 
for power generation. The project activity involved additional investments to 
the tune of 240 million rupees (to the investment in power generation using 
coal) to achieve a steady supply of the waste gas. 
The JSW Steel Ltd has also a CDM project operational, that is, generation of 
electricity through combustion of waste gases from the blast furnace and corex 
units at its steel plant (in JPL unit 1) at Torangallu in Karnataka. With the 
advent of the separate JSW Energy, the total amount of corex gas supplied to by 
the JSW Steel Ltd and the JSW Energy Ltd is metered separately. Also, the JSW 
Steel Ltd and the JSW Energy Ltd are two separate legal entities. 
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Sustainable Development 
The PDD of JSW Energy highlights the company’s contention that they have 
satisfied all the four indicators for sustainable development – social, economic, 
environmental, and technological well-being – as stipulated by the MoEF 
(Ministry of Environment and Forests), Government of India, in the interim 
approval guidelines for CDM projects. 
Social Well-Being 
! The project demonstrates harnessing power from waste gas sources, which 
will encourage replication of such project in future across the region. 
! The project has built up a knowledge base about the operation of the waste-
gas-based power generation and has built up a skill set for such kind of 
operation. 
Environmental Well-Being 
! The project activity involves generation of electricity using waste gas, thus 
replacing a certain amount of fossil fuel used for electricity generation. This 
has resulted in reduced GHG intensity per unit of electricity generation for 
the state grid; and, in effect, the total carbon intensity of the Karnataka state 
has been reduced. 
! The project has reduced the local air pollutants and environmental impacts 
due to increased share in the use of waste gas in the fuel configuration. 
Economic Well-Being 
! This project will demonstrate the use of new financial mechanism – that is, 
CDM – in raising finance for power generation from waste gases. 
What the Field Study Reveals 
A visit to Toranagallu village and discussions with some panchayat office 
bearers and villagers – Mr Shankar, who is a bill collector at the gram panchayat; 
Mr Govind, a gram panchayat member; Mr Shivkumar, gram panchayat 
member; and many other members – revealed that though the JSW Energy Ltd 
is a very big industry, established on an area covering 250 acres of land, the area 
is not declared as an industrial area by the government. The main products in 
this industrial set-up are steel and iron, where production of energy constitutes 
only a small proportion. JSW has got the land from the government at a throw-
away price of 10,000 to 15,000 rupees per acre. 
The company, before starting the project, had promised that they would 
adopt the entire area for all-round development and provide all kinds of civic 
amenities. However, after acquiring people’s lands, the company did not do a 
single social or developmental activity, and neither do they have any plans for 
doing so. They blatantly backed out on all their commitments about electricity 
supply, road construction, health facilities, employment benefits, and so on. The 
JSW Energy has only constructed a few bus-stop sheds and two roads, which 
are mainly used by the company. 
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Very few local people are engaged in the company as workers; most workers 
are from distant areas and even from other states. The village population is 
8,000; but with the number of people coming from other areas to work in the 
plants, the population touches 80,000. All the workers are contract labourers 
who are not allowed to work here for more than 2/3 years. Anyone who dares 
raise any question against the company’s work ethics does not get further work. 
The plant is indiscriminately releasing toxic waste water into the canal that 
passes through the village, not only polluting the canal water but also the village 
pond (which is linked to the canal) and the groundwater. Even the water 
collected from tube wells is found to be toxic. Besides harming farm produce 
and activities, water pollution by the industry has made it difficult for the 
villagers to access safe drinking water and has given rise to incidences of several 
water-borne diseases in the village. On the other hand, unabated air pollution 
from the industry has compounded the problems for the local populace. 
Diseases, such as skin ailments, asthma, and tuberculosis, which were not 
prevalent in the area, are now common. 
The company has also turned back on improving health services in the area. 
The local government health centre is in a dismal condition, depriving villagers 
of the requisite health services. However, the JSW Energy has opened a modern 
hospital named Sanjeevani, which only caters to its employees and discourages 
the local villagers to avail its health facilities by forcing them to pay unaffordable 
fees. Therefore, people have demanded that the JSW Energy develop the 
existing health centre, to which the company did not pay any heed. 
JSW has also illegally occupied the 600 acre village commons where there 
were plans of constructing schools, college, and an ITI (industrial training 
institute). 
The villagers complained that before starting a new unit or project, JSW 
never even bothers to get the consent of the villagers. They call only a few 
panchayat members for a meeting and bribe them with good food and sweets, 
and then take several photographs so that a fabricated story about people’s 
consent can be published in the newspapers. 
The CDM Hoax 
Sustainability Criteria 
! The field study clearly suggests that all the indicators of a CDM project have 
been grossly violated by the JSW Energy in the Torangallu region. No 
initiative on sustainable development of the region has been taken up by the 
company, and nor have the local people been involved in any decision-
making or project activities. The PDD claims that the project has built up a 
knowledge base about the operation of the waste-gas-based power 
generation and has built up a skill-set for such kind of operation. However, 
there has been no such initiative to even make people aware about a waste-
gas-based power system, let alone building any skill-set for such kind of 
operation. 
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! The economic development promised in the PDD has also turned out to be 
a hoax, as most people are now rendered unemployed after losing their land 
to the project. 
! In terms of environmental well-being of the region, the project has been an 
unmitigated disaster from the beginning. Instead of cleaning up the air and 
the atmosphere, it literally damned the local populace and their environment 
with unprecedented air, water, and sound pollution, which, in turn, brought a 
host of strange diseases to the village. 
! JSW Energy has even made no attempts to make people aware about the 
CDM component of the project, such as GHG emissions, clean mechanism, 
carbon trading, or even global warming. However, they have claimed in the 
PDD that the local people have a direct hand in the reduction of GHG 
emissions in the project and thereby contributing to the mitigation of climate 
crisis. 
Additionality 
In case of the Jindal projects, the CDM fraud goes deeper than violations of the 
sustainability criteria. Every new CDM project has to prove its ‘additionality’, 
which means that the project would not have been possible without the CDM 
benefits – monetary and otherwise. The additionality of the Jindal waste gas 
projects in Karnataka has been suspect from the very beginning; among others, 
the noted carbon market expert Dr Axel Michaelowa called the projects ‘clearly 
non-additional’, because the projects could have come up irrespective of the 
CDM money. Dr Michaelowa’s submitted a public comment challenging the 
project developers’ claim regarding the timing of when the plant was going to 
use waste gas for electricity generation: essentially showing that this decision had 
been made long before the company had applied for CDM funding, and that it, 
therefore, failed the additionality test, that is, the JTPCL had already decided 
(and had an incentive) to implement it without the CDM. Dr Michaelowa 
writes: 
I made a public comment on the first project questioning its additionality. In my 
view, these projects could become a key precedent for allowing large non-
additional energy-efficiency projects into the CDM. My comment read as 
follows: ‘This project is non-additional. Its claim that a decision to use waste 
gases to generate electricity was made at a later stage than the actual investment 
[was done] into the corex plant is not true. Electricity generation from corex 
gases was always a key element of the project investment (this is a well known 
fact in India) and thus the assertion that during March 2001, the JTPCL 
management took the decision for the current project activity is blatantly wrong. 
Moreover, the first tranche (130 MW) of the project started production well 
before 2000 and thus that tranche is not eligible for the CDM. See the 
publication (which does not mention the CDM at all and is another indicator 
that CDM was not seriously considered!) by the project participants – Dwijendra 
Ghorai, Friedrich Bräuer, Helmut Freydorfer, Dieter Siuka, L’unité COREX® 
chez Jindal Vijayanagar Steel : une réussite sur toute la ligne, Rev. Met. Paris, N°3 
(March 2001), p. 239-250; (English version, COREX operation at Jindal Steel: a 
success story in Millennium Steel, 2001, p. 20-25.’ It has also been alleged that 
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there has been a price fix for the electricity being generated: one arm of the 
Jindal group is charging another arm of the company a higher price for the 
electricity it generates under the CDM than normal, so as not to make the waste 
heat plant financially attractive without the CDM. These and other questions 
about the Jindal projects’ additionality and CDM norm violations were raised in 
the course of a Channel–4 programme in early 2007. 
Windfall Profits 
The extremely serious objections to the ‘CDM’ness of the projects, however, 
went unheeded. The Jindal group went on reaping enormous profits from the 
projects (Dr Michaelowa said during an interview with Channel 4 that the 
projects can gross up to 20 million euros annually by selling CERs). One has to 
remember that this is an early 2007 estimate when the average price of a 
secondary CER (CERs issued by the UNFCCC and coming from a project that 
is handled by a reputed broker) was about 15 Euros, and the CDM market 
touched its zenith of 27 Euros/CER in July–August 2008, before the recession 
effects started to be visible. The two CDM Jindal projects in Karnataka have 
been issued 7,843,000 CERs so far (till 26 August 2009). Because of all Indian 
companies’ typical habit of holding on to their CERs (for fetching better price 
at a later date), it is difficult to assume exactly how much money a particular 
project has earned. 
Jindals admitted to have earned, till late 2007, 1.1 billion rupees (it could be 
much more) from selling supposedly ‘reduced emissions’ (1.3 million CERs) at 
their steel plant in Karnataka. According to company sources, this boosted 
other incomes, and helped the Jindal Steel Works to record their best ever 
quarter in terms of profit. If we consider the presently issued CER figures, the 
total earning from their ‘profitable’ clean projects can be anything between 100 
and 150 billion rupees! According to another estimate, at the current market 
price of 15.5 Euros per CER in early 2007, the company stood to gain 109 
million Euros over a 10 year period from the sale of CERs; and interestingly 
enough, JSW Steel is expected to ‘save’ on an average 0.77 million CERs per 
annum that can be sold in the open market, which means that the company 
would hold on to its CERs in wait of even bigger ‘profit’! 
The Jindals have 9 CDM projects in their kitty, only 3 of which have a 
collective potential of generating no less than 24,378,000 CERs by 2020. These 
are all located in the JSW area at Torongulu. One of these (the biggest, with 
8,589,000 credits) has not been registered with the UNFCCC yet. 
Notes 
"  The article has been taken from – Mate N., and S. Ghosh (2009) ‘The CDM Scam: Case Study 
on Jindal CDM Projects in Karnataka’, Mausam, 1-2(2-5), pp. 27-29. 
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The MSPL Wind Power CDM Project"  
Nishant Mate and Soumitra Ghosh 
Location 
MSPL Ltd, part of the Baldota Group, owns three wind power projects, located 
at Sogi, Jogimatti, and Jajikalgudda in the districts of Bellary, Chitradurga, and 
Davangere, respectively, in Karnataka. Bellary, Chitradurga, and Davangere are 
at 300, 200, and 317 kilometres from the capital city of Bangalore. 
What the PDD says 
Project Overview 
The MSPL, with a view of being in line with the sustainable development 
priorities of India, is promoting project activities to generate sizable volume of 
green power by tapping wind energy in the ‘barren’ land of Karnataka, deficit in 
energy and peaking power. The project proposes to generate 125.15 MW 
equivalent of clean electricity with efficient utilization of the available wind 
energy through adoption of efficient and modern technology. The project will 
replace energy produced through combustion of fossil fuels with equivalent 
volume of clean energy. Green power of 303.3 million units per annum will be 
fed to the KPTCL grid, a part of the southern regional grid. 
The project involves three concerns of the Baldota Group – the MSPL Ltd, 
the RMMP Ltd, and PVS & Brothers. As per an agreement among these three, 
the MSPL Ltd has the ownership rights for this CDM project and is the sole 
transaction entity with the Executive Board of the UNFCCC (United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change). 
The 125.15 MW wind power project comprises 83 WEGs (wind-energy 
generators) of 1250 KW capacity, 17 WEGs of 950 KW capacity, and 7 WEGs 
of 750 KW capacity. The project activity has been planned and executed in two 
phases, with capacities of 27.65 MW in phase 1 and 97.50 MW in phase 2. The 
plan and WEG allocations of the two phases are described in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
S. No. Company No. of WEGs Capacity (KW) Make 
1 MSPL 7x750 KW 5250 NEG Micon 
  17x950 KW 16150 NEG Micon 
  5x1250 KW 6250 Suzlon 
 
Table 1: Phase 1: Total 27650 KW 
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S. No Company No. of WEGs Capacity (KW) Make 
1 MSPL 14x1250 KW 51250 Suzlon 
2 RMMPL 31x1250 KW 38750 Suzlon 
3 PVS 06x1250 KW 7500 Suzlon 
 
Table 2: Phase 2: Total 97500 KW 
Sustainable Development 
The MSPL Ltd is a proactive business entity and firmly believes that effective 
and efficient generation of green power, coupled with responsible 
environmental considerations, is vital to maintain a competitive edge. This has 
been a guiding factor towards their initiative in the conceptualization and 
installation of the 125.15 MW wind power project. To be competitive in the 
open market economy of India, the group is developing this project as a CDM 
project under the UNFCCC, which would appropriately reduce the use of coal 
and other fossil fuels in power generation, helping in significant reduction of 
GHG emissions and also promoting sustainable economic growth and 
conservation of the environment through use of wind as a renewable resource. 
The project primarily assists the State of Karnataka – and India as a whole – 
in stimulating and accelerating the commercialization of grid-connected 
renewable energy technologies. In addition, wind power projects of this 
magnitude, as conceptualized by this project activity, demonstrate the viability 
of larger grid-connected wind farms, which improve energy security, air quality, 
and local livelihoods, as well as assisting in the development of a sustainable 
domestic renewable energy industry. The specific goals of the project are as 
follows. 
! Operationalizing sustainable development through generation of eco-friendly 
power 
! Increasing the share of renewable energy power generation in the regional 
and national grid 
! Bridging India’s energy deficit in the business-as-usual scenario 
! Providing national energy security, especially when global fossil-fuel reserves 
threatens the long-term sustainability of the Indian economy 
! Strengthening India’s rural electrification coverage 
! Reducing GHG emissions compared to business-as-usual scenario 
! Reducing pollutants, such as oxides of sulphur, oxides of nitrogen, 
particulate matters, etc., resulting from the conventional power generation 
industry 
! Contributing towards the reduction of power shortage, especially in the state 
of Karnataka 
! Demonstrating and helping in stimulating the growth of the wind-power 
industry in India 
! Enhancing local employment in the vicinity of the project, which is a rural 
area 
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! Capacity-building and empowering vulnerable sections of the rural 
communities dwelling in the project area 
! Conserving natural resources, including land, forests, minerals, water, and 
the ecosystems 
What do the Field Studies Reveal? 
Sogi Village 
During a visit to the Sogi village area, R Manjunath Nayak (a civil engineer), B 
Hallya Nayak (a gram panchayat member of Govindpur village), and other 
villagers informed us that the wind mill project did not provide the village with 
any facility; the road built through the village is primarily for the transport 
purposes of the wind mill project and not meant for the villagers. The project, 
which is located on the nearby plateaux, usurped people’s lands without paying 
the right price; while the market rate of one acre of land is 200,000 rupees, the 
company has paid a maximum amount of 80,000 rupees per acre. Worse, 
agricultural land lost for the construction of the road was compensated with 
only 5,000 to 6,000 rupees per acre. Moreover, any damage caused to the road 
by heavy vehicles of the company is now repaired using the gram panchayat 
fund. Patches of agricultural land lost to make way for tower lines for 
transmission of electricity were hardly compensated for – people have got a 
ridiculous payment of 500 to 1200 rupees. In many cases, people have not even 
been paid anything after losing land to the project. 
The four power stations installed by the company occupy an area of 4/5 
acres each, but the company has acquired 40 acres of village and forest lands. 
The area is mostly inhabited largely by scheduled-caste and scheduled-tribe 
communities, with a spattering of other communities; and for them losing land 
without any alternative economic options in place is a huge economic setback. 
The company has not taken the necessary legal permission from the gram 
panchayat for setting up the project. Villagers said that the company gave 
assurance to provide jobs to them and thus duped them into signing some 
papers. However, no one has been employed in the project; a couple of local 
residents who were working as security guards earlier have now also been 
removed from their jobs. 
Most youth in the village are educated; there are even some engineers and 
diploma-holding technicians from ITIs (industrial training institutes). But, the 
company shows no interests in employing them in the project, not even on 
contract basis. For instance, R Manjunath Nayak, a civil engineer, has long been 
trying to get a job in the project. But, the company management turned down 
his request by saying that it was against the company policy to employ local 
people on such type of jobs. His hope to get at least some contract works is also 
shattered, as all such works go to outside contractors. While the wind turbines 
were being installed, only 20 per-cent people from the village got some work. 
The rest of the workforce was brought from other areas. While the construction 
was on, some workers were killed in an accident. The company hushed up the 
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case by providing some paltry compensation of 25,000 to 50,000 rupees to the 
victim families. All the workers who died were from local communities. 
Local villagers blame the coming up of the wind-mill systems for the erratic 
rain fall they are experiencing of late. Due to the working of wind mills, the 
monsoon is changing its course, they say. The local economy is primarily 
dependent on agriculture, and the change in rain-fall patterns has proved 
disastrous for them. The noise from the wind mills has a huge deleterious 
impact not only on humans but on the entire biodiversity of the area. While 
people cannot sleep at night, cattle and the wildlife are frightened. No wild 
animal is seen in the forest now. Villagers were also promised free electricity 
supply by the project; but that too has turned out to be a false commitment. 
Jogimatti Village 
Village Jogimatti – a slum settlement near the wind mill project – is located in 
the urban area of Chitradurga city. The project itself is located in the forest area 
of Chitradurga. People of the village mostly work as labourers and have not lost 
any land to the project. The villagers, however, complained of the noise from 
the wind mill as a huge problem due to which they cannot even sleep at night. 
Jajikalgudda Area 
Upon visiting Jajikalguda, it was revealed that it is in fact a cluster of many 
villages dotting the hilly area – Chitegiri, Adeveli, Nichapur, Nazirnagar, 
Hombergatta, Deverlimmalapur, and Tipahakaguhadli. From the Chitegiri 
village, the company has acquired four acres of land at a price of 40,000 rupees 
per acre. The Forest Department has ‘given’ a whopping 200 acres of forest 
land to this wind mill project. A power station has been constructed in 
Nazirnagar village from where electricity generated at the wind mill is supplied 
to other areas. Here, only one person from the village has been employed, as a 
security guard. In Hombargatta village, the wind mill project took # acre of 
land from one person and, in turn, employed him at a tower construction site 
saying that it was a government job and gave him only 1800 rupees per month. 
After a few months, he was asked to leave. The construction work has been 
given to a non-resident contractor, named Rajesh, who erects tower lines on 
villagers’ agricultural lands without paying any compensation. 
The CDM Hoax 
The field visit clearly establishes that all the sustainable development indicators 
as described in the CDM guidelines have not been satisfied by the project 
authorities. However, it seems, the project has managed to achieve a CDM 
status just by producing an impressive PDD (which looks and reads very much 
like the NSL PDD!). None of the promises made in the PDD about the 
project’s contribution towards sustainable development – strengthening India’s 
rural electrification coverage; enhancing local employment in the vicinity of the 
project, which is a rural area; capacity building and empowerment of vulnerable 
sections of the rural communities dwelling in the project area; and conserving 
natural resources including land, forest, minerals, water, and ecosystems – has 
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been met. Nor is there any hint of a rural development programme to show that 
the company is bothering at all about those promises. 
The MSPL did not even bother to conduct the necessary consultation 
process with the local population, village panchayat, and the local elected body 
of representatives before initiating the project. But the PDD claims to have 
roped in the people in ‘playing a big role in mitigating the climate crisis’ by 
directly participating in this CDM project. In reality, the local residents are not 
even aware about the nature and activities of the project, let alone concepts of 
CDM and carbon trading. Since the project has just led to a lot of woes for the 
people instead of benefitting them, the local populace hate the project. 
However, the wind mill project is reaping huge profits both by selling electricity 
to the state grid and from its CDM component. On 12 February 2007, the 
project was issued 267 666 CERs for the verification period 22 March 2004 to 
31 March 2006. Other parties in the CDM project are the United Kingdom and 
Northern Ireland. In monetary terms, this meant a windfall of no less than 4 
million Euros (going by the average secondary CER price of 15 Euros during 
early 2007), provided that the project had sold all its credits at that time. 
So much money...for doing what? We have seen how the apparently benign 
wind projects can usurp people’s commons and destroy livelihoods. We have 
also seen how the nicely worded and sleekly laid out PDDs can be full of 
unabashed lies. But, what about the tall claims of emissions reduction? Wouldn’t 
the projects have come up anyway, with or without the CDM money? Is any 
wind CDM project in India truly additional? 
Additionality 
The additionality of the wind energy CDM projects in India has always been 
under the scanner mainly because of the existing subsidy regime – both the state 
governments and the Government of India offer a range of subsidies to any 
renewable energy project including wind mills. Besides, there is this stipulation 
that the certain portion of the total electricity supplied to the grid and thereafter 
distributed to industrial consumers has to come from renewable sources. The 
UNFCCC has rejected a number of Indian wind projects on additionality 
grounds, including a Bajaj Auto wind project from Maharashtra. Now that the 
Indian government proposes to extend 1 incentives to wind farms for 10 years, 
the additionality of all wind CDM projects becomes doubly suspect. Perhaps the 
incentive move is due to the fact that wind is big business now; with the 
presence of corporate giants like Tata, Reliance, ONGC, and Suzlon, the 
government plans to extend GBI (generation-based incentive) to wind farms for 
a period of up to 10 years. Under this scheme, benefits equivalent to accelerated 
depreciation of 80 per cent at NPV (net present value) will be made available to 
private investors every year. The move is supported by the Planning 
Commission of India and the MNRE (Ministry of New and Renewable Energy), 
in tune with the National Action Plan for Climate Change. Currently, the wind 
mills can enjoy 80 per cent depreciation benefit only during the installation 
period in the first year. However, the new move is likely to boost up wind 
energy production considerably as the country plans to double its installed 
Cases 
 158 
capacity in this segment from the current 10 500 MW as on 31 March 2009 to 
20,000 MW in the next five years. The plan is to add 2000 MW every year. The 
government plans to attract an investment – mostly from the private sector – to 
the tune of 40,000 crore (400 billion) rupees in the next five years to create this 
additional capacity. ‘There are about 3000 private investors in this sector already 
and the proposed new benefit is likely to attract more investments from them,’ 
according to a senior government official. 
With the forum of electricity regulators adopting the RPS (renewable 
purchase standards) on behalf of all states, private investors are likely to get 
assured returns for the excess power they generate. Under the RPS, states will 
have to commit to buy a certain per cent of their electricity needs from 
renewable resources. The key states in the wind sector are Tamil Nadu (with an 
installed capacity of 4300 MW), Gujarat (1560 MW), Maharashtra (940 MW), 
Karnataka (1327 MW), and Rajasthan (738 MW).That the wind projects in 
themselves are extremely lucrative financial propositions is proved by the fact 
that a company’s stock prices soar as soon as it announces a wind energy 
programme. For instance, the shares of Gujarat NRE Coke soared 8 per cent on 
its windmill expansion plan in 2 December 2007; and the stocks of Suzlon, the 
biggest wind operator in the country, showed a consistent 3 upswing 
throughout the first quarter of 2009. 
Notes 
"  The article has been taken from – Mate N., and S. Ghosh (2009) ‘The CDM Scam: Wind 
Power Projects in Karnataka’, Mausam, 1-2(2-5), pp. 30-34.  
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The Deogad Hydroelectric CDM Project" 
Nishant Mate and Hadida Yasmin 
Location 
The DHP (Deogad Hydroelectric Project) – owned by the Gadre Marine 
Export – is located in village Ghonsari in Kankawali taluka of the Konkan 
region of Sindhudurg district in the state of Maharashtra. The dam site is 
approachable from Phonda village on the Kolhapur–Ratnagiri road (state 
highway no. 49), which is 18 km from the Mumbai–Goa national highway. 
What the PDD says 
Project Overview 
The Gadre Marine Export is to generate power from the irrigation releases of 
the Deogad dam, utilizing the variable head. The intake structure consists of the 
trash racks, the stop log gates, the air vent, and the steel penstock in the body of 
the dam. The powerhouse is to be located at the surface downstream. The tail 
water will be guided through the tail canal into the steel penstock. The 2.2-m-
diameter steel penstock is designed to carry a peak discharge of 10 cubic metres 
per seconds. On the downstream of the dam, a ‘Y’ piece is to be provided to 
this irrigation-cum-power-outlet in order to let out water directly into the river 
for irrigation whenever the powerhouse is to be closed. A butterfly valve in the 
powerhouse is provided for controlling discharge to the turbine. No additional 
storage or forebay, etc., is contemplated. 
Sustainable Development 
The main objective of the DHP is to produce clean electrical energy in a 
sustainable manner, optimizing the utilization of water – a renewable resource. 
The electricity generated by the project activity will replace the electricity 
produced by thermal power plants that utilize fossil fuels in the grid. In the 
wake of power shortage and the ever-increasing demand for electricity in 
Maharashtra, implementation of the proposed project, with an installed capacity 
of 1.5 MW, contributes to help meeting the demand. The Designated National 
Authority for the CDM in India, which is under the MoEF (Ministry of 
Environment and Forests), has stipulated indicators for sustainable 
development in the interim approval guidelines for Indian CDM projects. Each 
of these indicators has been studied in the context of the project activity to 
ensure that the project contributes to sustainable development. 
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Socio-economic Well-Being 
! The proposed project activity leads to alleviation of poverty by establishing 
direct and indirect benefits through employment generation and improved 
economic activities by strengthening of the deficit grid of the state electricity 
utility. This includes improvement of electricity quality, frequency, and 
availability. 
! The construction work will generate employment for the local population. 
There will also be various kinds of mechanical works on the site, generating 
employment opportunities on a regular and permanent basis. The 
transportation of various project components to the project site will also 
create work opportunities, thereby adding to the income of the local 
population. 
! There will also be various kinds of mechanical works on the site, generating 
employment opportunities for the local populace on regular and permanent 
basis. 
! The project will create indirect employment opportunities for 50-100 
unskilled workers for a period of two years (during construction), which 
would not happen in the absence of the project. In addition, the project 
creates direct permanent employment for about 35 persons for the operation 
of the project. 
! By promoting the decentralization of economic power, the project 
contributes in bringing economic sustainability around the plant site. 
! The project activity also leads to the diversification of the national energy 
supply, which is dominated by conventional fuel-based generating units. 
Environmental Well-Being 
! The hydroelectric project has no negative environmental impacts because it 
relies on existing irrigation releases and it does not involve any tree felling or 
submersion, etc. Furthermore, adequate provisions are made for plantation 
and greeneries, making the area more environment-friendly. 
! The project utilizes hydro energy for generating electricity replacing polluting 
fossil-fuel-based power plants, thus contributing to reduction in specific 
emissions, including GHG emissions. Use of hydro energy – which is a 
renewable resource – to generate electricity contributes to resource 
conservation. Thus the project causes no negative impact on the surrounding 
environment, leading to environmental well-being. 
! As hydro power projects produce no end products in the form of solid 
waste, such as ash, the problem of solid waste disposal encountered by most 
other sources of power is eliminated naturally. 
What do the Field Studies Reveal? 
A visit to the Ghonsari village, however, reveals something strikingly contrary to 
what the PDD claims. Villager Sakshat Prakash Parker told us that work on the 
so-called irrigation dam started 15 years ago and many villagers have lost their 
land and houses to this project. The population of the Ghonsari village is about 
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3000, and the primary source of livelihood of the villagers is agriculture. Out of 
the 12 wadas (specific community based clusters) in the village, two have 
completely gone under water. People who have lost their land and houses were 
supposed to get the resettlement money in two phases. 
In 2005, when the second phase of receiving compensation was due, people 
started protesting against the construction of the dam. Nevertheless, 
construction work was carried on by the contractor Nobel India Construction 
of Jaipur. The local people consider the Gadre Marine Export to be the sub-
contractors for electricity generation, and because the irrigation project was not 
completed they now think that this project is only for electricity generation, 
which will not be for their use. Moreover, because people from the village got 
no employment during the construction work of either project (let alone any 
other benefit they are entitled to under the CDM norms, and which the PDD so 
loudly proclaims), they are angry with everything concerned with the 
irrigation/hydropower project. ‘The contractor got all the workers from outside 
and we got nothing,’ said the villagers in unison. 
Sulentin Karlu Raise, another villager, who has lost half acre of agriculture 
land to the dam project, corroborated the fact that the company had indeed 
cheated the people on the assurance that local people would get employment 
during the dam construction and other project activities. 
Jeron Baren, a clerk in the local gram panchayat informed that the company 
did not hold any public meeting with the villagers before commencing the 
project. ‘They only sent a letter to the gram panchayat just to inform that it was 
going to construct the dam and the hydroelectric project,’ said Jeron, ‘It did not 
seek any NOC (no-objection certificate) from the gram panchayat.’. The village 
experiences power-cuts for eight hours a day. 
The CDM Hoax 
The DHP has is a registered CDM project and the company in its PDD has 
announced scores of development programmes including poverty alleviation 
and environmental well-being. 
But, we found that there has been no such project activity including the 
construction work that ensures direct or indirect employment generation or 
alleviation of poverty in this interior rural area. The PDD had, in fact, promised 
employment to at least 50 to 100 unskilled workers during construction of the 
dam and more employment during construction of the power generation 
facility. But, the company did not keep any promises made in the PDD. 
According to the PDD, at least 35 local villagers were to be recruited on 
permanent basis in the project; the company did appoint none. 
Further, the company has not involved the local people in the transportation 
process, thereby depriving them of a possible income opportunity after 
acquiring their land. The claim of the company as regards environmental well-
being in the PDD that it would promote plantation and rejuvenate green areas 
has also turned out to be mere promises, as no such activity was visible in the 
area. Any CDM project has to ensure participation of the local communities. In 
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case of this project, the local people have little or no idea about the project 
activities, let alone its clean environment processes or the concepts of ‘carbon 
trading’ and ‘carbon credit’. Only after the work started people came to know 
that this project was to generate electricity. 
While the company made no efforts to make the people aware about the 
CDM, carbon trading, or carbon credit through which the project would reap 
fat profits (the project claims to reduce 37,000 tons of CO2 equivalent, meaning 
an equal amount of carbon credit) its PDD trumpets that the local people are 
playing a big role in addressing the climate crisis and in the reduction of carbon 
emissions! 
Notes 
"  The article has been taken from – Mate N., and H. Yasmin (2009) ‘The CDM Scam: Case 
Studies on CDM Projects in Maharashtra’, Mausam, 1-2(2-5), pp. 35-40.  
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Offsetting Lives and Livelihoods: Atmospheric 
Brown Cloud and the Targeting of Asia’s Rural 
Poor" 
Soumya Dutta 
What is the ‘Atmospheric Brown Cloud’?  
In the last 7-8 years or so, in the middle of the intense engagement on the 
climate crisis/justice debate, and the intricate wheeling-dealings between 
transnational entities like the UN, nation-states, large corporations, NGOs, 
international funders and multi-lateral agencies, a new spin has been added. This 
is the issue of the Atmospheric (earlier called Asian!) Brown Cloud (ABC), 
containing, along with other aerosols/particulates, the Black Carbon (BC) 
aerosols, which are now ‘discovered’ to be having such a large impact on climate 
and glaciers that it is ‘considered’ almost as important as the climate changing 
global carbon dioxide emissions from the burning of fossil fuels (coal, 
petroleum products like petrol, diesel, kerosene, natural gas, etc). And the 
UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme) study that projected this has 
one Prof. Ramanathan from the well known Cripps Institute of Oceanography, 
as lead author/researcher. Many of these studies were coming out of data from 
a large scale international experiment conducted from 1996 to 1999, called 
INDOEX (Indian Ocean Experiment). The year 2002 saw this issue come into 
international focus, whereas 2008 saw the ‘study’ focusing on Asian sources and 
impacts, and consequent ‘plans’ to tackle this by the ‘carbon bazaar’. 
In short, the studies ‘discovered’ that the large number of poor families in 
Asia burning wood and other biomass for their daily cooking etc, are emitting 
large quantities of dark soot or black carbon particles – along with other 
aerosols coming from fly ash (large scale coal burning in Thermal Power Plants 
and industries), sulphates (these are generally from petroleum or coal burning) 
as well as natural particles like dust and fine salt – which are forming a sort of 
Brown Cloud in the atmosphere. This aerosol laden cloud is being driven by the 
North-East monsoon winds – from the Indian landmass to the Bay of Bengal, 
Arabian sea and the Indian Ocean. Thus, its concentration over these seas is 
highest from December to March – with a November to April presence. 
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Projected Impacts of the ABC  
This dark coloured ‘cloud’ – sometimes as thick as three kilometers at its largest 
atmospheric depth – is said to be absorbing a large amount of incoming solar 
heat, thus increasing the temperature of the lower atmosphere of the earth, 
disturbing normal tropical air circulations. By obstructing some solar heat from 
reaching the surface, it is also reducing the warming of the sea surface 
significantly, when present over ocean surfaces – reducing evaporation. This is 
supposed to be causing a significant drop in monsoon rainfall over both South-
West Asia, and India (though the effect on Indian summer monsoon is not well 
marked by this modelling study). It is also said to be reducing the winter time 
average temperature over the Indian land mass, thereby masking the impact of 
global warming – during winter time at least. 
Another harmful impact of the black carbon was found to be the increased 
rate of melting of Himalayan glaciers, as these dark coloured BC particles travels 
to the Himalayas and settles down on the ‘white’ glaciers, thus decreasing their 
‘albedo’ or reflectivity. This increases the heat absorption by the darkened glacial 
surface and consequently, its melting rate. The black carbon or soot is also a 
major health threat for the poor families who use solid fuels or other biomass as 
fuel in their ‘improper’ chulhas/cooking stoves.  
Selective Targeting 
It is also recognized that the ‘smoke’ from the large numbers of fossil fuel 
powered vehicles – particularly those with older and less efficient engines, as 
well as other industries burning fossil fuels are also contributing to a large extent 
to this problem of creating a heat absorbing cloud. To the surprise of many, the 
‘smoke and noise’ about the problem though has been focused on the millions 
of poor family kitchens. As the Himalayas are well within the two large and 
emission increasing nations – China and India, the problem of rapid melting of 
Himalayan glaciers are supposed to be accelerated by such black carbon in the 
northern regions of India and southern parts of China.  
Along with the Western nations, the Asian ruling elite and their corporate 
controlled media is now highlighting the urgency of tackling this ABC induced 
‘climate problems’ (along with global warming induced climate change), 
demanding that this heat trapping Atmospheric Brown Cloud (ABC) be reduced 
– largely by addressing the ‘problem’ of biomass burning by the large numbers 
of poorer families in Asia. So, now the industrialized world, who are supposed 
to be no major contributor to this ‘dangerous’ ABC – has another stick to beat 
the poorer developing countries in Asia, after the collapse of the ‘cattle 
produced methane’ beating stick. They are also playing to create further space 
for their ‘way of life’ of individual cars, big houses, lit up shopping malls, mass 
production of uniform goods, frequent flying etc – by occupying more 
atmospheric pollution space to be vacated by Asia’s biomass burning poor. The 
ABC and black carbon issue has become another pawn in the global climate-
political chess game. 
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GHG driven Climate Change, Black Carbon and Issues of Equity and 
Sustainability  
The worldwide engagement on the global climate change issues cluster and the 
resulting international negotiations at various levels have been focusing on the 
so-called greenhouse gases (GHG) mostly, and with very good reasons. The 
industrialized countries have extracted and used/burned an overwhelmingly 
large proportion of the total cumulative fossil fuels over the last couple of 
centuries. The ‘waste products’ of burning fossil fuels – mainly carbon dioxide 
(CO2) – has been dumped by these nations into the global common 
atmosphere, without any care or concern of the implications.  
As the total atmospheric CO2 dumping each year (about 30 GT in the year 
2006 – just from burning fossil fuels) is far above the CO2 recycling capacity 
(about 14 to 16 GT) of the earth’s atmosphere-hydrosphere-biosphere-
lithosphere systems, the ‘excess’ dumped quantity of CO2 has been building up 
in the atmosphere and have pushed up the CO2 concentration in it from around 
280 ppmv (parts per million by volume) during early industrial periods to the 
present value of around 388 ppmv. Over the last couple of centuries, the 
‘developed’ industrialized countries have contributed to nearly 90% of this CO2 
build up. This increased concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere is absorbing 
an increasing amount of the low energy and long-wave heat radiation going out 
from the earth’s surface, thus increasing the temperature of the lower 
atmosphere and the surface. This has disturbed many balanced climate systems 
on the earth – which are critically dependent on surface (both land and water) 
temperatures and temperature differences, causing unpredicted variations in the 
climate and inflicting untold miseries to natural resource and cycle dependent 
poorer populations. 
Logically, all effort should go towards reducing the emission of these GHGs, 
bringing them down to the levels which the earth’s carbon cycle can handle. The 
most direct and logical implication of this should have been a drastic reduction 
in the consumption of fossil fuels by those countries and societies (both in the 
Global North and South) who are the over-consumers. And the Kyoto protocol 
and its subsequent processes were expected to address that, putting pressure on 
the over-consuming industrialized nations to cut fossil fuel energy use by large 
margins.  
Any just action would also require/demand that the world’s majority of 
forced under-consumers – most of whom are denied even subsistence level 
energy and other consumables – be provided with enough to have a dignified 
life. Without establishing a ‘reasonable equity’ of access to all the global 
commons (including the common atmosphere), there is very little chance of a 
sustainable solution to the problem of chaotically changing climate system, as 
the resource deprived will rightfully attempt to access whatever they can get 
hold of, irrespective of its contribution to climate crisis or otherwise. For them, 
it is a question of ‘survival comes first’, unlike the ‘lifestyle demands’ of the 
richer countries/societies. And a reality check of this is the actual average CO2e 
(carbon dioxide equivalent) emissions figures of India ~ 1.4 tons/person/year, 
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USA ~ 19 tons/ person/year, EU ~ 9 tons/person/year. And if you take up the 
‘black carbon emitting’ poor of South Asia, the approx. 70% of the poorest 
here, who are the target of this motivated ABC/BC campaign? Their average 
CO2e emission is less than 0.6 tons/person/year. So why is the focus of this 
twisted, ABC induced, climate crying on these people? There are hidden 
agendas behind this.  
In refusing to carry out any significant reduction in their forcible over-
consumption and the resultant excessive waste dumping onto the global 
commons (like the oceans, the atmosphere etc) – the total GHG emissions by 
the Annex I countries have increased by nearly 20% from their 1990 levels, 
instead of coming down, as envisioned in the Kyoto treaty – the capitalist-
industrial societies have consistently tried to pass the burden of emission 
reduction to the already under-consuming societies – across nations as well as 
within nations. This has been done through market based mechanisms like 
carbon emissions trading and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
Now, one more potent weapon for emissions trading space has been discovered 
in the shape of the ABC, and the multilateral agencies along with the Western 
research institutes gleefully accepted the new found opportunity. 
Here, it is necessary to clarify that overwhelmingly large part of the solid 
fuels that South Asia’s (and other similar society’s) poor are forced to use for 
cooking, are not fossil fuels, as they are part of the ‘active carbon cycle’ of the 
earth and thus do not add to the net GHG emissions. This holds true to the 
extent that the wood or other biomass used by these poor families do not 
exceed the regeneration of these biomass resources within comparable time 
periods. The black carbon aerosols emitted by these fuels would surely 
contribute to the ABC and its climate impacts, but in a less significant way than 
assumed by Ramanathan’s and others studies, as I will explain/argue in a later 
part of this chapter.  
The apparently ‘clean’ electricity used for cooking by the majority of families 
in the Global North, and by the upper classes in the Global South as well – is 
not so clean after all, as most of this electricity comes from either the dirtiest 
GHG emitter – coal (about 70% in India and Australia, 80% in China, over 
50% in USA), or equally damaging dam based hydro-electricity (which also 
causes large emissions of the potent GHG methane by submerging huge forest 
biomasses, along with adding net CO2 emission by destroying this large forest 
carbon sink), or the dangerously polluting nuclear fission energy (which, apart 
from the millennia long radioactive contamination threat, also has a large carbon 
footprint – contrary to common perception – from their large embedded energy 
of construction, maintenance and decommissioning). 
What are the Projected Facts About Atmospheric Brown Cloud? 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as well as well known 
climate scientists, such as Hansen, Jacobson and Ramanathan’s UNEP study – 
all have tried to quantify the amount of global warming potential – called 
radiative forcing – of this Atmospheric Brown Cloud. There are wide variations 
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in these calculations (from 0.2 watts/sq.mtr to over 1 w/sq.mtr – or a factor of 
five!), with the UNEP study leading the pack, ‘showing’ the highest amount of 
warming contribution of ABC, by taking into account the effect of glacial snow 
melting by the black carbon settling down on Himalayan glaciers. No wonder 
that the Western and Asian media have selectively picked up this highest 
estimate, and the supposed ‘contribution’ of the poor families. 
The Himalayas on the Tibetan side (trans-Himalaya) are said to have warmed 
by more than one degree Celsius over the last century or longer – significantly 
higher than northern Indian plains or the global average, and the glaciers over 
there are supposed to be melting even faster. There are said to be ‘hotspots’ of 
this brown cloud, one of the prominent being identified as ‘Indo-Asian-Pacific 
Plume’, where one can ‘see’ the brown cloud rising up, even in the satellite 
images. In the so-called ‘HinduKush-Tibetan-Himalaya’ region, the warming by 
the black carbon factor is now being said to be almost equal to the warming by 
the additional carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. 
As an additional impact, the health cost to the poor families using these 
biomass stoves is also shown to be a serious concern (which, incidentally, is 
supported by independent and unrelated studies), adding strength to the ABC 
argument.  
Some Concerns, Doubts and Contradictions 
There are several questions, concerns and doubts – scientific, social and 
economic – about these projections and calculations, their selective nature 
included. Let us take up the issue of the sources of, and proportionate 
contributors to, this ABC. No doubt that a majority of Asia’s poor households 
burn a large quantity of wood and other biomass every day, for their cooking 
needs as they cannot afford to buy commercial fuel or have no access to such 
fuels. Nearly 70% of India’s households use some kind of solid cooking fuel, 
and a large part of them – being extremely poor (about 70% of Indians live on 
little more than half-a-dollar per person per day for all their consumption 
expenses – as per a Government of India commissioned report. What polluting 
fuels can they buy and burn any way?), use collected wood and biomass. The 
percentage of poor households in Bangladesh, Nepal or Pakistan using solid 
fuels would be similar or higher. The finer parts of the soot from these are 
expected to rise up somewhat into the lower atmosphere by the heat created 
updraft, as well as by natural wind.  
BUT, similar would be the case – only in a much larger scale – from the large 
numbers of forest fires in California, Australia, Russia, Mongolia, southern 
Europe etc (and also in Asian countries including Indonesia, China and India). 
Several such forest fires in California (USA) and Australia burn hundreds of 
square kilometers each, thus sending up black carbon/dark soot from many 
millions of whole trees – year after year. And as a burning forest fire would 
produce huge amounts of heat in a large area, the updrafts created are bound to 
be incomparably larger and stronger, carrying much larger amounts of black 
carbon ever higher into the atmosphere than is possible for an equivalent 
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amount of wood/biomass burned in a few million distributed kitchen fires over 
a year. These would then be prone to ‘transportation’ to all around the globe. 
The most recent ‘station fire’ in Acton in California itself burned up nearly 
44,000 hectares of forests! How many complete trees would that be? 
Also consider the fact that a very large number of American and European 
families still burn large quantities of wood for their heating needs in winters. An 
average poor family kitchen uses about 7-9kg of wood in a day’s cooking, 
whereas an average heating family will use around 30-40kg in a winter day in 
USA or northern Europe. Why do none of the Black Carbon/ABC studies 
point these out? Obviously, there is a hidden agenda here.  
Over and above this, most kitchen fires are lit – naturally within partly closed 
kitchens (which causes large health damages to the poor women and their young 
children though, partly because of lack of ventilation – which causes dangerous 
SPM build ups, in some cases measured to be over 1000 micrograms per cubic 
metre of air inside the kitchen), reducing the amount of heat/smoke that leaks 
out and rises into the atmosphere. With climate change drying out forests in 
many places, forest fires are increasing almost everywhere, putting evermore 
amounts of smoke/BC into the atmosphere. In contradiction, the number of 
poor households using biomass and other solid fuels is coming down as a result 
of some increased access to other fuels and some better designs of 
wood/biomass stoves.  
Thus, it is open to serious questioning as to how much of the visible smoke 
comes from kitchen fires, and what percentage comes from forest fires, 
industrial activities of fossil fuel burning, and from fossil fuelled automobiles. 
The quantity of fossil fuels being burnt by the increasing industrial-capitalist 
segment of South Asian societies (in the darkened footsteps of the ‘modern’ 
Western industrial-capitalist society) – mainly in their cars, airplanes and in mass 
production facilities – are rising fast in many countries of the region. The fuel 
consumption of the poor is not rising fast.  
It is not a secret that the amount of coal and petroleum products being 
burned in the richer countries is far higher than that being burned in the South 
Asian nations. Thus, it is clear that these countries of the Global North are 
contributing far larger amounts of aerosol emissions (in addition to the GHG 
emissions), and are far larger contributors to the Atmospheric Brown Cloud and 
Black Carbons.  
And if there are rising clouds visible from space, caused by the biomass 
burning Asian poor, there are much larger dark soot clouds which also are seen 
from space: those caused by large scale forest fires in many industrialized 
countries.  
With all their ‘advanced’ technology and economic resources, it should be far 
easier for these governments to control and even eliminate most of these fires. 
Just one such large fire in California two years ago burned down nearly 1800 sq. 
km of forests, sending as much dark soot to form brown clouds as maybe a 
hundred million poor families would do during their daily meal cooking. These 
huge forest fires are in no way ‘equivalent’ to the compulsions of daily cooking 
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by the Asian poor families. Neither are the rich people’s lifestyle demands of 
large amounts of electricity, big cars, etc. 
There are large numbers of industries and coal fired thermal power plants in 
northern India (as well as in other countries in the region near the Himalayas – 
with the enhanced glacial melting concern in focus) burning millions of tons of 
coal and oil and emitting hundreds of thousands of tons of dark suspended 
particulates into the atmosphere every year. Just in Delhi-NCR (National Capital 
Region, including peripheral towns like Gurgaon, Noida, Faridabad, Ghaziabad 
etc), there are over 16 lakh (1.6 million) cars (and about 4.4 million motorbikes 
to add) consuming many million tons of petrol/diesel, and emitting lakhs (one 
lakh is a hundred thousand) of tons of dark soot each year. Don’t these travel to 
the Himalayas and get deposited on the glaciers? Or only the soot from the poor 
family kitchens has that bad habit?  
Out of the 145,000+ MW of installed electricity generation capacity in India, 
about 95,000 MW is from coal fired thermal power plants. These consume over 
350 million tons coal each year, generating over 100 million tons of ash (Indian 
power coal often contains 35% of minerals – which generates the ash), a 
significant part of which flies off to the atmosphere as fine dark particulates. 
Does anyone show any concern about how these tens of millions of tons of fine 
dark particles contribute to the formation of the Atmospheric Brown Cloud, or 
adds to the warming of the northern Indian mountain region, or how much they 
contribute to the Himalayan glacier melting? Probably not – because the 
electricity thus generated is consumed mostly by the influential upper and 
middle classes in India. The 15 lakh+ cars in Delhi-NCR must be contributing a 
much larger dark soot component than the tens millions of poor family 
kitchens, but no State wants to confront or challenge the dominating ruling 
classes and their consumption and emissions. This is the reason why the 
corporate controlled media also selectively picked up the black carbon from the 
poor family’s kitchen as a big problem, hiding the fine particulate emissions 
from all these sources of the modern industrial-capitalist icons – which might 
have a much larger contribution. 
Another carefully hidden fact is that the atmospheric life of black carbon 
generated from kitchen fires ranges from a few days (during periods of high 
humidity/precipitation) to weeks at most, while the fine dark particles generated 
by power plants and car industries stay much longer; the atmospheric life of 
carbon dioxide is measured in centuries. Which should we concentrate on, for 
greater impact reduction? With most countries, including the giant economy of 
China, following in the same emission intensive industrial-capitalist pathway 
(China is reported to be completing about 50 new coal fired power plants of 
1000 MW capacity each year, as well as being the fastest growing car market – 
and the Tibetan Himalayan glaciers will also get black carbon from these 
Chinese emissions), contribution by the ‘kitchen fire’ of the poor households 
pales into insignificance. 
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The Hidden Agenda Behind Targeting Asia’s Poor – Forest Control, 
Offsets and Carbon Bazaar  
As the industrial-capitalist system contributes far more to the ABC than poor 
families’ kitchen fires, why is attention being focused on Asia’s poor? It is 
estimated that about 70% of Indian households still use solid fuels (including 
wood, coal, briquettes, dry leaves and grass, cow dung cakes, etc) as cooking 
fuel, as these are the only ‘affordable’ and somewhat accessible options. The 
‘great dream projection’ of the Indian State – of providing ‘clean LPG’ to every 
family – is now clear to be impossible and undesirable, considering that the 
inevitable peak oil and gas situation is drawing nearer. Also, from the 
perspective of the people, why would one want to dispossess the rural and 
forest dwelling poor from their self-accessible fuel source, forcing them into the 
cooking fuel market?  
But this is precisely the game plan: to bring this vast number (over 170 
million households in India alone) of partly fuel self-dependent families into the 
commercial fuel and stove market, opening more profit avenues for the large 
corporations. If they remain self-dependent in terms of their cooking fuels, how 
do these capitalists ‘grow’ their fuel business? How does the GDP grow – to 
enable more coal fired plants, more steel plants, more cars? 
Once you are successful in isolating the forest/forest-fringe dwellers from 
sustainable fuel and other supplies from the forests, these forest areas become 
available for closer government and corporate controls, including carbon trading 
and offset schemes – think REDD (see Lang in this volume). 
Why not create a big new emission trading/offset arena in the shape of the 
replacement of Asian poor’s kitchen fuel? It makes sense. The 
Western/Northern economies can keep belching CO2 and ‘offset’ their 
polluting emissions by buying cheap credits from millions of ‘improved’ kitchen 
fires of South Asia, without having to reduce their own emissions in any way. 
Doesn’t matter if the total emissions keep increasing, upsetting crucial climate 
systems of the earth. Doesn’t matter if hundred million or more poor families 
are forced into buying unaffordable fuel, forgoing some critically needed food in 
the bargain. Doesn’t matter if a few tens of millions of poor people’s lives are 
‘offset’. Doesn’t matter if a few million livelihoods, dependent on the collection, 
sorting and selling of biomass fuel, get lost in the process. All these will 
probably be considered ‘collateral damage’, a la George W. Bush and the Iraq 
war.  
There is no doubt that the families – particularly the women and younger 
children staying close to their mothers – are badly affected by the high levels of 
particulate pollution created by the burning of these biomass fuels in pollution 
belching stoves and poorly ventilated kitchens. One fairly large study in Orissa 
(an eastern province in India) showed that the average suspended particulate 
(SPM) pollution inside such kitchens were as high as 1200-1500 micrograms per 
cubic metre of air, which is frighteningly higher than the prescribed safe levels 
for long hours of exposure. Thus, the need to provide these families with 
something much less polluting and health impacting is obvious. The problem 
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arises with the commercialization and market linkage of this need. Once this is 
tied up with carbon trading type market mechanisms, the vulnerable poor 
families will be subjected to all kinds of exploitations and forced dispossession 
by the powerful trading entities and their ‘skilful’ technical consultants, 
operators, verifiers and certifiers coterie.  
The State has the responsibility of providing its poor with reasonable levels 
of means of life, and it cannot be allowed to wriggle out of this by tying up with 
commercial/trading interests for any of these. Easy access to cooking fuel, 
which do not slowly kill you by poisoning the air you breath, should be part of 
the fundamental rights of every citizen of this planet, and there is no place for 
trading this right. What we need to get clear is what interests are behind these 
periodic ‘scientific discoveries’ and targeted media campaigns. We need to 
analyze and challenge these malicious attempts of further privatization of 
essentially common resources.  
Notes 
"  The author has written a similar article for Mausam. Dutta, S. (2009) ‘The ABC of How to 
Torment Asia’s Rural Poor’, Mausam, 1-2(2-5): 23-26. 
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CRITIQUES 
Having presented the case studies, Part III offers a 
broader critique of carbon markets. What the seven 
chapters collected in this part of the book show is 
that carbon markets are not merely mechanisms to 
combat climate change. Instead, they must be seen in 
relation to the historical development of capitalism. 
In fact, carbon markets can be seen as the expansion 
of the capitalist project to new spheres which so far 
have escaped commodification. This is then where 
quite an existentialist question needs to be asked: can 
we trust capitalist markets to deal with such a grave 
and global problem as climate change, given that 
capitalist production and consumption regimes have 
created the problem in the first place? The authors of 
Part III argue that there is now overwhelming 
evidence that carbon markets will not help us 
mitigate climate change by commodifying the 
atmosphere, which should be seen as a common 
good shared by humanity. Instead, carbon markets 
will lead to more exploitation, inequalities and 
perverse speculations and financial bubbles of the 
kind the world has seen explode in 2008. Therefore, 
carbon markets should be seen as a dangerous 
diversion from the need to drastically change 
lifestyles and economic, social and political structures 
that will help to free ourselves from the world’s 
addiction to fossil fuels. 
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Regulation as Corruption in the Carbon Offset 
Markets" 
Larry Lohmann 
Introduction 
When a particular commodity market cannot be regulated, the attempt to 
regulate it can do no more than create an illusion of regulatability. Deflected 
into a cul de sac, official action to correct abuses sustains the underlying 
problems, or makes them worse. Regulatory acts become a danger to society. 
Governance becomes a part of corruption. All this happens regardless of the 
good intentions of regulators or anti-corruption fighters. 
This chapter argues that the carbon offset market is an example of such an 
unregulatable market, and that attempts to regulate it will only entrench its 
status as a locus of international corruption and exploitation. But to set the 
scene, it may be useful to begin with the example of another such market that 
has been much in the news since 2007: the market in complex new financial 
derivatives that lies at the root of the recent global economic crash.  
These derivatives were unregulatable. Instead of reducing or spreading risk, 
they amplified it and hid it.1 Because the risk measurement models used by both 
companies and regulators gave the illusion that everything was under control, 
they made things worse. ‘Giving someone the wrong map is worse than giving 
them no map at all,’ the options trader and risk expert Nassim Nicholas Taleb 
pointed out.2 US and UK officials, clinging to the dogma that regulation could 
handle any surprises thrown up by the explosive financial innovations of the 
1990s and 2000s (or that the innovations regulated themselves), refused to 
consider the possibility that certain kinds of product, and certain kinds of 
market, were simply too dangerous to be allowed to exist. As the market for the 
opaque new financial products became larger and larger, so did the scope for 
abuses, cheats and corruption.3 
The capture of finance policy by the private sector had a lot to do with the 
refusal to face up to the unregulatability of the new market. Former derivatives 
traders keen to stoke the booming markets, such as Robert Rubin from 
Citigroup and Hank Paulson from Goldman Sachs, occupied some of the 
highest positions in the US government. (Only ex-Wall Street executives, the 
reasoning went, could understand the vastly complicated world of finance well 
enough to govern it.) Private companies’ own mathematical models were seen as 
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a reasonable basis for regulation at both national and international levels. 
Orthodox economists in positions of regulatory responsibility such as successive 
US Federal Reserve Chairmen Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke were trained 
in ways that gave them the same faith in the inherent manageability of the new 
derivatives markets. Such long-entrenched forms of ‘legal corruption’4 were 
difficult for ordinary people either to speak against or to counter. There was 
little space for participating in policy or for questioning the doctrines that 
everything could be regulated and that ‘learning by doing’ would provide the 
answers to all problems. 
A similar analysis applies to the carbon offset markets. Carbon offsets are 
inherently unregulatable, for unalterable scientific and logical reasons. Instead of 
reducing climate risk, they increase it and conceal it, along the way reinforcing 
environmental and social abuses of multiple kinds.5 No one is sure how to 
measure them or indeed exactly what they are.6 Partly for these reasons, offset 
projects have encountered persistent implementation problems, many of them 
documented in this book. Hundreds of projects and millions of credits are 
accused of being fraudulent, scams for shoring up business as usual – or worse. 
Scandal after scandal regarding the offset market is splashed across the front 
pages of newspapers. As former proponents desert the cause of carbon markets7 
and a growing crowd of prominent climate scientists and economists join the 
chorus of criticism,8 the larger carbon markets of which carbon offsets are an 
integral part are poised on the edge of breakdown.9 
Yet the illusion endures that carbon offset markets could someday be 
redeemed through reform, regulation or certification. Improved methodologies, 
it is said, might allow carbon credits to be calculated accurately. Greater 
oversight could stop fraud. Gaming could be prohibited. Land grabs could be 
curbed. Best-practice standards and certificates could transform the trade. A 
transition to renewable energy could be effected. Improving local capacity could 
safeguard local interests and democratize the process. With proper reforms and 
better regulation, carbon offsets could someday switch from being a climate 
danger to being a climate benefit and their generally deleterious social effects 
ameliorated. ‘Let’s not throw out the baby with the bath water,’ has been the 
constant refrain of beleaguered carbon market proponents. ‘Instead, let’s 
practice “learning by doing” and maybe eventually the problems will become 
manageable.’ 
This illusion has practical effects. Under the ‘air cover’ of the claim that it is 
regulatable, an unregulatable offset market is taking over more and more 
territory at a time when it should be forced to retreat in an orderly and decorous 
fashion. As carbon offsets invade first the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, 
Australian and Japanese trading programmes, and now the incipient US carbon 
market, with its billions of tons of potential demand, the idea that offsets can be 
regulated has become a major threat to dealing effectively with climate change 
as well as a cause of social strife.  
The illusion of offset regulatability is sustained partly because climate policy 
has been captured on both national and international levels by an elite alliance 
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comprising big business, commodities traders, financial firms, neoclassical 
economic theorists and an influential group of professionalized, middle-class 
environmentalists. All are bent on seeing offset trading expand rather than be 
abolished.10 Invented and developed by derivatives traders as well as economic 
theorists of the Chicago School and elsewhere, carbon trading has dominated 
global climate policy ever since being forced into the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 by 
the US delegation led by then Vice President Al Gore, who himself became a 
big carbon market player.11 For more than a decade, governments, international 
agencies and private corporations alike have invested enormous resources in 
building up infrastructure for offset markets. The largest buyers of Kyoto 
Protocol Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) offset credits today are 
speculators on Wall Street and in the City of London and other financial 
districts,12 some of which have poured millions of dollars into lobbying for a US 
offset market from which they also hope to benefit.13 CDM offset regulators 
tend to be either offset buyers and sellers or former or current executives in 
private-sector carbon businesses, all of whom have a vested interest in seeing 
the trade expand as well as privileged access to information useful in navigating 
and promoting it.  
In elaborating on these themes, this chapter will suggest responses to the 
problem of corruption in the carbon markets that look beyond ‘technical fixes’ 
that attempt to regulate malpractice and administrative abuse. Because the 
problems of carbon markets go much deeper than is ordinarily understood, it 
will argue, they demand meticulous and thoroughgoing attention to structural 
issues of power, knowledge and democracy. 
Carbon Market Corruption: The Conventional Understanding 
Beware the Carbon Offsetting Cowboys, warns the Financial Times.14 ‘Irregular 
Carbon Credits Cause Upheaval in the Government of Papua New Guinea,’ 
reports The Economist.15 ‘Pollution Credits Let Dumps Double Dip’, reveals 
the Wall Street Journal.16 ‘The Great Carbon Credit Con: Why are We Paying 
the Third World to Poison its Environment?’ asks the Daily Mail.17 ‘Secretive 
U.N. Board Awards Lucrative Credits with Few Rules Barring Conflicts,’ 
according to ClimateWire.18 ‘UN Suspends Top CDM Project Verifier over Lax 
Audit Allegations,’ reports Business Green.19 ‘Europol Expects More Arrests in 
Carbon Fraud Probe,’ notes Reuters.20 
As such headlines attest, uncovering carbon market scandals is by now a 
minor journalistic industry. The prospective supply of further shocking stories, 
moreover, is limitless. Dirty installations ranging from industrial pig farms in 
Mexico to polluting sponge iron works in India are availing themselves of 
revenues from the trade, with hundreds of enterprises – including most of the 
763 Chinese hydroelectric projects applying or planning to apply for carbon 
credits21 – eager to take advantage of an opportunity to get a bit of extra free 
money for conducting business as usual. According to Peter Younger of 
Interpol, ‘in future, if you are running a factory and you desperately need credits 
to offset your emissions, there will be someone who can make that happen for 
you. Absolutely, organized crime will be involved.’22  
Critiques 
 178 
Countering such scandal stories with reassurances that regulation can solve 
the problems has also become a profitable industry, providing employment to 
hundreds of technicians, bureaucrats, academics and political figures. The CDM 
needs ‘not something new, but rather a change of culture and professional 
working practices,’ legal scholar Ray Purdy complacently assures his readers: 
‘more permanent and temporary staff … clear professional service standards … 
better knowledge-bases and methods of communication.’ Moreover, 
to allow more transparent oversight and avoid real or perceived conflicts of 
interest, the [CDM] Executive Board needs to recognize the governance 
requirements of accountability and clearly distinguish between supervisory and 
executive roles.23  
Other observers blandly recycle boilerplate about ‘due process safeguards’,24 
‘enhanced dispute resolution’,25 ‘capacity building,’ an ‘internal review 
mechanism’26 and improvements in ‘domestic CDM structures.’27 To quote Al 
Gore in recent testimony before the US Congress, ‘I think there is general 
agreement that in Copenhagen significant reforms of the CDM, uh, Collective 
Development Mechanism, uh, Cooperative Development Mechanism, have to 
be implemented.’28 
The understanding of corruption and regulation that enables and limits this 
discussion is narrow. The stories that most journalists and academics tell about 
corruption in the carbon markets tend to be traditional ones of con artistry, 
abuse of public office for private gain, and payment of bribes to government 
officials, as well as, occasionally, a somewhat broader narrative featuring more 
general abuses of power and wealth that undermine democratic governance and 
the cause of social justice. Although it has been out of fashion for some time, 
there are signs, too, that the customary story of conflict of interest may soon be 
revived as a framework for understanding corruption in carbon trading. 
For many journalists and academics, such stories have the great virtue of 
being familiar and easy to tell and understand. They identify bad guys who are 
getting away with murder. For many technicians, bureaucrats and politicians, 
these stories are attractive because they imply that there is a familiar job for 
them to do: catch the bad guys and formulate and enforce rules that will prevent 
more bad guys from being tempted into abuses. In these narratives, the 
problems plaguing carbon markets are due to relative lawlessness, lack of 
technical standards and incomplete enforcement – problems well within the 
capability of the prospective heroes of the stories to handle. 
On the surface, there is a great deal to be said for these narratives. Many 
examples spring to mind. However, probe a little deeper and complexities 
emerge that suggest a less comforting story. What follows will explore both the 
usefulness and the limitations of three stories that are often told about 
corruption and regulation in carbon markets, along the way assembling materials 
for a more politically and scientifically informed narrative.  
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Corruption as Confidence Trickery? 
Everyone who participates in or studies the carbon offset market knows that it 
is a haven for con artists. Businesses and even international financial 
institutions29 understand that, as long as they provide clever enough 
documentation, carbon offsets can become a source of extra funding for 
ventures they are engaged in that have nothing to do with climate change 
mitigation: even gas pipelines,30 fossil fuel-fired generating plants,31 coal mines32 
and oil wells.33 An investigation of projects in India by a carbon offset market 
proponent found that a third were simply business as usual.34 By the UN’s own 
rules, most hydropower projects in the Kyoto offset pipeline arguably should 
not be allowed to produce carbon credits at all.35 According to one prominent 
carbon banker, project proponents ‘tell their financial backers that the projects 
are going to make lots of money’ at the same time they claim to regulators ‘that 
they wouldn’t be financially viable’ without carbon finance.36 Carbon 
consultants often freely fabricate information required on official forms,37 and 
the more convoluted offset accounting methodologies become, the more 
opportunities for fraud emerge. An investigation of Nigerian carbon offsets 
devised by Western oil companies and carbon consultant firms, for example, 
found that it was nearly impossible to determine whether the gas that the 
companies claimed will be diverted from flaring to productive use will not in 
fact come from dedicated gas extraction operations, whose production is not 
flared.38 Businessman Marc Stuart of the carbon offset trading firm 
EcoSecurities admits that new schemes for generating carbon credits out of 
forest conservation involve such a ‘brutal potential for gaming’ that ‘getting it 
wrong means that scam artists will get unimaginably rich while emissions don’t 
change a bit.’39  
Is regulation capable of defusing such dangers? Can reform address the 
relevant problems? Is it possible to ‘get offsets right’, as Stuart suggests it is? 
There are several powerful reasons for answering ‘no’ to all of these questions. 
The abuses of power and wealth that constitute carbon market corruption do 
not derive merely from the misdeeds of individual carbon consultants and 
profiteers, but inhere in market architecture itself. They are an integral technical 
component of commodity formation. While individual consultants can and do 
make use of this market architecture for the gain of their clients and themselves, 
it is the architecture itself that performs the central abuses. Accordingly, what 
are conventionally classed as scams or frauds are an inevitable feature of carbon 
offset markets, not something that could be eliminated by regulation targeting 
the specific businesses or state agencies involved. Because the underlying 
problem is not, essentially, a matter of poor implementation or individual 
malefactors, it can only be eliminated by eliminating the offset market itself.  
One central difficulty is that for every offset project, carbon consultants 
must identify a unique storyline describing a hypothetical world without the 
project, and then assign a number to the greenhouse gas emissions associated 
with that world. They then must show that the project makes carbon savings 
‘additional’ to those of this baseline world. By subtracting the emissions of the 
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project world from those of the baseline world, they derive the number of 
carbon credits that the project can sell. Carbon accountants, that is, must 
present the counterfactual without-project scenario not as indeterminate and 
dependent on political choice but as measurable, singular, determinate and a 
matter for economic and technical prediction. This assumption, as Kevin 
Anderson, Director of the UK’s Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, 
observes, is a ‘meaningless concept in a complex system.’ As Anderson explains, 
the counterfactual ‘baseline’ against which the purported emissions savings of a 
carbon offset project must be measured must be calculated over 100 years to 
correspond with the approximate residence time of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere. For example, a wind farm in India may claim to be generating 
carbon credits because it is saving, over a century, fossil fuels over and above 
what would have been saved without the project. However, 
the wind turbines will give access to electricity that gives access to a television 
that gives access to adverts that sell small scooters, and then some entrepreneur 
sets up a small petrol depot for the small scooters, and another entrepreneur 
buys some wagons instead of using oxen, and the whole thing builds up over the 
next 20 or 30 years. … If you can imagine Marconi and the Wright brothers 
getting together to discuss whether in 2009, EasyJet and the internet would be 
facilitating each other through internet booking, that’s the level of … certainty 
you’d have to have over that period. You cannot have that. Society is inherently 
complex.40 
There will thus be no general scientific consensus about the number of credits, 
if any, generated by a particular carbon project. Even the question whether a 
project goes beyond business as usual in saving carbon, as carbon trader Mark 
C. Trexler and colleagues noted years ago, has ‘no technically ‘correct’ answer’41; 
as the US General Accounting Office concluded in 2008, ‘it is impossible to 
know with certainty whether any given offset is additional.’42  
It follows that it is also impossible to know with certainty whether any given 
offset is non-additional. Hence it is a misdiagnosis of the recurring scandals in 
carbon offset markets to say that they are due to consultants claiming falsely 
that non-additional projects are additional. The problem goes deeper. 
Scientifically speaking, there is no such thing as ‘additionality’ or ‘non-
additionality’, and thus no standard that either market participants or regulators 
could use either to clarify the accounting rules or to prevent scamming.43 If it is 
impossible to distinguish between fraudulent and non-fraudulent offset 
calculations, regulators’ power to enforce climate benefit becomes illusory.44 
They have no choice but to fall back on aesthetic, political or pseudo-scientific 
criteria in deciding whether to wave projects through. As Lambert Schneider of 
Germany’s Öko-Institut notes, ‘If you are a good storyteller you get your project 
approved. If you are not a good storyteller you don’t get your project through.’45 
The problem, in other words, is not that the tools for regulating the offset 
market need further development or that they are not being used correctly. The 
problem is that no such tools exist. 
But if the offset markets cannot be regulated, then proceeding as if they 
could be will inevitably encourage both unscrupulous manufacturers of carbon 
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credits and the Northern fossil fuel polluters who are only too happy to buy 
them without inquiring too closely into their validity. The central ‘abuse of 
public office for private gain’ in the carbon offset trade does not stem from 
individual corporations getting special treatment from individual public officials 
in return for bribes. It derives, rather, from the way that public officials across 
the world acquiesce in the use of fake mathematics and science to benefit a 
fossil fuel-dependent corporate structure as a whole at the expense of public 
welfare. It is less the antics of market players than the attempt to construct an 
unfeasible market that is corrupt, and corrupting. 
Carbon offset accounting’s need to isolate a unique storyline describing a 
hypothetical world without an offset project leads also to a second abuse of 
power and wealth inherent in the trade. Offset accounting frames the political 
question of what would have happened without carbon projects as matter of 
technical prediction in a deterministic system, while at the same time framing 
project proponents as free decision-makers whose carbon initiatives ‘make a 
difference’. Carbon offset mathematics dictates that, in any given situation, ‘no 
other world is possible’ as an alternative to business as usual except that created 
by corporations wealthy enough to be in a position to sponsor carbon offsets. 
This suppression of unknowns built into offset mathematics entails suppression 
of climate alternatives pursued by the less powerful and wealthy. Among the 
first observers to call attention to this built-in bias were social activists from 
Minas Gerais, Brazil campaigning against the attempt of a local charcoal and pig 
iron company, Plantar, to get carbon credits for the environmentally-destructive 
eucalyptus plantations it had established on occupied land. The activists 
categorized the company’s argument that without carbon credits it would have 
to switch from eucalyptus charcoal to more-polluting coal as an energy source as 
a ‘sinister strategy … comparable to loggers demanding money, otherwise they 
will cut down trees’: 
What we really need are investments in clean energies that at the same time 
contribute to the cultural, social and economic well-being of local populations.46 
For the activists, carbon accounting’s suppression of knowledge of the plurality 
of choices amounted to an abuse of power blocking popular pathways to an 
alternative future.  
Carbon offset accounting methodology also drives corrupt activity in 
another, more indirect way, through yet another of its intrinsic features: its 
promiscuous drive to establish that different technologies in different places are 
somehow climatically ‘the same’. In its push for liquidity, the carbon offset 
market incentivizes thousands of technical experts to undertake a relentless 
search for far-fetched equivalences among the most distant activities. On one 
day, carbon consultants may devise calculations that make diverting Nigerian 
methane from flaring to productive use ‘the same as’ shutting down a Nebraska 
coal-fired power plant. On the next, they will come up with techniques that 
render the annexation of forested land in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
‘the same as’ making efficiency improvements in Spain’s housing stock. Rather 
than seeking ways to effect a structural shift away from fossil fuels in Northern 
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countries, that is, offset market actors are driven toward constructing ever more 
fanciful equations for shifting climate burdens onto the South in the name of 
increased liquidity and cost-effectiveness. In political economy terms, the 
proliferation of such equations reflects a use of expertise and money to take 
advantage of a multitude of local resources and local political weaknesses across 
an expanding global field that is ever more difficult to police. Market expansion, 
far from being a solution to the market’s problems, thus not only increases the 
ecological debt of the North to the South, but is also a recipe for growing 
obscurity, evasions and cheats of all kinds, greatly advantaging centralized 
market actors while weakening the possibility of local oversight. As Willem 
Buiter of the London School of Economics notes, the fact that offset 
accounting requires  
the impossible verification of how much carbon dioxide equivalent would have 
been emitted in some counterfactual alternative universe. … makes one shout 
out: impossible! Fraud! Bribery! Corruption! Wasteful diversion of resources into 
pointless attempts at verification! And indeed this is what is happening before 
our eyes. Enterprises get paid for not cutting down trees and for installing filters 
and scrubbers they would have installed in any case. The new Verification of the 
Carbon Counterfactual industry is growing in leaps and bounds. The amounts of 
money involved are vast and the opportunities for graft, bribery and corruption 
limitless. The offset proposal has birthed a monster.47  
Such a ‘vastly complicated apparatus,’ agrees Clive Crook of the Financial 
Times, is by its nature a ‘playground for special interests.’48 
Corruption as Erosion of the Rule of Law by Money and Influence? 
The carbon markets abound in stories of offset developers finding ways of 
evading the law through bribery or abuses of influence. Officials allied to offset 
developers may receive land concessions that communities are denied.49 Faulty 
project documents are routinely approved by government departments.50 As 
Interpol observes, moreover, bribery and intimidation are certain to be 
ingredients of the growing forest carbon offset market;51 recently, a nephew of 
Papua New Guinea’s Prime Minister was accused of pressuring villagers to sign 
away their land for carbon deals despite there being no carbon trade laws in 
place.52  
The conventional response to such stories – including that of many 
environmental NGOs – is to repeat the mantra that regulation is capable of 
saving the alleged ‘real potential’ of offset markets from the menace of 
corruption.53 Such responses again overlook the extent to which the erosion of 
the rule of law is part of the design of carbon trading, not an incidental feature 
that can be remedied by applications of ‘good governance’. For an illustration of 
the point it is useful once again to turn to the Niger Delta.  
There, for 50 years, energy companies have been burning off the great bulk 
of the methane they find in underground oil reservoirs. Although methane is a 
valuable fuel, it is cheaper for Shell, Chevron and other firms simply to flare it 
on site than to use it in power plants or reinject it underground. As a result, 
local people are subjected to continuous noise, light and heat, acid rain, retarded 
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crop yields, corroded roofs, and respiratory and skin diseases. Although flaring 
is prohibited by law in Nigeria, oil companies have so far contented themselves 
with paying penalties for non-compliance. In this context, one focus of local 
and international environmental activism is simply to insist on the rule of law. 
The Clean Development Mechanism, however, takes breaches of the law in 
Nigeria as the ‘baseline’ for carbon accounting. The Italian oil corporation Eni-
Agip, for example, plans to buy some 1.5 million tons per year of cheap carbon 
dioxide equivalent pollution rights from a project at an oil-gas installation at 
Kwale that was registered with the UN in November 2006.54 The core of the 
credit calculation is that 
whilst the Nigerian Federal High Court recently judged that gas flaring is illegal, 
it is difficult to envisage a situation where wholesale changes in practice in 
venting or flaring, or cessation of oil production in order to eliminate flaring will 
be forthcoming in the near term.55 
Accordingly, the project creates an incentive for the Nigerian authorities to 
replace legal sanctions with prices and the rule of law with markets for 
environmental services. In such cases, carbon trading undermines any attempt 
to tackle the underlying reasons why environmental law is flouted in Nigeria by 
ensuring that money is made by treating violations as a given. 
In many other host countries as well, the Kyoto offset market is creating 
incentives for emissions-related environmental laws not to be enforced or 
promulgated, since the greater the ‘baseline’ emissions, the greater the payoffs 
that can be derived from carbon projects.56 These incentives are explicitly 
spelled out in UN policy. In August 2007, for instance, the CDM Executive 
Board published forms for the submission of applications for a new type of 
carbon project called programmatic CDM or ‘programmes of activities’ (PoA). 
A PoA, it stated, could be additional and thus acceptable as CDM even if a law 
already existed that mandated the measures that the PoA would bring about, if 
that law was not being ‘enforced as envisaged but rather depend[ed] on the 
CDM to enforce it’, or if the PoA would ‘lead to a greater level of enforcement 
of the existing mandatory policy/regulation than would otherwise be the case’.57 
Here as elsewhere, corruption – interpreted as the erosion of the rule of law by 
financial interest – is a structural principle of carbon offset trading. Regulation 
curbing corruption would have to outlaw offset trading itself. 
Corruption as Conflict of Interest? 
Everyone working in carbon offsets is aware of the conflicts of interest that 
pervade the trade. These conflicts are present at all levels, but particularly afflict 
the carbon markets’ regulatory systems. For example, Lex de Jonge, head of the 
carbon offset purchase programme of the Dutch government, is the chair of the 
Board of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the UN offset market’s 
regulatory body.58 Other members of the board have meanwhile been accused 
of being ‘very active in defending projects that come from their country or that 
are hosted in their country, or where some companies have a particular 
interest.’59 Barclays Capital, a major speculator in the carbon markets, boasts 
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openly that ‘two of our team are members of the Executive Board.’60 In 
addition, like credit ratings firms in the financial markets, private sector carbon 
auditors approved by UN regulators have a strong interest in gaining future 
contracts from the companies that hire them; unsurprisingly, they wave through 
an overwhelming majority of projects under review.61 Meanwhile, banks that 
own equity stakes in carbon offset projects, or are ‘going long’ on carbon 
credits, may also be carbon brokers or sector analysts, ‘creating a temptation to 
bid up carbon prices to increase the value of their own carbon assets.’62 For 
example, Goldman Sachs owns a stake in BlueSource, a carbon offset developer, 
while JPMorganChase has acquired Climate Care, another offset specialist, and 
is to buy carbon offset aggregator EcoSecurities for US$204 million.63 
Within the insular, tightly-knit professional climate mitigation community, 
moreover, experts are constantly passing through revolving doors between 
private carbon trading consultancies, government, the UN, the World Bank, 
environmental organizations, official panels, trade associations and energy 
corporations. For example, Martin Enderlin, a CDM board member from 2001 
to 2005, is now director of government and regulatory affairs at EcoSecurities.64 
As one principal of a carbon asset management firm who is also a member of 
the UN’s CDM methodology panel noted at an industry meeting in London in 
October 2008, ‘I helped set the rules; now my firm plays by those rules.’65 
Revolving doors host a flow of traffic to and from many other zones of the 
carbon market as well. James Cameron, an environmental lawyer who helped 
negotiate the Kyoto Protocol, now benefits from the market he helped create in 
his position as Vice Chairman of Climate Change Capital, a boutique merchant 
bank that recruited as staff members Kate Hampton, former climate chief at 
Friends of the Earth, and Jon Sohn, formerly of World Resources Institute. 
Hampton was then seconded by Climate Change Capital to the UK’s 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) as a senior 
policy adviser during the UK’s G8 summit (which focused on climate change) 
and EU Presidency. Climate Change Capital’s Vice President for Carbon 
Finance, Paul Bodnar, took charge of climate change finance at the US State 
Department in 2009. Henry Derwent, a former director of international climate 
change at Britain’s DEFRA, who was responsible for domestic and European 
climate change policies, is now president and chief executive of the International 
Emissions Trading Association, the industry alliance. Sir Nicholas Stern, author 
of the British government’s Stern Report on Climate Change, has meanwhile 
championed the initiative of his private firm, IDEACarbon, to set up a carbon 
credit ratings agency – which many observers are likely to see as subject to the 
same type of conflict of interest that earlier afflicted Moody’s and other credit 
ratings agencies that depended for their income on the companies whose 
products they were rating.66 In the unregulated ‘voluntary’ markets for carbon 
credits, conflict of interest is also deeply entrenched. Laurent Segalen, formerly a 
carbon trading manager at the failed Lehman Brothers investment bank, 
expressed a wide consensus when he affirmed that ‘traders should be the ones 
designing and determining the standards.’67 The secretariat of the UK’s All-
Parliamentary Committee on Climate Change, which proposes regulatory policy 
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for the voluntary carbon offset market, is housed at The Carbon Neutral 
Company, whose business depends on such regulation. 
Is it possible to get rid of such pervasive conflict of interest through 
regulation? No, because conflict of interest is inherent in offset market 
structure. First, the fact that supply and demand in this trade, as well as the 
nature of the commodity itself, are dependent on decisions made by small elites 
within governments, all of whom, whether buyers or sellers, are interested 
mainly in creating as many carbon credits as possible, means that there is little 
incentive on any side to inquire too closely into whether the manufacture of 
those credits is good for the climate or not. While buyers of blue jeans care 
about whether they will wear out or not, acting as a check on the temptation of 
manufacturers to cut corners, buyers of carbon credits care only about whether 
regulators will accept them in lieu of local compliance.68 And while most 
markets have regulators whose careers depend on checking to see whether the 
goods on sale are what they say they are, regulators in the carbon offset market, 
as often as not, are buyers or sellers themselves, whose interests lie elsewhere. ‘I 
don’t see us as police,’ the chair of the CDM Executive Board confirmed in 
2007.69 European Commission coordinator for carbon markets and energy 
policy Peter Zapfel, a disciple of US economist-advocates of pollution trading 
and an instrumental figure in convincing European bureaucrats and 
governments to commit themselves to carbon trading,70 meanwhile has openly 
urged ‘cross-fertilization between regulators and regulated.’71 Nor could 
environmental impact assessments (EIAs) compensate for the lack of market 
incentives working in favour of climatic stability, even if carbon project EIAs 
were tasked with assessing climate impacts, which they are not. Throughout the 
world, conflicts of interest are also an inherent part of the EIA process, since 
consultants contracted to perform EIAs are typically paid by project developers 
themselves as a part of regular and accepted practice. 
Second, the trade in carbon commodities, like that in advanced credit 
derivatives, is both so complicated and so lucrative that the experts best 
qualified to regulate it are almost certain to have vested interests, whether they 
are involved in making money out of it directly, in advising interested 
governmental parties to it, or in designing it. As early as 2000, top 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change scientist John Houghton admitted 
it was impossible to staff his scientific panel on forestry offset accounting 
without recruiting experts with financial interests in selling carbon credits.72 
Today, when the largest buyers of carbon credits are financial-sector speculators 
bent on creating complex new instruments with them, including Goldman 
Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Barclays Capital, Deutsche Bank, Rabobank, BNP 
Paribas Fortis, Sumitomo, Kommunalkredit, Cantor Fitzgerald, Credit Suisse 
and Merrill Lynch, meaningful regulatory oversight has become even less likely. 
Any more general public understanding of the tricks of the trade, meanwhile, is 
virtually ruled out at the start by the complicated nature of the commodities on 
offer. The recent temporary suspension of the accreditation of the leading 
verifier of CDM credits, the Norwegian firm Det Norske Veritas,73 on the 
comparatively trivial ground that a company employee had signed off on five 
Critiques 
 186 
projects without surveying them, unwittingly reveals the impossibility of 
regulators’ coming to terms with the central issues involved, much less engaging 
in meaningful action. So does the ineffectual UN reaction to rumblings about 
corruption on the CDM Executive Board – which has been to admit that 
determining whether members are subject to conflict of interest is left to ‘their 
own individual discretion’ and that they need do nothing more than state under 
oath that they have ‘no financial interest in any aspect of the Clean 
Development Mechanism.’74 
Conclusion 
Preliminary reactions to corruption and abuse in the carbon offset trade – 
scandal stories in the news media, a few arrests or suspensions, calls for better 
regulation – have served a useful purpose in that they have been a first indicator 
of fundamental problems in market structure. But this first reflex response 
needs now to be supplemented with analysis of what underpins the scandals: by 
themselves, knee-jerk calls for ‘reform’ and ‘regulation’ are likely in the end to 
function only to deepen the roots of social exploitation and climate danger. 
A first step is to understand that the principal problems of corruption in 
carbon markets are not located in the transgressions of individual firms, 
government officials or rogue traders seen as acts of corruption such as fraud or 
bribery. That is, the essential problems are not ‘carbon cowboys’ or ‘bad apples.’ 
Rather, they are to be found in the architecture of the markets themselves, 
which have been the creation of economists, traders, policy wonks, ministers, 
UN officials, NGOs, scientists and other experts as well as of the corporate 
sector. As argued above, the contradictions built into the markets – 
unverifiability of carbon credits, mutually-reinforcing relationships between 
carbon commodity production and erosion of checks and balances and the rule 
of law, systematic bias entrenching the power of fossil fuel-dependent 
corporations at the expense of public interest, and so forth – cannot be resolved 
by regulation any more than they can be addressed by ‘learning by doing’. To 
continue to claim that carbon offset markets can be regulated is to legitimize 
continued corruption and to undermine popular struggles against it, as well as to 
harm the causes of climate action and climate justice. 
By the same token, because the problems are systemic rather than criminal in 
a conventional sense, to call for the suspension, arrest, prosecution or shaming 
of the US and European economists, officials, policymakers and experts who 
have created carbon offset products or promoted their official acceptance is 
neither appropriate nor necessary. Despite the responsibility of such elites for 
entrenching inherently corrupt and damaging trading systems in national and 
international law, the correctible problem lies in the existence of those systems 
itself, not in their inventors and advocates; in any case, presumably, no clear 
legal basis exists for claims of causality or intent to defraud. No more useful 
purpose would be served by pursuing the officials and experts responsible than 
by attempting to prosecute the individuals responsible for the development and 
spread of certain hazardous chemicals or financial instruments such as 
collateralized debt obligations. 
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It should be sufficient, instead, for society to take the perfectly conventional, 
well-worn and easily implementable self-protective path of simply abolishing the 
trade in question, just as it has banned, or could ban, the manufacture or trade 
of certain chemicals, weapons or financial derivatives. Any reasonably thorough 
investigation into the corruption built into the carbon offset markets shows that 
they require not purification, but elimination. Once the systemic problem is 
tackled, petty or individual corruption will no longer be an issue: if illegal offset 
trading aimed at easing compliance with government-mandated emissions limits 
were carried out at all, it would have to be carried out in public. Doing away 
with this trade would be a simple, adult and effective approach to preventing a 
type of corruption which is threatening not only ordinary landholders, workers 
and victims of pollution but also human flourishing and survival itself.75 
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The Politics of the Clean Development 
Mechanism: Hiding Capitalism Under the Green 
Rug 
Joanna Cabello 
Introduction 
Climate change is a consequence of capitalism. An on-growing extractive system 
entirely dependent on the use of fossil fuels as a cheap energy source that has 
driven unsustainable practices with socially and environmentally destructive 
consequences. The climate crisis also embodies the complexities of unequal 
distribution of impacts, historical responsibility for emissions, the right to use 
atmospheric capacity, as well as political, economic and social injustices. Within 
this context, a hegemonic world polity and ideology based on liberal or free-
market environmentalism1 started mandating how involuntarily interdependent 
states should deal with ‘common problems’ by devolving power to global 
market forces and non-state actors. This led to the international response in 
1997, through the Kyoto Protocol, of establishing the carbon market as the only 
‘efficient’ solution to deal with climate change. 
While the Protocol binds industrialized countries to reduce their emissions 
to an average of 5.2 per cent compared to 1990 levels by 2012, the core deal of 
this agreement was held together with the creation of the so-called ‘flexible 
mechanisms’2 from which the ‘Clean Development Mechanism’ (CDM) is the 
only one that involves developing countries. The CDM enables investment in 
‘emission-saving’ projects in developing countries in exchange for carbon credits 
that industrialized countries (also their companies or financial institutions) can 
use to meet their targets under the Protocol or to trade within the carbon 
market. Therefore, if a corporation needs to emit above its permitted level, it 
can buy cheap credits within the carbon market to cover this increase. The 
assumption is that as greenhouse gases (GHG) are emitted they will result in a 
contribution to the global increases of temperature, regardless of where or 
which is the source. However, it allows corporations and governments to buy 
their way out of the problem by offsetting their pollution somewhere else.  
Under the Emissions Trading mechanism (also known as cap-and-trade), 
industrialized countries have distributed their initial allocation of credits or 
‘rights to pollute’ to their dirtiest industries, which can be bought and sold 
between them as a market commodity. Conversely, it also allows trading with 
the ‘Certified Emission Reduction’ (CER) credits, acquired under CDM projects 
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in developing countries, thereby inflating the fixed caps. By April 2009, there 
were over 1,500 registered CDM projects and over 4,000 projects awaiting 
approval.3 European corporations are the main buyers of CERs and currently, 
offsets are predicted to deliver more than half of the European Union’s planned 
reductions to 2020.4 
This article argues then that the CDM, as a keystone of the carbon market, is 
a central element in the expanding agenda of capitalism in two fundamental 
ways. First, materially, it allows the creation of new financial markets, securing 
the conditions for accumulation and capital reproduction while allowing 
polluters to avoid making any real structural change. And second, ideologically, 
it searches to legitimize the ongoing commodification of nature (the atmosphere 
in this case) reinforcing a ‘green capitalism’5 whose legitimacy is an essential part 
of its own existence.  
In this regard, the New Carbon Finance6 agency shows that in spite of the 
global economic recession, the volume of trading in the carbon market in the 
first quarter of 2009 grew by 37% compared to the forth quarter of 2008. 
Moreover, they expect that most of the growth will come from increased 
liquidity in the secondary market of CDM carbon credits. Similarly, a recent 
analysis by Friends of the Earth7 highlights the problems with carbon tradings’s 
financial growth, which currently is fundamentally a derivatives market on 
which speculators do the majority of trades. This speculative nature – which 
also led to the recent financial crisis – can generate a carbon bubble and 
stimulate the development of subprime carbon (future contracts to deliver 
carbon that carry a relatively high risk of not being fulfilled), particularly with 
CDM credits.  
The constant need for legitimacy is at the same time inherent to the carbon 
market’s accumulation ambition, whereby the ‘green’ discourses have managed 
to disguise an economic treaty as an environmental treaty.8 The CDM appears 
then like an ideal strategy for maintaining the status quo: while creating a new 
commodity, the right to pollute, it simultaneously establishes the apparatus 
which gives the illusion of having ‘carbon neutral’ governments, corporations, 
industries or life-styles without making any real reduction or structural change. 
Moreover, as nature is considered a form of capital, ‘environmental 
sustainability’ has also been redefined to provide the basic conditions for 
preserving capital as ‘economically sustainable’. 
The international negotiations, on the other side, have framed the climate 
crisis as a technical issue rather than political, marginalizing voices for 
alternative knowledges; and as a result, there is a perception of having 
governance without politics, while these unaccountable and undemocratic 
institutions are, on the contrary, embedded with political as well as economic 
interests. As Welford argues,  
the dominant corporate culture (…) believes that natural resources are there for 
the taking and the environmental and social problems will be resolved through 
growth, scientific advancement, technology transfer via private capital flows, free 
trade and the odd charitable hand-out.9  
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In this vein, key tasks for implementing, financing and monitoring the scheme 
have been ‘outsourced’ to the private sector, giving them the space to legitimize 
their own actions. 
The UN Commission on Global Governance indicates that ‘governance has 
been viewed primarily as intergovernmental relationships, but it must now be 
understood as also involving non-governmental organizations, citizen’s 
movements, multinational corporations, and the global capital market’.10 With 
this understanding, as the professor Sangeeta Kamat11 analyses, power relations 
are seen as non-existent. Profit-seeking corporations and marginalized groups 
are considered equal legitimate actors and private interests are represented in the 
form of ‘partnerships’. Consequently, during the Bali and Pozna! UN climate 
negotiations (2007 and 2008 respectively), the corporate lobby group 
International Emissions Trading Association – with 172 corporate members 
such as BP, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, E.ON, Goldman Sachs, PetroBras, 
Repsol YPF, Schell, Rio Tinto or The Carbon Neutral Company12 – was the 
largest represented ‘Non-Governmental Organization’.13  
In this regard, as David Harvey14 argues, the acceleration of privatization and 
financialization are creating a form of accumulation in which states exercise 
their power to preserve property rights and other market institutions while 
dispossessing, in this case, those who live in and with a privatized environment. 
Therefore, the CDM, which masks a mechanism for land grabs, local conflicts 
and pollution, dispossesses local communities not by the conventional form of 
property rights but by the application of ownership constructs at the global 
level. 
It’s Not Only About the Climate! 
The CDM was a late intervention in the Kyoto negotiations. It emerged from 
the Brazilian delegation proposition, accepted by the Group of 77 and China, to 
create a ‘Clean Development Fund (CDF)’ on the basis of the ‘polluter pays’ 
principle. It would apply penalties for industrialized countries that exceeded 
their targets in order to finance clean energy projects for mitigation (actions to 
avoid and reduce emissions) and adaptation (actions that deal with the impacts 
of climate change) in developing countries. However, during the Kyoto 
negotiations in 1997, the CDF was transformed into the CDM and, as the 
researcher from the Corner House, Larry Lohmann, stated ‘fines were 
transformed into prices; a judicial system was transformed into a market’.15  
Each project – including hydropower dams, efficiency improvement in coal-
fired power plants, wind farms, monoculture plantations, biomass power plants, 
etc. – must go through a UN registration process designed to ensure ‘real, 
measurable and verifiable’ emission reductions that are ‘additional’ to what 
would have occurred without the project. This additionality characteristic is 
crucial, but at the same time, it is its most fundamental flaw. There is no sound 
way to show that a project would not have happened without the CDM. As the 
professor of the Öko Institute, Lambert Schneider, stated,16 ‘If you are a good 
storyteller you get your project approved. If you are not a good storyteller you 
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don’t get your project through’. Yet, if a project was going to happen anyway, 
no real offset is being made since new emissions should need new ‘emission-
saving’ projects. However, new markets in benefit of the same private and 
governmental actors have been made in order to help the capitalist system 
entering another phase with ‘green’ legitimation. 
The additionality requisite requires identifying one distinctive business-as-
usual storyline to compare with the storyline that comprises the project. With 
countless ‘without-project’ scenarios, the selection of which one is to be used in 
measuring the carbon credits is a matter of political decision rather than 
economic or technical conjectures.17 As the organization International Rivers18 
highlights, as of 1 October 2008, 76 per cent of all registered projects were 
already completed by the time they were approved as eligible to sell credits. In 
China for instance, more than 200 large-scale hydro plants are at the CDM 
validation phase even though hydro is a major component of the Chinese five-
year governmental plan. Since constructions began before CDM registrations, 
these projects would have continued even if they were not registered as CDM 
projects.19  
On the other side, the Designated Operational Entities (DOE) or the so-
called ‘validators’, which are mainly large risk management firms, verify and 
validate each project’s emission-reductions and removals. The CDM Executive 
Board accredits the DOEs so that they can be hired by project developers as 
external auditors for validating the project documents (assessing projects in 
accordance with CDM rules) and verifying the emission reductions in the field 
(assessing if the project is reducing emissions as claimed and according to the 
stipulated methodology). 
This outsourcing of ‘expertise’ for supervising the CDM places a heavy 
reliance on profit-driven private actors for transparency and accurate reports. 
Moreover, the few registered DOEs have made the system a practical oligopoly: 
they are able to set prices for their services and they can collude among 
themselves to ensure that projects are approved in order to receive all of the 
proposed CERs. The CDM Executive Board itself has stated that there is a 
‘clear and perceived risk of collusion’20 between the DOEs and the companies 
that hire them to review their offset projects due to their strong interests in 
having future contracts.  
Consequently, as Heidi Bachram and others21 affirm, ‘as all scramble for a 
piece of the emissions trading pie, no equivalent level of activity is seen from 
credible verifiers or monitors’. This on-going marketization and privatization of 
climate governance has turned the negotiations into structures for legitimized 
accumulation – with corporate powers at the heart of it – that sustain and 
increase old relations and imbalances and relations of power between rich and 
poor, North and South, as well as the idea of maintaining continuous business-
as-usual growth on a finite planet. 
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A Greenwash Scheme 
The research organization CorpWatch defines greenwash as ‘the phenomenon 
of socially and environmentally destructive corporations attempting to preserve 
and expand their markets by posing as friends of the environment and leaders in 
the struggle to eradicate poverty’.22 Moreover, they affirm that it also involves 
‘any attempt to brainwash consumers or policy makers into believing polluting 
mega-corporations are the key to environmentally sound sustainable 
development’. In this regard, the severe ideological reductionism of the 
negotiations, which has transformed ecological politics into managerial 
strategies, is indeed constantly helping powerful actors to overcome the 
capitalistic intrinsic tension between accumulation and legitimation ambitions.  
In this regard, the Protocol states that CDM projects are emission reductions, 
however, planting trees, fertilizing oceans, burning methane from landfills to 
generate electricity, or setting up wind farms cannot be verified to be climatically 
equivalent to reducing fossil fuel consumption.23 Moreover, since these offset 
projects generate CERs that will allow emissions somewhere else, then there is 
no reduction happening at the global scale. On the contrary, they are creating 
new credits for the Emissions Trading scheme, underestimating the already 
inadequate caps established in the Protocol. Northern polluters can continue to 
pollute, and even increase pollution legitimately, with the help of the carbon 
market without being concerned about abatement actions.  
As the New York Times highlights, ‘if a company or a country is fined for 
spewing excessive pollutants into the air, the community conveys its judgement 
that the polluter has done something wrong. A fee, on the other hand, makes 
pollution just another cost of doing business, like wages, benefits and rent’.24 
The focus is thus no longer on reducing emissions but on trading and claiming 
credits. In another words, the wealthiest actors are – one more time – enabled 
to buy their way out. 
BP and Shell, for example, have been cultivating ‘progressive’ corporate 
images and positioned themselves at the forefront of the offsets market. The 
opportunity to greenwash their activities in order to present themselves as 
environmentally responsible is legitimizing their destructive forms of production 
and extraction. On the other side, several offset companies offer citizens, 
companies and governments the illusion of being ‘carbon neutral’ by buying 
some offset credits. No change is required. As a result, the space for ecological 
political opposition or organized acts of resistance, mainly in Western societies, 
has been significantly reduced. 
Similarly, the carbon market’s ideological fabrication reflects the battle of 
interests and powers at play during the negotiations for persuading partners and 
possible allies towards hegemonic convictions, whereby the various actors have 
to deal with an involuntary ecological interdependence. Consequently, the 
Kyoto debate has been instrumental for re-affirming capitalistic interests in 
moments of global governance legitimacy crises.25 According to Henry 
Bernstein,26 this crisis has been indeed alleviated in part by the success of the 
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free-market environmentalism in which the climate negotiations subordinated 
environmental purposes for economic goals.  
Sustaining the Inequalities 
The core objectives of the CDM are to help industrialized countries meet their 
commitments under the Protocol and at the same time, to promote sustainable 
development in developing countries. The latter was crucial for earning the 
support of the Group of 77 and China block. Hence, in order for a CDM 
project to be registered it must first be approved by the Designated National 
Authority (DNA), which is selected by each developing country and who’s 
prerogative is to validate whether the project contributes to its sustainable 
development.  
Market liberalism’s compatibility with sustainable development has been 
constantly disproved by many.27 In the climate case, the absence of a concrete 
definition in the Protocol presents an assumption that projects that are good for 
carbon abatement must also be good for sustainable development. Moreover, 
the construction of the concept with poverty is linked with the historical usage 
of the term ‘development’ and consequently, the responsibility and pressure of 
achieving it is being pushed towards developing countries.  
For that reason, while the accounting for emission reductions is subject to a 
stringent international assessment, the sustainable development objective is 
considered unnecessary to assess at the international level and has been entirely 
left to the approval of the DNA at the Project Document stage (before the 
implementation). All the responsibility for monitoring each project’s 
sustainability therefore depends on developing countries. Even more 
importantly, as capitalism depends on exploiting and intensifying global 
inequalities to further its own growth, the sustainable development discourse is 
being used as a way to legitimize this new colonialist scheme. 
Consequently, there is a trade-off between the two objectives in favour of 
the one that has a price in the market. As Bobby Peck from the South African 
environmental justice organization ‘GroundWork’ notes,28 ‘companies that are 
able to avoid reducing GHG through carbon trading are also not going to be 
reducing the other pollution that causes harm to local communities next to 
these industries’. Furthermore, most large-scale renewable energy projects (such 
as windmills, dams and plantations) are silent in their need for big quantities of 
land and resources for implementation as well as in the social impacts that this 
conveys, such as the massive evictions of local communities, land-grabbing, 
migration to the cities, direct human and indigenous rights violations, repression 
of social movements, and many more.  
Since developing countries’ interest to participate in the CDM scheme 
essentially rests on obtaining further funds, strict sustainability requirements are 
then undermined in order to facilitate the entrance of new investors. In this way, 
the CDM is legitimizing a type of sustainability whose definition is not 
contested at the governance decision-making tables and whose legitimization is 
more important than even its attempt to accomplish it. As Cathleen Fogel 
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mentions, ‘global discourses emphasize that standardized carbon units can be 
produced through standardized sequestration projects in standardized developing 
countries. In order to be efficient and hence, to economically benefit from 
global institutions, the ‘local’ must accept its construction as compliant, 
homogenous and safe, which is to say, as absent’.29  
This false notion of sustainability, as the activist Vandana Shiva30 affirms, is 
then assigning primacy to capital, depending on capital, and substituting nature 
as capital. Therefore, words that were meant to speak about politics and power 
have become co-opted and meaningless for the service of alternative 
interventions and mobilizations, by framing them not only as neutral but also 
turning them into merely policy buzzwords.  
During the 7th Session of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in 
May 2008, an Indigenous representative declared that  
The Report doc E/c.19/2008/L.2 does not take into account the proposals and 
concerns of the Indigenous Peoples regarding the initiative to reduce emissions 
from deforestation in developing countries known as REDD or the CDM or the 
Carbon Market (…) The adopted recommendations (…) made by the Forum 
experts are not the position of indigenous organizations (…) We are also 
concerned that the initiatives of CDM are considered examples of ‘good 
practice’. 31  
Many local and Indigenous groups in India, Thailand, Indonesia, South Africa, 
Nigeria, Brazil, Peru, Paraguay, among many more around the world, besides 
trying to incorporate counter-hegemonic discourses around the negotiation 
tables, are strongly resisting the carbon market locally, specifically CDM 
projects. 
From a developing country perspective, the economic incentives and 
technology transfers for Southern big polluters and governments are clear. But 
it must also be made clear that this represents a payment to ensure that the 
‘North’ and wealthiest actors can continue polluting and accumulating as well as 
deepening the intrinsic inequalities of the world political economy. The CDM 
has become an instrument of foreign policy that creates new structural 
dependencies. We are facing a new form of colonialism whereby the expansion 
is not only the cooptation of resources and land but also of atmospheric 
capacity. 
Who Received an Invitation? 
The CDM project cycle heavily relies on a diverse set of actors, including 
governments, corporations, auditors, science boards, financial investors, 
international and local NGOs, local communities, etc. However, the 
institutionalization of an ‘invited’32 participation has paved the way for 
establishing a structure that imposes boundaries and excludes certain actors and 
views from entering the arenas in the first place and hence, obstructs critical and 
different discourses and epistemologies. 
For this reason, when the Protocol was ratified, the accepted line of 
reasoning was that a market-driven mechanism is ‘the only possible’ alternative. 
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This dominant idea strengthens the ideological hegemonic stance. As the CDM 
Executive Board Secretary, Yvo de Boer, stated during the COP in Bali, 
‘market-based mechanisms need to be at the heart of things. It’s the only way of 
achieving the goal’.33 Therefore, this ‘development’ thinking is reduced to 
certain social actors (i.e. UN bodies) and a certain social transformation (i.e. 
technology transfer), while marginalizing other social actors and trivializing 
other alternatives for change.34 
In this regard, it is interesting to highlight some of these actors. 
Industrialized governments on one side carry a convenient dual role. They, and 
‘their’ corporations, are buyers of CERs on the market while simultaneously 
deciding upon the rules of this market as Parties of the decision-making process. 
Moreover, they channel important donations to the UNFCCC secretariat for its 
operation, as well as to the World Bank, UNEP and UNDP, which are 
institutions heavily involved in the finance and implementation of CDM 
projects.35  
Similarly, the role of the World Bank in the management of carbon funds is 
more than controversial due to its self-assigned role as a facilitator or broker of 
the carbon market while making money out of its commissions on projects. 
Even more fundamentally, through its initial position in the market as well as in 
the regulatory field, the Bank is influencing CDM regulation in its own interest 
under a facade of political neutrality. The Group of 77 and China block have 
clearly stated during the negotiations that they do not consider the World Bank 
as the suitable institution to manage the climate funds and would prefer a body 
directly accountable to the UNFCCC. Furthermore, the World Bank’s role turns 
out to be ironic since it still funds heavily polluting industries and is not willing 
to mainstream climate change considerations into its own energy projects or 
country strategies.  
On the completely opposite side, the small existing ‘consultative’ space 
where local communities can give their input on the projects has other 
constraints embedded in the politics of participation.36 While formally the CDM 
has different opportunities for public involvement, they only take place when 
the design of the project is already decided. The language used in most of the 
documents is English and their translation into local languages is not required. 
Moreover, most information is communicated through the Internet, which is 
most of the times not a culturally appropriate way to reach local communities. 
Consequently, local and indigenous peoples are not considered actors of their 
own development but on the contrary, the CDM is establishing a homogenous 
‘sustainable development’ path which is constructed in international arenas for 
accomplishing specific colonialist purposes. 
Conclusion: A Mechanism for Dispossession 
The CDM structure – created in the name of ‘mitigating global warming’ while 
transferring ‘clean’ technology to the developing world in the name of 
‘sustainable development’ – has become an instrument used to expand capitalist 
globalization whereby the wealthiest actors continue to accumulate by 
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dispossessing the excluded. Is in this sense, local and social movements striving 
for climate justice are in essence struggling against the capitalistic model.  
The CDM and the carbon market are based on the idea of economic growth 
within the extractive system of capitalism, and at the same time, on a climate 
governance that has been pursuing a regime of expanding accumulation. On one 
side, developing countries will have to bear the consequences of being 
industrialized countries’ carbon dump and ‘pay the bill’ for not having the right 
to pollute. Moreover, since emissions are growing faster than ever and climate 
change impacts are affecting the poorest parts of the world; countries with the 
most to lose are being more dispossessed, intensifying long-standing exploitative 
and dependent relations which started in colonial times. 
On the other side, local communities intervened by CDM projects in most 
of the cases are being dispossessed from their lands, forests, water sources and 
traditional ways of living. In the name of ‘sustainable development’ an imposed 
‘development’ is determining their path by hegemonic and capitalistic values. 
The transferred large-scale ‘clean’ technologies, which serve powerful global 
interests, are undermining the traditional ways for sustaining local and 
indigenous peoples’ livelihoods, which are an invaluable source of ecological 
sustainable alternatives. Moreover, the incorporation of the environment into 
the heart of liberal market institutions, such as the World Bank, enables a more 
rooted institutionalization of green capitalism. Hegemonic discourses are trying 
to persuade us that a green capitalist economy could achieve the miracle of 
sustainable development and continuous ‘growth’. However, global policies that 
intensify inequalities, social injustice and accumulation by dispossession 
practices are false solutions.  
The lobbying and political pressures for the summit at Copenhagen in 
December 2009, where the negotiations for the post-Kyoto agreement will be 
carried out, are trying to deepen the process within these market mechanisms. 
Proposals for other kinds of offsets have been presented, with the same 
underlying logic, the same profit-driven incentive, and still no real structural 
changes. Countries and corporations continue to seek ways to avoid their 
reduction obligations by deepening the process of accumulation under a green 
capitalism.  
Conversely, the alternatives are strong and diverse: community-led renewable 
energy, food sovereignty, reverse over-production and over-consumption, small 
scale agriculture systems, respect and learn from indigenous and traditional ways 
of living, and many others within the scope of people-centred approaches. The 
need for climate justice cannot be neglected or postponed any more. 
 The world needs a radical change in its fundamental economic pillars. 
Technological solutions are limited and do not address the historical and 
structural problem of the ideological and material foundations of capitalism. For 
that reason, building alternatives to capitalism’s inexorable accumulation forces 
is necessary for achieving no-carbon economies within a social justice 
framework.  
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Rent Seeking and Corporate Lobbying in Climate 
Negotiations  
Ricardo Coelho 
The Political Economy of Carbon Markets 
Rent seeking behavior can be defined as using resources to influence changes in 
legal rights to obtain an increase or avoid a decrease in income wealth.1 The 
concept was devised by Gordon Tullock2 to define the process by which 
industrialists engage in lobbying government officials or competing to become 
civil servants, in order to achieve monopoly power. Anne Krueger3 broadened 
the concept to include lobbying for protectionism. In this chapter, we use the 
same framework for analyzing corporate lobbying inherent to carbon markets, 
as industries compete to get a greater share of the cake. 
Economically, rent seeking results in a waste of resources with the lobbying 
process. Politically, it leads to corruption and undermines democratic decision-
making. Yet, and in spite of this, the so-called ‘international community’ 
approved a treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, which created a heaven for rent-seekers: 
an artificial market for carbon emissions, complemented with offset provisions 
under the umbrella of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).4 
When a new carbon market is born, such as the European Union Emissions 
Trading System (EU ETS), an enormous rent is delivered on a silver platter to 
the greatest polluters, corresponding to the value of emissions permits given 
away for free. The potential profits (or avoided losses) from trading (or using 
for compliance) cheap carbon credits from the CDM (the Certified Emissions 
Reductions, in Kyoto’s jargon) add to this rent. If we further add profits from 
financial services offered by consulting agencies, investment banks and traders, 
we have more money than Uncle Scrooge had in its money bin.  
As time goes by, more and more big polluters, bankers and traders, are aware 
of the potential for profits in an international carbon trading system. This has 
led companies to form partnerships with NGOs, allegedly with the objective of 
inducing corporate awareness to global warming mitigation, to lobby for the 
schemes that allow trading of carbon emissions. One example is US Climate 
Action Partnership (USCAP), incorporating big polluters like General Electric, 
General Motors, BP America, Dow Chemical, Duke Energy, Ford, Dupont and 
Rio Tinto and the NGOs Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), Natural 
Resources Defense Council (NRDC), The Nature Conservancy and World 
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Resources Institute (WRI). Its recent recommendations for US legislative action 
includes a mandatory cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gases (GHG), 
allowing for emissions offsetting. 
Other partnerships went further, creating voluntary emissions trading 
schemes. In 1995, the Pilot Emissions Reductions Trading Project (PERT, 
renamed later as CleanAir Canada) launched an emissions trading program in 
the Canadian province of Ontario. The program was reformed in 1997 to 
include CO2 emissions and one year later the Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Reduction Trading Pilot (GERT) allowed the trading of GHG emissions in 
Canada. Both programs were conceived with the input of NGOs, unions, 
industries and local and federal authorities. 
The US followed this example, and in 2000, EDF joined BP, Dupont, Shell 
and other companies from Canada and France to set up the Partnership for 
Climate Action (PCA), another voluntary GHG trading system. Three years 
later, this initiative gave way to the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), formed 
by a group of big polluters, including BP, Ford and Dupont. CCX is the axis of 
international voluntary carbon trading, joining forces with other similar 
exchanges in Montreal (Canada) and Tianjin (China) and with European Climate 
Exchange (ECX), the biggest exchange operating within the EU ETS. 
We can see, then, that the majority of the world’s greatest polluters support 
and even lobby for international carbon trading. But it would be extremely naïve 
to think that this happens because their CEOs are deeply committed to saving 
the planet from runaway climate change. On the contrary, what determines 
corporate lobbies’ tactics is rent seeking behavior. 
Tactics for Corporate Lobbying 
We can distinguish three tactics for corporate lobbying in climate negotiations: 
denial, influence and greenwashing.5 The first one consists on creating and 
financing think tanks and fake grassroots groups that launch campaigns, 
supported by some scientists (the so-called ‘skeptics’) to deny global warming 
science. If it succeeds in creating doubts about the consequences of rising GHG 
concentrations, reducing the influence of the environmental movement, then it 
will be much more difficult to enact a strong climate agreement.  
The first tactic has been followed most notably by Exxon-Mobil.6 This 
company was instrumental in the creation of the Global Climate Coalition 
(GCC), a denialist lobby group, after the first meeting of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), in 1989. The GCC gathered representatives 
from the oil, auto and mining industries and was successful in persuading 
governments to oppose binding targets in the Earth Summit, in 1992. In 2002 
the group was dismantled, with a statement supporting George W. Bush’s 
proposal for (ineffective) voluntary agreements with the industry. 
The second one consists on lobbying governments in order to assure a more 
corporate-friendly attitude by national delegations in the climate negotiations. 
This might involve the persuasion of government officials or even the 
appointment of corporate-friendly officials to integrate governmental 
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delegations. Again, Exxon-Mobil provides an example of this tactic. In 2001, 
this company issued a memo to the US government suggesting that Robert 
Watson, a radical scientist working within the IPCC, was substituted by a 
‘skeptic’.7 The scientist was in fact substituted in 2002 by the Bush 
administration, elected with a generous financial support from Exxon. 
The third tactic is more of a public relations and marketing stunt. By 
enacting voluntary agreements through partnerships with NGOs, governments 
or the UN, companies can clear their image and give the impression that they 
are doing their part in the effort to mitigate global warming, even if the reality is 
very different. This allows them to gain bargaining power in climate 
negotiations, namely because NGOs’ opposition to their presence will be much 
lower. In more extreme cases, NGOs funded by corporations show more 
concern with polluter’s profits than with the environment, leading them to 
praise ineffective policies like emissions trading.8 
These three tactics aren’t mutually exclusive and any company or business 
association can resort to more than one of them. For the corporate lobby, 
anything that helps in its effort to delay climate action is worth the effort. BP, 
for instance, was a founder of the GCC but left in 1997, reversing its denialist 
position. In 1999 BP set up an internal emissions trading scheme and one year 
later it launched its ‘beyond petroleum’ campaign, announcing its (fake) effort to 
reposition itself as a renewable energy company. In 2002, the company played a 
central role in the formation of an voluntary carbon trading scheme in the UK, 
which distributed 111 million pounds to participating companies to continue 
‘business-as-usual’,9 given the over-allocation of permits to pollute. After this 
‘success’, BP lobbied for the expansion of the experiment at the EU scale.10 
Meanwhile, the aggressive ‘greenwashing’ campaign shielded the oil company 
against criticisms from environmentalists. 
How an Industry-Friendly Treaty was Signed 
The negotiation process for an international agreement on climate change 
mitigation started in the late 80s. After some meetings and the publishing of the 
IPCC’s first assessment report in 1990, it became evident that a framework 
convention was necessary. To this endeavor, an International Negotiating 
Committee (INC) was created. 
Two aspects from the negotiations in the INC deserve our attention. The 
first is that, from the start, both the US and the EU opposed binding targets for 
emissions. This lead to a convention, the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), approved in the Earth Summit, 
that merely recommended the stabilization of emissions at 1990 levels by 2000.11 
The second is that even before the UNFCCC was approved, research on 
carbon trading was already being undertaken within the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). This UN agency set up a 
department on this instrument in 1991 and a few years later was already 
proposing its implementation.12  
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The famous Kyoto Protocol was approved in 1997, incorporating the trading 
of permits to emit GHG as a way to reduce emissions by about 5% until 2012 
from 1990 levels. From the start, two major loopholes were introduced to 
assure the stabilization of permit prices at low levels: ‘hot air’ and the CDM. 
The first loophole was created indirectly by allowing countries to choose 
1990 as the base year for emissions reductions. Eastern European economies 
collapsed in the period 1990-91, so their GHG emissions dropped sharply 
during this period. Nevertheless, 1990 was chosen as the base year to calculate 
emissions reductions targets, so these countries could claim huge emissions 
reductions and sell excess permits. Swamping the carbon market with this ‘hot 
air’ allows Western European countries, as well as Japan, to buy cheap credits 
from the former USSR countries, while the latter can claim a huge rent. Also, 
significant emissions reductions were achieved in the UK and Germany because 
of a switching from coal to gas in electricity generation, for economic reasons, 
and deindustrialization in the former German Democratic Republic. Had the 
base year been set at 1992, and industries would have to comply with much 
more stringent targets for GHG emissions reductions. 
The second loophole became known as ‘the Kyoto surprise’, given the way it 
was introduced in the negotiations. Brazil had by 1997 set forth the proposal to 
create a Green Development Fund, aimed to finance mitigation projects in less 
developed countries and financed by the fines imposed on the countries that 
didn’t comply with required emissions reductions. At the time, developing 
countries, gathered in the G-77, as well as China, endorsed this proposal and 
opposed the idea of allowing industrialized countries to exceed their emissions 
quotas by financing emissions reductions projects in other countries. 
Nevertheless, Brazil reversed its position just one month before the negotiations 
in December, presenting instead a joint proposal with the US to create the 
CDM. 
This was just one of the successes by the Clinton-Gore administration in its 
effort to water down Kyoto. During the next years, a confrontation emerged 
between the EU and the US considering restrictions on carbon trading. The EU 
wanted that at least half of the emissions reductions by industrialized countries 
were met with domestic action, instead of using permits bought from other 
countries, a position backed up by the least developed countries. The US, on the 
other hand, defended unrestricted carbon trading and offsetting as the only 
feasible way to comply with the emissions reductions required by Kyoto. This 
position had the support from Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Japan. 
The US delegation, led by Al Gore, was also a key player in the tackling of 
opposition to the CDM by the end of 1998. The EU and the G77 were by then 
pointing its guns at the US’ pretension to count forests and agricultural fields as 
carbon sinks, in order to get credits to pollute more. At the same time, the 
group of least developed countries, along with China, were being bought into 
accepting carbon trading by promises of technological transfers and financial 
aid. In the end, the ‘Buenos Aires Plan of Action’, approved in the fourth 
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Conference of Parties (COP), set up as a priority the design of the CDM,13 the 
biggest corporate bail out in environmental treaties. 
At the same time, the US was already preparing its way out of the Protocol. 
The Senate Resolution 98, approved by unanimity, stated that the US 
government shouldn’t be a signatory to any protocol that didn’t impose 
emissions reductions targets for developing countries and/or would seriously 
harm its economy.14 This resolution is still valid, implying the impossibility of 
ratification by the Senate. Nevertheless, the US government decided to continue 
negotiating, hoping to gather the necessary support to shape the Protocol 
according to the needs of its industry. 
Over the next years, negotiations continued to reflect the confrontation 
between the EU and the US, with the latter continuing its pressure to get more 
credits, unrestricted carbon trading and offsetting and the exemption of 
penalties for no compliance. The dispute led to the failure of negotiations at 
COP-6 in Den Haag, in 2000. In 2001 Bush’s administration announced its 
abandonment of the climate negotiations and the dispute ended. But by this 
time EU’s opposition to unrestricted carbon trading and offsetting had been 
overcome by the growing pressure from the industry and it ended up reversing 
its position. What we have now is a compromise stating that the use of 
flexibility mechanisms should be ‘supplemental’ to domestic action, a 
meaningless rule given that no quantitative restrictions have been set. 
In 2001, COP-7, in Marrakesh, ended up defining the main features of the 
CDM. Given the disagreements on forestry projects, though, the rules of 
procedure were only completely defined two years later. 
Corporate Lobbies and Corporate-Friendly NGOs Paving the Way to 
Environmental Injustice 
To understand how the US position on carbon trading prevailed even after its 
withdrawal from negotiations, we must analyze the role of corporate lobbying. 
Not only were corporate lobbies incorporated in climate negotiations as 
‘stakeholders’, but also its representativity clearly surpasses that of the NGOs,15 
even if we don’t consider the number of lobbyists that manage to attend 
negotiations as government representatives. Worse, the UN has been so 
overwhelmed with corporate culture that it went so far as to encourage the 
growing participation of these lobbies in COPs. 
In 1999, UNCTAD joined forces with the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development (WBCSD), a corporate lobby that emerged in the 
Earth Summit, and created the International Emissions Trading Association 
(IETA). IETA is now the most powerful corporate lobby with the explicit 
purpose of supporting emissions trading, counting with the support of powerful 
companies like BP, Shell, KPMG and PriceWaterhouseCoopers. Yet, it was 
created by an organization aimed to protect peace, human rights and the 
environment. 
Another international institution crucial in shaping Kyoto’s Protocol 
according to industry needs was the World Bank (WB). In 1999, the WB 
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established the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF), a $180 million mutual fund, to 
fuel the CDM and JI markets. At this time, Kyoto had not been ratified by 
enough countries to guarantee its survival16 and the rules of procedure for CDM 
projects had not been established, but many companies were eager to invest in 
the new carbon market, anticipating future profits from being the ‘first movers’. 
The PCF was obviously a tool to force the implementation of Kyoto’s flexibility 
mechanisms. Mainly because of this fund, in 2004, before Russia ratified Kyoto, 
assuring that the Protocol would be implemented, more than 120 transactions 
of carbon credits had already been registered.17  
As for corporate lobbies, besides IETA, two other groups have had a central 
role in climate negotiations. The first is the mentioned WBCSD, which gathers 
CEOs from about 140 of the world’s largest transnational corporations.18 The 
council is a keystone in the rebranding of corporations as environmentally 
friendly (read greenwashing) and it had a major role in the lobbying for carbon 
trading. 
The second is the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the most 
influential corporate lobby group. From the start, the ICC has lobbied against 
government regulation and for emissions trading and offsetting.19  
These industrial lobbies were successful in their campaigns for ‘cost 
effective’ environmental policies. We can see this influence very clearly in the 
creation of a European carbon market, molded according to industry’s needs. 
A Market for Carbon is Born 
The design of the EU ETS, the only carbon trading scheme implemented so far, 
is symptomatic of the importance of corporate lobbying in the politics. By the 
early 1990s, a carbon tax was seen as the basis of EU’s climate policy. But this 
proposal never got the necessary unanimous support from the Council of 
Financial Ministers and was strongly opposed by industry. This lead to a stall, 
which ended in 2000, when the EU started discussing the creation of a region-
wide carbon trading system. 
To implement the ETS, the European Commission (EC) undertook a 
consultation with the main stakeholders. In 2000, a Green Paper on emissions 
trading was published and representatives from industries and environmentalists 
were asked to express their opinions.20 Unsurprisingly, industries lobbied for the 
right to use the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol (CDM and JI) to 
comply with the emissions reductions requirements, while environmentalists 
defended that the use of these mechanisms should be very restricted. Also 
unsurprisingly, the final position from the EC largely reflected the interests from 
the industry, allowing for the member states to establish limits for the use of the 
flexibility mechanisms. 
Another contentious issue between environmentalists and industrialists was 
the allocation of permits to emit CO2. While Climate Action Network – Europe 
(CAN-E), representing big environmental NGOs, defended auctioning of 
permits, according to the polluter-pays principle, the largest corporate lobbies 
argued that they should be given for free according to historic emissions 
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(‘grandfathering’). Again, the EC’s decision reflected the needs of the industry, 
giving them permits that they could later sell for a profit.21 For power 
companies, what this means is that they can pass the costs of the permits to the 
consumers, raising electricity bills, and then sell them for a profit if they end up 
with a surplus. The scandal was not corrected in the second phase (from 2008 to 
2012), and a report by emissions trading advocate World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 
and the consultancy agency Point Carbon estimated that windfall profits in this 
phase could reach 23 to 63 billion Euros.22 
Meanwhile, emissions reductions were not induced by the ETS in its first 
stage. There was a substantial over-allocation of permits in Phase I, exceeding 
emissions in 3%, and the carbon market collapsed in 2007, with the permit price 
dropping to near zero. The allocation in the second stage was lower but still the 
permit price collapsed again recently, in the midst of the financial crisis. The 
contraction in production increased the number of permits held in excess by 
companies, while the need for liquidity made companies sell those permits. In 
February 2009, a ton of carbon was worth only about 8!. 
As a result, the ETS has failed to provide an environmental gain. The EU-15 
has committed itself to reducing its GHG emissions by 8% until 2012, from 
1990 levels, a target that could easily be reached given the significant emissions 
reductions achieved in Germany and in the UK in the early 1990s, following a 
switch from coal to gas in electricity generation. But the lack of a coherent 
policy to phase out fossil fuels has led the EU-15 to miss the target: according 
to estimates by the European Environment Agency, GHG emissions reductions 
by 2012 will amount to a mere 3.6%, in a ‘business-as-usual’ scenario. This 
doesn’t mean, however, that the EU won’t comply with Kyoto. Thanks to the 
extensive use of the CDM, the EU not only anticipates compliance with the 
2012 objective but has even announced more ambitious targets for the future. 
Nevertheless, the EC is still committed to carbon trading as the cornerstone 
of its climate policy after Kyoto, which shows how it weighs industries’ profits 
against climate change mitigation. 
More Loopholes in the Horizon 
In present climate negotiations, the hot topic for a post-Kyoto agreement is the 
broadening of the scope of the CDM. We can see this by the list of proposals 
presented recently by the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments 
for Annex-I23 Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP).24 In the next 
climate summit at Copenhagen, in December 2009, world leaders are going to 
discuss these proposals. 
The most important one is the issuance of carbon credits for preserving 
forests – the Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
(REDD) proposal. This proposal was already incorporated in the Bali Action 
Plan, approved at COP-13. When forests are commodified, a massive land grab 
is to be expected in Latin American, African and Asian countries, and 
communities that live a low carbon life will be treated as climate criminals for 
wanting to occupy ‘carbon sinks’. With the objective of creating yet another 
Critiques 
 210 
source of cheap carbon credits, the fate of the world’s forests will be at the 
hands of the unpredictable financial markets.25 
Other proposals include the generation of carbon credits by two dangerous 
technologies: carbon capture and storage (CCS) and nuclear energy. CCS is the 
basis of the ‘clean coal’ fantasy. By sequestering carbon emissions at coal plants 
and burying them underground, the energy industry hopes to continue to use 
fossil fuels and, simultaneously, earn carbon credits. But CCS won’t be available 
in the next decades and it will be an uneconomic, dangerous and 
environmentally unfriendly technology.26 As for nuclear energy, the unresolved 
issues of radioactive waste and leakages show that we are merely trading one 
environmental disaster for another. 
Another issue that will be discussed in Copenhagen is the creation of a 
sectoral crediting mechanism. This would allow for a non-Annex I country to 
generate carbon credits if the emissions from a given sector are below the 
projected emissions (an absolute target) or if the carbon intensity of emissions is 
below the projected carbon intensity (a relative target). If the proposal is 
approved, we can expect the carbon market to be swamped with cheap carbon 
credits. 
The AWG-KP is merely expressing the needs of the industry and the 
financial sector in its proposals. This is of no surprise when we see that its chair 
is Harald Dovland, a former consultant for Poyry, which is a consulting and 
engineering agency that profits from carbon trading.27 Once again, the conflict 
of interests is evident. 
A similar analysis can be made of the Council of the EU proposals for 
Copenhagen. Despite the failure of the ETS in providing significant emissions 
reductions, the EU maintains its commitment to carbon trading and proposes 
the creation of a OECD-wide carbon market by 2015, to be expanded in 2020 
to industrialized developing countries through sectoral crediting and trading 
mechanisms.28 Simultaneously, the EU is presenting its ‘20-20-20 target’ (20% 
reduction in GHG emissions and 20% renewable energy by 2020) as a sign of 
good will but in reality the emissions reductions after 2012 will only amount to 
4-5%, as Stefan Singer, director of global energy policy at WWF concludes.29 
The extensive use of the CDM will be determinant for compliance with the 
target, so it is no wonder that the EU supports many of the AWG-KP 
proposals, like REDD and sectoral crediting mechanisms. 
Conversely, the substitution of the CDM by a fund that assures the transfer 
of clean technology and the assistance to adaptation in the least developed 
countries in such a way that real emissions reductions are made, the standard of 
living is raised and people’s participation is assured is not on the table.30 A 
profound reform of the CDM, to assure that non-additional offsets are purged 
from the system, is supposedly on the negotiating table, but in reality no 
industrialized country wants to lobby for a much tighter certification system that 
would make them resort more to domestic action to comply with Kyoto.  
Certification problems occur because two conflicts of interest prevail in the 
CDM. The first is the conduction of certification by private companies working 
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for the sellers of carbon credits. It is in the best interest of both parties in the 
process of certification that the number of rejected projects will be as low as 
possible, so there is an obvious incentive for cheating. On the other hand, the 
competition between certification companies will lead to adverse selection, as 
the ones that spend less time and resources with the process of certification will 
offer lower prices and, consequently, get a greater market share. 
The second conflict of interest arises because both sellers and buyers of 
carbon credits are very much indifferent to quality. It doesn’t matter at all that a 
certain project delivers no emissions reductions and even harms local people, as 
long as the seller is able to earn a profit and the buyer is able to use the cheap 
credits to comply with Kyoto. Again, there is an incentive for strategic 
cooperation. 
To be fair, in recent years some modifications in the certification process 
have been introduced, raising the number of projects rejected by the CDM 
Executive Board. But the pressing issues regarding conflicts of interests are not 
seriously discussed in present climate negotiations, turned into a trade fair by the 
increasing power of corporate lobbying. Neither is the basic question of the 
impossibility of accurately defining ‘additionality’. In the end, the result of 
climate negotiations reflects the balance of power between NGOs and 
corporate lobbies, with the latter having much more negotiating power. 
Building a Movement Against Climate Change Profiteers 
Real solutions for climate change won’t come from international negotiations 
riddled with rent-seeking from corporate lobbies. Nor will they come from 
miraculous new technologies or from market-based policies. On the contrary, 
the problem of global warming can only be seriously addressed when its main 
source, the use of fossil fuels, is stopped. The full decarbonization of 
industrialized societies may be a condition for its survival as a civilization. 
Moreover, the degradation of life conditions in the global South by ‘natural’ 
catastrophes, droughts and plagues as a result of global warming, a problem 
caused by the industrialized North, is an unacceptable form of social injustice. 
All this seems consensual, as we can find this sort of considerations in global 
leader’s speeches. Yet, new coal plants, highways and airports continue to be 
built in industrialized countries, even when it implies a departure from emissions 
reductions targets. This incoherence can be explained by the political economy 
of global warming, given that the phasing-out of fossil fuels implies reducing 
profits from major companies, namely from the energy and transport sectors. 
Corporate lobbies will then oppose any regulation that would hurt them. Only 
by forming strong social movements can we make politicians work for the ones 
that elected them, instead of obeying those who finance their campaigns. 
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Forests, Carbon Markets and Hot Air:  
Why the Carbon Stored in Forests Should not be 
Traded 
Chris Lang  
Introduction 
Reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) is, in 
theory at least, a simple idea. Governments, companies, forest owners, local 
communities or indigenous peoples in the South should be rewarded for 
keeping their forests instead of  cutting them down. The devil, as always, is in 
the details. Marc Stuart of  EcoSecurities describes REDD as  
the most mind twistingly complex endeavor in the carbon game. The fact is that 
REDD involves scientific uncertainties, technical challenges, heterogeneous non-
contiguous asset classes, multi-decade performance guarantees, local land tenure 
issues, brutal potential for gaming and the fact that getting it wrong means that 
scam artists will get unimaginably rich while emissions don’t change a bit.1  
None of  this prevents Stuart from supporting the trade in carbon stored in 
forests. This is perhaps not surprising since as a founder of  one of  the biggest 
carbon consulting firms in the world, EcoSecurities, he has made his fortune 
from carbon trading. 
What is REDD? 
The idea of  making payments to discourage deforestation and forest 
degradation was discussed in the negotiations leading to the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol, but it was ultimately rejected in part at least because of  the problems 
that Marc Stuart describes. REDD developed from a proposal in 2005 by a 
group of  countries calling themselves the Coalition of  Rainforest Nations 
(more on them later). Two years later, the proposal was taken up at the 
Conference of  the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change in Bali (COP-13). An agreement on REDD is planned to be made at 
COP-15 which will take place in Copenhagen in December 2009. 
The ‘Bali Action Plan’ Calls for: 
Policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role 
Upsetting the Offset 
  215 
of  conservation, sustainable management of  forests and enhancement of  forest 
carbon stocks in developing countries.2 
The above paragraph (paragraph 1b(iii)) is referred to as ‘REDD-plus’. It is 
worth reading closely. ‘REDD-plus’ includes activities with potentially extremely 
serious implications for indigenous people, local communities and forests: 
! ‘conservation’ sounds good, but the history of  the establishment of  national 
parks includes large scale evictions and loss of  rights for indigenous peoples 
and local communities;3 
! ‘sustainable’ management of  forests’ could include subsidies to commercial 
logging operations in old-growth forests, indigenous peoples’ territory or in 
villagers’ community forests; 
! ‘enhancement of  forest carbon stocks’ could result in conversion of  land 
(including forests) to industrial tree plantations, with serious implications for 
biodiversity, forests and local communities.4 
In order to prevent abuses under REDD, we would hope, as an absolute 
minimum, to see that the UN is ensuring that international human rights 
instruments are reaffirmed in any agreement on REDD. Particularly important 
are the UN Declaration of  the Rights of  Indigenous Peoples and the concept 
of  Free Prior Informed Consent. Unfortunately, the UN climate change 
negotiations are going in the opposite direction. In December 2008, at COP-14 
in Pozna!, the US, Canada, New Zealand and Australia opposed any reference 
to Indigenous Peoples’ rights in the negotiating text and the draft text was duly 
weakened.5 
While there has not yet been any agreement on how REDD is to be 
financed, a look at some of  the main actors involved suggests that there is a 
serious danger that it will be financed through carbon trading. The role of  the 
World Bank is of  particularly concern, given its fondness for carbon trading. 
The World Bank’s main mechanism for promoting REDD is a new scheme, 
launched in Bali in 2007: the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). Under 
this scheme, the Bank is working with tropical countries to help them achieve 
‘readiness’ for REDD. When the World Bank launched the FCPF, Benoit 
Bosquet, a senoir natural resources management specialist at the World Bank, 
said ‘The facility’s ultimate goal is to jump-start a forest carbon market that tips 
the economic balance in favour of  conserving forests.’6 As Marcus Colchester 
of  the Forest Peoples Programme points out, the speed with which the FCPF is 
going ahead risks undermining REDD. In particular, the ‘importance of  
securing rights [for indigenous peoples and local communities] has been played 
down and [the World Bank’s] safeguards process allowed to drift.’7 
What’s Wrong with Trading Forest Carbon? 
The problem with trading the carbon stored in forests is that we need to reduce 
greenhouse emissions and stop deforestation. We cannot trade off  one against 
the other.  
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Trading the carbon stored in forests would mean that one ton of  emissions 
reduced through avoided deforestation or forest degradation would allow 
emissions in the North to increase by one ton. Offsetting emissions in the 
North against carbon credits generated through REDD does not by definition, 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This is the model of  the clean development 
mechanism. A recent report by the University of  Zurich, Öko-Institut, 
Perspectives GmbH and Point Carbon explains the problem succinctly: 
A continuation of  the CDM as a pure offset mechanism would not directly 
contribute to the achievement of  this goal [of  limiting warming to 2°C], since 
the emission reductions generated under this mechanism in developing countries 
allow for higher emissions in industrialized countries.8 
Another problem is that carbon markets cannot send long term investment 
signals. During 2008, the global financial and economic crisis led to a slight 
reduction of  emissions of  greenhouse gases in the EU. But when New Carbon 
Finance released a report announcing the fall in emissions in mid-February 
2009, the Financial Times described the report as a ‘blow to the [carbon] 
market’.9 The Financial Times explained that  
Falling emissions spell a lower carbon price because fewer permits will be needed 
by the heavy industries, such as power generation and steel-making, covered by 
the scheme.  
This is a serious flaw in the carbon market. If  the price of  carbon goes down 
due to the economic slowdown, incentives for serious re-investment disappear. 
As soon as the economy starts to recover, all the old machinery is simply started 
up again. 
On 1 April 2009, thousands of  people set up camp in the City of  London, 
outside the European Climate Exchange to protest against carbon trading in 
Europe. They had good reason to do so, given the record of  the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme. Kevin Smith of  the NGO Carbon Trade Watch sums up the 
problems:  
Phase 1 of  the scheme gave away the right to pollute for free. Bingo! The biggest 
polluters then made billions in windfall profits. Phase 2 and in the wake of  
market meltdown, the price of  carbon is again at rock-bottom. The EU scheme 
is providing all manner of  opportunities to pollute and make money, which is 
why companies from e.on to BP to BAA are all supporters. As a mechanism to 
reduce emissions it has been an out and out failure.10 
Innovative Financial Mechanisms or the New Sub-Prime? 
The problems with trading forest carbon are not limited to the fact that it will 
not address runaway climate change. Forest carbon would be one part of  the 
global carbon markets. In 2007, Chris Leeds, then-head of  emissions trading at 
Merrill Lynch told the New York Times that carbon could become ‘one of  the 
fasting-growing markets ever, with volumes comparable to credit derivatives 
inside of  a decade.’11 But the similarities between carbon trading and derivatives 
trading are not limited to predictions of  the size of  the carbon trade. There are 
close parallels between the way the carbon markets are developing and the way 
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the markets in derivatives and futures developed, until they crashed spectacularly 
in 2008. Yet proponents of  financing REDD through trading forest carbon talk 
about ‘innovative financial instruments’ as if  the current global financial crisis 
had never happened. 
For example, at a side event at the climate conference in Pozna! in 
December 2008, Ben Vitale of  Conservation International spoke positively 
about the role innovative financing could play in financing forest conservation. 
During the questions after his presentation, I asked Vitale to say something 
about the current global financial crisis and in particular to say something about 
the financial innovations that led to the financial collapse and the billion dollar 
bailouts. I noted that the carbon market will be extremely complex, not 
transparent and that it seems ironic to be talking about ‘innovative financing’ at 
this particular moment in history. 
Vitale declined to answer my questions, commenting only that with this 
financial crisis perhaps it makes sense to have a more stable fund but, he added, 
the fund would have to be very, very large and it would have to grow over time. 
He made no mention of  the bailout of  the banks, the complexity of  the carbon 
market, or what would happen if  the carbon market fails.12 
Derivatives Trading and Carbon Markets 
Larry Lohmann of  the UK-based research and advocacy organization The 
Corner House has been investigating the failure of  carbon markets to address 
climate change for several years. In 2006, he edited a book titled Carbon Trading: 
A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatization and Power.13 In a summary of  
a memorandum submitted to a UK Select Committee on carbon trading, 
Lohmann points out the dangers of  carbon trading: 
Carbon markets are characterised by a type of  speculative derivatives trading and 
need to be evaluated as such in the light of  the current financial crisis. Like 
financial derivatives markets, carbon markets are legitimated by (spurious or 
overblown) claims of  efficiency but undermined by their tendency to exacerbate 
a crisis. Carbon markets are plagued by difficulties of  asset valuation parallel to 
those that have contributed to the financial crisis and are themselves prone to a 
similar crash. Carbon markets are also characterized by inherent problems of  
conflicts of  interest, regulatory capture and unregulatability familiar from recent 
analyses of  the financial crisis.14 
Even people very closely involved in the carbon markets admit that there are 
similarities with trade in derivatives. ‘I guess in many ways it’s akin to subprime,’ 
said Marc Stuart of  EcoSecurities after the value of  the company’s shares 
crashed in 2008. ‘You keep layering on crap until you say, “We can’t do this 
anymore”‘.15 
Lohmann lists some of  the institutions dealing in derivatives that are 
involved in carbon markets, including Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, Morgan 
Stanley, Barclays Capital, Fortis, Rabobank, BNP Paribas, Sumitomo, 
Kommunalkredit, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and Cantor Fitzgerald. He 
points out that ‘The stupendous complexity of  new financial instruments such 
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as collateralized debt obligations is in some ways matched by that of  carbon 
trading, with its reams of  additionality calculations, diversity of  carbon credits, 
daunting monitoring and legal requirements and crowd of  acronyms.’16  
Several of  the same people who were involved in creating financial 
derivatives markets are also involved in creating carbon markets. The founder 
and chairman of  the Chicago Climate Exchange is Richard Sandor, who in the 
1970s was one of  the leading developers of  derivatives and futures markets.17 
The Chicago Climate Exchange offers a futures contract based on emissions 
allowances under a US cap and trade scheme – before such a scheme even 
exists. 
Richard Sandor is, predictably, in favour of  trading forest carbon. ‘The clock 
is moving. They are slashing and burning and cutting the forests of  the world. It 
may be a quarter of  global warming and we can get the rate to two per cent 
simply by inventing a preservation credit and making that forest have value in 
other ways. Who loses when we do that?’ he said in an interview with The New 
Yorker last year.18 
Sandor appears to have little sympathy for local communities and even less 
knowledge of  the complexities of  tropical forest politics. The obvious answer to 
Sandor’s question is that indigenous peoples and forest dependent communities 
are likely lose when someone in the USA makes their forests more valuable to 
outsiders. Land grabs are the almost inevitable consequence of  increasing the 
value of  forests. Of  the many attempts to stop or slow deforestation, the few 
successful projects have been those that work closely with local communities 
and actively support Indigenous Peoples’ and local communities’ rights.  
‘Fleecing Landowners and Indigenous People’ 
Recent events in Papua New Guinea illustrate some of  the problems with 
Sandor’s simplistic approach to forests. The Office of  Climate Change appears 
to have issued at least 40 REDD ‘credits’, each denoting one million tons of  
carbon, according to investigations carried out by a journalist with The Economist 
magazine.19 One of  the REDD carbon ‘credits’ relates to the Kamula Doso 
REDD project. As the Eco-Forestry Forum, a PNG NGO, points out ‘In 
November 2008, the Office of  Climate change issued a certificate granting the 
rights to 1 million tons of  carbon from Kamula Doso to a company called 
Nupan Trading limited. This certificate was issued despite PNG having no laws 
that allow trading in carbon rights and the Office of  Climate Change not having 
obtained the informed consent of  landowners.’ The head of  the Office of  
Climate Change, Theo Yasause, denies any wrongdoing and says that the sample 
credits were created merely ‘to see what it looked like’.20 In June 2009, Yasause 
was suspended while an internal investigation of  the Office of  Climate Change 
is carried out.21 
Meanwhile, conmen are travelling from village to village offering fake carbon 
trading deals and promising huge returns. Villagers hand over about US$500, for 
‘registration as a shareholder’ in a carbon trading company. They receive a 
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receipt and the conman leavers, never to be seen in the village again. Natasha 
Loder, a journalist with The Economist, comments,  
What is striking about the invention of  an avoided forest carbon market is the 
extent to which it is quickly spawning a variety of  imaginative ways of  fleecing 
landowners and indigenous people in the rush for green gold.22 
Can Carbon Markets be Regulated? 
It is not just out in the bush in Papua New Guinea that trading in forest carbon 
is unregulated. Carbon markets are riddled with conflicts of  interest and 
revolving doors between public and private institutions as well as between 
regulators and traders.  
Carbon markets were effectively created in 1997, when Al Gore led the 
USA’s climate negotiators in destroying the Kyoto Protocol, by allowing rich 
nations to buy their emissions cuts from other countries.23 Of  course Gore’s 
film ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ has done a great deal to convince large numbers 
of  people that climate change is real and the film has also helped expose the 
folly of  climate denial. But when Gore jets around the world for his 
extraordinarily well-paid speaking appointments24 he does not mention the 
inconvenient truth that he helped to create carbon markets and is now profiting 
from them. In 2004, Al Gore co-founded Generation Investment Management, 
together with David Blood, former chief  executive of  Goldman Sachs Asset 
Management.25 In 2008, Gore’s firm bought a 9.6 per cent share in Camco 
International Ltd,26 a Jersey-based company which holds one of  the world’s 
largest carbon credit portfolios. In February 2009, Generation Investment 
Management increased its share in Camco International to 13.74 per cent, 
making it the largest shareholder in the company. The following month 
Generation Investment Management increased its share further to 18.94 per 
cent.27 
Ken Newcombe is another key player in the development of  the trade in 
forest carbon. As a recent article in the trade magazine Point Carbon notes, ‘Ken 
Newcombe has been involved in carbon markets since their inception.’28 From 
1990 to 1996, Newcombe was chief  of  the global environment division at the 
World Bank. He led the Bank’s involvement in Forest Market Transformation 
Initiative,29 which the Bank describes as a ‘strategic coalition of  conservation 
NGOs, private sector forest industry leaders, researchers, development 
practitioners, and financiers, including the World Bank, [that] is working to 
develop innovative approaches to the adoption of  more environmentally 
friendly forest management and marketing practices in the remaining forest 
frontiers.’30 After that, he led the creation of  the Bank’s Prototype Carbon 
Fund.  
During a press conference at the Carbon Expo Trade Fair in Cologne in 
2004, Newcombe explained the purpose of  the Bank’s involvement in carbon 
markets: ‘The World Bank is reducing the risk for private investors.’31 The 
following year Newcombe left the Bank’s carbon finance unit, by which time the 
Bank was managing carbon funds with a total value of  US$1 billion. Newcombe 
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became senior manager and advisor of  the G8 investment framework initiative 
at the World Bank. 
The next year he was on the move again, this time to Climate Change 
Capital, the largest private sector carbon fund in the world. James Cameron, 
Vice-Chairman at Climate Change Capital said of  Newcombe, ‘He has a 
fantastic network and knows about World Bank projects that we can now invest 
in.’32 Cameron is an environmental lawyer who helped negotiate the Kyoto 
Protocol. From Climate Change Capital, Newcombe headed the carbon desk at 
Goldman Sachs in New York before launching his own company, C-Quest 
Capital, to profit further from the carbon markets. ‘We see the voluntary market 
as a risk hedge strategy,’ Newcombe explained to Point Carbon. ‘We are getting 
our foot in the door in assets we think might be good for compliance in the 
future’, he added. He sees international offsets as an ‘inevitable part of  any US 
scheme’.33  
Newcombe divides people involved in carbon markets into two groups. 
‘There are those who see it as a way to make money, and see it as the next wave 
as high risk, high reward businesses’, he told Point Carbon. ‘Others are wanting to 
make good money, but by doing good in the process. I like to think I build 
teams who are the latter camp’.34  
Newcombe is a director emeritus of  Forest Trends, an organization that 
developed from the World Bank’s Forest Market Transformation Initiative.35 
Michael Jenkins, the president and CEO of  Forest Trends also came from the 
World Bank, where he held a joint appointment as a senior forestry advisor. 
Given the World Bank’s disastrous record in the forests of  the global South,36 
Jenkins might be considered a strange choice to head up an NGO. But Forest 
Trends is no ordinary NGO. Its board includes representatives from Mitsubishi 
International, ABN Amro, Sveaskog, The Nature Conservancy, Greenpeace 
Russia, Rainforest Action Network and Generation Investment Management.37 
One of  the board members, David Brand, is head of  New Forests, ‘an 
investment management and advisory services firm specializing in forestry and 
land-based environmental markets, such as timber, carbon, biodiversity and 
water’.38 Generation Investment Management is one of  the four shareholders in 
New Forests and David Blood, the co-founder of  Generation Investment 
Management, sits on New Forests’ board.39 Forest Trends publishes Ecosystem 
Marketplace and helped create the Katoomba Group, the Business and 
Biodiversity Offsets Program, SpeciesBanking.com, ForestCarbonPortal.com 
and the Chesapeake Fund, all of  which promote market ‘solutions’ to 
environmental problems. In April 2009, at the tenth anniversary of  Forest 
Trends, Al Gore said ‘Forest Trends has become widely-regarded as the most 
comprehensive advocate and resource for anyone who wants to understand and 
help to further develop markets for ecosystem services’.40  
Larry Lohmann notes further conflicts of  interest in carbon markets.41 
Barclays Capital is a major investor in the carbon markets and at the same time 
boasts that ‘One of  our team is a member of  the Methodology Panel to the 
UNFCCC CDM Executive Board’.42 Lex de Jonge is simultaneously head of  the 
Upsetting the Offset 
  221 
carbon offset purchase programme of  the Dutch government and vice chair of  
the Clean Development Mechanism Executive Board. Harald Dovland headed 
Norway’s climate negotiations team for 12 years. He is vice chair of  the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto 
Protocol.43 Dovland states that what is needed now is ‘acceptance of  long-term 
goals on a high political level, further development of  markets, and innovative 
financing solutions’. But at the same time, Dovland is an advisor to Econ Pöyry, 
a company which profits from carbon trading.44 
The magazine Point Carbon claims to be a ‘provider of  independent news, 
analysis and consulting services’, but as the Financial Times recently noted Point 
Carbon is in fact ‘part-owned by financial and industrial interests’. (Point 
Carbon is owned by Oak Investments, JP Morgan, J-Power, Mizuho, Schibsted 
and the employees.)45 
Caisse des Dépôts is one of  the organizations that is pushing to include 
forests in carbon markets, through reports such as ‘Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Degradation: What Contribution from Carbon Markets?’.46 
But as well as producing reports promoting expanded carbon markets, Caisse 
des Dépôts profits from the trade in carbon. It is a 40 per cent shareholder in 
Paris-based BlueNext, Europe’s main spot EU Allowances (EUAs) exchange. In 
February 2009, BlueNext was earning over 2 million euros a week on 
transactions of  EUAs.47  
Kevin Conrad and the Coalition for Rainforest Nations 
This discussion of  carbon markets and forests would be incomplete without 
looking at the role of  Kevin Conrad, ambassador and special envoy for the 
environment and climate change for Papua New Guinea. In December 2007, at 
the UN climate negotiations in Bali, Conrad told the US delegation, ‘if  for some 
reason you’re not willing to lead, leave it to the rest of  us. Please get out of  the 
way’.48  
To his credit, Conrad remains critical of  the US. ‘President Barack Obama’s 
current proposal to reduce US emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 and 80 per cent 
below by 2050 is grossly insufficient in the near term and simply pushes true 
responsibility on to future US presidents’, he wrote in April 2009. ‘Why should 
the greatest emitter in history be granted 12 extra years simply to get to the 
starting line accepted by other industrialized countries? Is this leadership or 
laggardship?’49 
Conrad is executive director of  the Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN), 
a group of  tropical countries which tabled the first proposal for REDD at the 
UNFCCC COP11 in Montreal, in 2005. CfRN has since grown from 11 
countries led by Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica, to 40 countries.50 Conrad 
and CfRN promote trading of  the carbon stored in forests: ‘The Rainforest 
Coalition seeks to incorporate certified emissions offsets related to deforestation 
(in addition to afforestation and reforestation) within global carbon emissions 
markets by revising the Marrakech Accords, amending the Kyoto Protocol, or 
developing a linked ‘optional protocol’ under the UNFCCC’.51 
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Conrad is not a forester, nor does he appear to have any experience in 
managing or protecting forests. His qualifications are business qualifications, 
most recently a degree from the Columbia Business School. For the final project 
of  his Executive M.B.A. Conrad looked at whether the money from carbon 
credits could equal the revenue from logging in Papua New Guinea. His 
supervisor for this project was Professor Geoffrey Heal, Head of  Columbia 
Business School. When the project was completed, Conrad and Heal persuaded 
Papua New Guinea’s prime minister, Michael Somare, to start the Coalition for 
Rainforest Nations.52 In January 2005, Somare called for the formation of  the 
Coalition for Rainforest Nations at the World Leaders Forum held at Columbia 
University.53 In May 2005, Somare was back at Columbia University for the 
Global Roundtable on Climate Change, once again calling for the Coalition for 
Rainforest Nations: 
I have called for the formation of  a ‘Coalition for Rainforest Nations.’ To 
support that call, my government has held discussions at the United Nations 
with representatives from Peru, Congo, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia – who, together with us, would constitute 
the largest expanse of  rainforest globally under such an issue-specific coalition.54 
Speaking in Parliament a month later, Somare referred to the Global Roundtable 
on Climate Change as a ‘Carbon Trading Seminar [that] I addressed at the 
Columbia University’.55 Perhaps not surprisingly, the secretariat of  the CfRN is 
in Columbia University.56  
Geoffrey Heal, the co-founder of  the CfRN, is Garrett Professor of  Public 
Policy and Corporate Responsibility and Professor of  Economics and Finance 
at Columbia University’s Graduate School of  Business, and Professor of  Public 
and International Affairs at the School of  International and Public Affairs.57 He 
is also on the board of  the Union of  Concerned Scientists and was a Director 
of  Petromin Holdings PNG Ltd,58 a state-owned oil, gas and mineral company. 
Kevin Conrad was also hired as an advisor to Petromin.59  
Some of  Conrad’s business deals are controversial in Papua New Guinea. A 
recent article in the Australian newspaper, The Age, comments that Conrad ‘has 
been linked to a string of  failed business dealings in Papua New Guinea.’ In 
2007, Peter O’Neill, then-opposition leader in PNG accused Conrad (among 
other things) of  ‘involvement in a failed housing scheme in the 1990s for the 
Public Officers Superannuation Fund where 17 million kina ($A8million) was 
paid but not one single house was built.’60 In an interview with Australian 
Associated Press, Conrad said ‘If  you look at PNG every businessman has failed 
about as often as they have succeeded and the reason is because the government 
has had too much control’.61 
Taking the Pressure of  Polluters and Subsidizing Logging 
In his speech at Columbia University, Michael Somare said ‘Let me be clear, our 
intentions are NOT to take the pressure off  the fossil-fuel emission reductions 
necessary within industrialized nations’.62 But on its website, the CfRN states 
that it aims to ‘Slow deforestation internationally through the Clean 
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Development Mechanism (CDM) and other international investments in forest 
conservation’.63 Trading the carbon stored in forests inevitably takes the 
pressure off  to reduce fossil-fuel emissions in the North. One example of  this 
is the American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACESA), about which Kevin 
Conrad is so critical. One of  the reasons that the US can get away with such a 
low target is because of  the offsets loophole. A critique by International Rivers 
and Rainforest Action Network points out that the Act is ‘is seriously weakened 
by its heavy reliance on offsets to substitute for actual emissions cuts by large 
polluters’. Payal Parekh of  International Rivers explains that ‘If  polluters indeed 
use the maximum allowable number of  offset credits, domestic emissions in 
2012 would increase by 38% rather than decrease by 3%, the reduction that the 
cap sets. Emissions would not dip below 2005 levels until 2026, 17 years from 
today’.64 
The legislation is further weakened by the inclusion of  ‘sustainable forest 
management’. As International Rivers and Rainforest Action Network explain: 
ACESA envisions offset credits for ‘sustainable forestry practices,’ a widely 
abused term that is too often a cover for expanded industrial logging into 
primary tropical rainforests. Unless forest degradation is included, even heavily 
logging a forest, which would result in large emissions, could still generate offset 
‘credits’ because full deforestation was avoided.65 
The Coalition for Rainforest Nations’ is also interested in developing 
‘Sustainable Forest Markets’. Under this initiative, CfRN’s website explains that  
In cooperation with the International Timber Organization (ITTO), the 
Rainforest Coalition will facilitate certification of  sustainable logging, develop 
disincentives to illegal logging and support the establishment of  businesses 
within developing countries that can process lumber locally to the standards of, 
and in partnership with, end users in industrialized markets.66 
What this means in reality became more clear in May 2009, at the World 
Business Summit on Climate Change. Business leaders from around the world 
flew to Amsterdam to discuss how they could profit from climate change. (The 
website of  the Copenhagen Climate Council, which helped organize the event 
has the headline, ‘Turning risks into opportunities’67). For industry, REDD 
‘presents ample opportunity for the private sector to engage all along a !50-100 
billion value chain’.68 A report produced by the ClimateWorks Foundation for 
the Summit explains which companies might benefits from REDD: ‘Companies 
in forest management, pulp and paper, or construction could build new 
businesses around carbon abatement’.69 In its presentation at the Summit, 
Project Catalyst, which brings together ‘climate negotiators, senior government 
officials…and business executives emphasized ‘the size of  the prize for 
business’.70 
The assumption underlying sustainable forest management is that by logging 
less destructively, more trees will be left standing and therefore less carbon will 
be released to the atmosphere. Here we enter the territory that Dan Welsh, a 
journalist with Ethical Consumer magazine describes so well: ‘Offsets are an 
imaginary commodity, created by deducting what you hope happens from what 
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you guess would have happened’.71 A recent report by Global Witness, ‘Vested 
Interests – industrial logging and carbon in tropical forests’, documents how 
what the logging industry hopes will happen (or at least says it hopes will 
happen) in any case releases large amounts of  carbon to the atmosphere. 
Reduced impact logging ‘kills 5-10 non-target trees for every target tree cut, and 
releases between 10 and 80 tons of  carbon per hectare’. Logging also makes 
forests more vulnerable to further deforestation and to fire. ‘During the El Niño 
events in the late 1990s, 60% of  logged forests in Indonesian Borneo went up 
in smoke compared with 6% of  primary forest’, Global Witness notes.72 
Campaigns Against Trading in Forest Carbon 
Several NGOs and networks are campaigning to expose the problems with 
trading the carbon stored in forests, including FERN, Friends of  the Earth, 
Indigenous Environmental Network, the Durban Group, World Rainforest 
Movement, Rainforest Action Network, Global Witness, The Wilderness 
Society, Greenpeace and the Rainforest Foundation. By creating a huge number 
of  carbon credits, the trade would allow business as usual to continue in the 
North. In an interview with The Guardian in November 2008, Joseph Zacune of  
Friends of  the Earth explains that ‘there is genuine risk that all of  these kinds 
of  proposals would provide a get out of  jail free card to rich nations. It would 
allow them to buy their way out of  emissions reductions. It would create the 
climate regime’s biggest ever loophole and would remove any environmental 
integrity from a post 2012 deal’.73 
A Greenpeace report released in March 2009 makes a related point: 
‘Including forest protection measures in carbon markets would crash the price 
of  carbon by up to 75 percent and derail global efforts to tackle global 
warming’. The report, which was produced by a New Zealand-based economic 
modelling group called KEA3, found that including REDD credits in carbon 
markets would reduce investments in clean technologies worldwide, causing a 
‘lock in’ effect, leaving high-carbon technologies such as coal-fired power 
stations in place for many years to come. In addition, the report points out that 
‘significant questions of  permanence, leakage, and additionality have been raised 
about potential REDD credits; as well as the ability of  countries to accurately 
measure, monitor, and report on such emissions’.74 
Academics such as Alain Karsenty of  CIRAD (the Paris-based International 
Centre for Cooperation on Agroforestry Research and Development) also point 
out the dangers of  trading in forest carbon. In a paper published last year in the 
International Forestry Review,75 Karsenty comments on the uncertainties involved 
in establishing the impact of  REDD measures, which would ‘essentially force 
experts to disentangle an embedded array of  factors, isolating what can be the 
net impact of  policies and measures effectively taken by the authorities to tackle 
deforestation (i.e. stringent law enforcement, removal of  agricultural subsidies, 
etc.) and external factors such as (involuntary) changes in market prices for 
agricultural commodities, drought episodes causing forest fires (as well as 
abnormally high rainfalls)’. 
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Karsenty concludes his paper with the following statement, ‘Markets 
instruments are very effective tools for achieving specific goals, such as 
improving efficiency of  economic agents, but they will probably be unable to 
change the socio-political context underlying tropical deforestation’. 
Conclusion: Forest Carbon should not be Traded 
The carbon stored in forests should not be traded. There are several important 
reasons why not, which I’ve covered in this chapter. To summarize: 
! First, we need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and stop deforestation. 
We cannot trade off  one against the other. 
! Second, carbon markets do not send long term investment signals. A volatile 
carbon price might be great for investors willing to bet on the future price of  
carbon. If  the carbon price drops during a recession industry is given little 
incentive to invest in the major changes required. When the economy 
recovers, the old machinery is restarted. 
! Third, there are close parallels between the market in derivatives and the 
market in carbon. Proponents of  the trade in forest carbon talk about 
‘innovative financial instruments’, in spite of  the current financial crisis. 
! Fourth, carbon markets are riddled with conflicts of  interest. This may not 
be illegal, but it certainly makes the sector very difficult (or impossible) to 
regulate. 
! Fifth, trading the carbon in forests is bringing calls for ‘sustainable forest 
management’, from institutions such as the International Timber Trade 
Organization that have supported destructive forestry operations for 
decades. Logging of  primary forests (including so-called ‘reduced impact 
logging’) would release huge amounts of  carbon to the atmosphere. 
Offsetting the carbon supposedly stored in forests subjected to ‘reduced 
impact logging’ would allow emissions to continue in the North, would lead 
to forest degradation and destruction on a large scale and would provide an 
enormous subsidy to the timber industry. 
! Sixth, trading the carbon stored in forests would create a loophole for the 
North, allowing industry to write cheques rather than reduce emissions at 
home. 
! Seventh, forests are not just sticks of  carbon waiting for an economist to 
value them correctly so that they will not be cut down. They are home to 
millions of  people. Defending the rights of  indigenous peoples, forest 
dwelling communities and local communities is crucial to preserving tropical 
forests. 
The UN climate negotiations are getting more and more complex, while 
governments’ proposed emissions reduction targets are less and less likely to 
address runaway climate change. George Monbiot has developed a simple test to 
show whether governments are genuinely commitment to stopping the climate 
crisis: ‘whether they are prepared to impose a limit on the use of  the [fossil fuel] 
reserves already discovered, and a permanent moratorium on prospecting for 
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new reserves. Otherwise it’s all hot air’.76 Governments proposing to trade the 
carbon stored in forests fail Monbiot’s test because trading REDD credits 
allows the continued burning of  fossil fuels. Hot air, then. 
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Hegemony and Climate Justice: A Critical 
Analysis" 
Vito De Lucia 
Introduction 
Justice has over the years become a key factor to consider in any climate 
negotiation. Usually framed in terms of distribution of the burdens of climate 
mitigation and adaptation,1 its foundational principle in the current climate 
regime is that of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility. 
In the last 15 years, the ethical challenge of climate change has been 
sharpened by the increasing severity of both projected and occurring impacts of 
climatic changes, and by the increasing awareness that the distribution of the 
damaging impacts is inversely proportional to the causative sources of the 
climate forcing gases. 
At the Bali Climate Conference held in December 2007 a new negotiation 
platform2 set the stage for a two-year negotiation efforts aimed at landing a 
post-Kyoto climate agreement in 2009, at the Copenhagen Conference, the 
hope reinvigorated as the USA re-joined the negotiation. The 2008 Pozna! 
Conference however, has been by most accounts a disappointment, leaving the 
task of preparing a draft negotiating text wholly to the preparatory meetings 
leading up to the Copenhagen Conference. 
In the meantime, two ‘events’ can be assigned particular significance: the 
election of Barak Obama as the new President of the USA, and the emergence – 
in Bali and then in Pozna! – of the Climate Justice Now! Coalition.3 The former 
gives hope of a new, progressive and climate-friendly policy orientation of the 
American administration, breaking decisively with the previous Bush approach, 
and finally putting climate mitigation on the policy agenda, both domestically 
and, most importantly, as a matter of foreign policy. The second ‘event’ 
represents, on the other hand, a radical, grassroots movement whose aim is to 
expose ‘false solutions’ to the climate crisis and the green washing of the climate 
regime,4 and which, most importantly, insists that justice is a fundamental issue 
to be addressed in any climate negotiation. 
The language, the discourse of justice is however embraced so widely that 
the question must be asked: what is climate justice? The discourse of justice 
brings together politics, business and civil society, a convergence which is in this 
article postulated to occur through a dialectical debate which oscillates between 
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extreme neoliberal, market radicalism and a liberal, embracing, cosmopolitan 
articulation of equity and climate justice. In this context, justice becomes an 
ideological tool aimed at winning the consent of a wide social base, necessary 
for the renegotiation and (re)solidification of consent and hegemony, aimed at 
the reconfiguration of capitalism under conditions of ecological/climate crisis. 
This article aims at making visible the assumptions underlying the framing of 
climate justice within what we will call the United Nations Climate Regime5 
(UNCR) and civil society at large. This task of deconstruction is important to 
the extent that climate justice is necessary for the survival of all the species 
including the human one. As such this article intends to be a contribution within 
current debates.  
Mainstream Articulations of Climate Justice: (Re-)Distribution, 
Compensation, (right to) Development 
Let us review some central contribution towards the shaping of climate justice, 
from academia, politics, and civil society. Already Henry Shue6 had begun 
framing the question of climate justice in terms of distribution of costs and 
benefits. The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol also centered the question of 
ethics on responsibility and distribution of costs and benefits.7 Distribution is 
likewise the main focus of major equitable frameworks such as Contraction and 
Convergence8 and Greenhouse Development Rights.9 While the former – 
endorsed widely – promotes a per-capita egalitarian approach supported by 
technology and emissions trade flows, the latter’s main contribution is the 
explicit incorporation of the right to development into the equation. The 
Buenos Aires Declaration on the Ethical Dimension of Climate Change 
(BADEDCC), a major attempt a laying out a comprehensive articulation of 
ethics in relation to climate change, proposed as key ethical questions 
responsibility for damages, distribution of harm and benefits, allocation of 
emissions budgets across countries, economic costs,10 technology.  
Kofi Annan’s Global Humanitarian Forum (GHF) launched recently a 
Global Alliance for Climate Justice. The main priority areas are identified in 
financial transfers and transfer of sustainable technologies. Which is to say, (re-) 
distribution and (right to) development.  
And if justice is framed in terms of (re-)distribution, it follows as a 
precondition the necessity to measure emissions and sinks, costs and benefits, 
by way of mapping a whole series of acts, meanings, sentiments, species and 
ecosystems onto monetary expression11. This regardless of how difficult or 
arbitrary the mapping turns out to be. Money (and monetary/monetized 
instrumentality) becomes the fundamental rationalizing ground for action.  
This presupposition of commensurability, moreover, leads to two important 
consequences. Firstly, market exchanges become universally possible, hence 
carbon trading (in all its forms) as the ‘flagship’ climate policy of UNCR. 
Secondly, substitutions can take place. Substitution of man-made capital for 
nature (and ‘natural capital’); of (equitable) monetary compensation for lack/loss 
of access to local ecological resources and means of subsistence;12 of mono-
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culture carbon plantations for native forests;13 of development for livelihood, as 
in the construction of ‘need’ and ‘rights’, and its counterpart, dependency.14  
Development in particular deserves examination at some length. By mapping 
the world over a rich-poor continuum, measured in a very specific, culturally 
narrow way, development becomes an obligation rooted in the universal/izing 
discourse of justice and human rights, which must be ‘distributed’ equally.  
This discourse is built on the assumptions of industrial progress, which can 
raise the standard of living in the ‘underdeveloped areas.’15 In the context of 
climate change, (this) development is framed as the only adaptive path for 
countries, populations and communities which will feel the brunt of climatic 
changes. At the same time, development causes climate change, as economic 
growth – the underpinning engine of development – grows GHGs emissions. 
Development is thusly inextricably linked to technology: technology can make 
development climate-friendly and low-carbon. 
Technology however has a distinct ‘ideological footprint’, as it is inevitably 
linked with specific power/knowledge configurations: its underlying social 
power relations will re-produce themselves inevitably with their diffusion, and 
will re-produce as well their main features of metabolizing ‘time and space’,16 
inevitably implicating both extraction and accumulation of ecological and social 
value.17 In this light, ‘transfer of technology’ is not a neutral operation. 
Lohmann reinforces this point when he suggests that the practices of 
development necessarily ‘ignore, displace, supplant or even eradicate knowledge 
possessed by their “target populations”’. 18 This displaced, supplanted 
knowledge often represents key social strategies for addressing the local effects 
of climate change. 
As distribution – of costs, benefits and emissions rights – underlies 
mainstream articulations of climate justice, it follows that it’s the market which 
can best and most efficiently operationalize this distributional justice, enabling 
finance and technology to rescue the heating planet in a just and equitable way, 
and the circulation of emissions rights to their ‘highest and best use’ through the 
emerging global carbon market. 
Climate, Hegemony and Justice: A (neo-)Gramscian reading 
Gramsci and (neo-)Gramscian critical theory offers a useful lens to interpret the 
UNCR and civil society’s conceptions of climate justice. 
Gramsci19 articulated his idea of hegemony as the supremacy of a social 
group predicated on both coercion and consent. As it is the element of consent 
which for Gramsci allows a hegemonic social group to endure, social control 
must be built on intellectual and moral leadership. Hegemony is thus ‘endlessly 
reinforced in schools, churches, institutions, scholarly exchanges, museums and 
popular culture.’20 The spontaneous consent of ‘the great masses’ is for Gramsci 
historically caused through the workings of intellectuals and civil society. A key 
element sustaining hegemony is the concept of historic bloc, which represents 
the relationship established by the dominant social forces with antagonistic 
ones. This relationship produces an integration of different class interests, 
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engendering a convergence of economic and political objectives, a convergence 
which is also, importantly, intellectual and moral. 
There are three mechanisms required to establish a ruling world view: 
universalization, naturalization and rationalization. The first represents the 
projection of a historically situated and local project as universal. This can take 
the form of political alliances or cultural dissemination. Naturalization entails a 
process of reification of a given situation, abstracting it from its historical 
contingency, and containing any social demands necessarily within this 
constructed social ontology. Rationalization, finally, refers to the supporting role 
of an intellectual class, which produces and re-produces knowledge in order to 
maintain hegemony: ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose.’21 
Gramsci calls this intellectual class ‘organic intellectuals’.  
Organic Intellectuals and the Mythos of Science22 
The term mythos, whose original meaning is ‘utterance’, indicates both statement 
and story, eluding the distinction between objective and discursive knowledge. 
One of the function of mythos is that of narratives, storing and sanctioning 
rituals with functional purpose. Pantheistic religions, through their associating 
each ‘god’ (a river, a mountain, a field, agriculture etc.) to specific rituals 
governing behavior (both social and individual) represent embedded norms of 
social conduct and of technical behaviour.23 Mythos is also, importantly, 
embodied in a specific place and culture, coordinating and containing social 
action through its patterns of nomos and ethos. While nomos means either custom, 
convention or (positive) law, ethos can be rendered as the ‘disposition, character, 
or fundamental values peculiar to a specific person, people, culture, or 
movement.’24 Their etymological roots clearly indicate the relation between 
habit/values and place. By articulating possibilities and proprieties of socio-
technical configurations, these conventions mold the natures and the cultures in 
particular ways. Different ethe25 map to different sets of dispositions and values, 
and through their localization they also, significantly, express different relational 
engagements with particular natures/ecologies and different patterns of nomos, 
which is to say, customs and norms. Traditionally localized ethe function mostly 
through ecological exchanges (with nature) rather than economic exchanges 
(with markets), which determines a necessary harmonization of cultural and 
ecological times and rhythms, in order to ‘guarantee an uninterrupted flow of 
goods, materials, and energy from ecosystems.’26 
The emergence of the specific mythos of modern science has determined a 
separation of nomos from ethos. This has rather important effects, which underlie 
and sustain the claims for objective and universal/izing value: by separating the 
two elements, modern science has obscured the significance of locality and 
particularity, while providing the intellectual mechanism to support universal 
laws. However, modern science is one historically given mode of knowledge, 
which is particular to a specific culture, and which incorporates within it a 
similarly contingent set of assumptions and values. 
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Let us take as an example the precautionary threshold that emerges from the 
reports of the IPCC. The establishment of an acceptable threshold is 
controversial. It is the fruit of a compromise which considers already 
‘committed’ warming, mitigation possibilities under current circumstances, 
mathematical modelling through which projections of future change are tested 
and predicted, economic trade-offs and analyses of costs and benefits.  
Donald Brown27 reminds us that the composition of the IPCC is very much 
skewed towards Western scientists and the Western knowledge system. The 
IPCC’s work is based on the input of ‘a narrow elite’, expression of those 
societies which will be impacted the least by climate change and of an epistemic 
community largely comprised of scientists and technicians from North. Brown 
continues by remarking how ‘[t]he voices of the sufferers – people living in 
climate change hot spots, indigenous nations, children, disenfranchised – are not 
included in the assessment reports and seldom reviewed for inclusion in the 
work of the IPCC’, and ‘[d]ecision on final synthesis reports, including line-by-
line review of text, is made by government representatives’. The knowledge of 
the victims is discounted, displaced and delegitimized through the processes of 
production of ignorance Lohmann28 refers to. ‘The reports’ concludes Brown 
‘are vetted by a narrow group of experts trained and privileged by larger 
structures of globalization’. 
‘Organic intellectuals’ contribute significantly to the production and re-
production of a specific power-knowledge configuration instrumental to the 
hegemonic project. It is indeed through the IPCC reports that the mitigation 
debate is framed in terms of technology, carbon markets and efficiency.29 The 
pre-analytic vision or world view of most IPCC contributors and authors is such 
that those policy recommendations are seen as inevitable. Rationalization thusly 
leads to naturalization. 
The ‘Climate Ethics Consensus’ and the Negotiation of Hegemony: 
Convergence of UNCR and Civil Society 
Robert Cox distinguishes in this respect between problem-solving – which 
‘takes the world [...with its] prevailing social and political relations and [...] 
institutions [...] as the given framework for action’ – and a critical, counter-
hegemonic approach, which calls into question these institutions and social and 
power relations, aiming at decentering that very framework of action.30 
The debate over current climate policy is by and large shaped and conducted 
on a problem-solving agenda,31 with carbon markets as the centerpiece, as we 
shall see through a cursory review of the climate policy approach of 6 major 
civil society organizations (CSOs): they legitimate the UNCR’s paradigm, 
although dialectically posing demands on it. 
! WWF International is one of three core founders32 of the Gold Standard, a 
private ‘certification’ whose goal is to guarantee the environmental integrity 
of carbon offsets available for purchase in both the CDM and the private 
carbon markets.33 
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! Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) is a major supporter of current US cap-and-
trade legislation:34 ‘Our top priority is to pass national legislation that caps 
global warming pollution and creates a flexible emissions trading market’.35 
! National Resources Defense Council also sees the carbon market as a solution, 
both in its domestic cap-and-trade policy form, and in offsets mechanisms.36 
! Climate Action Network (CAN), a worldwide network of more than 450 
NGOs, works ‘to promote government and individual action to limit 
human-induced climate change to ecologically sustainable levels,’37 by 
protecting the ‘atmosphere while allowing for sustainable and equitable 
development worldwide’. CAN – which is a major ‘sparring partner’ of 
UNCR – endorses a three track approach.38 The Kyoto Track: capping and 
pricing carbon to provide incentives to market agents. The Greening Track: 
markets/price incentives can funnel financial flows towards low-carbon 
technological development. The Adaptation Track: a corrective measure of 
re-distributional finance for adaptation. 
! Framtiden i våre hender39 is a major Norwegian Environment and Development 
organization. It is actively engaged in the promotion of carbon offsets, 
through the management of a localized version of ‘My Climate’.40 
! Greenpeace International, in its very recent submission41 to the UNFCCC on the 
matter of the role of the CDM in the second commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol, demands sharply more strict rules to ensure the CDM’s 
environmental integrity. However, Greenpeace still appreciate CDM’s value 
in a future international climate regime. Greenpeace is also a supporting 
member of the Gold Standard. 
While there are some – even significant – differences, all reviewed CSOs can be 
placed along the same continuum, mirroring UNCR’s policy platform. The 
economics of pollution are the center of the UNCR’s policy approach. The 
Polluter Pays principle links the legitimacy of the release of waste streams (or 
pollution damages) to one or another form of payment for the use of the waste 
recycling capacity of the local/global environment, following a Coasian, 
(carbon) market logic.42 The 2001 and 2007 reports of IPCC’s Working Group 
III offer ample evidence on the matter, and so does the UNCR. In the Kyoto 
Protocol the key policy instruments – the so-called flexibility mechanisms – are 
three market-based instruments: Emissions Trading (ET); Joint Implementation 
(JI); Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
Against this background, civil society, while making demands on States 
(politics) with the aim of advancing a progressive vision of climate protection 
and social justice, use nonetheless the categories and methods of UNCR 
(economics), championing a ‘more and better’ approach: more stringent 
emissions caps, more energy efficiency, better designed carbon markets, more 
financing and investment in adaptation and sustainable development etc. 
The integration of UNCR and civil society into what can be described as a 
‘Climate Ethics Consensus’ (CEC) takes place through a dialectic that constitute 
and reproduce the hegemonic historic bloc: within it, consent is created, shaped, 
negotiated and maintained through the acceptance and internalization of a set of 
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values and world-views that reinforce established power relations. While UNCR 
reflects the internationalization – and trasnationalization – of the (aligned) 
material interests of the various domestic hegemonic groups, civil society is the 
vehicle through which the ethics and the conception of justice promoted by the 
hegemonic group(s) is legitimized. In this manner, the world-view of the 
hegemonic social group is reinforced and validated, while protest and 
‘resistance’ is transformed and incorporated within the hegemonic discourse, 
serving to further its internalization and naturalization by the ‘great masses’. 
Civil society becomes then a key part of the forming historic bloc of a 
‘sustainable capitalism’, by either ‘endlessly reinforcing’ hegemony, or through 
the process of trasformismo. Trasformismo is for Gramsci a ‘strategy of assimilating 
or domesticating potentially dangerous ideas’,43 and the groups and organization 
which promotes them. This process works towards the integration and 
incorporation of those ideas and groups, drawing them within the paradigm of 
the dominant social group.44 
Tras formismo  through Justice 
Gramsci viewed justice, legitimacy and moral credibility as necessarily integrated. 
The UNCR, the organic intellectuals and civil society, when aligned in the CEC, 
constitute and legitimize that climate governance whose practices, Paterson 
argues, ‘should be understood as a pursuit of’ a coherence between 
accumulation and legitimacy within the context of ‘an ecological regime of 
accumulation thus forestalling more radical critiques arguing that capitalism and 
sustainability are inimical’.45 
In this respect justice becomes a tool of hegemonic groups towards the 
coordination of dispersed values into an ideological ‘whole’ supportive of their 
position of dominance. To this purpose, the perception of justice, and the 
dialectical processes whereby the ‘great masses’ demand (and obtain) ‘more’ 
justice,46 are to be maintained within specific boundaries. This task is 
accomplished through civil society,47 and its participation in the shaping of the 
UNCR. To further illustrate, an article that appeared in The Guardian48 reported 
how, during the climate meeting in Accra in 2008, justice groups protested 
against forest carbon trading, because forest credits schemes could undermine 
the world price of carbon, damaging the effectiveness of the market. The 
arguments distinguished then between a just and an unjust market, where just 
maps to efficient: including forests in the carbon market could ‘crash the price 
of carbon’ and reduction of pollution in rich countries would become 
uneconomic: prices and markets as THE solution to climate change. 
Greenpeace reiterates this point in one of its submissions to the UNFCCC:49  
Inclusion of LULUCF and REDD activities in mechanisms generating offset 
credits...has the potential to Flood the carbon market with cheap credits, which 
in turn have the potential to significantly lower the global price of carbon and 
thus undermine ambitious emissions reduction targets for industrialized 
countries by reducing the incentive to invest in low carbon infrastructure.  
CAN makes a similar distinction:  
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If emissions trading is designed well it could help us substantially reduce our 
greenhouse pollution. If it is designed badly it could be an elaborate way to 
disguise a lack of action and transfer wealth to polluters.50 
Civil society becomes thus both the ‘object and the medium’ of the hegemonic 
struggle.51 The outcome of these dialectical processes is dynamically captured by 
‘soft’ declarations and political statements. It then ‘trickles’ slowly and in diluted 
form into the hard rules of the UNCR. This gives a sense of participation to 
environmental and social movements and organizations. Their demands are 
watered down and re-oriented so that discontent is absorbed and kept within 
the framework of action,52 providing the hegemonic social group with a 
mechanism to manage the demands of ‘dissent’ and to ‘transform’ potential 
resistance: by adhering to ‘some’ of the demands in some diluted form, it draws 
these groups within its bloc. Once integrated and transformed, civil society can 
become an engine of hegemony. At the same time this same process isolates the 
more radical antagonizing elements of potential counter-hegemony, by framing 
their existence outside of ‘common sense’. 
The emphasis on (distributional) justice and the right to development as key 
elements of any post-Kyoto agreement has then this effect of transforming 
dissenting sections of public opinion and developing countries into ‘supporters’ 
of the global capitalist vision and ideology of the dominant social group. Justice 
turns then into a fundamental space of ideological negotiation, where hegemony 
is nurtured, articulated and universal/ized. Its articulation is founded on the 
instrumental role that justice is to play as regards cementing the historic bloc, 
and its function of ‘coordination of the interests of other groups with those of 
the leading class or fraction in the process of securing their participation in 
[their] social vision.’53  
Conclusion: Towards a Climate Justice as Equity 
To conclude, some remarks on future directions towards the delineation of an 
alternative (counter-hegemonic) climate justice. Any even provisional research 
agenda in this respect will need to address three crucial points. Firstly, a 
historical and comparative narrative of justice. This is instrumental to highlight 
the transition from oral to literate justice, which also maps to a transition from a 
local, customary and necessarily plural justice(s) towards a legalized, 
universal/izable singular one. The ideal, fixed, abstract, universal conception of 
justice, was shaped by the fixity and ‘removed’ properties of writing, which have 
historically facilitated analytical thinking, the ‘objectification’ of human 
knowledge, and its being eradicated – disembedded – from the flow of human 
experiences.54 
In the fluid oral world by contrast, what one must relate to is not a singular 
justice, but rather justices, in the plural. Justices do not reflect an a priori set of 
principles, but are processes whose aim is that of conserving existing mores or 
restoring the propriety of the relationships within the community.55 
The second point to address is the conceptual transition from a Universal 
Ethics56 (back) to local ethe/equities. This can be accomplished partly by 
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rejoining nomos and ethos, and will help towards (re-)aligning justice with people’s 
natures and cultures. In this sense, it may be useful to mend the rip – between 
justice and equity: in Plato57 equity becomes the mitigating element of ‘people’s 
justice’, and justice begins to assume a technical, legal, top-down character. 
Equity has however opposed the universal nature of the Law with the historicity 
of actual facts, thusly operating to constrain the disembedding trajectory of law, 
re-locating, quite literally, justice in its contingent historicity.58 
Finally, a third point to address is how Universal/izing Justice is a social 
construction. The Greek philosophers known as the sophists already expressed 
a critical, ‘constructivist’ view of justice: relative, contingent and linked to 
prevailing interests. Protagoras’ famous saying that man is the measure of all 
things59 is a deep commitment to criticizing any instances of ‘a view from 
nowhere’, any essentialist, universal/izing, transcendental, objective 
configurations of Man, virtues, values and reality. An anticipation of Sandel’s 
critique of liberal justice and of the ‘unencumbered man’60 which it presupposes. 
This relation of justice to contingency and circumstance61 (both of place, 
time and culture) is inextricably linked to equity, so that the severance of the link 
between to two has operated functionally towards allowing the disembedding of 
justice from, ultimately, people. At the same time Justice enters the realm of 
Law. As such, universal and ‘juridified’, it can become a ‘mode of hegemony’, an 
instrument of the dominant social group, either towards forming/re-forming an 
historic bloc, or towards the maintenance of its stability. 
We have seen how both nomos and ethos, given their fundamental linkages 
with place, and by way of articulating possibilities and proprieties of socio-
technical configurations, encompass both natures and cultures in particular ways. 
Latour62 reinforces this point, by submitting that ‘[f]or each Society there exists 
a corresponding state of Nature’.63 Moreover, traditional/indigenous 
societies/ethe possess a ‘unified’ vision of nature-cultures: ‘it is the impossibility 
of changing the social order without modifying the natural order – and vice 
versa – that has obliged the premoderns64 to exercise the greatest prudence.’65 It 
is significant to note how the situatedness of ethos within a specific ‘socio-
ecological place’ provides solid grounding for an embodiment of justice which 
applies to the whole nature-culture. Further, Toledo shows the clear and solid 
linkage between cultural and biological diversity, centered around indigenous 
nature-cultures. Yet these local, indigenous knowledges and the related 
articulations of localized nature-cultural justice(s) are threatened by the 
globalizing Justice of hegemonic UNCR: universal/izing Ethics (Justice) 
threatens local ethe. 
Climate change, while global as a scientific and economic problem of 
accumulation,66 is local in many of his socio-ecological effects. This global-local 
cleavage allows ‘global benefits’ of GHGs reduction – and of ‘climate and 
development financing’67 – to stem from ‘substitutions’. Projects such as large 
dams, or large carbon-absorbing plantations of alien fast-growing tree species68 
substitute/compensate for the destruction of local livelihoods consequence of 
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land expropriation and displacements.69 So long as they generate credits 
expendable in the carbon markets. 
Indeed climate policy, being predominantly abstract and global, destroys 
time and again local justice(s). Recognition that extraction and accumulation 
draw resources – both human and natural, both time and space – towards the 
core, leaving peripheral, marginal places in ‘poverty’, with a loss of geographical, 
cultural, economic, social and political diversity, becomes then crucial. (Re-
)distributing (some of) the benefits of this time/space appropriation only 
increases the gap between Justice and justice(s). When monetary 
distribution/compensation predominates, peripheral places are drawn within the 
global capitalist flows, losing the ability to cope independently. This 
incorporation of nature-cultures within global markets and the global circuit of 
capital is a natural consequence of the ‘enforcement’ of universal/izing justice, 
which penetrates through financial flows, the right to development, and its 
inevitable technological dimension – with the implications illustrated above. The 
UNCR provides the legal and technical means, particularly through carbon 
markets. Justice to the ethical justification. 
This global/izing dimension of UNCR’s climate policy enhances and 
furthers that process of socio-ecological disembedding identified by Polanyi 
(2001) as one of the crucial elements of the ‘great transformation’ spawned by 
the rise of industrial capitalism. Caroline Merchant70 describes in detail the same 
process of disembedding which took place in England with the enclosure of 
‘farm, fen and forest’, and the effects on the environment of the transition ‘from 
peasant control for the purpose of subsistence to capitalism control for the 
purpose of profit’. A transition instrumental to the emergence of a mechanistic 
view of nature,71 and mapping onto a similar transition from local justice(s) to 
universal/izing Justice. 
Paraphrasing Ivan Illich’s72 distinction between universal peace and people’s 
peace, we can say that a universal ‘market’ justice tends to make cultures alike 
whereas [justice] is that condition under which each culture flowers in its own 
incomparable way. Justice cannot be exported: its attempted export means war 
and poverty. It follows that any articulation of justice which is abstracted from 
its local, embodied context has a disruptive, ‘belligerent’ potential. Critical 
resistance groups – such as La Via Campesina or the Climate Justice Now! 
Coalition – counter this abstraction by opposing ‘food sovereignty’73 to ‘food 
security’, energy sovereignty to industrial energy production and distribution. 
This fundamentally implies people’s control over their means of subsistence, 
and rejects the professional satisfaction of needs through global markets, which 
‘naturalizes’ the global capitalist industry, and its production, distribution and 
exchange methods, processes and social power relations: indeed its very vision 
of man, unencumbered, self-interested, alienated. Recalling Waltzer, ‘every 
substantive account of...justice is a local account... Justice is rooted in the 
distinct understandings of places, honors...things of all sorts, that constitute a 
shared way of life. To override those understandings is (always) to act 
unjustly’.74 
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In the end, climate justice(s) – besides and beyond identifying historical 
responsibility and redressing, financially, historical and present wrongs75 – must 
open towards people’s sovereignty, autonomy, self-coping, in a wider 
perspective where people’s equity fosters sovereign ecological cultures.  
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Resistance Makes Carbon Markets 
Matthew Paterson  
Introduction 
While critiques of carbon markets have developed powerful exposés of scams in 
the CDM and voluntary offset markets, less well recognized is that their 
opposition and critique, and the occasional associated political resistance, has in 
fact been important in shaping the character of those markets in the first place. 
Proponents of carbon markets would have us believe there is no real distinction 
between the abstract ideas of the free market economists who, since Ronald 
Coase, have dreamed up schemes for pollution markets, and actually existing 
carbon markets, as if the abstract ideas have been smoothly rolled out. 
Occasionally critics fall into a similar trap. But the fact that many have criticized 
such markets from the outset, and a much broader range of people are distinctly 
uneasy with the idea of commodifying the atmosphere, or paying others to 
offset their emissions, has in fact shaped what those markets look like in 
practice.1 
As we worry and criticize carbon markets as they develop, then we should 
understand that critique in two contexts at least. One is that previous critiques 
and opposition to carbon market development have affected the specific 
character of carbon markets, with the effect of making them potentially more 
effective environmentally and to avoid the worst excesses of their socially unjust 
dynamics. The other context is the political dilemma this poses – that even 
while resistance may indeed be fertile, it is unlikely to achieve the intended goals 
of many critics themselves, that of overturning the basic tendency to market 
mechanisms as means to respond to climate change. 
I illustrate these points using two examples. The first is the debate about 
forestry in the CDM as it was being negotiated between 1997 and 2001, which 
resulted in the virtual exclusion of forestry from the CDM. The second is the 
development of certification systems in the offset markets, mostly by 
environmental and development NGOs, and their emerging effects on that 
market.  
Kyoto, the CDM, and Forestry 
Throughout the period before 1997, when the Kyoto Protocol was agreed, 
questions of how and whether industrialized countries would be able to have 
‘flexibility’ in meeting their commitments were central to negotiations. Already 
in the UNFCCC negotiations, a proposal originally by Norway in 1991, and 
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leapt upon by the United States, that countries should be able to meet their 
commitments ‘individually or jointly’, had been accepted. In the period after the 
FCCC came into force, in late 1994, what this term might mean was routinely 
discussed. A central question was whether such ‘joint implementation’ could 
involve developing countries. The latter, led by India and China in particular, 
stated consistently that such an approach was impossible because ‘joint 
implementation’ implied that both parties involved had emissions limitations 
commitments to implement, and the FCCC is clear that developing countries 
have no such commitments. They opened the door however, in accepting a pilot 
phase for ‘activities implemented jointly’ (the wording not implying jointly held 
commitments, but the substance was the same), which started in 1995. In this, 
companies and governments in the Annex I countries would be able to develop 
mitigation projects in the South. There were no credits for these activities; it was 
intended as a ‘learning by doing’ period.2  
The ‘learning’ occurred rather quickly however – within a year US 
negotiators in particular were already insisting on some such mechanism in the 
agreement to be signed in Kyoto. Investing in East European countries as they 
underwent ‘transition’ to capitalism was all very well, but projects in the South 
would be so much cheaper in terms of the emissions reduced, that it would be 
economically irrational not to include them. During 1996 and into early 1997, 
US negotiators piled on the pressure for ‘flexibility’, proposing and insisting on 
emissions trading in Kyoto (resisted for a long time by the EU and Southern 
countries), turning the AIJ pilot phase into Joint Implementation (albeit just 
among Annex I countries – so mostly involving projects in the former Soviet 
bloc).  
It looked like developing countries had successfully resisted the idea that 
they might be included in such projects. But at the last minute, Brazil, which has 
pursued an independent line from other developing countries on many issues in 
the climate negotiations, proposed a ‘clean development mechanism’. This was 
intended as a compensation mechanism – that Annex I countries who failed to 
meet their targets to reduce their emissions would have to pay into a fund which 
would invest in emissions reductions in developing countries. The US 
negotiators jumped on the proposal and said in effect ‘why not have this as a 
carrot not a stick?’ A quick re-write ensued and the CDM – ‘Kyoto’s surprise’ – 
was created.3 
But what in practice the CDM would become was negotiated over the next 4 
years, in the run-up to what would be called the ‘Marrakech Accords’, which are 
the operational rules for the Kyoto Protocol. In fact, the forestry negotiations 
were so complex that the rules were only finalized a couple of years after 
Marrakech, in December 2003. In the Protocol itself, the CDM is only described 
in very general institutional terms – that it is subject to the authority of the 
FCCC parties, that projects need to deliver ‘real, measurable, and long-term 
benefits related to the mitigation of climate change’, and the like.4 Nothing is 
said about what types of projects can or cannot be included, how emissions 
foregone are supposed to be calculated, who gets to decide on such calculation 
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techniques, whether there should be limits to rich countries’ recourse to the 
mechanism to meet their commitments, or similar details. These were all 
negotiated over the following years.  
As the conversations about putting the mechanism into practice developed, 
there was much conflict precisely about these aspects of the mechanism. Central 
was (and is) the question of methodology, of how to make a claim that any 
given project reduces emissions compared to what they would have been absent 
the project. And in trying to think through this question, forestry became a key 
debate. This was in part because of the technicalities of measuring the 
absorption of carbon by sinks such as forests, which are completely different to 
those associated with measuring emissions. Not only are you measuring 
counterfactuals – what emissions would be without the project compared to 
what they are with it – which is the basic problem with all offset systems like the 
CDM, but you are doing so for the uptake of CO2 from the air by tree species 
which vary widely in their growth rates, and in ecological conditions which vary 
enormously, so the uncertainty range increases drastically. Also, the permanence 
of the projects is very much more in doubt, since guaranteeing the continued 
growth of forests, and thus the uptake of carbon, over a long period of time, is 
considerably more problematic than that for an energy efficiency project or a 
wind farm.5 This sort of debate pervaded the Marrakech negotiations in general, 
not just to do with the CDM – as some countries wanted to increase their ability 
to use sinks in meeting their commitments (and strategically, to try to get the US 
to be able politically to sign), thus weakening commitments generally. But it had 
a particular resonance in relation to the CDM. 
Mainstream environmental NGOs such as Friends of the Earth, as well as 
more radical organizations like the World Rainforest Movement, and the 
informal protest networks arising out of anti-globalization movements which 
mobilized in particular at the Hague COP in 2000, all raised a range of concerns 
about including sinks in the CDM. The principal concerns of these movements 
was that forestry projects in the CDM would act as a series of ‘low-hanging 
fruit’, enabling cheap offsets which would undermine the effectiveness of the 
Kyoto targets being negotiated. This would then create longer-term problems 
for developing countries by using up all the easy, cheap, abatement options, and 
thus operate as a sort of ‘carbon colonialism’. The projects would also be 
ecological disasters by creating incentives to develop large eucalyptus 
monoculture plantations, and would be social disasters in displacing indigenous 
peoples, peasant farmers, and others, from their lands. The Plantar Project in 
south-eastern Brazil, a US-funded project under the AIJ pilot phase (see above), 
was widely publicized as a textbook case of this sort of problem. Finally, they 
were subject to huge uncertainties in measuring the uptake of carbon by forests 
in different ecological contexts, and thus particularly prone to the problems of 
‘climate fraud’.6 
NGOs built alliances with governments in the South, who worried that the 
CDM in general, but CDM sink (i.e. forestry) projects in particular, would in 
practice enable Northern countries to get out of their emissions reductions 
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obligations. They also had significant support, at least until the US pulled out of 
Kyoto in March 2001, from most European countries.  
As a consequence of the sustained pressure, and political alliance building, 
such concerns, along with the technical problems in measuring sinks compared 
to measuring emissions, resulted in rules which have made such projects 
extremely difficult to get approved in the CDM processes, and only a small 
handful of CDM projects are in forestry as a consequence. ‘Avoided 
deforestation’ projects were excluded entirely, and the rules for other types of 
forestry projects (deforestation, reforestation, afforestation) were written to be 
very tight. Countries could have a maximum of 1% of their 1990 emissions 
mitigated by such projects.7 In fact, the numbers have come in well below this 
amount: in 2007 under 1% of the CERs issued were in forestry projects (as 
compared to around 30% of projects in the voluntary carbon markets).8  
Of course, carbon traders and project developers don’t like the virtual 
exclusion of forests from the CDM. They include this question in their 
recurrent attacks on the CDM institutions for their (alleged) rigidity. And 
forestry is back on the CDM agenda for the post-Kyoto period, in the way that 
the debates about Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD) are being articulated. It is not yet clear what way these 
negotiations will go, but there is great pressure from business actors to link 
REDD to the CDM given the market opportunities this creates for the carbon 
market industry. It is also difficult in political terms to see how industrialized 
countries will provide significant financial support for REDD activities in 
developing countries without some way of getting credit for it in relation to 
their emissions reductions obligations, and the CDM is (for them) the obvious 
means of doing this. This re-opens a Pandora’s box whose lid had largely been 
kept shut in the negotiations for Marrakech.  
The Dynamics of Certification Schemes 
The second example of where resistance makes carbon markets is the 
development and dynamic of certification systems in the offset markets, both 
the CDM and the voluntary markets. There are now around 15 such 
certification systems, mostly developed by mainstream environmental NGOs 
like WWF, which is behind the Gold Standard, one of the best-known schemes. 
These systems have arisen precisely because of the widespread worry (fed by the 
exposés by critics of carbon markets) that offsets (including the CDM) may 
have little benefit in terms of carbon abatement and serve merely to assuage the 
consciences of Western consumers or the pursuit of green PR by corporations. 
The certification systems aim in many cases to add extra hurdles to those in the 
CDM markets, or to create possibilities for different types of projects in the 
voluntary markets (community-based agro-forestry, for example, in the Social 
Carbon standard). While their boosters clearly exaggerate the effects, there is 
nevertheless some evidence that these standards are having an impact on 
practices in the offset markets, and that there may be a ‘race to the top’ as the 
more stringent standards gain in market share and the prices projects certified 
by them can garner.  
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Boosters of voluntary carbon markets are keen to let us know that these 
markets precede the regulatory ones; that the first voluntary carbon market 
transaction was in 1989 when AES, a US electricity company, invested in a 
forestry plantation (of pine and eucalyptus, precisely the sort critics of carbon 
markets worry about) in Guatemala to offset the emissions from its new coal-
fired power plant in Connecticut. But these markets started to get going in the 
late 1990s and only really became sizeable in the last few years, growing from 
US$22m in 2003 to US$331 in 2007.9  
Early on, there was no way of checking that the investment did what the 
company making the investment claimed it did. Companies like the 
CarbonNeutral Company, originally founded as Future Forests, could invest in 
projects proclaiming their virtue and there was no way an outside observer 
could judge the reasonableness of their claims. But as these markets developed, 
two processes have intertwined to change this picture.  
First, the principal demand for voluntary market offsets has become 
corporate. In the public eye, carbon offsets are about enabling individuals 
feeling guilty about their consumption levels to purchase offsets for their flights 
(a particular focus in the marketing of offsets) or more generally, hence the 
criticism of offset markets as ‘the new indulgences’.10 The whole paraphernalia 
of carbon footprint counters, strategic links between airlines and offset 
providers, and so on, is where these markets are visible on an everyday level. 
But these sources provide only a tiny fraction of the demand for offset market. 
Individuals purchased only 5% of the offsets sold in 2007, while NGOs bought 
13%, governments 0.4% and businesses the rest.11 So the driving force behind 
demand is not individual guilt tripping, but the desire of corporations for good 
PR. Amongst various reasons corporations give for buying offsets, PR and 
Corporate Social Responsibility (which often amounts to the same thing) 
predominate.12 So the desire of a bank to be able to claim it is Carbon Neutral, 
or is working towards carbon neutrality, is the central driving force behind this 
market. 
Given the scandals of the last decade, from Enron, WorldCom, and the 
collapse of LTCM onwards, and of course particularly acutely in the current 
crisis which has been triggered by financial dodgy-dealings, but also the 
increasing ability of social movements to expose corporate abuses from human 
rights to environmental destruction, the visibility of large firms like HSBC is 
very high. Their desire for PR is a double-edged sword – if you make bold 
claims, it is difficult to evade the glare of those checking up on you. Indeed 
many companies prefer simply to keep their head below the parapet – if you put 
it above, then you get shot at. The experience of BP’s re-branding as ‘beyond 
petroleum’ is an object lesson in the risks of making such bold claims. So when 
buying offsets, many large corporations are averse to taking risks with their 
image.  
The second process has been the development of third-party certification 
schemes for the offset markets. One of the first was the Gold Standard, 
established by WWF in 2003. As we saw above, one of the key worries in offset 
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markets is about forestry. The Gold Standard sought to overcome this problem 
by excluding forestry by fiat. For a project to be certified under the scheme, it 
can only be in renewable energy or energy efficiency. This certification scheme 
arose precisely out of the sorts of worries about the potential in offset markets 
for ‘climate fraud and carbon colonialism’ identified by critics of carbon 
markets.13 Others have likewise been developed by NGOs seeking to respond. 
But the response can take different forms, as in the Social Carbon standards 
attempt to design a forestry standard which escapes the problems of large-scale 
plantations, displacement of communities, and lack of social benefits of such 
projects.  
Most of the standards have been organized by groups of corporations – in 
particular the banks involved in carbon trading who are wholesaling credits (as 
in the Voluntary Carbon Offset Standard) or by groups which represent the 
businesses involved in carbon offsetting, such as the Voluntary Carbon 
Standard (VCS) developed by the Climate Group and the International 
Emissions Trading Association (IETA), or the (even more arms-length) 
ISO14064 standard. But while this clearly raises the question of corporate 
capture of this verification process, those organizations are in effect responding 
to the same set of concerns – that offset projects may be scams in terms of their 
emissions reductions or cause other PR problems to do with human rights or 
other abuses. 
It is notable that the main flurry of these standards coming on-stream was in 
2007 – so relatively late in the emergence of the voluntary market, and after the 
steady stream of stories about scams in the offset markets appeared in the 
public eye, highlighted by critics of carbon markets and campaigning (or 
sometimes just opportunistic) journalists. Ecosystem Marketplace, an 
organization boosting carbon markets, called 2007 ‘the year of the standard’.14 
By 2007, 87% of projects were being verified by a third-party verifier according 
to some sort of standard.15 Between 2006 and 2007, what was also noticeable 
was a dramatic drop (from 23% to 2% of all projects which used a standard) in 
the number of projects being verified according to the retailer’s own standard, 
and a noticeable decline in the proportion going through the Chicago Climate 
Exchange, who operate their offset projects according to principles not 
accepted by any other voluntary market operators.16 In contrast, the proportion 
going to projects often regarded as providing relatively plausible claims about 
additionality (such as the Gold Standard, VCS or VER+) went up. Projects 
using those standards also appear to gain a price premium – a project using the 
Gold Standard in particular sells for about twice the average price in the 
voluntary market.17  
Now none of this should be taken as a simple example of successful industry 
self-regulation, and that carbon offsets are not a problem at all. The scams 
identified by critics of the offset markets continue, and exposés of problems 
such as climate fraud or carbon colonialism are likely to be necessary for years 
to come. But it does point to two things. One is that the carbon market in 2005 
is not necessarily the same thing as the carbon market in 2008; the sorts of 
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problems that will arise will evolve as the market does itself. But more 
importantly, the evolution of this market, and the way that it is regulated or 
regulates itself, is driven precisely by the exposés of the problems of offsetting 
per se. Whether driven by NGOs attempting to improve the sorts of projects 
investors engage in, or avoid the worst sorts of projects, or companies seeking 
to avoid exposés and seek good PR, it is the opposition to carbon offsetting 
which is playing an important role in shaping what sorts of offsets can be 
pursued, how they need to be justified, and so on. 
Conclusions 
So, resistance makes markets. The character that carbon markets have – the 
operational rules, informal norms, changing dynamics – is produced at least in 
part by the reactions to opposition to carbon markets as a means of responding 
to climate change. Resistance is indeed, thus fertile. The process here is very 
much a microcosm of a more general phenomenon identified by writers such as 
Hardt and Negri, or in a rather different way, Naomi Klein.18 That is, the 
overarching projects of ‘global neoliberal governance’ (or Empire, if you prefer) 
have been generated as strategies by powerful global forces to overcome, co-
opt, or destroy opposition to its power. At times (as in the many examples given 
by Klein in The Shock Doctrine) the strategy is to eliminate opposition, often 
physically through torture and murder. But at other times the approach is more 
subtle, involving an appropriation of the themes and ideas of critics and a 
twisting to enable further accumulation of capital and extension of global 
power. The appropriation of many ideas in the 1970s ‘counterculture’ for 
capitalist purposes, from Ben and Jerry’s to ‘flat hierarchies’, to the ‘new 
economy’, is a classic example.19  
Carbon markets could precisely be interpreted as a sort of ‘disaster 
capitalism’, in Klein’s terms, where climate change was articulated as an ‘urgent 
disaster’ in order to legitimize the opening up of new frontiers for investment 
and financial trading, all the while deploying climate as the legitimizing signifier. 
But while this is clearly a strategy by big, globally organized business to serve its 
interests, it is nevertheless the case that the impetus to do so was to appropriate 
the energy and desire to act on climate change, and forestall and respond to 
criticism of corporate capitalism for failing to act.20 
But the effects here are of course contradictory. For many involved in 
opposing carbon markets, the point is to get rid of them, not make them work 
better. We are thus in the awkward position of shaping the form of something 
we may prefer didn’t exist.  
And of course we should not over-emphasize the power of resistance. 
Carbon markets in general are still expanding rapidly and show little sign of 
slowing down overall, despite the financial crisis and generalized calls for re-
regulation of finance and a ‘green new deal’. New schemes are likely to come on 
stream in New Zealand, Australia, and perhaps Canada in the next couple of 
years, and cap and trade still seems to be the centrepiece of any legislation likely 
to come out of Washington. In the ‘post-Kyoto’ negotiations, the CDM still has 
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the aura of an unassailable institution about it – many of the developing 
countries that in the run-up to Kyoto and then the negotiations to Marrakech 
were highly hostile to the CDM, now see it rather as an opportunity to attract 
investment and technology. So resistance does clearly not result in the aim of 
many critics – to cause the abandoning of carbon markets as a response to 
climate change.  
But this is not new in the history of capitalism. Oppositional movements 
from at least the late 19th century have seen their protests and resistance turned 
into new sorts of legitimacy for capitalist and state elites, and often new sorts of 
means for corporations to make money. From Bismarck’s welfare state, to the 
New Deal and the Fordist-Keynesian management system from the 1930s 
onwards, reform has been driven by responses to protest and movement 
activism. Often this simultaneously shores up the legitimacy of the system while 
benefiting corporations directly – the key winners in the Fordist-Keynesian 
system were arguably the car manufacturers, oil companies, road builders, and 
construction companies who made money from the organization of economic 
development by the state. Carbon markets are not much different to that – the 
winners are different (the city firms like Barclays Capital dominating the trading, 
the auditors like SGS dominating the consulting and verification systems), but 
the alliance between legitimacy and profitability are similar.21 
So this puts critics in an awkward position. There is no easy way out of this 
dilemma. Short of an eco-socialist transformation, any project to reduce 
emissions dramatically will entail some of response from which some bits of big 
business benefit – no response to climate change can oppose all business and 
expect to win. This is the Gramscian logic of hegemony at work – within 
capitalist society no political project can become hegemonic without involving 
some powerful sections of capital. And renewable interests on their own are not 
powerful enough to overcome the opposition of coal and oil interests. From 
this sort of political point of view, the genius of carbon markets is that such a 
set of capitalist interests have been engineered – substantial parts of the City of 
London, albeit rhetorically and we should be sceptical of their rhetoric – that 
have interests in reducing emissions. More stringent targets = higher carbon 
price = more hedging by regulated firms = more arbitrage and demand for 
derivative products, and thus profits for city firms. The Carbon Market and 
Investors Association, a group of city firms who split from the International 
Emissions Trading Association because the latter caved in too often to the 
interests of regulated firms, now argues openly for stringent targets to reduce 
emissions.22 
So it is unlikely, in my view, that resistance will overcome the tendency to 
carbon markets as a key element in the response to climate change. But it will 
shape the character of those markets, potentially reduce some of their worst 
effects, and generate support for the policies and social change which are 
essential and for which carbon markets may well be simply a distraction. In the 
context of the financial crisis in particular, it is clear that this opens up certain 
opportunities for critics and for resistance. Already, the reframing of carbon 
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markets through the notion of ‘subprime carbon’ has emerged.23 And critics 
have not been slow to point out that many of the firms closely associated with 
the financial collapse – Merrill Lynch, most prominently – have also been 
closely involved in carbon trading and other private climate governance schemes 
developed by the financial industry, like the Carbon Disclosure Project. 
Highlighting the possibilities for arbitrage, speculation, development of 
derivatives instruments, and so on, within carbon markets, and thus the 
vulnerability to now-discredited financial strategies, has become a new weapon 
in the armoury of critics. There is little evidence that such strategies however are 
causing a ‘roll-back’ in the impetus to develop carbon markets – indeed, if 
financiers are restricted in other areas as they are re-regulated, then there is 
every likelihood that they will push hard to keep new markets expanding, and 
that mainstream politicians will want to accommodate them. But there is good 
reason to believe that it will affect how new carbon markets are designed, just as 
previous critiques and opposition have affected carbon markets as they have 
emerged so far. One specific direction is that it opens up space to make claims 
about dealing with climate change in a way which goes beyond the fetishization 
of carbon markets. The notion of the ‘green new deal’ is one such approach; 
deliberately alluding to previous periods of crisis and reform, both to connect 
climate change to the other crises produced by contemporary capitalism, while 
opening up space to show how markets alone cannot deliver the 
decarbonization that the world economy needs to engage in.24 
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Green Capitalism, and the Cultural Poverty of 
Constructing Nature as Service Provider" 
Sian Sullivan 
People differ not only in their culture but also in their nature, or rather, in the 
way they construct relations between humans and non-humans.1 
Loss 
We hear a lot these days about loss. In April 2009, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) estimated that banks, insurance instruments and pension funds 
have ‘lost’ some US $4.1 trillion from the global economy.2 The amounts lost to 
taxpayers via government removal of the toxic assets littering the financial 
sector are so huge as to be almost meaningless. According to the IMF, UK 
taxpayers have already lost over £1.2 trillion to Britain’s financial sector,3 while 
in North America the Inspector General of the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP) stated recently that potential government/taxpayer assistance could 
total $23.7 trillion.4 Meanwhile, the International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN) asserts that the wildlife crisis actually is worse than the 
economic crisis, with almost 900 species lost already in an analysis of some 
45,000, and no fewer than 16,928 of these currently threatened with extinction.5 
Habitat loss to ‘development’ is a major cause of these extinctions. Greenpeace 
reports of the Brazilian Amazon that ‘one acre [is] lost every 8 seconds’, the 
hamburger-cattle sector identified here as the major driver of clear-felling in this 
landscape.6  
Crisis Capitalism and the Creation of ‘Value’ 
Notwithstanding the complexities beneath these alarming figures, they do seem 
to signal some sort of crisis, both of capitalism, and of ‘the environment’. 
Intuitively it makes sense to think that these crises might be connected in two 
key ways. First, that economic exploitation and the profit motive, in driving 
production and transformed consumption of ‘natural resources’, is causing and 
contributing to ecological crisis. And second, that the ecological crisis arising 
from these pressures is itself generating crisis in the global economy, through 
making manifest the material limits to economic production and consumption. 
This is the so-called Limits to Growth argument of the 1970s,7 which posited 
resource limits to economic growth, and the need to sensibly distribute 
resources as well as reducing production and consumption to avert both 
economic and ecological crises.  
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But this intuitive view – that ecological loss is entwined with and also signals 
economic crisis – seems to be somewhat naïve. To look at these connections 
another way is to see that capitalism thrives on crisis. This is its engine of 
innovation and creativity. As with the Kafkaesque derivatives markets that in 
part have pushed the international finance market into such recent toxicity,8 
capitalism makes a virtue of crisis. If the risk of loss or hazard can be priced, 
and this financial value captured via trade and speculation, then economic 
growth – the unassailable good of capitalist ‘culture’ – will be maintained, to the 
presumed benefit of everyone.  
It also is in times of crisis that new forms of capitalist value, new frontiers of 
accumulation, and new enclosures and dispossessions, are created. In The Shock 
Doctrine, Naomi Klein forcefully argues that various crisis events, from natural 
disasters to terrorist attacks, in fact are central to the creation of the openings 
required for incursions of corporate capital investment, thinly masked by the 
seemingly liberating guise of instituting free markets and democracy.9 
In this zeitgeist of crisis capitalism, the environmental crisis itself has 
become a major new frontier of value creation and capitalist accumulation. 
Referred to by terms such as ‘market environmentalism’,10 ‘green 
neoliberalism’11 and ‘green capitalism’,12 the understanding is that if we just price 
the environment correctly – creating new markets for new ‘environmental 
products’ based on monetized measures of environmental health and 
degradation – then everyone and the environment will win. If nature can be 
rationally abstracted and priced into assets, goods and services, then 
environmental risk and degradation can be measured, exchanged, offset and 
generally minimized. At the same time, the new financial values accruing to the 
declining ‘stock’ of nature’s assets, goods and services might in and of 
themselves attract more financial value via speculative trade on stock exchanges. 
Indeed, stock exchanges focusing only on new environmental products now are 
arising, the Climate Exchanges in London and Chicago being key examples. 
These have been established for the sole purpose of brokering and trading the 
new commodity/currency of tradeable carbon – itself created as the vehicle via 
which climate-change-causing carbon emissions can be measured and ostensibly 
reduced.  
‘An Ecosystem at your Service?’13 
Behind this monetization of environmental crisis is a logic and language that 
transforms the global environment – Nature – into a provider of services for 
humans. This conceptual capture, and the economic rationalization of nature’s 
value that it permits, is facilitating the creation of markets for the exchange of 
‘ecosystem services’ in the form of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES).  
 Arguably this construction and discourse is justifying right now what in time 
might be considered a critical, cultural transformation in how relationships 
between humans and the non-human world are conceived, valued, managed and 
governed globally.  
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Conservation biologists have been labelling nature as service provider by 
using the language of ecosystem services since the 1970s.14 As noted above, this 
is a decade which also saw the first globalizing statements of concern regarding 
the ecological limits to economic growth and the emergence of environmentalist 
discourses requiring development to be ecologically, as well as economically, 
‘sustainable’.15 Some years later, Robert Costanza and colleagues brought the 
concept of ecosystem services firmly into economics by estimating their annual 
value globally to be $16-54 trillion.16 The ensuing alliance between 
environmental economists and environmental campaigners has emphasized 
‘convergence between commercial interest and environmental imperative’ in 
demonstrating ‘the business case for sustainable development’.17 At the same 
time, assertions of the monetized values for defined ecosystem services has led 
to the corresponding conclusion that currently they are not being valued for 
what they are worth, and that somehow they should be paid for. As Jean-
Christophe Vié, Deputy Head of IUCN’s Species Programme, stated recently:  
It’s time to recognize that nature is the largest company on Earth working for 
the benefit of 100 percent of humankind – and it’s doing it for free.18 
In recent years, two phenomena have conspired to push these concerns and 
concepts together to generate a utopian win-win scenario of both mitigating 
environmental degradation and facilitating economic growth through pricing the 
ecological services provided by nature. The first is the 2005 publication of the 
influential United Nations Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA), which 
highlights human-generated change of the biosphere and overwhelmingly uses 
the language of ecosystem services in speaking of the non-human world. These 
are further categorized into provisioning services (food, water, timber, fibre, 
etc.), regulating services (floods, droughts, land degradation and disease), 
supporting services (such as soil formation and nutrient cycling), and non-
material cultural services (recreational, spiritual, religious, etc.).19 Through 
combining the quantification skills of ecological science and economics, the 
MEA proposes that breaking nature down into these increasingly scarce 
services,20 quantifying their functionality, and assigning a price to them, will 
assist conservation by asserting their financial value; at the same time as 
fostering economic growth by creating new tradeable assets.21  
The second is the creation of a multi-billion dollar market in a new 
commodity – carbon – intended to mitigate (i.e. minimize) climate change by 
providing the possibility of profitably exchanging one of the gases contributing 
to anthropogenic global warming. As noted above, this is generating a market-
based context for approaching the broader environmental concerns of the 
MEA. Like Adam Smith’s putative economic ‘invisible hand’,22 the assumption 
is that both good environmental governance and the equitable distribution of 
environmental services will derive from the correct pricing of quantified 
environmental goods and services, combined with the self-regulating market 
behaviour that will emerge from their market exchange.  
In this case, the financial price attributed to carbon is allocated to, and 
therefore captured by, heavy industry emitters. It is they who gain tradeable 
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carbon credits (i.e. the currency representing carbon), for example, under the 
European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme.23 Some (currently minimal) 
scarcity is built into the market by allocating credits at a level below what major 
installations require to cover their emitting levels, so as to meet the emissions 
reducing targets set by the Kyoto Protocol of the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCC). Once these credits enter the international 
financial system their future value can be speculated on (as with any other 
currency or commodity, including derivatives) and significant profits can ensue. 
In the wake of this, a veritable ecosystem of economists, stockbrokers and 
financial advisers has emerged to service trade in this new commodity, as 
epitomized by the Europe Climate Exchange in the City of London. This is ‘the 
leading marketplace for trading carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in Europe and 
internationally’,24 and basically a stock exchange for the currency of tradeable 
carbon credits. Interestingly, the website of the Europe Climate Exchange 
provides very little information connecting this exchange with environmental 
impacts through the reduction of atmospheric CO2. Such presentation seems to 
emphasize that this is a product with a great deal to do with trade, finance and 
profit, that operates at a rather large remove from the materiality of global 
climate and eco-systems.  
The Ecosystem Marketplace 
Of course, payments for the environmental services produced by nature’s labour 
do not go to the environment itself, but to whoever is able to capture this newly 
priced value. A key logic is that such payments will act as compensation for 
economic opportunity costs in contexts where environmental-use practices are 
altered so as to conserve ecosystem services. As stated by Conservation 
International, ‘[t]he payment for ecosystem services concept helps address the 
destruction of Earth’s habitats, landscapes and ecosystems by assigning a value 
to these services, and compensating the people, communities and countries 
whose actions enhance or protect ecosystem services and the costs that work 
incurs’.25  
This might take the form of relatively simple direct payments for 
transformed behaviour to maintain a particular and clearly defined 
environmental good. In water management, for example, the water available to 
those living downstream can be directly negatively affected by water-users 
upstream, and PES schemes may be established to alter upstream behaviour so 
as to maintain downstream water quality and access. Paradigmatic here is the 
case of Vittel (Nestlé Water) in north-east France, who came to a financial 
agreement to compensate farmers for altering their nitrate-based fertilizing 
practices upstream which were contaminating the aquifer producing the bottled 
mineral water sold by the company.26 In this case the key parameters were 
relatively clear to define. They included the environmental good 
(uncontaminated water), the potential ‘servicers’ of that good (nitrate-using 
farmers), the environmental problem (contamination by nitrate-based 
fertilizers), and the purchaser of the environmental good (Vittel). Further critical 
factors are embodied here with implications for the applicability of such 
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initiatives elsewhere and over broader geographical scales, such as between 
contexts in the urban industrialized North and the rural ‘underdeveloped’ South. 
The wealth of the purchasing company and the continued market value of their 
product, provided economic sustenance for their interest in pursuing the 
ecosystem services exchange. The land constituting the source area for the water 
is enclosed as private property under clear tenure arrangements, permitting the 
establishment of relatively direct contracts between service purchasers and 
providers. And Vittel was able to collaborate with a professional and well-
funded prolonged (four-year) period of research on the connections between 
farming practices, water quality and potential collaborative alternatives, prior to 
the long-term establishment of a PES scheme. Even with these factors, the 
initiative cost Vittel some 24.25 million Euros to develop in its first seven years 
(an estimated 980 Euros per hectare per year),27 and it took some ten years 
following the initial four-year period of research for the scheme to become 
operational.  
Increasingly, PES involves the creation of derived environmental ‘products’ 
that are agreed by sellers and buyers to represent some sort of measure of 
environmental health or degradation. An example might be the creation of 
schemes financed as commercial deals by private investors whereby new 
products representing a defined environmental good are sold both to fund 
conservation practice and to generate a return to investors. The Malua Wildlife 
Habitat Conservation Bank (MWHCB), also referred to as the Malua BioBank, 
in Sabah, Malaysia,28 might be considered a paradigmatic example here. In this 
scheme a collaboration between private investors and the Sabah government 
has created saleable ‘Biodiversity Conservation Certificates’, each representing 
100m2 of rainforest restoration and protection. Over a 50-year license of 
conservation rights to the BioBank from the Sabah government,29 the sale of 
certificates is intended to ‘make rainforest rehabilitation and conservation a 
commercially competitive land use’.30 It is projected that the initial US$10 
million of private investment committed for the rehabilitation of the Malua 
Forest Reserve over an initial six years will be recovered from the sale of these 
certificates and also will endow a trust fund (the Malua Trust) to fund the long-
term conservation management of the BioBank over the remaining 44-year 
period of the license. In this case, investment is via the Eco Products Fund, LP, 
a private equity investment vehicle managed by the international asset brokers 
New Forests Inc.31 and Equator Environmental, LLC (whose self-defining 
phrase is ‘creating value by investing in ecosystems’32). As a member of the 
collaborative Clinton Global Initiative33 between governments, the private 
sector, NGOs and ‘other global leaders’, the Eco Products Fund commits US$1 
million over 6-10 years towards finding ways, globally, ‘[t]o realize value from 
illiquid environmental assets such as carbon, water, and biodiversity, and to use 
innovative financial structures to represent the value of these critical services in 
the marketplace’.34 In the case of the Malua BioBank, any profits from the sale 
of biodiversity certificates are to be shared between the forest management 
license holder and the investor. The purchase of certificates does not constitute 
an offset against rainforest impacts elsewhere, and as such is designed to 
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constitute a simple purchase of conservation. It is projected that by the end of 
the licensing period the initial endowment ‘will be fully capitalized and this 
funding can be used either to renew the conservation rights to the Malua Forest 
Reserve or to establish a conservation bank on another property with high 
biodiversity value’.35 Within-country ‘conservation banks’ and ‘species banks’, 
involving the creation and trading of ‘credits’ representing biodiversity values on 
private land, also are proliferating, particularly in the US.36 
While purchase of the Malua BioBank’s biodiversity certificates is not 
designed to offset environmentally damaging activities due to the 
transformation of landscapes through economic development elsewhere, much 
of the anticipation regarding the new pricing of ecosystem services revolves 
around exactly this. Thus the attribution of new prices to conserved land already 
owned by commercial companies might be mobilized so as to offset 
environmental degradation caused through resource extraction elsewhere. Even 
more attractively, companies might be able to trade newly priced marketable 
ecosystem services on appropriated land that they now own, thereby capturing 
new financial value from the new construction of nature as service provider. 
Mining conglomerate Rio Tinto, for example, are exploring with the IUCN 
‘opportunities to generate marketable ecosystem services on land owned or 
managed by the company’.37 These might include ‘potential biodiversity banks in 
Africa, as well as the opportunity to generate marketable carbon credits by 
restoring soils and natural vegetation or by preventing emissions from 
deforestation and degradation’.38 Environmental credits rewarded to businesses 
for ecosystem improvement activities also might be ‘banked’ against future 
environmental liabilities’ or sold to other land developers ‘to compensate for the 
adverse environmental impacts of their projects’,39 with a new generation of 
‘commercial conservation asset managers’ required to broker these exchanges 
and revenues.  
These new forms of ecosystem value thus become conventional business 
opportunities for investment: the ensuing transformation of ecosystem services 
into marketable assets provides ‘new trading opportunities’ such that buyers and 
sellers of these services can generate profit that ‘does not imply the loss of 
natural assets’.40 Large corporations, investors and investment brokers now are 
moving to claim slices of emerging ecosystem markets, and the potential finance 
flows accruing from newly priced species, ecosystems, services and 
environmental products.  
The new global multi-billion dollar trade in carbon, in particular, is providing 
a market-based model, embraced by both business and major environmental 
organizations, for pricing and exchanging environmental products across the 
environmental spectrum under the rapidly proliferating arenas of PES and the 
proposed programme administered by the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation (REDD). A critical component of the logic underlying these 
approaches is an assumption that environments, emissions and effects in very 
different locations somehow are equivalent and therefore substitutable, such 
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that they allow negative impacts in one location to be offset against 
environmental investments in another. So the REDD programme proposes 
equivalence between carbon emitted in the fossil-fuel fumes of cars and industry 
etc., with that stored in living and decomposing biomass in the myriad 
configurations of long-evolved and diverse assemblages of species. Emissions 
therefore can be offset against newly priced carbon stored in standing forests, 
principally in ‘developing countries’. An accompanying logic is that the new 
financial value accruing to standing forests will act to reduce the carbon 
emissions produced by their potential transformation into different landscapes 
which currently might be more economically profitable (to some people at 
least); examples might include the clear-felling of the Amazon for hamburger-
cattle, soya or oil production.  
But significant questions remain. Are the molecules of CO2 emitted through 
fossil-fuel burning really equivalent to the carbon stored in complex terrestrial 
ecosystems whose assemblages have evolved over many millennia? Do such 
offsetting schemes actually reduce environmental impacts (e.g. levels of CO2 
emissions), or do they instead provide incentives to continue to profit from 
these emissions and their trade? And as discussed below, how does trade in 
derived environmental products relate to and affect the peoples, livelihoods and 
lifeworlds located in the landscapes from which these products are derived?  
Nevertheless, new markets for ecosystem services and other ecological 
products now are proliferating, with an accompanying array of brokers 
advertising ecological wares online. Websites and companies abound with 
names such as ‘Ecosystem Marketplace’,41 ‘Species Banking’42 and ‘Climate 
Change Capital’.43 At the same time, the major global conservation NGOs such 
as Conservation International (CI), The Nature Conservancy, and the World 
Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) are embracing PES as a critical tool for 
generating and distributing the finance needed for conservation activities. A CI 
glossy brochure called Nature Provides, published in August 2009, thus announces 
the forthcoming launch of ARIES – Artificial Intelligence for Ecosystem 
Services – described as a ‘web-based technology...offered to users worldwide to 
assist rapid ecosystem service assessment and valuation at multiple scales, from 
regional to global’.44 This alliance between investment capital, business and 
environmental organizations is being fostered by the world’s oldest and largest 
global environmental organization – the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) – a network of governments, donor agencies, 
foundations, member organizations and corporations (www.iucn.org). An 
onlooker at the four-yearly IUCN World Conservation Congress in Barcelona in 
October 2008, for example, would be forgiven for thinking that multinational 
corporations now are the planet’s conservationists. At this event, the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) was particularly 
visible. This is a network of the Chief Executive Officers of some 200 
corporations, whose mission statement is ‘to provide business leadership as a 
catalyst for change toward sustainable development, and to support the business 
license to operate, innovate and grow in a world increasingly shaped by 
sustainable development issues’.45 The image in Figure 1, taken at the prominent 
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WBCSD stand at the 2008 World Conservation Congress, is suggestive of its 
planetary reach and ambition. It depicts the brand logos of many of the world’s 
largest multinationals, stretching across an abstract earth, smoothed of 
difference, diversity and inequality. This is a world good for capital. But is it also 
good for cultural and ecological diversity? 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The world according to the World Business Council for Sustainable Development: a 
smooth earth populated by corporate logos. From the WBCSD display at the 2008 World 
Conservation Congress of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature. Photo: Sian 
Sullivan. 
A Unifying Language?  
Recently, the UNEP and the IUCN described ecosystem services as a ‘unifying 
language’ in global environmental policy.46 This indeed may be the desire. 
Significant questions remain, however, with serious relevance for the 
distribution of power and voice in global decision-making. Who is creating and 
writing this language and for whom? What are the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions built into the construction of nature as service 
provider – i.e. what is understood to be the nature of nature? And what are 
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thereby legitimated as appropriate methods for claiming ‘nature knowledge’? 
How are human/non-human relationships being structured, both materially and 
conceptually, in the process of creating and instituting this ‘unifying language’? 
And what knowledges and experiences are being othered and displaced through 
the parlance and practice of ecosystem services markets?  
Some of these questions can be approached through the brief descriptions of 
PES concepts and schemes outlined above. The construction and monetization 
of nature as service provider clearly produces a range of significant 
transformations. Through PES the non-human world in all its diversity and 
mystery becomes the provider of services for humans. People dwelling in areas 
now valued for the ecosystem services they provide to people in other locations 
become the necessary custodians and providers of these services, with 
recompense from service-users being dependent on services received. This may 
be a double-edged sword for people living in newly priced service-providing 
landscapes, especially in the Global South. Continuing a long history of 
displacement for environmental conservation,47 food-producing practices and 
cultures may be restructured and constrained in the process of shifting from 
direct production for subsistence and livelihoods to producing environmental 
service-oriented landscapes. And finally, those numerate in the labyrinthine 
abstractions accompanying the creation of new ecological commodities and 
markets – accountants, brokers, bankers and assisting ecological scientists – 
become the expert mediators and managers of monetary value for both.  
All these transformations emphasize conceptual difference rather than 
continuity between human and non-human worlds. Nature somehow is 
backdrop to, rather than co-creator of, human activity. At the same time they 
reinforce somewhat Hegelian master-servant relationships between human and 
non-human realms, extended further to those between ‘experts’ on, and 
inhabitants of, newly priced service-providing landscapes.48 Nature serves 
culture; and those dwelling in landscapes newly monetized for their provision of 
ecosystem services are themselves constructed as servers for visions of the 
appropriate nature of these landscapes, as perceived by policy and technical 
experts who, while globally mobile, frequently are based in distant urban 
locations.  
These transformations are critical for cultures as well as for environments 
worldwide. I opened this chapter by noting the ways in which economic and 
ecological crisis narratives revolve around assertions of loss. To complete the 
picture, the 2009 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) Atlas of the World’s Languages in Danger announces 
the loss of 233 known languages, with a further 574 classified as ‘critically 
endangered’.49 If language is a key lexicon through which culture is expressed, 
shared and made meaningful, then the loss of languages equates with the demise 
of cultures. The causes are complex interactions of marginalization, 
‘acculturation’ to modern monetary and capitalist culture, and direct 
displacement. The outcome is a subtle ‘culturecide’: the death of collective 
identities through displacement by a dominant and globalizing culture that has 
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amongst its norms and values certain disciplining assumptions about the nature 
of reality. These include rather strict conceptual separations between culture and 
nature (echoed by that between mind and body, male and female, civilized and 
wild and so on) – separations which tend to privilege the first part of each of 
these binaries; together with the elevation of monetized exchange as the key 
measure and mediator of value. As indicated by the global loss of languages, the 
peoples, cultures and epistemologies that are othered in this capitalist 
structuring of values can become rather ‘disposable’,50 in part through 
constructing them as poor, marginal, and often as environmentally problematic.  
As an extension of a globalizing capitalist culture which has these 
assumptions at its heart, it is difficult not to see the unifying language of 
ecosystem services as part and parcel of these processes of cultural displacement 
in the realm of human/non-human relationships, understandings and values. In 
part this is because the proliferating freedoms and futures espoused by free-
market environmentalism simultaneously close off possibilities for other 
freedoms and futures in how relationships between human and non-human 
worlds are practiced and expressed. Many forms of value, appreciation, 
understanding and experience of non-human worlds simply are 
incommensurable with economic pricing mechanisms, and are displaced or 
closed off completely in the process of pricing for monetized exchange.51 Where 
money and capital are the measures of wealth, economically marginalized 
indigenous cultures, as well as those who choose to live by different values 
within highly industrialized nations,52 are seen only as materially poor and thus 
requiring intervention to foster economic development. A recent UN Food and 
Agriculture Organization report thus focuses on the desire to better capture the 
ecosystem services provided by dryland ecosystems globally, in part through 
shifting the livestock-based livelihoods of ‘the poor’ who dwell in such lands.53 
As I have noted elsewhere,54 the ‘poor’ in these contexts include peoples as 
diverse as Maasai of East Africa, Raika pastoralists of India’s Rajasthan, and 
Quechua-speaking highland herders in Peru: a global fabric of rich and different 
cultures sustained through mixed farming practices of which livestock constitute 
a major part. Importantly, such peoples may not define themselves and their 
land-entwined lifeworlds as ‘poor’, as indicated by Maasai in the strong 
statement that ‘the poor are not us’.55  
A particular irony here is that many of the endangered languages noted 
above are those of so-called indigenous cultures; of people who retain and can 
trace some form of coherent connection with the landscapes with which their 
lineages are entwined. Often these connections seem to be in landscapes that 
currently are highly valued for their biodiversity and other environmental riches. 
At risk of essentializing or romanticizing, perhaps it might be that the 
complexities of indigenous cultural engagement with these landscapes have 
something to do with their current conservation value. It might also signal that 
disappearing languages and their associated cultures have something relevant to 
say and teach about other possibilities for what it means to be and become 
human today, in dynamic relationship with non-human worlds.  
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Cultured Lands 
Despite a problematic past in service to colonial endeavours, anthropology has 
relevance here as an academic discipline that at least makes some effort to 
understand and enter into culturally unfamiliar experiences and conceptions of 
being human. With Damara or $N" Khoen people living in the dry, open lands 
of north-west Namibia, I have been privileged to witness, experience and learn 
some very different ways of relating with the non-human world. Here, for 
example, the process of acquiring food and other substances, while a pragmatic 
effort to procure resources, at the same time also required constant 
conversation and exchange with the ancestors and other non-human presences 
populating the land. Non-human worlds were alive to be spoken to, and 
variously remonstrated with and celebrated through words, song, dance and gift-
giving. People were not separate and alienated from the non-human world; they 
were co-creators with it.  
To illustrate this, let me relate one story here.56 Figure 2 is an image taken in 
1995 at a place called |Giribes, which are large open grassy plains to the north-
west of a larger settlement called Sesfontein or! Nani|aus. We had driven there 
early in the morning, and the sun was starting to burn. I had my notebook and 
plant press at the ready, and was keen to get going with the resource-use 
documentation – the knowledge collection, if you like – that I hoped to do that 
day. But the first thing that these three people did – they are Nathan $Ûina 
Taurob on the right, his daughter and her partner – was to move some way 
away from the car, sit down and start talking out at the land. I remember feeling 
slightly bemused and impatient at the time, anxious to get on with the ‘real 
work’ of resource collection and documentation. But I was curious enough to 
ask what they were doing.  
The answer I received was that this was aoxu – the practice of connecting 
with and giving something away to their ancestors remaining in this landscape 
and to the spirits of the land, to ask for safe passage and for success in finding 
the foods they wished to gather. They were giving away tobacco – $N" Khoen, 
particularly of Sesfontein/!Nani|aus, have long been known regionally for the 
pungent tobacco they grow in small gardens – and also the leaves of tsaurahais or 
Colophospermum mopane, valued locally for their healing properties. The direction 
they are facing is to the north – towards the settlement of Purros. This is the 
land where Nathan $Ûina grew-up; it is the land (!h!s) that he knew and loved, 
and with which his heart as a healer (!gaiaob) was connected. Nathan and his 
family were no longer able to live there, but in the 1990s they continued to 
return to these areas, sometimes for several weeks at a time. Most of this 
movement was completely invisible to the various formal administrations of the 
region. And some of it meant moving into tourism concessions, run by 
commercial enterprises, to which they officially no longer had access. 
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Figure 2: Nathan $Ûina Taurob and family greet and gift the spirits of the land in |Giribes plains, 
north-west Namibia. Photo: Sian Sullivan. 
 
It took a fairly prolonged period of unlearning of my own encultured 
assumptions regarding the nature of reality to reach some understanding of 
what might be going on here. From this and other experiences, I know now that 
it is possible for human beings to embody an implicit ethos of reciprocity in 
relationship with the other sentient beings making up what we now call 
biodiversity. In this way of doing things, all ‘resource-use practice’ 
simultaneously is a conversation, a negotiation and an exchange that binds 
people into multilayered and multifaceted direct reciprocal arrangements with 
ancestors, spirit and with other species. It is not just about something that is 
taken to be consumed; it also is about something that is returned, through direct 
material and energetic exchanges with the non-human world. Human beings can 
thereby communicate with and serve the known and unpredictable 
manifestations of the non-human world, and in doing so affirm reciprocal moral 
obligations as well as make moral sense of phenomena that cannot be 
completely knowable or ultimately controlled. Infusing this is an epistemic and 
ontological orientation to non-human worlds that embraces continuity with, 
rather than separateness between, these realms, and that encourages movements 
with, rather than ownership and management over, dynamic ecosystem 
processes. I perceive also that this practice and logic is encountered in remaining 
shamanic cultures worldwide – cultures that interestingly also seem to be those 
who have lived in maintaining relationships with currently much sought after 
biodiversity. There is depth, diversity and coherence in the understandings of, 
and communications with, an animated non-human world embodied by many 
of the world’s now disappearing cultures.57 But these are ways that seem opaque 
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to a modern world whose cosmovision rests instead on fetishized commodities, 
financial transactions, private property, competition and hunger for growth.  
International PES policy developments such as REDD assert the need for 
‘ensuring effective participation’ of indigenous peoples and local communities,58 
and many such communities may see participation in these schemes as a means 
of generating income and gaining footholds in global economic structures. 
Others, however, express resistance to ‘being participated’ on the programmatic 
terms laid out by these schemes. A recent declaration of Confederation of 
Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon (CONFENIAE) thus 
states that:  
We reject the negotiations on our forests, such as REDD projects, because they 
try to take away our freedom to manage our resources and also because they are 
not a real solution to the climate change problem, on the contrary, they only 
make it worse.59 
Such resistance denotes a missed opportunity. This is not in terms of local 
peoples coming on board in these narrowing trajectories for determining value 
for the global environment. It is in terms of missed opportunities for listening 
to and learning from different ways of conceptualizing and enacting 
relationships with the non-human world.  
Serving Nature?  
Green capitalism and market environmentalism are rapidly becoming the 
dominant policy and political choices linking environmental health with 
economic development. In this paradigm the creation and capture of market 
value for the services provided for humans by the non-human world is 
considered the most efficient and sustainable means of mitigating global 
environmental problems while maintaining and even enhancing economic 
growth. In this article I ask some questions of this significant conceptual 
reframing of nature as service provider. What might this discourse say of the 
ways in which our collective relationship with the non-human world is 
construed and constructed? What is othered and excluded in the process, and 
what significance does this have for understanding both the phenomenon of 
nature and for the cultural and epistemological inclusiveness of contemporary 
environmental agendas? And finally, what potential does the understanding of 
nature as service provider really have for kindling health in the earth’s 
psychosocial- and eco-systems? 
Gretchen Daily and colleagues represent a common optimism in claiming 
that ‘[t]he main aim in understanding and valuing natural capital and ecosystem 
services is to make better decisions, resulting in better actions relating to the use 
of land, water, and other elements of natural capital’.60 Such a statement, 
however, is devoid of political and epistemological context. It affects an illusion 
of solution through ecological modernization61 and linear progress.62 At the 
same time, and in common with most international environment and 
development initiatives, it uses a depoliticized language that excises the 
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significance of ‘for who’ and ‘by whom’ questions in this new governance 
arena.63 
The core idea underlying these initiatives is that so-called environmental 
services have not been correctly valued to date. Of course I would agree that 
capitalist culture has tended to ride roughshod over both biological and cultural 
diversity. But it seems to me that pricing something financially is not the same 
thing as valuing it. 
We are critically impoverished as human beings if the best we can come up 
with is money as the mediator of our relationships with the non-human world. 
Allocating financial value to the environment does not mean that we will 
embody practices of appreciation, attention, or even of love in our 
interrelationships with a sentient, moral and agential64 non-human world. 
Instead, it lowers ‘the moral tone of social life’ and, through doing so, it furthers 
damage to both humans and ecosphere because ‘the pricing of everything works 
powerfully as a device for making morality and love... seem irrelevant’.65 
We are bearing witness to another significant and accelerating wave of 
enclosure and primitive accumulation to liberate natural capital for the global 
market. Commodification now extends from genes to species and to 
ecosystems, i.e. to all the domains of diversity that are delineated by the 
Convention on Biodiversity (www.cbd.int). The continued capture and 
monetized exchange of the non-human world in the form of Payments for 
Ecosystem Services (PES) seems set to have an impact on global human/non-
human relationships as significant as that which began with the transformation 
of land into individualized property in England from the Tudors onwards: 
formalized throughout Europe through escalating Enclosure Acts and 
accompanying property law, and exported globally via European colonial 
adventure.66 We know from history that this past revolution in capital creation, 
accumulation and investment had major social and environmental implications, 
reducing diverse cultures to labour in the service of capital, and disembedding 
peoples’ relationships with landscapes in the process.67  
It seems clear that collectively we are in need of some radically different 
ways of valuing the global environment. But is it possible to turn instead for 
training and inspiration to those who, in many different contexts, and often 
against the odds, seem to have both valued and served nature’s ‘services’? And 
through doing so is it possible to (re)claim and (re)learn communicative 
relationships with non-human worlds: worlds which express the same moral, 
creative, mysterious and playful agencies that humans also embody? Perhaps it 
might be that ways of relating with and valuing non-human worlds that are 
othered by modernity and capitalist culture, in fact are those offering openings 
into possibilities for dwelling that are less hungry and more sustainable, at the 
same time as perhaps being more meaningful, poetic and enjoyable. But to hear 
and learn this requires an act that capitalist and developmentalist culture almost 
by definition cannot countenance: which is stopping to listen to, and perhaps 
even embodying, such alternatives. 
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IV 
ALTERNATIVES 
Part IV of the book hopefully gives us hope. The 
point that each paper in this part makes is that there 
are real alternatives to carbon markets, many of 
which already exist in local communities around the 
world. If indeed carbon markets often deliver quite 
perverse outcomes – as many contributions to this 
book have shown – then what are the alternatives? 
What can we practically do to mitigate climate change 
and create a real sustainable, low carbon future? The 
point that this section makes is that a sustainable 
future is in our hands. The first two papers offer a 
more ‘political’ answer to carbon markets, suggesting 
that, rather than managing complex carbon markets, 
we need to think about the ‘ecological debt’ we have 
created and consider climate change from a point of 
view of justice. The remaining papers collected in this 
part of the book offer a range of very practical 
insights into how communities already live in 
sustainable ways. What these contributions seem to 
be saying is that we cannot depend on governments 
or markets to save us from climate change. If 
something has to be done, then it has to be done by 
us – each and one of us.  
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Repaying Africa for Climate Crisis: ‘Ecological 
Debt’ as a Development Finance Alternative to 
Emissions Trading" 
Patrick Bond 
Introduction 
Carbon trading is under attack, but is there an alternative strategy to transfer 
resources to the Global South to support a different model of development? Is 
it reasonable to make calls for ‘ecological debt’ or ‘climate compensation’ in the 
form of a fund that would justifiably exceed $100 billion/year within a decade, 
without tendentious reliance upon emissions trading brokers, offset salesmen, 
futures and options, ‘additionality’ requirements, corruption, and the 
‘commodification of the air’ associated with the Kyoto Protocol and its likely 
successor regime?  
There is a fairly simple financial choice facing those advocating global 
climate governance: the North would pay hard-hit South sites to deal with 
climate crisis either through ‘Clean Development Mechanism’ (CDM) projects 
and declining overseas development aid – both entailing plenty of damaging side 
effects – or instead, pay through other mechanisms that must provide financing 
quickly, transparently and decisively, to achieve genuine income compensation 
plus renewable energy to the masses. The Kyoto Protocol – and its potential 
Copenhagen COP successor – is all about the former choice, because the power 
bloc in Europe and the US put carbon trading at the core of their emissions 
reduction strategy, while the two largest emitters of carbon in the Third World, 
China and India, are the main beneficiaries of CDM financing.  
What that means is that problems caused when Al Gore’s US delegation 
brought pro-corporate compromises to Kyoto in 1997 – deceitfully promising 
US sign-on to Kyoto in exchange for carbon trading – will now amplify and 
haunt this debate for a long time to come. For what we have witnessed since 
Kyoto came into effect in February 2005 is a climate-reduction stalemate by a 
coalition of selfish, fossil-fuel addicted powers. Terribly weak targets may get a 
mention (or even no mention, as at the Bali 2007 Conference of Parties), but 
market mechanisms will be invoked as the ‘solution’ so as to appease polluting 
capital and associated governments, especially Washington. Some of the less 
principled environmental NGOs and opportunistic Third World elites (and even 
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campaigners like Wangari Maathei) will sign up, as has become a habit in such 
global governance gambits. 
Market mechanisms – especially carbon trading and offsets – allow 
corporations and governments generating greenhouse gases to seemingly reduce 
their net emissions. They can do this, thanks to the Kyoto Protocol, by trading 
for others’ ‘certified emissions reductions’ (e.g. CDM projects in the Third 
World) or emissions rights (e.g. Eastern Europe’s ‘hot air’ that followed the 
1990s economic collapse). The pro-trading rationale is that once property rights 
are granted to polluters for these emissions, even if given not auctioned (hence 
granting a generous giveaway), a ‘cap’ can be put on a country’s or the world’s 
total emissions. It will then be progressively lowered, if there is political will. So 
as to minimize adverse economic impact, corporations can stay within the cap 
even by emitting way above it, by buying others’ rights to pollute. But critics1 
argue that the carbon market isn’t working, for several reasons: 
! the idea of inventing a property right to pollute is effectively the 
‘privatization of the air’; 
! greenhouse gases are complex and their rising production creates a non-
linear impact which cannot be reduced to a commodity exchange 
relationship (a ton of CO2 produced in one place accommodated by 
reducing a ton in another, as is the premise of the emissions trade); 
! the corporations most guilty of pollution and the World Bank – which is 
most responsible for fossil fuel financing – are the driving forces behind the 
market, and can be expected to engage in systemic corruption to attract 
money into the market even if this prevents genuine emissions reductions;  
! many of the offsetting projects – such as monocultural timber plantations, 
forest ‘protection’ and landfill methane-electricity projects – have 
devastating impacts on local communities and ecologies, and have been 
hotly contested; 
! the price of carbon determined in these markets is haywire, having crashed 
by half in a short period in April 2006 and by two-thirds in 2008, thus 
making mockery of the idea that there will be a sufficient market 
mechanism to turn the society towards renewable energy; 
! there is a serious potential for carbon markets to become an out-of-control, 
multi-trillion dollar speculative bubble, similar to exotic financial 
instruments associated with Enron’s 2002 collapse (indeed, many Enron 
employees populate the carbon markets);  
! as a ‘false solution’ to climate change, carbon trading encourages merely 
small, incremental shifts, and thus distracts us from a wide range of radical 
changes we need to make in materials extraction, production, distribution, 
consumption and disposal; and 
! the idea of market solutions to market failure (‘externalities’) is an ideology 
that rarely makes sense, and especially not following the world’s worst-ever 
financial market failure, and especially not when the very idea of derivatives 
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– a financial asset whose underlying value is several degrees removed and 
also subject to extreme variability – was thrown into question. 
Most scientists insist that at least an 80% drop in emissions will be necessary 
within four decades, with the major cuts (of at least 45%) before 2020. To 
achieve this, carbon markets won’t work, as the leading US climate scientist, 
James Hansen, concluded in leading the intellectual opposition to Barack 
Obama’s cap and trade scheme. Obama’s legislation – the Waxman-Markey bill 
that passed the US House of Representatives in June 2009 (with similar Senate 
legislation bogged down at the time of writing in September 2009) – was so 
profoundly flawed that the more ambitious wing of environmental civil society 
argued it should be scrapped, especially because of the legislation’s destruction 
of Environmental Protection Agency powers to regulate carbon pollution.2 
Even the financial speculator George Soros criticizes cap and trade: 
The cap and trade system of emissions trading is very difficult to control and its 
effects are diluted. It is pretty much breaking down because there is no penalty 
for developing countries not to add to their pollution. You count the saving but 
you don’t count the added pollution going on. As a world, I don’t think we are 
getting our act together on climate change at the moment… [CDMs] are not 
effective: you buy credits in third world countries that don’t have a cap on 
emissions and you can get carbon credits whether you can sell them or not… It 
is precisely because I am a market practitioner that I know the flaws in the 
system.3  
To be sure, one wing of civil society – e.g., campaigners Avaaz, the World 
Wildlife Federation and the Climate Action Network – are apparently asking 
that Copenhagen ‘seal the deal’ no matter such flaws, which can be partially 
explained by the fact that some in the latter group have substantial conflicts of 
interest as carbon-traders themselves. According to Michael Dorsey, professor 
of political ecology at the US’s Dartmouth College, these include CAN board 
member Jennifer Morgan of the Worldwide Fund for Nature, who took leave 
for two years to direct work on Climate and Energy Security at carbon trading 
firm E3G, Kate Hampton, formerly of Friends of the Earth, who joined 
Climate Change Capital as head of policy while simultaneously advising the EU 
on energy and the environment, working for the California Environmental 
Protection Agency, and acting as president of International Carbon Investors 
and Services, and several others. 
Dorsey concludes: ‘After more than a decade of failed politicking, many 
NGO types...are only partially jumping off the sinking ship – so as to work for 
industries driving the problem. Unfortunately, many continue to influence 
NGO policy from their current positions, while failing to admit to or even 
understand obvious conflicts of interest’. 4 
Critics condemn carbon trading for these and many other reasons, and term 
the emissions trade a ‘false solution’. In contrast, central to a genuine solution to 
climate crisis is the task of raising the world’s standards of living in a manner 
not characterized by the fossil fuel addiction of industrial society. Climate-
related finance will be required, and this might logically begin with the North’s 
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payment of ecological debt to the South for excess use of environmental space 
and for the damage done to many ecosystems already, and in future when vast 
damages are anticipated especially in Africa. 
Ecological Debt Defined 
According to the Quito group Accion Ecologica: ‘ecological debt is the debt 
accumulated by Northern, industrial countries toward Third World countries on 
account of resource plundering, environmental damages, and the free 
occupation of environmental space to deposit wastes, such as greenhouse gases, 
from the industrial countries.’5 The term came into professional use in 1992 at 
the Earth Summit of the United Nations in Rio de Janeiro of 1992, with NGOs 
promoting the concept through an ‘Alternative Treaty’. An initial voice was the 
Institute of Political Ecology in Santiago, Chile, and contributed to world 
consciousness about CFC damage to the ozone layer. A Colombian lawyer, José 
María Borrero, wrote a 1994 book on the topic, and further research and 
advocacy was provided by the Foundation for Research on the Protection of the 
Environment. By 1999 Friends of the Earth International and Christian Aid 
agreed to campaign against Ecological Debt, especially in relation to climate 
damage. 
The leading scientist in the field, Autonomous University of Barcelona’s 
Joan Martinez-Alier, calculates ecological debt in many forms: ‘nutrients in 
exports including virtual water, the oil and minerals no longer available, the 
biodiversity destroyed, sulphur dioxide emitted by copper smelters, the mine 
tailings, the harms to health from flower exports, the pollution of water by 
mining, the commercial use of information and knowledge on genetic resources, 
when they have been appropriated gratis (‘biopiracy’), and agricultural genetic 
resources.’ As for the North’s ‘lack of payment for environmental services or 
for the disproportionate use of Environmental Space,’ Martinez-Alier criticizes 
‘imports of solid or liquid toxic waste, and free disposal of gas residues (carbon 
dioxide, CFCs, etc).’ According to Martinez-Alier:  
The notion of an Ecological Debt is not particularly radical. Think of the 
environmental liabilities incurred by firms (under the United States Superfund 
legislation), or of the engineering field called ‘restoration ecology’, or the 
proposals by the Swedish government in the early 1990s to calculate the 
country’s environmental debt.6 
The sums involved are potentially vast. As Martinez-Alier puts it, ‘tropical 
rainforests used for wood exports have an extraordinary past we will never 
know and ongoing biodiversity whose destruction we cannot begin to value.’ 
However, ‘although it is not possible to make an exact accounting, it is 
necessary to establish the principal categories and certain orders of magnitude in 
order to stimulate discussion… If we take the present human-made emissions 
of carbon, [this represents] a total annual subsidy of $75 billion is forthcoming 
from South to North.’7 Leading ecofeminist Vandana Shiva8 and former South 
Centre director Yash Tandon9 estimate that wild seed varieties alone account for 
$66 billion in annual biopiracy benefits to the US. Examples of biopiracy in 
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Africa, according to a 2005 study commissioned by Edmonds Institute, African 
Centre for Biosafety, include: 
! three dozen cases of African resources – worth $billions – captured by firms 
for resale without adequate ‘Access and Benefit Sharing’ agreements between 
producers and the people who first used the natural products; 
! diabetes drug produced by a Kenyan microbe and Libyan/Ethiopian 
treatment; 
! antibiotics from Gambian termite hill and giant West African land snails;  
! antifungal from Namibian giraffe and nematocidal fungi from Burkina Faso;  
! infection-fighting amoeba from Mauritius; 
! Congo (Brazzaville) treatment for impotence;  
! vaccines from Egyptian microbes;  
! South African and Namibian indigenous appetite suppressant Hoodia; 
! drug addiction treatments, multipurpose kombo butter from Central, 
W.Africa; 
! beauty, healing treatment from Okoumé resin in Central Africa;  
! skin and hair care from the argan tree in Morocco, Egyptian ‘Pharaoh’s 
Wheat’, bambara groundnut and ‘resurrection plant’;  
! endophytes and improved fescues from Algeria and Morocco;  
! groundnuts from Malawi, Senegal, Mozambique, Sudan and Nigeria;  
! Tanzanian impatiens; and  
! molluscicides from the Horn of Africa.10 
A partial ecological debt accounting was published by environmental scientists 
in early 2008, and counted $1.8 trillion in concrete damages over several 
decades.11 According to co-author Richard Norgaard, ecological economist 
at the University of California, Berkeley, generated a crucial finding: ‘At least to 
some extent, the rich nations have developed at the expense of the poor, and, in 
effect, there is a debt to the poor. That, perhaps, is one reason that they are 
poor. You don’t see it until you do the kind of accounting that we do here’.12 
The study included factors such as greenhouse gas emissions, ozone layer 
depletion, agriculture, deforestation, overfishing, and the conversion of 
mangrove swamps into shrimp farms, but the researchers did not (so far) 
succeed in calculating other damages, e.g. excessive freshwater withdrawals, 
destruction of coral reefs, bio-diversity loss, invasive species, and war. 
Another route into the intellectual challenge of calculating ecological debt 
was taken by the World Bank (2006) in its estimates of tangible wealth (in the 
book Where is the Wealth of Nations?). In addition to resource depletion and rent 
outflows, there are also other subsoil assets, timber resources, non-timber forest 
resources, protected areas, cropland and pastureland to account for. The 
‘produced capital’ normally captured in GDP accounting is added to the 
tangible wealth. In the case of Ghana, to consider one example, that amounted 
to $2,022 per person in 2000. The same year, the Gross National Saving of 
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Ghana was $40 and education spending was $7. These figures require downward 
adjustment to account for the consumption of fixed capital ($19), as well as the 
depletion of wealth in the form of stored energy ($0), minerals ($4) and net 
forest assets ($8). In Ghana, the adjusted net saving was $16 per person in 2000. 
But given population growth of 1.7%, the country’s wealth actually shrunk by 
$18 per person in 2000. Notwithstanding the World Bank’s conservative 
counting bias,13 Africa shows evidence of net per capita wealth reduction, largely 
traceable to the extraction of nonrenewable resources that is not 
counterbalanced by capital investment from those firms doing the extraction 
(Table 1). 
 
 Income per capita 
before adjustment 
($) 
Change in wealth 
per capita after 
adjustment ($) 
Benin 360 -42 
Botswana 2925 814 
Burkina Faso 230 -36 
Burundi 97 -37 
Cameroon 548 -152 
CapeVerde 1195 -81 
Chad 174 -74 
Comoros 367 -73 
Rep of Congo 660 -727 
Côte d’Ivoire 625 -100 
Ethiopia 101 -27 
Gabon 3370 -2241 
The Gambia 305 -45 
Ghana 255 -18 
Kenya 343 -11 
Madagascar 245 -56 
Malawi 162 -29 
Mali 221 -47 
Mauritania 382 -147 
Mauritius 3697 514 
Mozambique 195 -20 
Namibia 1820 140 
Niger 166 -83 
Nigeria 297 -210 
Rwanda 233 -60 
Senegal 449 -27 
Seychelles 7089 904 
South Africa 2837 -2 
Swaziland 1375 8 
Togo 285 -88 
Zambia 312 -63 
Zimbabwe 550 -4 
 
 Table 1: African countries’ adjusted national wealth, 200014 
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African Leaders United? 
How is Africa reacting? Generally the leadership of African countries has 
cooperated with those doing the resource extraction and utilizing Africa’s 
ecological space, with only complaints by exploited communities, by workers 
subject to safety/health violations and exploitation, and by environmentalists. 
However, finally in mid-2009, the African Union’s leadership on climate issues 
became a force to be reckoned with, thanks to Ethiopian prime-minister Meles 
Zenawi, who also chaired the New Partnership for Africa’s Development and 
thus was invited to G20 gatherings along with the South African government. 
Sometimes considered a US proxy power in the Horn of Africa – thanks to the 
disastrous, Washington-sponsored 2007 invasion of neighboring Somalia – 
Zenawi is rather more complex. He was once a self-described Marxist but 
became a tyrant whose troops killed scores of students and other democrats. It 
is ironic, thus, for Zenawi to lead the ecological debt charge, reportedly 
demanding a minimum of $67 billion – and up to $200 billion – annually from 
the North by 2020.15 
Ironic or tragic, nevertheless this voice must be heard, considering how 
much Africa will be devastated by the climate crisis. The most shocking 
probable outcome of climate change is, according to the UN Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change director R.K. Pachauri, ‘that there could be a possible 
reduction in yields in agriculture of: 50% by 2020 in some African countries... In 
Africa, crop net revenues could fall by as much as 90% by 2100, with small-scale 
farmers being the most affected.’16 The Climate Change Vulnerability Index, 
calculated in 2009 ‘from dozens of variables measuring the capacity of a country 
to cope with the consequences of global warming’, listed 22 African countries 
out of 28 across the world at ‘extreme risk’, whereas the United States is near 
the bottom of the world rankings of countries at risk even though it is the 
leading per capita contributor to climate change.17 
There is no question that those most responsible should pay reparations, 
now that there is near-universal awareness of the damage being done by rising 
greenhouse gas emissions, and by the ongoing stubborn refusal by the rich to 
cut back. The amounts can be debated, for of course $67 billion/year for Africa 
is way too low, given how many incalculably valuable species will be lost, how 
much devastation to individuals and communities is already underway, how 
many economies will falter, how much ecology is threatened. 
The question is not mainly a technical one, but related to power. Behind 
African elites’ considerations are the threat to repeat their performance in 
Seattle in 1999 and Cancun in 2003, when denial of consent in World Trade 
Organization negotiations were the proximate cause of the summits’ collapse on 
both occasions. On September 3, 2009, Zenawi issued a strong threat from 
Addis Ababa about the upcoming Copenhagen conference: ‘If need be we are 
prepared to walk out of any negotiations that threatens to be another rape of 
our continent.’18 
To gather that power, Zenawi established the Conference of African Heads 
of State and Government on Climate Change: chairpersons of the AU and the 
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AU Commission, representatives of Ethiopia, Algeria, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Uganda, Chairpersons of 
the African Ministerial Conference on Environment and Technical Negotiators 
on climate change from all member states. They met at the AU Summit in Sirte, 
Libya in July 2009, agreeing that Africa would have a sole delegation to 
Copenhagen with a united front and demands for compensation. According to 
AU official Abebe Hailegabriel, ‘Trillions of dollars might not be enough in 
compensation. Thus there must be an assessment of the impact before the 
figure.’ Added AU head Jean Ping, ‘Africa’s development aspirations are at stake 
unless urgent steps are taken to address the problems of climate change. Climate 
change will fundamentally affect productivity, increase the prevalence of disease 
and poverty...and trigger conflict and war’.19 
The most important African negotiator – and largest CO2 emitter 
(responsible for more than 40% of the continent’s CO2) – is South Africa.20 
Long seen as a vehicle for Western interests in Africa, Pretoria’s negotiators 
have two conflicting agendas: increasing Northern payments to Africa (a 
longstanding objective of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, which 
requested $64 billion per annum in aid and investment concessions during the 
early 2000s, much of which would be channeled through Pretoria as an aspiring 
good-governance gate-keeper); and increasing its own CO2 outputs through 
around 2050, when the Long-Term Mitigation Scenario – South Africa’s official 
climate cap – would come into effect (only at that point are significant emissions 
declines offered as a scenario). In the meantime, Pretoria has earmarked more 
than $100 billion for emissions-intensive coal and nuclear fired electricity 
generation plants due to be constructed during 2010-15, which would amplify 
Africa’s climate crisis, requiring more resources from the North for adaptation. 
But the South African ruling class does not, officially, see itself as an ecological 
creditor. As the environment minister, Buyelwa Sonjica put it in September 
2009: ‘We expect money. We need money to be made available... we need 
money as of yesterday for adaptation and mitigation.’21 
South African negotiators are also amongst leaders of the G77 on this issue, 
and are on record from August 2009 demanding that ‘at least 1% of global GDP 
should be set aside by rich nations’, according to one report, so as to help 
developing countries conduct research, improve flood control, protect their 
coastlines, create seed banks and take other steps to cope with the severe storms 
and droughts linked to climate change. The money also could help poor 
countries obtain technology to reduce their carbon emissions. Alf Wills, a top 
South African environmental official, summed up the position going into 
Copenhagen: ‘No money, no deal.’22 
There are other allies, especially Bolivia, whose submission to the UNFCCC 
in 2009 made the ecological debt demand explicitly: 
The climate debt of developed countries must be repaid, and this payment must 
begin with the outcomes to be agreed in Copenhagen. Developing countries are 
not seeking economic handouts to solve a problem we did not cause. What we 
call for is full payment of the debt owed to us by developed countries for 
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threatening the integrity of the Earth’s climate system, for over-consuming a 
shared resource that belongs fairly and equally to all people, and for maintaining 
lifestyles that continue to threaten the lives and livelihoods of the poor majority 
of the planet’s population. This debt must be repaid by freeing up environmental 
space for developing countries and particular the poorest communities. There is 
no viable solution to climate change that is effective without being equitable. 
Deep emission reductions by developed countries are a necessary condition for 
stabilising the Earth’s climate. So too are profoundly larger transfers of 
technologies and financial resources than so far considered, if emissions are to be 
curbed in developing countries and they are also to realize their right to 
development and achieve their overriding priorities of poverty eradication and 
economic and social development. Any solution that does not ensure an 
equitable distribution of the Earth’s limited capacity to absorb greenhouse gases, 
as well as the costs of mitigating and adapting to climate change, is destined to 
fail.23 
Bolivia’s government is generally driven by left-leaning popular forces in the 
rural and urban social movements. Other countries that have expressed similar 
sentiments include Venezuela, Paraguay, Malaysia and Sri Lanka. In Africa, 
where most countries do not have such strong movements, what is the state of 
play around civil society’s ecological debt demands? 
Civil Society Reactions 
The threat of a walkout at Copenhagen was contemplated with interest by civil 
society groups, both in Africa and across the world. The former became 
increasingly active in August 2008 when Africa chapters of Jubilee South 
converged in Nairobi to debunk limited ‘debt relief’ by Northern powers and to 
plan the next stage of financial campaigning. Nairobi-based Africa Jubilee South 
co-coordinator Njoki Njehu concluded, ‘Africa and the rest of the Global South 
are owed a huge historical and ecological debt for slavery, colonialism, and 
centuries of exploitation.’ Njehu says Jubilee’s challenge as it rebuilds is to link 
issues as diverse as food sovereignty, climate change, trade and EU Economic 
Partnership Agreements and continuing debt bondage. ‘From the initial 13 
countries that participated in the Jubilee South founding conference in 
Johannesburg in 1999, the Africa Jubilee South network has grown to 
organizations and movements from 29 countries.’24 
A year later in Nairobi, the Africa Peoples Movement on Climate Change (a 
Nairobi-based initiative hosted by Ibon and the Kenyan Debt Relief Network) 
pronounced:  
! We reject the principle and application of Carbon Trading, which is a false 
solution based on inventing a perverse property right to pollute, a property 
right to air;  
! We demand that human rights and values be placed at the centre of all 
global, national and regional solutions to the problem of climate change;  
! We call on colleagues in the social and economic justice movement globally 
to rigorously campaign against the undemocratic corporate led agendas 
which will dominate the deliberations and processes at COP 15;  
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! We emphasize that ecological, small holder, agro-biodiversity based food 
production can ensure food and seed sovereignty and address climate change 
in Africa; 
! We support the call by African leaders for reparations on Climate Change 
and support the initiative of the upcoming AU ministers of environment 
meeting and call for African governments to embrace more people centred 
alternatives for the African peoples;  
! We urge African governments to engage civil society groups positively and 
collaborate with them to build common national and international responses 
on the problems of climate change.25 
Another node of ecological debt organizing is the World Council of Churches 
(WCC), whose Central Committee adopted a formal statement in September 
2009 on the North’s ‘deep moral obligation to promote ecological justice by 
addressing our debts to peoples most affected by ecological destruction and to 
the earth itself.’ It is useful to consider the WCC’s analysis because it does not 
stop at the debt, but attacks the mode of production itself: 
We call for the recognition, repayment and restitution of ecological debt in 
various ways, including non-market ways of compensation and reparation, that 
go beyond the market’s limited ability to measure and distribute... This warrants 
a re-ordering of economic paradigms from consumerist, exploitive models to 
models that are respectful of localized economies, indigenous cultures and 
spiritualities, the earth’s reproductive limits, as well as the right of other life 
forms to blossom. And this begins with the recognition of ecological debt.26 
The WCC Central Committee made several requests, including that the 
environmental justice and faith community: 
! Urges Northern governments, institutions and corporations to take 
initiatives to drastically reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions within 
and beyond the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), which stipulates the principles of historical responsibility and 
‘common, but differentiated responsibilities’ (CDR), according to the fixed 
timelines set out by the UNFCCC report of 2007. 
! Urges WCC member churches to call their governments to adopt a fair and 
binding deal, in order to bring the CO2 levels down to less than 350 parts 
per million (ppm), at the Conference of Parties (COP 15) of the UNFCCC 
in Copenhagen in December 2009, based on climate justice principles, which 
include effective support to vulnerable communities to adapt to the 
consequences of climate change through adaptation funds and technology 
transfer. 
! Calls upon the international community to ensure the transfer of financial 
resources to countries of the South to keep petroleum in the ground in 
fragile environments and preserve other natural resources as well as to pay 
for the costs of climate change mitigation and adaptation based on tools 
such as the Greenhouse Development Rights (GDR) Framework. 
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! Demands the cancellation of the illegitimate financial debts of Southern 
countries, most urgently for the poorest nations, as part of social and 
ecological compensations, not as official development assistance.27 
It is evident at this writing (October 2009) that the COP15 – or its immediate 
successors – will not make the urgent progress required in three areas: first, 
cutting emissions to the levels at which climate disaster can be averted (at least 
45% by 2020); or second, replacing the ‘false solution’ of carbon trading with 
genuine emissions cuts; or third, on providing restitution and reparations to 
Third World peoples, or even canceling their illegitimate debts. To be sure, in 
September 2009, the European Union acknowledged its responsibility to begin 
paying ecological debt, but only up to $22 billion annually to fund adaptation, 
roughly 1/7th of what EU environment commissioner Stavros Dimas observed 
would be required by 2020 ($145 bn). Some of that would be subtracted from 
existing aid. The EU damage estimates were considered far too conservative, as 
China’s mitigation and adaptation costs alone would be $438 bn annually by 
2030, according to Beijing. According to one report, the EU view is that 
emissions trading should be the basis of ‘much of the shortfall’, because ‘The 
international carbon market, if designed properly, will create an increasing 
financial flow to developing countries and could potentially deliver as much as 
!38bn per year in 2020.’28 As noted above, however, this strategy is replete with 
fatal flaws. 
Because of the influence of big capital and pro-market ideology on Northern 
governments in the Kyoto process to date, not only will emissions continue 
rising and the ecological debt not be properly paid, carbon trading will not be 
dropped as a central EU and US strategy. As a result, critical narratives will 
become more common, and in turn will force serious advocates of 
environmental justice to raise very important strategic issues about how to get 
the North to repay the ecological debt.  
Conclusion: Repaying the Debt? 
Existing North-South redistributive processes are not effective. Northern 
foreign aid to the South goes only a small way towards ecological debt 
repayment. It is a far lower sum (and falling) than military spending (which is 
rising), and in any case 60% is ‘phantom aid’, according to the Johannesburg-
based agency Action Aid.29 Aid is also a tool of imperialism. Other North-South 
payments to Africa are yet more dubious, including the debt relief promised in 
2005. In spite of enormous hype at the Gleneagles G8 meeting, the 
International Monetary Fund calculates that notwithstanding a lower debt stock, 
the actual debt repayments of the lowest-income African countries stayed stable 
from 2006-08 and then increased 50% in 2009 as a percentage of export 
earnings.30 So although there was debt cancellation, it was on unrepayable debt, 
with debilitating debt servicing charges for low-income African countries still 
preventing local accumulation and provision of social services, much less 
financing preparations for climate change adaptation. 
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There are important debates about who should pay what share. But in 
general, it is important to note that ecological debt results from the 
unsustainable production and consumption systems adopted by elites in the 
Northern countries, which are to some extent generalized across the Northern 
populations. Hence even poor and working-class people in the North, often 
through no fault of their own, are tied into systems of auto-centric transport or 
conspicuous consumption, which mean that they consume far more of the 
Earth’s resources than do working-class people of the South. 
Hence, recalling the WCC position in favour of a ‘Greenhouse Development 
Rights’ framework, it is worth considering that a per capita ‘right to pollute’ – 
and to trade pollution rights – will have some of the same dubious outcomes. 
The bigger questions which GDRs pose are whether environmental justice can 
be measured merely in terms of formal ‘equality’; whether environmental justice 
is instead historical, political-economic, and grounded in social struggles of 
those adversely affected; and in turn, whether environmental justice should not 
aim higher, for a broader, deeper eco-social transformation? The WCC hints at 
such a perspective, but the GDR approach may foreclose it by reducing the 
challenge to incremental reformism. When it comes specifically to GDRs as a 
methodology for calculating debt liabilities and beneficiaries, Larry Lohmann of 
The Cornerhouse (a British development institute) critiques the model’s tacit 
endorsement of a long-discredited concept of ‘development’ that 
condescendingly sees ‘resilience’ as ‘far beyond the grasp of the billions of 
people that are still mired in poverty’, and that singles out for special climate 
blame ‘subsistence farming, fuel wood harvesting, grazing, and timber 
extraction’ by ‘poor communities’ awaiting Northern tutelage in capital flows, 
social networking, carbon trading and methods for holding policymakers 
accountable.31 
Is a rights-based approach to environmental services preferable, as a strategy 
for demanding and properly redistributing ecological debt payments from North 
to South? South Africa’s ‘Free Basic Services’ provide insights into the 
possibilities and limitations of rights discourses for redistributing wealth from 
North to South. In 2000 (just after Nelson Mandela left the presidency), the 
ruling party’s municipal campaign platform highlighted this promise: ‘African 
National Congress-led local government will provide all residents with a free 
basic amount of water, electricity and other municipal services, so as to help the 
poor. Those who use more than the basic amounts will pay for the extra they 
use.’ But as can be shown in excruciating detail, it was the failure to move 
beyond individualized nuclear-family household units and tokenistic amounts of 
free basic water (6 kl/household/month) and electricity 
(50kWh/household/month) that led to many ‘service delivery protests’ during 
subsequent years, contributing to South Africa’s standing as the country with 
the most per capita social unrest. Attempts to gain justice in these cases through 
the court system – even the Constitutional Court in September 2009 – proved 
extremely frustrating.32 
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Juridical approaches to ecological debt may not be optimal, although 
interesting precedents have emerged. In November 2008 a San Francisco court 
began considering an ecological debt and reparations lawsuit – under the Alien 
Tort Claims Act – filed by Larry Bowoto and the Ilaje people of the Niger Delta 
against Chevron for involvement in 1998 murders reminiscent of those that 
took the life of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni leaders on November 10, 
1995. The first judgments went against Bowoto et al but appeals are in process. 
In June 2009, Shell Oil agreed in a similar lawsuit to an out-of-court settlement 
with reparations payments of $15.5 million. Although representing just four 
hours’ worth of Shell profits, it was considered a crucial step in establishing 
liability and disincentivizing corporate exploitation of people and nature. In late 
2009, further reparations lawsuits were expected in the New York Second 
District Court by victims of apartheid who initially requested $400 billion in 
damages from US corporations which profited from South African operations 
during the same period. Supreme Court justices had so many investments in 
these companies that in 2008 they bounced the case back to a lower New York 
court to decide, effectively throwing out an earlier judgment against the 
plaintiffs: the Jubilee anti-debt movement, the Khulumani Support Group for 
apartheid victims, and 17,000 other black South Africans. When Judge Clara 
Scheindlin replaced the late John Sprizzo, the case suddenly was taken seriously 
and in March 2009 moved a step closer to trial when she rejected the 
corporations’ attempt to have it dismissed.33 
Beyond these kinds of tort actions, will courts start declaring climate-related 
ecological debt a valid concept? Environmental rights to protection from 
climate change were explored in a court case filed by Friends of the Earth, 
Greenpeace and the cities of Boulder, Colorado, Arcata, Santa Monica and 
Oakland in California, against the US Export-Import Bank and Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation, which had invested, loaned or insured $32 billion in 
fossil fuel projects from 1990–2003 without regard to the US National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). At present, only US cities have formal 
standing to sue for damages from climate change under NEPA, in the wake of a 
2005 federal ruling. The out-of-court-settlement in February 2009 meant that 
the defendants will in future incorporate CO2 emissions into planning, but there 
are prospects for further suits that extend into identification and payment of 
damages.34 
There are quite obvious limits to prospects for court relief under the Alien 
Tort Claims Act or NEPA, the two most advanced areas. Hence it would be 
consistent to also proceed with more immediate strategies, as well as direct 
action tactics. As Al Gore expressed it in 2007, ‘I can’t understand why there 
aren’t rings of young people blocking bulldozers and preventing them from 
constructing coal-fired power plants’.35 Arguing that ‘Protest and direct action 
could be the only way to tackle soaring carbon emissions,’ the US National 
Aeronautic and Space Administration’s leading climate scientist, James Hansen, 
‘The democratic process is supposed to be one person one vote, but it turns out 
that money is talking louder than the votes. So, I’m not surprised that people are 
getting frustrated. I think that peaceful demonstration is not out of order, 
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because we’re running out of time.’36 Hansen himself moved to direct action in 
2009, demonstrating at coal-fired power plants in Coventry, England and West 
Virginia (where at the latter site he was arrested).  
But the most effective examples of direct action come from the Global 
South, especially the Niger Delta. In January 2007, at the World Social Forum in 
Nairobi, many other groups became aware of this movement thanks to eloquent 
activists from the Delta, including the Port Harcourt NGO Environmental 
Rights Action (ERA). In separate disruptions of production (including armed 
interventions), the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
prevented roughly 80% of the country’s oil from being extracted, although a 
cease-fire was called in mid-2009.37 The strategy is consistent with the 
grassroots, coalface and fenceline demands of civil society activists in the 
Oilwatch network (headquartered at ERA) to leave the oil in the soil, the coal in the 
hole, the tar sand in the land. Activists from Accion Ecologica popularized this 
approach in their struggle to halt exploitation of the oil beneath the Yasuni park 
in the Ecuadoran Amazon. The German state development agency GTZ 
conceded to a $50 mn/year grant, although Yasuni may become a pilot carbon 
trading case unless Ecuadoran environmental and indigenous rights activists can 
resist.38 By October 2009, the hope lay in Ecuadorean Foreign Minister Fander 
Falconi’s public announcement that he would review the Yasuni to reconsider 
any relationship with the carbon market. 
The legacy of keeping oil in the soil includes Alaskan and Californian 
environmentalists who halted drilling and even exploration. In Norway, the 
global justice group, ATTAC, took up the same concerns in an October 2007 
conference and began the hard work of persuading wealthy Norwegian Oil 
Fund managers that they should use the vast proceeds of their North Sea 
inheritance to repay Ecuadorans some of the ecological debt owed via a Yasuni 
grant. In Australia, regular blockades of Newcastle coal transport (by rail and 
sea) by the activist group, Rising Tide, correspond to Gore’s injunction.  
Canada is another Northern site where activists are hard at work to leave the 
oil in the soil. In a November 2007 conference in Edmonton, the University of 
Alberta Parkland Institute addressed the need to halt development of tar sand 
deposits (which require a liter of oil to be burned for every three extracted and 
devastate local water, fisheries, and air quality). Institute director Gordon Laxer 
laid out careful arguments for strict limits on the use of water and greenhouse 
gas emissions in tar sand extraction; realistic land reclamation plans (including a 
financial deposit large enough to cover full-cost reclamation up-front); no 
further subsidies for the production of dirty energy; provisions for energy 
security for Canadians (since so much of the tar sand extract is exported to the 
U.S.); and much higher economic rents on dirty energy to fund a clean energy 
industry (currently Alberta has a very low royalty rate). These kinds of 
provisions would strictly limit the extraction of fossil fuels and permit oil to 
leave the soil only under conditions in which much greater socio-ecological and 
economic benefit is retained by the broader society.39  
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There are many other examples where courageous communities and 
environmentalists have lobbied successfully to keep nonrenewable resources 
(not just fossil fuels) in the ground for the sake of the environment, community 
stability, disincentivizing political corruption, and workforce health and safety. 
For many victims, the extraction of these resources is incredibly costly in terms 
of local land use, water extraction, energy consumption, and political corruption, 
and requires constant surveillance and community solidarity. The adverse 
balance of forces noted at the outset should be restated: the climate negotiators 
and corporations of the Global North will consistently fail to make sustained 
emissions cuts; to depart from the ineffectual, dangerous carbon trading modus 
operandi; and to offer adequate reparations for the ecological debt. This will, in 
turn, require national states to take stronger actions, such as Zenawi has 
threatened, or as Bolivia’s Evo Morales has done in his ecological debt 
statement, or as Ecuador’s Rafael Correa did in defaulting on odious foreign 
debt in early 2009. But most of all, it will require people of conscience across 
the world to become involved, and to offer solidarity and activism aimed at 
leaving fossil fuels in the ground. 
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Rethinking the Legal Regime for Climate Change: 
The Human Rights and Equity Imperative 
Philippe Cullet 
Introduction 
The existing climate change regime has a strong equity basis. This includes, in 
particular the differential obligations that developed and developing countries 
have taken with regard to emissions reduction. Equity will in all likelihood 
remain a key component of any future climate change deal because differential 
treatment remains a condition for developing country participation. While 
equity has been a key principle of climate change instruments for the past two 
decades, the same cannot be said with regard to human rights aspects of climate 
change. The increasing certainty about the causes and the consequences of 
climate change as well as the increasingly visible links between climate change 
and most other environmental issues has made the link between ongoing 
climate change and human rights much more evident. Yet, human rights play at 
best an extremely marginal role in the existing climate change regime.  
The existing climate change regime needs to be revisited for several reasons. 
Firstly, the commitments taken by developed countries until now are 
insufficient to effectively mitigate climate change. Secondly, the existing 
conceptual framework for differential treatment based largely on a division 
between developed and developing countries is increasingly incapable of 
providing results that are just. This is due to the fact that there is little that can 
justify putting together countries about to be submerged by rising sea levels and 
countries whose economies are completely dependent on oil extraction. 
Similarly there is little in common between a small land-locked least developed 
country like Malawi and giants like China and India. Thirdly, the state-centric 
framework to achieve differentiation has never been the best possible policy 
instrument. It has, however, become increasingly less appropriate in the past 15 
years that have witnessed very fast growth in some countries but of a kind that 
has seen inequalities between the poor and the rich increasing markedly. A new 
framework that recognizes not only the distinction between rich and poor 
between countries but also within countries is thus necessary. This is where the 
inclusion of a human rights perspective can make a significant difference.  
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Limitations of the Existing Regime and Evolving Situation 
The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities underlies the whole 
climate change regime.1 It provides a strong basis for climate change mitigation 
commitments that are not simply based on a mechanical application of the 
principle of sovereign legal equality. The latter would not yield results that are 
substantively equal. In this sense, the climate change regime is among the most 
progressive instruments dealing with a global issue.  
Yet, this is insufficient because the present regime is not conceived broadly 
enough. A number of additional issues need to considered in the future to 
ensure that the overall problem of climate change is effectively addressed, to 
ensure that each country’s contribution to any mitigation effort is proportional 
to its responsibility and capacity, to ensure that countries of the South suffering 
disproportionately more from ongoing climate change are given the priority they 
deserve and to ensure that climate change is not addressed as an issue that 
affects countries as if everyone in a given country was equal in front of climate 
change. 
One of the ways in which a broader framework can be given to the equity 
dimension of climate change is by giving a more prominent role to the notion of 
vulnerability. Vulnerability is an apt starting point because it has influenced the 
climate change regime from the outset.2 It emphasizes the fact that countries 
and people are not similarly placed when it comes to making choices that 
influence their contribution to climate change or when it comes to the impacts 
of climate change. It also constitutes an acknowledgment of the fact that while 
climate change is a global issue, different parts of the globe are and will be 
affected in different ways by its negative impacts. This is true of countries since 
countries like the Maldives and Nepal do not and will not suffer the same kind 
of problems because of climate change. This is also true of people since 
different individuals and communities do not and will not be affected in the 
same way. A number of reasons explain these differences, ranging from 
geographical factors that sees people living in low-lying areas more likely to be 
affected by rising sea levels than those living higher up to socio-economic 
factors that see the rich being able to adapt much more easily, for instance by 
relocating to safer locations. 
In legal terms, the existing regime is limited in several ways. Firstly, its equity 
framework is built in large part around mitigation issues which indirectly gives 
more importance to long-term concerns over ongoing adaptation threats. 
Secondly, the climate change regime is built around a convenient but limited 
framework that largely divides the world between developed and developing 
countries. This does not provide a framework to recognize the vast gaps that 
exist between different countries such as Tuvalu and Saudi Arabia and the lack 
of common interests these countries have in the face of climate change. Thirdly, 
the framework adopted in 1992 may not be anymore adapted to changed 
circumstances two decades later. Whereas issues of historical responsibility have 
changed little over the past two decades, the same is not true of overall 
greenhouse gas emissions. Since climate change is global in nature a simple 
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North-South division may not be sufficient to address the problem at stake. 
Fourthly, the whole climate change regime is not adapted to the challenges that 
need to be addressed. The traditional state-centric international law framework 
is reductionist because it does not give effective space to people’s concerns. 
This requires a different paradigm for the future. The inclusion of a human 
rights dimension to the climate change regime constitutes a first way to reorient 
the regime. 
Another issue that needs to be addressed in future is the premise on which 
emissions reduction commitments are allocated. At present the regime assumes 
that countries have a certain entitlement to pollute and the main question is to 
allocate these entitlements among countries. This is convenient in terms of 
negotiations but does not include any acknowledgment that climate change 
mitigation must start not from the comfort zone of existing pollution levels but 
from the needs of the global environment together with the needs of the 
regions and people likely to suffer most. This includes rethinking the ways in 
which we conceive air, the atmosphere and the right to pollute in legal terms.  
These different issues and the need for new ways to think about climate 
change policy are illustrated by the case of India. On the one hand, India 
remains without any possible doubt a developing country. India’s position in the 
ranking of the Human Development Index at number 128 just ahead of several 
least developed countries like Laos and Cambodia reflects the reality that the 
majority of Indians experience. On the other hand, India has experienced fast 
economic growth in recent years. Additionally it has increasingly sought to flex 
its political muscle on the world stage by seeking recognition as a major power. 
In terms of climate change, as in many other dimensions, India is today two 
countries. The India that shines has standards of living that often match those 
of developed countries with a concomitant negative environmental impact in 
terms of climate change. In India the majority of the population has made little 
progress since 1990. Thus, 77 per cent of the population has an income of less 
than $2 a day.3 In fact, while there has been some reduction in the percentage of 
people in ‘extreme poverty’, the overall number of poor and vulnerable people 
has increased from 733 to 836 millions between 1993-94 and 2004-05.4 
From an equity perspective, India must be analyzed from these two different 
perspectives. On the one hand, from the perspective of climate change, an 
international problem requiring the collaboration of all states to address it, India 
has a duty to contribute to efforts to mitigate climate change. In fact, India is 
already contributing to climate change mitigation through its involvement in the 
Clean Development Mechanism like other developing countries. Yet, 
progressively, more needs to be done. Additionally, from the perspective of a 
big country that shows no signs of overall vulnerability, it is increasingly difficult 
to justify that India should hide behind the veil of its ‘developing country’ status 
since it has little in common with countries like Malawi or the Maldives in terms 
of vulnerability.  
On the other hand, the overwhelming majority of India’s population is as 
vulnerable as the average inhabitants of other developing countries, including in 
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many cases people in least developed countries. India’s rank of 94 on the Global 
Hunger Index (out of 118 countries listed) reflects this other reality.5 Equity, as 
realized through differential treatment in international law cannot justify the 
imposition of emissions reduction or stabilization commitments in a way that 
would increase the vulnerability of the already vulnerable majority of the 
population. This would go against the idea of progressive of realization of 
fundamental rights. 
New Bases for the Climate Change Regime 
This section focuses on some of the many issues that need rethinking in the 
continuous search for an effective climate change regime. It highlights the need 
for a new understanding of differentiation. It also emphasizes the primacy of 
human rights and vulnerability as a necessary foundation of further measures on 
climate change. Further, it argues that air and the atmosphere should be 
recognized as a common heritage to ensure that the benefits of climate 
mitigation are not appropriated by private actors but rather ploughed back into 
renewable energy or other measures that are sustainable and primarily benefit 
the most vulnerable. Finally, it argues that a new basis for allocating entitlements 
must be found to ensure that the poor and vulnerable are not indirectly 
dispossessed of something that is in essence humankind’s primary survival 
resource. 
Rethinking Differential Treatment for Future Emissions Reduction Commitments 
The basis for differentiation remains as strong as it was at the time of the 
negotiation of the Climate Change Convention. Indeed, on the whole it is the 
same small number of countries that contribute most to climate change in per 
capita terms. At the same time, there is still a majority of countries whose 
contribution to climate change is negligible, starting with all least developed 
countries. These countries are also the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate 
change.  
Yet, rapid economic development in some part of the world over the past 
decade has altered the balance of overall contributions that countries make. In 
particular, the share of big developing countries like India and China in global 
GHG emissions has increased since 1990. This is due to the fact that their 
emissions have been growing at least 4 per cent per year, faster than any other 
region of the world.6 Since the climate change legal regime is primarily about 
achieving a global environmental benefit, any substantial increase in emissions is 
to be taken into account, wherever the additional emissions are generated.  
The need to rethink differential treatment for the future is due to the fact 
that the legal regime must reflect the changes that have taken place since the 
early 1990s in the position of some developing countries, must reflect the 
increasingly central role that climate change plays among environmental issues 
and must reflect the fact that climate change is much more than an 
environmental and economic issue but as well a core human right issue. 
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First, it is increasingly difficult to attribute emissions on the basis of the 
fiction of legal equality of states alone. On the one hand, the direct or indirect 
contribution of each individual country varies, according to wealth and other 
factors. On the other hand, questions arise concerning the responsibility of a 
country for all emissions arising from its territory. The case of special economic 
zones (SEZ) is a telling example. Where companies invest under particularly 
beneficial conditions and where they export all the products they manufacture, 
equity requires that emissions be at least partly allocated to the actors that take 
advantage of the lax legal regimes that increase profits on products that are 
marketed in wealthier parts of the world. Beyond SEZs, a number of other 
situations may call for similar treatment, for instance, where deforestation is 
undertaken to use the cleared land to produce cash crops that are mostly 
exported. In this case, it is necessary to find new ways to allocate responsibility 
for climate change. These should take into account not only countries’ 
contributions but also that of actors that directly benefit in economic terms 
from greenhouse gas emitting activities. This would constitute a useful 
application of the polluter pays principle. The issue can therefore not be 
reduced to a simple dichotomy between taking and not taking commitments. It 
is also not a simple case of whether developing countries as a block (the G77 
group) should or not take on commitments under the Kyoto Protocol.  
Second, differential treatment is not in itself an instrument that seeks to 
favour developing countries. It so happens that under most existing treaties, 
differentiation has been approved based on countries’ classification as 
developed or developing. Yet, since there is no generally agreed definition of 
which country is a developing country and since the decision is often left to self-
identification, this is in itself no effective guide. Further, the simple division in 
two groups is only for convenience’s sake but is increasingly itself inequitable 
since it does not take into account the complete lack of congruence between the 
respective situations of Malawi and South Korea or Vanuatu and India. The real 
purpose of differential treatment, which is to foster substantive equality and a 
partnership among all countries in solving problems of a global nature, cannot 
be equated with the division of the world between developed and developing 
countries. There are thus a number of situations where developing countries 
should either be individually targeted for preferences or at least clubbed in 
smaller groups so that, for example, small island states that are going to 
disappear as a side-effect of climate change do not have to be put in the same 
category as OPEC countries that have become much wealthier because of the 
growth of the global carbon economy.7 
Third, differential treatment goes beyond the granting of preferences based 
on differences in levels of economic development. In fact, differential treatment 
in environmental treaties primarily seeks to foster the overall environmental 
goals of the agreement by fostering the participation of countries that may have 
little incentive to participate. Thus, in the case of climate change, developing 
countries as a whole would have had little incentive in 1992 to join a global legal 
regime to address a problem they had hardly contributed to cause.8 
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The implication is that differential treatment in the context of any 
subsequent commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol needs to be much 
more closely tailored to the overall environmental goals of the regime while 
providing a much-needed equity angle. This means that differentiation must be 
an instrument that takes into account both the contribution of each country to 
the problem, its capacity to mitigate and adapt and the vulnerability of its 
population. In the case of a country like India, this also requires going beyond a 
simplistic decision on commitments versus no commitments. What differential 
treatment calls for is that big countries like India and China whose emissions 
grow faster than any other regions of the world take up their responsibilities as 
member of the international community and more specifically as aspiring 
military and political global powers. At the same time, the focus of differential 
treatment on equity clearly bars the imposition of any commitment that would 
harm the majority of the vulnerable population of these countries. Mechanisms 
thus need to be devised at the international and national levels to ensure that the 
burden of any commitments falls exclusively on polluting industries, on the 
people whose lifestyle makes a significant contribution to climate change and on 
the government to ensure that climate change friendly policies are implemented. 
In other words, commitments should go alongside with new forms of 
international technology transfers and new forms of resource redistribution at 
the national level.  
It is clear that countries like India cannot simply curb their economic growth 
in a bid to satisfy the North. These countries must, nevertheless urgently 
reorient their growth and find alternative economic development paths. One of 
the possible solutions is to rely on technology transfers where the North 
provides the more environmentally friendly technologies it has already 
developed to ensure that economic growth in developing countries is not 
hampered by taking climate change friendly measures. This could include, for 
instance, wind and solar energy technologies. Another solution lies in focusing 
on renewable energy, something that can easily be fostered by reallocating 
resources away from carbon intensive energy sources. In other words, 
addressing climate change does not have to be a costly proposition in terms of 
economic growth. It may in fact provide an excellent opportunity to rethink 
failed economic development strategies. Thus, climate change does not provide 
a basis for promoting just any energy source that is not harmful from a climate 
change point of view. Current efforts to suggest that nuclear energy is an apt 
alternative to carbon-based energy do not take into account the fact that nuclear 
energy has no justification from an environmental point of view. Indeed, while 
the actual production of energy may be harmless in terms of greenhouse gas 
emissions, nuclear energy is unacceptable from the point of view of its other 
impacts, particular because there is no environmentally acceptable solution to 
nuclear waste at present and because of a number of side-effects of nuclear 
power generation on human health are either unknown or not in the public 
domain.9 
With regard to resource redistribution, two main points can be made. Firstly, 
one option may be for some developing countries like India and China to take 
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on commitments with a view to ensure that climate change is effectively averted. 
This would give a strong signal that the world cannot tolerate more emissions 
and that further economic development strategies need to be rethought 
throughout the world. The commitments taken by such countries in the name 
of the global environment benefit that is climate change mitigation and reduced 
costs of climate change adaptation should be borne in part or entirely by 
developed countries under the CBDR principle. Secondly, any form of 
compensation that is provided by developed to developing countries with 
commitments should be carefully targeted. It must benefit the poor and in 
priority the poorest and the most vulnerable. This is a matter of equity and 
human rights since both focus on the situation of the most disadvantaged. 
Resources made available should be invested primarily in mitigation and 
adaptation measures for the poor since they are the most vulnerable and least 
able to adapt, as well as in measures that put the poor at the centre of any new 
economic development strategies. Together, this will ensure that differentiation 
contributes to global and local environmental benefits as well as to poverty 
alleviation and the realization of human rights. This new framework is 
imperative to redirect climate change law towards being more environmentally 
friendly and more equitable.  
The Human Rights Imperative 
Links between climate change and human rights can be identified at different 
levels. Yet, human rights have not been a significant dimension of climate 
change policy debates. This can be partly ascribed to the fact that while climate 
change is in essence an environmental problem, it requires much more 
significant changes in strategies of economic development than other 
environmental problems. Additionally the link between GHG emissions and 
economic growth has ensured that debates have given significant attention to 
economic, trade and financial aspects of climate change. Another less obvious 
reason is that the addition of a human right dimension to climate change has the 
potential to completely change the way in which law and policy is conceived in 
this area. Indeed, the human rights consequences of climate change are 
potentially so severe that they will overwhelmingly prevail over economic and 
related considerations if human rights are effectively taken into consideration in 
climate change law and policy. Nevertheless, human rights must be placed at the 
centre of law and policy on climate change. This is a precondition for ensuring 
the legitimacy of climate change law and ensuring that measures taken on 
environmental grounds do not have negative human rights consequences.  
Human rights concerns arise both in the context of mitigation and 
adaptation. With regard to climate change mitigation issues arise for developing 
countries with regard to taking on emission stabilization or reduction 
commitments. Indeed, commitments are only justifiable if their consequences 
are completely offset for the majority of the poor. This is a direct consequence 
of the principle that countries can take progressive measures to realize socio-
economic rights but they cannot backtrack.10 It goes further than this since 
climate change commitments should also not lead to any reduction in the 
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measures currently taken to progressively realize human rights. Thus, it would 
not be enough to take measures to reduce GHG emissions in the generation of 
electricity. At the same time, measures must be taken to increase access to 
electricity for the majority of villagers who do not have access at present. This 
may require a reduction in consumption from the wealthier individuals and 
economic actors or the installation of alternative, CO2 free sources of electricity 
in villages. 
Conversely, the realization of the human rights to life, health, food, water 
and environment for the majority of the poor should be put at the centre of 
climate change policies. In other words, any shift away from a carbon-based 
economy must be conceived in priority with the realization of human rights in 
mind.  
In the context of adaptation, human rights consequences are easier to 
identify since there is an immediate connection between ongoing climate 
change-related damages and the realization of human rights. Again, since the 
poor are the most vulnerable to climate change, they are also the most affected 
by ongoing damages. Thus, food shortages and floods induced by climate 
change invariable affect the poor first and need to be given priority. 
While the environmental law regime does not directly address the human 
rights dimension of climate change yet, UN human rights organs have started 
giving the issue consideration.11 This has, for instance, resulted in resolutions of 
the Human Rights Council focusing on climate change.12 These make the link 
between ongoing impacts of climate change and the realization of human rights, 
recognizing the specific problems that the poor face in this context as well as 
low-lying countries. They also link climate change concerns and the right to 
development, thus squarely emphasizing the development dimension of climate 
change. 
Much more needs to be done to ensure that human rights are effectively put 
at the centre of climate change law and policy. Currently, the emphasis is largely 
on adaptation to ongoing climate change and the human rights impacts of 
events that are most likely directly linked to global warming. This is important 
but needs to be supplemented by a much broader agenda. Indeed, the 
realization of human rights also has a big contribution to make to climate 
change mitigation and adaptation. Thus, the realization of the human right to a 
clean environment – a right not yet formally recognized in international law but 
existing in nearly 120 countries – could be directly linked to greenhouse gas 
reduction measures. This is in fact what all countries will eventually have to do. 
While reducing greenhouse gas emissions is fundamental to addressing climate 
change, these gases are the same that cause local air pollution, one of the most 
severe environmental problems in many parts of the world. In this sense, a 
human rights perspective that starts from the realization of human rights has the 
potential to be much more powerful than a simple look at the ways in which 
climate change damages affect the realization of human rights. A general though 
unspecific recognition of this need is visible in the 2009 resolution which 
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recognizes that human rights have ‘potential to inform and strengthen 
international and national policy-making in the area of climate change’.13 
New Legal Constructs for a More Equitable and Environmentally Sustainable Regime: 
Recognizing Air as a Common Heritage 
Air was for the longest time the object of little interest by lawyers, economists 
or policy makers. Indeed, while air is the first basic element that allows us to 
survive, it was for all practical purposes beyond appropriation. This situation 
changed relatively quickly over the course of the twentieth century with the 
introduction of aviation that led states to assert control over their airspace.14 At 
the same time, the question of air pollution led to the realization that while air 
may be beyond legal control, humankind was able to impact on air in various 
negative ways. Yet, a treaty like the Convention on Long-range Transboundary 
Air Pollution does not address the question of air pollution from the point of 
view of states’ right to pollute.15 As a result, it proposes a series of measures to 
reduce air pollution without trying to ascribe entitlements or addressing the 
status of air or the atmosphere. Beyond airspace, which cannot be directly 
compared with air or the atmosphere, the only other dimension that states have 
addressed is that of outer-space where the consensus is that it is a common 
heritage of humankind.16 
In the context of the climate change regime, the international community has 
agreed that the climate and its adverse effects are a common concern of 
humankind.17 This implies an acknowledgment that the climate can only be 
addressed through common action of all states but it does not indicate whether 
states or individuals are in a position to lay specific claims on air or on air 
pollution. The Kyoto Protocol does not address this issue directly either. 
However, the Protocol indirectly provides the most polluting nations on Earth 
specific polluting entitlements. In other words, while no legal claims to air or the 
atmosphere are staked by any state, an indirect appropriation takes place. This is 
problematic because science has clearly showed that the global sink that is the 
atmosphere can only absorb a limited amount of carbon. Above a certain limit, 
consequences which are extremely harmful will most likely take place. In other 
words, the polluting rights indirectly given to developed countries under the 
Kyoto Protocol constitute entitlements that affect all nations on Earth.18  
The approach taken in the Kyoto Protocol is problematic. The starting point 
for regulating emissions is ‘grandfathering’ (see also Chapter 19 in this volume), 
which indirectly rewards industries that have done least to cut back pollution 
before the adoption of the new regime. Grandfathering also rewards countries 
that industrialized early because their high level of pollution becomes the 
baseline against which reductions are debated. Countries that have lagged in 
industrial development suffer the double disadvantage under a grandfathering 
scheme of having lower levels of economic development and lower pollution 
levels that entitle them to similarly lower polluting entitlements. Both equity and 
environmental concerns call for a different type of response to climate change. 
In terms of equity or environmental conservation, the shortcomings of 
grandfathering call for giving the climate change regime new bases. One of the 
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starting points for a differently conceived regime is to rethink the legal status of 
air and the atmosphere. 
The Kyoto Protocol is in principle a treaty focusing on an environmental 
problem. Yet, in reality because of the nature of the problem being addressed, 
the real focus has been on economic development and the impacts that 
addressing climate change will have on economic growth. The debate has thus 
been framed mostly as an economic development issue within the broader 
context of environmental quality. This is unfortunate because it sidelines 
increasingly important impacts of air pollution on human health and thus the 
realization of the human right to health. More generally, the current regime fails 
to take into account the human impacts of air pollution and thereby fails to 
directly acknowledge that vulnerability is not just an issue in terms of the 
impacts of climate change but also in terms of the causes of climate change. For 
instance, the urban poor in developing countries are much more likely to be 
affected by air-related health issues than the middle classes.  
Since air pollution cannot be regarded as being limited to a dichotomy 
between environmental quality and economic growth, the legal status of air 
must be conceived in a broader perspective. Given that there is only one 
atmosphere, it follows that it needs to be managed as such. Individual control 
over air is physically impossible and would go against the need for a global 
solution. Air, the atmosphere and the global climate should thus be seen as a 
common heritage of humankind that needs to be commonly conserved and 
managed. The most obvious starting point for developing this concept is the 
notion of common heritage developed in the context of the law of the sea.19 
Common heritage status implies first of all that no sovereign claims can be 
made on the area or resource covered.20 It also prohibits unilateral appropriation 
and requires international cooperation in the exploitation of resources, for 
instance, by giving an international body the necessary authority.21 
The introduction of common heritage status for air and the atmosphere 
would make a significant contribution to policy debates on the future climate 
change regime. Indeed, it would provide a new solid basis for rethinking the 
allocation of emissions reduction commitments and for regulating the use of 
flexibility mechanisms according to priorities focused on differential treatment 
and vulnerability rather than in terms of economic efficiency and the indirect 
allocation of individual property rights over a global heritage.  
Common heritage status would, for instance, lead to setting a new 
framework for the CDM. At present the CDM provides essentially economic 
benefits to project partners. The CDM policy framework itself does not indicate 
how these benefits should be used. As a result, they can simply be used to foster 
the partner’s business. Since benefits accruing through CDM projects are linked 
to climate change mitigation, under a scheme where air is a common heritage, 
there is no reason for project partners to receive unconditional benefits. Indeed, 
there are a number of social and environmental priorities that must be addressed 
in the context of climate change. The resources raised in the name of climate 
change mitigation should thus be used for activities that specifically contribute 
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to addressing the global heritage since no one should be able to acquire direct or 
indirect rights to pollute something which is vital for survival for all living 
beings. The use of CDM proceeds to address issues related to the global good is 
even more important in a context where governments often claim that they have 
insufficient resources to implement effective environmental and social policies. 
Turning the air, the atmosphere and the global climate into a common 
heritage will no doubt be fiercely resisted by a number of actors who have and 
still benefit immensely from the absence of clear concepts determining who is 
entitled to ‘use’ air and ‘pollute’ the atmosphere. Yet, this is in fact but a small 
extension of the notion of public trust, a concept widely used.22 Interestingly, 
the Indian Supreme Court already declared more than a decade ago that air is a 
public trust in India.23 The notion of public trust implies that the state has to act 
as a trustee on behalf of all individuals, must take a long-term view of its 
protection and must ensure socially equitable and environmentally sustainable 
access to and use of the resource.24 It also implies that the state is not in a 
position to trade away or sell pollution rights or carbon credits in its role of 
trustee.25 These safeguards include fostering the realization of human rights and 
ensuring that no violations of existing protection level takes place as well as the 
respect for environmental law in general and not just of climate change law.  
Towards New Forms of Entitlements on Air 
The basis for today’s climate change law is, on the whole, the grandfathering of 
existing emission patterns. In political terms, this can be easily explained since 
any other formula would affect existing polluters more than the economic 
actors or the countries that contribute less to climate change. Yet, this is an 
ineffective way to address climate change. Indeed, while a baseline based on 
existing energy use puts the burden on developed countries and on polluting 
industries, it does not provide any compensation mechanism to non-
industrialized countries and to people who have not benefited from the 
standards of living achieved while causing climate change. 
As long as existing levels of economic development and existing pollution 
patterns constitute the basis for regulation, climate change law will largely reflect 
the priorities of the economically and politically more powerful states. An 
equitable and effective climate change regime needs to be based on a different 
paradigm that takes into account a broader variety of factors. The starting point 
is the common benefit that a healthy global environment represents for the 
whole of humankind and for life on Earth in general. Basic principles of 
environmental law, such as precaution and equity are thus at the centre of 
efforts to define entitlements. Today, environmental protection is conceived by 
all states as encompassing human rights, social and economic aspects. This is 
implies that it is not only the realization of the right to a clean environment 
recognized in nearly than 120 countries that is at stake but also the realization of 
all human rights. 
This broad framework leads to the development of a regime, which does not 
give economic growth and economic development the kind of importance they 
have under the Climate Change Convention and Kyoto Protocol. It is human 
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development and not economic development, which should be the starting 
point for a climate change regime. Human development gives primacy to human 
rights and environmental considerations but does not per se deny the necessity 
of economic development. In fact, the link between economic development and 
the realization of human rights, in particular socio-economic rights is well 
established. This is important because it recasts economic development as a tool 
for the realization of the human rights of the poor and marginalized. In this 
context, the success or failure of policies and laws is rated according to their 
impact on the poor. 
In terms of climate change the first step would be to move away from a 
system that allocates polluting rights based on past or present emissions. Indeed, 
any such scheme rewards long-term polluters – developed countries – and 
provides incentives to the few countries among developing countries such as 
some East Asian countries, India and China to increase their pollution levels as 
fast as they can so that their own emissions levels will be grandfathered the day 
they take on commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. This is unjustifiable in 
environmental terms and inequitable for the majority of developing countries 
and all least developed countries that will be made to suffer the consequences of 
their lower levels of economic development twice over.  
The most widely proposed alternative to grandfathering allocations is one 
based on per capita entitlements.26 The basis for an equitable climate change 
policy should indeed take into account that every single human being has a right 
to a certain quantity of emissions. These include subsistence emissions including 
emissions related to the growing of food or the use of firewood to cook meals 
or purify water.27 This also includes livelihood emissions, which relate to 
everyone’s right to benefit from the fruits of economic and technological 
development, for instance, by having access to electricity. Thus, there should be 
a basic human entitlement to a certain level of emissions. This level needs to 
take into account the needs of the global environment and may thus imply 
reduced emissions by the minority of the world’s population that directly or 
indirectly emits much more than what the global atmosphere can support.  
This entitlement is to be conceived from two related but distinct 
perspectives. At the international level, it provides a new way to allocate 
emission rights, which is fairer to countries that have not benefited from the 
fruits of economic growth. At the national level, it provides a similar mechanism 
whereby the poor and marginalized that do not have access to the amenities that 
their wealthier counterparts benefit from, obtain a right to benefit from existing 
resources. In other words, the developed world and the minority of wealthy 
citizens within each country each have a debt to the poorer segments of the 
community. 
While the basis for entitlements should be on a per capita basis, this cannot 
be the only criterion. Two reasons, at least, call for a more selective approach. 
Firstly, a per capita entitlement may have the negative impact of fostering 
population policies, which may not otherwise be in the interest of the concerned 
countries. Secondly, an equitable legal framework should also take into account 
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that some countries have low population density because their environment is 
already degraded to such an extent that population has failed to grow over time. 
Since these countries usually happen to be among the poorest as well, 
recognition of their situation must also be taken into account.  
The entitlement proposed here must differ from a Kyoto Protocol 
entitlement in an additional respect. The debt that rich countries and rich people 
within each country have accumulated towards the poor cannot be redeemed by 
simply stabilizing emissions or reducing them.28 The entitlement scheme must 
be based on the premise that the only way in which emissions can be accessed 
from the poor that do not use their quota is by accepting a duty to invest an 
equivalent amount of money towards developing non-carbon development 
paths. If that is not undertaken, the entitlement system will simply end up being 
another market mechanism through which the poor will sell their entitlements 
but without any policy framework imposing the necessary changes for 
effectively mitigating climate change in the long term. Thus, any future CDM 
should only fund projects that provide zero-carbon emissions so that the CDM 
itself becomes a vehicle for technology transformation and not just a cheap 
compliance mechanism that, at best, does nothing for the poor and at worst 
contributes to harming them further where already discredited development 
options are reintroduced in the guise of climate change friendly policies.  
The new entitlement framework is thus conceived as a mechanism through 
which the poor and vulnerable can demand new technologies or emissions 
convergence. In other words, this entitlement framework imposes on the rich 
parts of the world (rich countries and rich segments of the population) to either 
reduce their own emissions or invest in ways and means so that the poor do not 
follow the rest of the world in increasing their own emissions as economic 
development eventually reaches them. In India, where the richest classes 
produce 4.5 times more CO2 than the poorest class and almost 3 times more 
than the all-India average, this convergence is also required.29 A number of 
different initiatives could be taken. For instance, in a situation where, in India, 
only 31 per cent of rural households use electricity, there is untold potential for 
emissions increase if the poor are provided with the same kind of amenities that 
the rich benefit from.30 The entitlement framework based on human rights 
indicates that the poor also have in principle a right to the lifestyle that the rich 
enjoy. As a result, the only way to ensure that poverty eradication does not harm 
the global environment more, while at the same time providing alternative 
economic development paths for the rich and poor alike is for the rich to invest 
in new ways to deliver development benefits. For instance, electricity generation 
in India could easily be focused on local solutions, in particular solar energy. 
Similarly, technological research should focus on new forms of public transport 
rather than on private vehicles with a lower negative climate change impact. 
Simply improving or changing the fuel on which private vehicles run may have a 
positive contribution on the global environment. However, as witnessed in the 
case of Delhi and its shift to CNG on a large-scale, this neither solves the 
environmental pollution caused by vehicles per se nor addresses the huge social 
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and other problems caused by increasing reliance on private modes of 
transportation.31 
Conclusion 
Climate change must be addressed in earnest urgently. While the existing climate 
change regime made a noteworthy attempt at starting the process of effectively 
addressing the problem, much more needs to be done in the future. The task of 
addressing the environmental problem of climate change is complicated by the 
fact that it affects all aspects of development.  
The international community understood that the special nature of climate 
change required special measures. This explains why the climate change regime 
provides one of the strongest recognition of the need for differential measures 
among environmental treaties with the adoption of different commitments for 
developed and developing countries under the Kyoto Protocol.  
This now needs to be supplemented by much stronger measures because the 
scientific understanding of climate change has evolved dramatically since the 
early 1990s. While differential treatment will remain the basis of any broadly 
acceptable regime it needs to be strengthened and to be adapted to evolving 
realities. The limitations of a regime that focuses mostly on states also needs to 
be addressed by incorporating a human rights dimension. Finally, it is time for 
the international community to consider the broader implications of a climate 
change legal regime and adopt new principles clarifying the legal status of air 
and the atmosphere. Indeed, air and the atmosphere need to be clearly separated 
from any sovereign claims that states may have over natural resources. 
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Low Impact Development" 
Larch Maxey and Simon Dale 
What is Low Impact Development? 
Low Impact Development (LID) is a superb example of sustainability being led 
from the grassroots which has emerged from the UK and is blossoming around 
the world. Whilst planners and policy makers wring their hands over climate 
change, affordable housing and rural decline, for over a decade across the UK, 
LIDers have quietly got on with building a greener future from the ground up. 
LID is one of the few approaches offering holistic solutions to climate change, 
peak oil and sustainability. It has the potential to help revitalize rural and urban 
communities and help the world’s nations feed and power themselves. Given 
LID’s background as a grass roots movement, it should come as no surprise 
that its definition has not stood still, but has continued to evolve. Development 
under the LID umbrella is generally:  
! locally adapted, diverse and unique  
! made from natural, local materials  
! of an appropriate scale  
! visually unobtrusive  
! biodiverse  
! based on renewable resources  
! autonomous in terms of energy, water and waste  
! inclusive, working with local communities providing public access to open 
space  
! based on sustainable travel, minimizing the need to travel, prioritizing 
walking, cycling, public transport and car share and thus generating little 
traffic  
! linked to sustainable livelihoods  
! coordinated by a management plan  
These points have been more fully discussed elsewhere.1 There are two crucial 
points to make here, however. Firstly, LID will continue to evolve in a dialogue 
between developers on the ground and policy makers/planners. Secondly, as 
independent studies consistently show, LID is a rare example of truly 
sustainable development capable of social, economic and environmental benefits 
to society as a whole. Thus LID draws on the skills, traditions, designs and 
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materials best suited to each site, empowering those involved and contributing 
to an emerging regional uniqueness and sense of place. LID housing, for 
example, tends to be built to very high energy efficiency standards and also to 
use locally available natural and/or reclaimed materials so that the embodied energy 
of the building itself is also very low. Both these points are illustrated by the 
Welsh Assembly Government’s (WAG) adaptation of LID to the Welsh context 
by morphing it into ‘One Planet Development’ (OPD).2 This exciting move 
offers LID, or OPD, an exemplary role within WAG’s sustainability strategy as 
Wales becomes a One Planet Nation by 2050! As WAG acknowledges, LID 
demonstrates that One Planet solutions exist right now and can act as catalysts 
for wider change. This policy also shows what can happen when Governments 
are small enough to really respond to the ideas and energy of people on the 
ground, rather than following big business’ agenda. 
Why do we Need Low Impact Development?  
Ecological crisis is not a future possibility but a current reality. Current rates of 
species extinction are at their highest since that of the dinosaurs. Ninety percent 
of the large fish in our seas have gone. Anthropogenic climate change is 
happening one hundred times faster than our best models have predicted. This 
change threatens not only the extinction of individual species but the collapse or 
death of entire ecosystems. We are faced with the question of whether it is too 
late for us to take any effective action. The fact that this crisis is already 
happening means that the question is not to do with whether it can be averted, 
but what we can do to stop exacerbating it and to cope with its effects. It is not 
too late; anyone, anywhere can take locally effective actions today.  
The Case for Urgent Preparation for Energy Descent  
Human development has for the last two hundred years been powered by the 
use of fossil fuels. We have converted from locally self-reliant agrarian focused 
societies to a globalised society powered predominantly by fossil fuels. This 
global society is mediated by interdependent international financial markets. 
With the exception of minor blips such as the Great Depression and recent 
bank collapse these markets and their various currencies have seen continuous 
growth simultaneous with the growth in supplies of fossil fuels. This financial 
growth has also been exponential due to the growth of speculation. Our 
financial transactions of trade are now dwarfed by the transactions of pure 
finances, the speculation on that trade and the speculation on that speculation. 
All of this financial activity is based on assumptions and predictions of 
continued growth. On this our global society is dependent. We cannot have 
infinite economic growth on a finite planet, yet we are only recently beginning 
to see mainstream media and politicians brave enough acknowledge this and 
that we can replace economic growth with sustainable, steady state economies in 
which everyone has healthy, fulfilling work for which they are truly valued.  
Climate change gives a clear imperative to curtail our fossil fuel use. In 
addition, world supplies of fossil fuels are currently passing their peak of 
production. There is growing agreement that oil has passed its peak, gas will 
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very shortly, and coal will peak in the next couple of decades. Uranium may not 
be a fossil fuel but that too will reach and pass its peak of production within the 
next few decades. Without these we either have to invent a new power source, 
make a transition to renewables, or reduce our power/fuel consumption.  
Our society is operating under the assumption that economic liberalism and 
the free market will provide technological solutions for our future energy needs, 
the effects of climate change and any other problems that we might encounter. 
As several chapters in this book make clear, the imperative of economic growth 
(business as usual) has led to much of the support for carbon offsetting and its 
associated techno-fixes. It is true that the free market and technological progress 
have extended our capabilities and even solved certain problems. However, they 
have more often replaced one problem, with a bigger, longer-term problem 
whilst undermining local skills, knowledge and sustainable solutions in the 
process! Furthermore, all of this has been the product of increasing 
consumption of fossil fuels. The technological advance that would give us a 
replacement source of power to continue our growth is utterly unprecedented. 
Never before have we done what our society relies on us achieving now, by the 
essentially passive continuation of an unchanging method.  
The belief that future technological fixes will enable continued growth is 
crucial for the functioning of our speculative economies. Without this belief our 
markets would collapse, and unlike the slow dwindling of fuel supplies, this can 
happen quickly as investor confidence fails. At the moment we are staving off 
this occurrence with increasingly creative accounting and economic 
manipulation including inflated housing prices, and increased public borrowing. 
Already we are seeing how precarious this approach has been with the collapse 
of over extended banking giants and the beginning of the ‘global economic 
downturn’.  
There is a significant chance that replacement energy sources will not be 
realized before we lose the economic buoyancy that makes such technological 
progress possible. If this happens we will have no options but to make a radical 
transition to a non-growth paradigm and much lower energy ways of living. This 
will require major adaptations. The sooner we can begin to make these 
adaptations, the slower the transition will be and the more chance we have of 
positively managing the subsequent energy descent as an equitable and 
comfortable process. If wisely managed we still have a wealth of resources and 
powerful technology in our hands. With discerning use these assets could help 
us address our most fundamental needs for a long time to come.  
Reducing our Energy Dependency  
To reduce our energy dependency we will not only have to reduce our 
consumption, we will have to dramatically increase the productivity of our land 
and ecosystems. The most crucial parts of our society are our food production 
and distribution systems. Particularly in the ‘minority world’, our agricultural and 
food supply systems are heavily fossil fuel dependent. Most of our food is either 
imported, or has travelled many miles within the country. It is largely produced 
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by industrial farming techniques which require both heavy machinery and fossil 
fuel derived fertilizers and pesticides. Calorifically, all of these inputs are many 
times greater than the outputs, meaning that we are constantly feeding energy 
into agriculture and most Westerners currently put more fossil fuel calories into 
their mouths than into heating their homes.3 Clearly, without fossil fuels, 
agriculture needs to be a net donor of energy to human society. Before the use 
of fossil fuels in agriculture, the vast majority of the population were involved in 
agriculture. If we are to move beyond fossil fuels this may well have to be the 
case again. Cuba’s transition to a low carbon, low fossil fuel economy, for 
example, has involved the return of 20% of the population to agriculture (from 
less than 1% before the ‘special period).4 
There is also a need for other important land based produce, particularly 
fuels and fibre. Although the details vary around the world, forestry and its 
derived products are often central to this. As well as timber for building, tools 
and the making of other objects, wood is our primary renewable fuel source.  
Sustainable and Resilient Communities  
In order to be sustainable, a system or community must be self-reliant in all the 
resources it requires. The greater the number of independent sub-systems that 
can provide for the functions and required resources, the greater the resilience 
of the system. Whilst our global society still contains many different sub-
systems, they are not independent, being linked by shared fossil fuel 
dependency, trans-national ownership and the globalized economy. Where we 
can replace this with independent self-sufficiency at the smallest scales we will 
have sustainable and resilient local communities.  
Firstly, in many places we need to heal the infertility that is the legacy of 
ecological degradation and intensive farming. Naturally, the restoration of soil 
fertility will take time, as will the establishment of gardens, orchards and 
complex agroforestry systems. All of these forms of land based production 
require supporting infrastructure and processing facilities. These also need to be 
localized and provided in ways suitable for a carbon-capture future. Simple, low-
impact homes can be built where they are needed, with natural materials and 
accessible methods. These buildings can easily provide high levels of comfort 
and efficiency at a tiny fraction of the cost of their conventional equivalents. 
Effective and reliable systems for water, sewage, heating, refrigeration and even 
modest electricity can be simply made in a multitude of locally adapted, low-tech 
ways with reused and natural materials.  
There will always be benefits and pleasures of community co-operation and 
facilities. Essential supporting facilities which also need re-localization include 
mills, forges, tanneries, lime-kilns and carpenters workshops. These 
communities may also have their own independent councils, markets, and local 
events. Local trading systems or currencies add to community resilience by 
strengthening the local economy and protecting against global financial 
instability. Alongside the required infrastructure comes the need for many sets 
of skills. A lot of these are traditional skills to be revived, some will be derivative 
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of the contemporary world, and others will be a synthesis of the two. All take 
time to learn, develop and share.  
Permaculture  
Permaculture is a set of design principles for human scale, sustainable systems. 
It is based on the three ethics of ‘people care, earth care and fair shares’. It 
provides an approach that is most frequently applied to small scale agriculture, 
but can equally be applied to buildings, domestic systems and community 
interactions.  
Permaculture has played a key role in Cuba’s ‘special period’ after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990. Oil imports were cut in half, and food by 
80%. The island underwent a transition from an industrial system to one of 
urban gardens using organic methods. We can choose this kind of transition to 
meaningfully curtail our contributions to climate change and prepare for ‘peak 
everything’5 and its associated economic instability. The Cubans’ response, 
largely based on permaculture and community agriculture, was highly successful. 
Vegetables were planted on rooftops and abandoned car parks. Havana now 
produces 60% of its food from urban land within the city itself.6 
A Force for Change  
There is significant and rapidly growing energy at the grass roots for 
permaculture type solutions and the intentional move towards re-localization 
and energy descent. Organizations such as the Transition Towns Network are 
part of the gathering momentum in this direction. The call to energy descent is 
never going to come from the corporate or political arenas, as it challenges the 
growth paradigm. It is coming now from the grass roots, with rapidly increasing 
numbers of people unwilling to remain on the sinking ship of consumption and 
growth, waiting blindly for the techno-fix lifeboat.  
The scale and power of this enthusiasm became clear to us during our 
various experiences of building simple low-impact homes in Wales.7 Part of our 
motivation was to show others that this kind of living was possible. I (Simon) 
put a few photographs of our home on a simple web page to show half a dozen 
friends who had helped us with the construction. Within a few weeks, it had 
been passed on and started to appear on a few blogs. Since then the website has 
been receiving up to 50,000 unique visits a day and has been looked at by 2 
million people. We have both also been involved since 2005 in the setting up 
the Lammas cooperative (see below) and have had thousands of emails from 
excited and inspired people. Some with tears, some with plans, some with their 
own stories and every single one with enthusiasm and encouragement.  
The combination of this feedback cycle with the enthusiasm and innate 
appeal of this route makes this a powerful movement, and one that is capable of 
making effective change at every small step. The major obstacles holding it back 
are availability of land and people’s time. These again are economic issues. The 
sort of work required to begin to make the transition to an energy descent is 
inherently uneconomic and shall remain so until the point at which there are no 
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longer any other options. It is both crucial and appealing that before this time 
comes we do whatever we can to build local resilience. Whilst large numbers of 
people are pursuing this kind of work in their leisure time, it is impossible for 
most to follow it as a full time vocation at the same time as paying for housing 
and the land they are working.  
Opportunities  
As in many countries, the UK planning system does make allowances for 
farmers and seasonal forestry workers to live on their land; this is commonly 
subject to strict tests of their functional need to be there and proof that the 
enterprise is a viable business. In France, for example, this is generally a far 
simpler process, whilst the OPD scheme in Wales promises to open up these 
opportunities for all. After much lobbying even the UK Englishframework does 
make limited allowance for subsistence smallholders and this is slow progress in 
the planning system.  
Small numbers of individuals and communities have been taking a direct 
action approach and simply moving on to agricultural land and getting on with 
their projects without advance planning permission. Many, though less than half 
of these projects, end up coming to the attention of the planners to whom they 
make retrospective applications, usually under the agricultural guidelines 
described above. Almost without exception, those who can afford the lost sleep 
and considerable expenses of a planning appeal get awarded permission, 
although it is often temporary permissions of 3-5 years.  
Understandably, the majority of people are currently put off this route by its 
uncertainty. If the planning system gives concessions to those wishing to live on 
and work small pieces of agricultural land in this way, the situation would be a 
very different one. Once the route is established it will be appealing to sufficient 
numbers of people to make significant preparations for the transition to energy 
descent. If a workable route can be made within the planning system to grant 
access to land, and the right to live on it, to those wishing to make these 
changes, we can allow a rising tide of people to make real progress towards a 
sustainable society. If a workable route is not found, we will be reliant upon the 
increasing numbers of people ready to take to the land without planning 
permission. The former is preferable on three counts: firstly, it reduces the 
stress and energy needed to be in a constant state of flight or fight with the 
planners; secondly, it allows planning systems the world over to play their part 
in addressing climate change and peak oil. They canuse their wealth of 
knowledge and experience to prevent poorly thought out developments 
dependent on cars, for example. Finally, as the planning system embraces LID it 
allows it to infiltrate further into the mainstream and play its full part in 
fostering sustainability transitions. 
Bringing Low Impact Development into the Mainstream  
We stand at a cross roads. If we act now there is still time to create a world of 
abundance in which everyone can fulfil their highest potential, a world in which 
humans take their rightful place within a thriving natural world. If we continue 
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on our current path for another ten years this choice will be lost and we will 
have committed ourselves, our species and our planet to catastrophic climate 
change. Indeed, the latest research is increasingly clear: stopping all fossil fuel 
use is not enough. We need to actively draw CO2 back out of the atmosphere 
and lock it up again.8 The good news is that we can begin this process right now! 
LID can contribute to this new development paradigm. In order to do this on 
the scale required LID will need to shift from the fringes of modern 
development to the mainstream. LID has much to offer mainstream 
development if it is to become truly sustainable.  
Harnessing People Power  
LID has sprung literally from the ground up, rooted in practical projects which 
have drawn upon permaculture, traditional knowledge, appropriate technology 
and the creativity of LIDers themselves. As we transform society to address the 
twin challenges of climate change and peak oil it is essential that we harness the 
ingenuity, energy and local knowledge of people everywhere.  
LID can help turn current social trends into powerful, practical forces for 
change. Since 2005, for example, the UK has seen an exponential rise in interest 
in local, seasonal, organic and home grown food, green lifestyles and global 
ethics, with seed sales going through the roof and allotment waiting lists 
bulging.  
Programmes such as Channel Four’s ‘Grand Designs’ show the growing 
interest in self-build eco-housing, with LIDs consistently winning best design 
awards.9 Mainstreaming LID will allow us to unlock this potential. This is 
particularly important as the world faces the impending peak everything-fuelled 
economic recession. House building is slowing down throughout the Western 
world as mainstream builders struggle to make a profit. LID offers one way of 
ensuring a continuing supply of sustainable, affordable housing as it is not 
motivated by the need to make a profit, but people’s desire to create beautiful, 
efficient homes for themselves. Whilst LID need not necessarily be self-built, it 
harnesses the skill and energy people are willing to invest into their own lives. 
LID simultaneously offers empowerment, employment and re-skilling.  
LID can be remarkably adaptable and flexible, from a bender produced for 
nothing from entirely reclaimed materials through a £500 simple straw bale 
house such as the one built at Coed Hills,10 to ‘luxury’ designer homes costing 
up to £40,000 such as that built by Ben Law and featured on Channel Four’s 
‘Grand Designs’.  
LID has been a seed bed for experimentation and discovery over the last 
fifteen years. Indeed, in a recent UK appeal decision, planning inspector 
Woolnough found ‘there to be considerable ecological, educational and cultural 
benefits in further exploring permaculture’ due to ‘the development of and 
experimentation with sustainable technologies and agricultural practices which 
that way of life facilitates’. Ideas and approaches which are starting to appear in 
the mainstream such as compost toilets, reed beds, solar water panels, turf roofs 
and passive solar heat gain have all been tried and tested in LIDs. As these ideas 
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begin to inform the mainstream anyway, the time is ripe for LID as a whole to be 
embraced by the mainstream, rather than just individual components cherry 
picked out of context.  
The UK Government’s target for all new housing to be carbon neutral by 
2016 is ambitious given the unsustainable performance of most contemporary 
housing. Indeed, even its own official reports suggest Britain is already falling 
behind any chance of meeting this target11 These targets, far from being too 
stringent, as large building companies claim, do not go far enough for two 
reasons. First, they ignore the embodied energy required to quarry, process, 
transport and dispose of current mainstream building materials. Second, they 
fail to respond to the latest science which shows that rather than aiming for 
carbon neutral development, future development needs to actively lock up 
carbon. LID has always been sensitive to the embodied energy of the materials 
it uses and through using natural materials such as wood, straw and hemp, 
building up soil fertility, and planting trees and perennials, LID can contribute 
to the process of drawing carbon out of the atmosphere again. LID can meet 
the real challenge of carbon capture development immediately.  
Lessons from Lammas  
Lammas Low Impact Initiatives Ltd is one example of how LID is beginning to 
move into the mainstream, raising its profile and making it more accessible to a 
wider range of people. Formed in 2005, Lammas is a cooperative limited by 
shares which aims to promote LID throughout the UK. A key way Lammas 
achieves this is through developing its flagship eco-hamlet in Pembrokeshire. 
This was granted planning permission on appeal in August 2009 and includes an 
eco-terrace of four units as well as five more traditional smallholdings. This eco-
terrace follows the co-housing model, providing both private space and shared 
common space. It offers an attractive route into LID for single people, couples 
and families, including those without capital and those who are less able to build 
their own home.  
One of Lammas’ innovative features is its commitment to working with the 
planning system. It is the first time a LID hamlet has been granted planning 
permission prospectively. This is invaluable in moving LID towards the 
mainstream as more people will consider LID if they can do so with the 
certainty and security that planning permission provides. However, this 
approach entails its own set of tensions which offer insight into some of the 
challenges posed by mainstreaming LID. Bureaucratic hurdles are perhaps the 
biggest obstacles Lammas has faced. Not only has it negotiated the delays and 
quirks of an overburdened and archaic local planning system, it is also breaking 
new ground within both the LID movement and the planning system. Lammas’ 
approach, however, has brought international support, its own free view video 
series and allowed it to pioneer the first mortgages for LIDs on this scale. 
Mortgages allow those without cash to buy the 999 year leases Lammas sells to 
residents as well as all the materials to create their dream LID homes and 
livelihoods. 
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The Ecological Land Co-op (ELC) 
This initiative works on a slightly different model to Lammas, but again acts as a 
broker through the planning and land purchasing quagmires to make it easier 
for people to set up LIDs. By attracting investors the co-op has the funds to 
buy land and gain planning permission before then leasing LID smallholdings 
on affordable 999year leases. The ELC was also founded in 2005 and purchased 
its first site in 2009. It is always on the lookout for ethical investors.12 
Educational LID Projects  
Another way in which the LID movement has already begun to reach out to the 
mainstream is through a range of educational initiatives. Most established LID 
projects include an educational component, from tours, open days and courses 
on site to stalls, talks and web sites off site. Additionally, a new generation of 
LID educational projects are beginning to emerge. These have education as their 
central focus and whilst they do not necessarily involve people living on site and 
developing more traditional low impact livelihoods, their contribution to 
mainstreaming LID is considerable.  
Such projects include Down to Earth Menter Felin Uchaf, Cae Mabon and 
LILI.13 Other educational initiatives in which LID ideas and techniques feature 
extend well into the mainstream from the Centre for Alternative Technology to 
the Eden Centre, with the largest rammed earth installation in the UK. Around 
the world there are thousands of such projects featuring local, natural 
approaches to building and land management. Each time LID in any form 
appears in the mainstream it is an opportunity for the movement to reach out 
further. It is crucial, however, that these opportunities are used to convey LIDs’ 
true message and power – that sustainable solutions are holistic and achievable 
by everyone, rather than discrete bits being cherry picked out of context or 
allowed to become the preserve of ‘experts’.  
Conclusion  
LID has huge potential to deliver truly sustainable development immediately, 
helping the world feed, fuel and house itself. In addition to offering One Planet, 
carbon capture, rather than carbon neutral development, LID can help both 
rural and urban regeneration. However, if LID is to be brought into the 
mainstream it is vital that LIDers themselves continue to set the agenda in terms 
of defining and expanding what LID is. This sets a significant challenge to the 
planning system tasked with working in participatory ways with people, with a 
minimum of bureaucracy. It also presents challenges to LIDers themselves to 
form new and innovative partnerships, working with more mainstream 
organizations such as Housing Associations, Local Authorities, charities, NGOs, 
researchers, schools, educators and enlightened building companies. This is a 
challenge in which everyone, including you, have roles to play – will you join us? 
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Planning for Permaculture? Land-Use Planning, 
Sustainable Development, and ‘Ecosystem 
People’" 
Mike Hannis 
One day, historians may view carbon offsetting as a last-ditch attempt to keep 
our collective head buried in the sand, ignoring the critical metabolic 
relationships between human ‘civilization’ and the rest of the world. As a large 
scale response to climate change, the tortuous doublethink of carbon trading 
makes sense only from within a mindset unshakeably convinced that globalised 
consumer capitalism is the inevitable destiny of humanity. 
This mindset also routinely resists and frustrates smaller scale grassroots 
attempts to devise more sustainable lifestyles, which seek to actually reduce their 
ecological impact at source rather than paying to offset it elsewhere. One site of 
such resistance, as Maxey and Dale note elsewhere in this book, has been the 
British land-use planning system’s response to ‘low impact development’, 
particularly where this involves residential use associated with permacultural 
land management. 
Applicants trying to get residential permaculture projects legitimized by local 
authority planning departments often end up extremely frustrated. This is not 
just because of the bewildering bureaucracy involved, but because the two sides 
often seem to be speaking different languages which somehow contain the same 
words. The whole process can seem like a surreal comedy, though it’s rarely 
funny for those involved. Being refused planning permission to live in your 
carefully crafted oasis of ecological sanity, on the grounds that you would be 
‘harming the environment’, is not exactly calculated to lower the blood pressure. 
In Britain as elsewhere, modern planning policy claims to be all about 
‘sustainable development’. So why is it often so hard to get permission for these 
harmless yet (sometimes) cutting-edge experiments in sustainable living? 
Prejudice and local vested interests can play a part in the disproportionate 
number of refusals, but there are more fundamental issues at stake too. 
Understanding these requires a closer look at the nearest thing there is to an 
official definition. In the canonical words of the Brundtland report: 
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. 
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This definition, of course, emerged as a clever diplomatic compromise between 
new environmental concerns and the demand for continued economic growth. 
It achieved this heroic balancing act largely by dodging the crucial question of 
what constitutes ‘needs’, as opposed to desires or expectations. Rather than 
looking at what kind or level of human activity might actually be ecologically 
sustainable, it has always been focussed on sustaining development. So what is 
really meant by ‘development’ here? 
Development: Separating People from Land? 
The strange but powerful idea that human societies naturally evolve or develop 
along a defined path leading from ‘primitive’ hunter-gatherer cultures to modern 
civilization, complete with oil-driven industrialization and profit-driven 
economic growth, has murky origins in nineteenth century social Darwinism. 
Most of the world, with its prodigious variety of alternative paths, had been 
defined by the mid-twentieth century as ‘underdeveloped’: and a major indicator 
of supposed underdevelopment, even today, is a prevalence of land-based 
lifestyles and subsistence agriculture. Development has always involved 
separating people from land, to the point where most human beings on the 
planet now live in urban areas. 
Conservation, now considered a key aspect of sustainable development, has 
also contributed to this rapid and largely involuntary separation. Beginning in 
the UK and US in the late nineteenth century, the enforced move away from 
land-based livelihoods brought with it the new idea of nature conservation. 
Early environmentalists began arguing that ‘nature’ should be preserved by 
enclosing it, to protect it from the destructive impacts of growing and 
industrializing human populations. When the first national park was established 
in the US, native Americans were removed from Yosemite to create the 
‘wilderness’ that city-dwellers wanted to believe in. Indigenous and other local 
people continue to be evicted from parks and reserves today, particularly in 
Africa and Asia.1 Ironically, these are often the only people who understand 
how to live sustainably in such places, which is why they are sometimes referred 
to as ‘ecosystem people’.2 
After 1947 the new land-use planning system in Britain, and particularly in 
England, inherited and enforced the idea that people should be concentrated in 
built-up areas designed for the purpose, and the precious rural landscape 
conserved as ‘natural heritage’.3 Only farmers, who really needed to be there to 
produce food for everyone else, should be allowed to live outside defined towns 
and villages. But as farming became industrialized and food markets became 
global, the number of agricultural workers fell dramatically, leaving the 
depopulated countryside we see today. 
New Ecosystem People? 
Permaculture is one part of a massive and diverse global search for alternatives 
to the development mindset which has largely led to the current ecological crisis. 
It seeks to integrate human foods and dwellings into living ecosystems. In this 
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sense, permaculture practitioners worldwide are trying to find ways of being 
ecosystem people in a modern context.  
This is the underlying reason why permaculture projects in Britain (even 
more than, say, organic smallholdings) remain hard for unadventurous planners 
to support. Once mature, permaculture holdings can produce abundant yields, 
but very rarely the profitable surpluses needed to qualify as a viable business and 
thus justify ‘new residential development in the open countryside’. Subsistence 
(or ‘subsistence-plus’) agriculture and low impact dwellings can help build a 
sustainable future: but this, of course, would be a future with many more people 
living on the land. This is, to put it mildly, not an easy thing for the current 
planning system to embrace. 
The clash of mindsets is particularly dramatic when it involves designated 
areas of ‘unspoilt’ countryside. For example, in early 2009 a planning inspector 
refused permission for the picturesque Karuna project in Shropshire, saying that 
residential use of the land ‘harmed the character and appearance of the 
surrounding Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty’.4 
One unexpected consolation in this case was that the AONB management 
were more receptive than the planners to the idea of integrating sensitive human 
habitation within the beautiful landscape, and have subsequently revised their 
management plan for the area to reflect this. Such small changes reflect the slow 
but significant progress which has taken place since the bizarre 1995 judgement 
which stated 
As to the issue of sustainable development, the view is taken that the provision 
of groups of tents or similar residential accommodation in the open countryside 
merely to provide a subsistence living for the occupants, is not a practical pattern 
of long term land-use. 
John Gummer, the Secretary of State in whose name this decision was issued, 
somehow failed to notice that such patterns of land use have in fact already 
been sustained for thousands of years. He was refusing a planning appeal by the 
residents of the low impact settlement at Tinkers Bubble in Somerset, who 
happily did get their permission in the end. Over the last fifteen years the 
pattern of land use there has proved to be very practical indeed. The residents 
have successfully fed and sheltered themselves, and inspired many others, as 
well as producing a considerable surplus of timber and wholesome food for 
sale,5 while maintaining some of the smallest ecological footprints in the UK. 
Early cases such as Tinkers Bubble, and some determined lobbying, resulted in 
the government’s landmark acceptance in 2004 that 
Some enterprises which aim to operate broadly on a subsistence basis, but which 
nonetheless provide wider benefits (e.g. in managing attractive landscapes or 
wildlife habitats), can be sustained on relatively low financial returns.6 
Building on this new guidance, in 2007 an unusually forward-looking planning 
inspector gave a temporary permission for the Landmatters permaculture 
community in Devon, finding that 
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Profitability and self-sufficiency, whilst important, are not the only measures of 
success of a project of this kind. [...] I find there to be considerable ecological, 
educational and cultural benefits in further exploring permaculture. 
Some other recent appeal decisions, particularly the grants of permission to the 
Lammas project and Steward Wood, do reflect this new willingness on the part 
of certain inspectors to consider the broader merits of projects seeking to 
explore and demonstrate more sustainable lifestyles and land management 
practices. However, there are also worrying signs that in England (though not, 
apparently, in Wales) the next round of rural planning guidance may in fact 
downgrade the importance of sustainability itself, in pursuit of an old-fashioned 
post-credit-crunch economic stimulus. Inexplicably there is now, apparently, ‘no 
such thing as a separate rural economy’.7 
Sustainability: Bottom-up or Top-down? 
Permaculture, like the Transition Towns movement and other grassroots 
initiatives, tends to be associated with a vision of sustainability from the bottom 
up. After all, it is tempting to think that if all land were autonomously managed 
by local communities according to permaculture principles, many environmental 
problems would disappear. For many practitioners, this view often goes hand in 
hand with an entirely understandable perception that government in general, 
and planners in particular, are the problem rather than the solution. But in 
practice, facilitating sustainability from the top down is also important. 
Paradoxically, even if a radically decentralized low-carbon society is to be the 
long term aim, plenty of coordinated large-scale action will be needed to get 
there. 
Land-use planning is likely to remain a key element of this co-ordination for 
the foreseeable future, helping to ensure that activities like housebuilding, power 
generation and agriculture are sensibly located and serve the common good 
rather than short-term profit. In a densely populated country like Britain, there 
will always be a need for commercial agriculture, especially if imports are to be 
reduced. Planning is (or should be) an essential part of managing the inevitable 
transition away from unsustainable oil-based agriculture. No-one knows how 
this transition to sustainability will happen, but we can be sure that it will not be 
easy, and that it will require encouraging rather than prohibiting experimental 
bottom-up solutions, including those based on residential permaculture. We can 
be equally sure that it will never be achieved by keeping people off the land. 
Notes 
"  An earlier version of this article was first published in Permaculture Magazine – Solutions for 
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2 See e.g. Barbier, E., J. Burgess, and C. Folke (1994) Paradise lost? The Ecological Economics of 
Biodiversity. Earthscan, p. 85. They describe ecosystem people as those who ‘subsist […] largely 
on resources produced or gathered from their immediate vicinity [...] [and] often develop a 
strong social culture that reflects their close interaction and interdependence on the 
environment, both within and across generations’. 
3 See Fairlie, S. (2009) Low Impact Development: Planning and People in a Sustainable Countryside (2nd 
edition). Jon Carpenter. 
4 Planning Inspectorate reference numbers for decision letters cited are as follows: Karuna 
(2009) APP/B3220/C/07/2060815;Tinkers Bubble (1995) APP/R3325/C/94/635596-607; 
Landmatters (2007) APP/K1128/C/06/2032148; Lammas (2009) 
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6 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) (2004) Planning Policy 
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4: Planning for Sustainable Economic Development (introduction). For discussion, see Fairlie, S. (2009) 
‘Rural Policy Rift Along Offa’s Dyke’, The Land, 7. 
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Cycles of Sustainability:  
From Automobility to Bicycology 
Chris Land 
Introduction 
It is often claimed that ‘there is no alternative’ to capitalism and market 
managerialism; that ‘free’ markets and representative democracy are the most 
efficient and egalitarian ways through which to organize the economy and 
society; and that to suggest otherwise is ideologically suspect, naïve, conceals a 
hidden agenda, or is just plain ignorant. This same argument is often raised in 
relation to the environment and carbon management: ‘Yes, there is a problem, 
but we have to deal with it through a combination of state regulation and 
markets.’ State regulation works through governmental representation in global 
forums like United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the 
Kyoto protocols, and the Copenhagen climate summit. Markets function 
through activities like off-setting and carbon trading to try to reintroduce 
indirect costs that would conventionally be treated by organizations and 
individuals as externalities. Either way, the assumption behind this perspective 
on carbon management is that the solution to the problem of climate change 
and sustainability lies with relatively small-scale modifications to current systems 
of state and market governance. The fundamental assumptions on which 
governments’ and corporations’ success indicators are based – continued 
economic growth and accumulation – are rarely questioned. 
Against this idea that climate change can be solved with more of the same 
have been arrayed a range of more radical critiques that suggest a need to 
challenge the dominant logic of government, markets and economic growth. 
Whether these critiques are ‘realistic’ or not, or whether such radical critiques 
only have a material effect through a kind of radical flank effect, whereby 
moderate reforms are rendered more acceptable to the mainstream by the 
existence of a more radical critique (see also Paterson in this volume), is not the 
concern of this chapter. Rather, this chapter explores some of the ways in which 
more radical critiques have moved beyond challenging the ability of states and 
markets to solve the problems of climate change, and have begun constituting 
‘alternatives’ to these systems, and to the climate solutions they propose, that 
build sustainability into everyday life. At the heart of these alternatives is a 
combination of material artefacts and technologies, distinctive forms of social 
and economic organization, and a belief that genuine sustainability requires a 
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change to our quotidian practices of economic, cultural and social reproduction. 
To explore this, the chapter works through one specific example of a material 
technology that has become emblematic of sustainability – the bicycle – and its 
reappropriation by groups and individuals seeking an alternative to corporate 
and State solutions to climate change.  
Against Automobility 
… all you habitual motorists are suckers. You’ve all been hoodwinked. Your 
automobility is expensive, annoying, and anti-social. My bicycle is cheap, fun and 
at times a travelling party.1 
‘The car – and particularly the 4x4 SUV – has become emblematic for many of 
the worst excesses of Western consumerism’. With a high price tag, poor fuel 
efficiency, few safety features for those outside of the vehicle, and macho, 
aggressive styling, the SUV combines an immediate threat to the environment 
with a powerful symbol of Western capitalism.2 In the UK, road transport in 
2002 accounted for over 18% of all greenhouse gas emissions, approximately 
half of which was from private transport, significantly more than was 
contributed by air travel.3 This figure continues to increase and, in the current 
context of economic recession, increasing sales of cars and defending the 
automotive industries has been a lynch-pin of the government’s recovery 
strategy, with financial assistance being offered to individuals buying new cars 
and to automotive manufacturers. This should perhaps not be a surprise though. 
In the course of the 20th century the automobile was often associated with 
publicly funded economic growth. The building of the Autobahns in Germany 
and the Interstates in the USA are good examples of governments investing 
heavily in the infrastructure necessary to ensure that private car ownership was a 
realistic and desirable option for the masses. In both cases the direct creation of 
employment in the building projects helped to pull the economies into growth 
and created the conditions for a booming industry that would ensure such 
growth continued after the initial investment was made.  
Despite a long historical association with big government, the automobile 
has become synonymous with an ideology of individualism and independence. 
As Rajan has argued, the idea of autonomy associated with the automobile 
reflects quite specific, Western, neo-liberal conceptions of what a human, 
political subject is.4 The ideal of being able to decide on a path and to direct 
one’s own movement, even as that movement is constrained by consideration 
for others and for the law, gives the automobile a particular affinity with 
Western liberal ideas of political subjectivity and the relations between the 
individual and the state. Of course, the parallel between mass, public transport 
and more communist forms of government are equally strong and ideologically 
affective.  
On top of this, the automobile is the consumer status symbol par excellence. 
Our cars define who we are. They are an expression of our personal tastes, 
individuality and social-economic status. The car we drive says much about us 
whether it is a Porsche, a Lamborghini, a BMW, an old Citroen 2CV, a VW 
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campervan, or a modern hybrid electrical car. In particular, driving an expensive, 
fuel-inefficient car proclaims economic success and wealth. In advertising we are 
repeatedly sold the image of an automobile as giving us independence and 
autonomy. The ubiquitous image of the solitary car flying along a mountain road 
with apparently no regard for speed limits or traffic cops sells an illusion of 
unfettered desire. And yet the lived reality for most drivers is of heavily 
regulated mobility, or even immobility. Cars must travel along specific routes 
circumscribed by transport planning, speed limits, traffic lights, regulations and 
traffic density. Drivers are controlled and governed by the transport police, 
traffic wardens, private clamping companies and other drivers. The illusion of 
independence is thus a sham. 
As the above quote from Resist suggests, not everyone accepts the dominant 
image of automobility as independence, autonomy and success. For an 
increasing number of people concerned with the environment the car is a 
symbol of the worst excesses of capitalism. It is expensive and wasteful of 
scarce resources, inefficient and anti-social. The pollution from cars has been 
associated with breathing problems, particularly in young children.5 The 
maintenance of an effective road system in an era of expanding car-use requires 
massive road building projects that destroy natural spaces of greenbelt, forests 
and farmland. New roads separate communities and create dangerous obstacles 
for people walking to school, to work, to the shops, to the park, or to visit 
friends. With road traffic casualties in the UK in 2007 in the order of 8 fatalities 
per day, there is also a significant immediate human cost associated with road 
transport.6 
On top of these costs, road transport is inefficient. Average travel speeds in 
highly automobilized cities like London and LA are the same as, or lower than, 
the average speed of horse drawn transport more than a century ago. If you 
factor in the amount of time spent working to pay for petrol, vehicle purchase 
and upkeep, the average speed of a car would be below walking pace.7  
The car, then, is more than just a source of greenhouse gases that can be 
fixed by off-setting and more ecologically friendly technologies. It is a social 
system of production and consumption that connects models of political 
subjectivity, social hierarchy, large scale government, individual consumption 
and the nuclear family into a particular image of the social. The refusal of the car 
as a mode of transport thus has much broader significance than just the 
immediate reduction of greenhouse gases that might result from moving to 
public transport, walking, or a bicycle. It is a challenge to a material symbol and 
bedrock of the dominant social order: the very order that has brought us to the 
point of immanent climate catastrophe, producing along the way a series of 
human and social catastrophes that we have come to accept as a part of 
everyday life. 
Automobility and Progress 
The combination of economic growth, the promise of ever increasing speed, its 
technological complexity and its affinity with progressive-liberal concepts of 
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political subjectivity mean that the car has become emblematic of progress. For 
the Italian Futurists and their followers in the early 20th century, the automobile 
symbolized the modern promise of progress and speed.8 For social planners in 
the early to mid-century, the automobile was a centrepiece of modern planning 
that was even encapsulated by the name of one of the most famous and 
successful car-manufacturers: Fordism. When seeking to understand the 
changes in society and economic production in the late 20th century, social 
theorists turned to concepts of post-Fordism or neo-Fordism, taking examples 
from the restructuring of the automobile industry as a paradigm for broader and 
deeper socio-economic changes.9 In all cases, the car has long been associated 
with the very concept of ‘progress.’ To challenge the car is thus to question the 
very idea of technological and economic progress: the belief that social history 
develops along a pre-set trajectory from ‘primitive’ tools and tribal societies, to 
more complex machineries and associated forms of social organization. To 
question this complex of social, economic and technological progress is to invite 
accusations of ‘Luddism’, of being against civilization and seeking to throw 
humanity back to a primitive, pre-enlightenment dark-age by rejecting science 
and technology tout court.  
Such conceptions of progress are dependent upon a naïve understanding of 
innovation and technological change as a politically neutral process that 
develops independently of social and political factors, as if nature simply 
revealed itself to science and from this scientific advance, inevitable 
technological developments could be read off.10 As Langdon Winner has 
argued, however, technological artefacts have politics.11 In the case of the 
automobile we can see this in two ways. First, the automobile is a condensed 
symbol of a particular conception of politics and subjectivity. Second, for its 
effective and on-going use, the automobile depends upon a strong central 
government and taxation system that can provide the infrastructure, 
administration and policing necessary to regulate the use of automobiles and 
their often deleterious consequences. It also requires a global system of oil 
production, refining and distribution that itself depends upon a very specific 
geo-political system to ensure the ‘free’ flow of automobiles. Rather than an 
abstract form of technological progress, therefore, the car is both the product 
and sedimentation of quite specific geo-political, social and economic 
formations.  
There are two main responses to this kind of analysis. One is to reject 
technology and civilization altogether.12 The problem with this approach is that 
it accepts the dominant idea that technological progress and ‘civilization’ are 
linear processes that must be either accepted or rejected in their entirety. A 
more subtle form of analysis suggests that there are many different forms of 
technology, each with its own specific politics, and that the desirability of these 
should be considered and judged on the basis of the forms of association and 
social organization that they presume or make possible,13 including their 
material consequences for the environment. From this perspective, the idea of 
off-setting, or reducing, the carbon emissions produced by road transport is 
only dealing with one small part of a much deeper problem. It is not doing 
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anything to challenge the underlying forms of social, political, and economic 
organization that gave rise to, and clearly cannot deal with, the environmental 
catastrophe we find ourselves living through today. 
Towards a Constitutive Politics 
These days we are no longer satisfied with symbolic protest – which can almost 
be seen as militant lobbying. Our movement is leaning toward a more 
constitutive politics. People are beginning to work out what they want, what 
they are for, not only what they are against. What is more, people are actually 
‘acting’ for what they want: practice not just theory. People are realizing that ‘we 
live in a world of our own making’ and attempting to consciously (re)make it.14 
Environmental protest and radical critique are often perceived, especially by 
the mainstream media, as negative affairs: positions of hostility to a social order 
without a clear idea of what might replace it. Thus ecological activists are 
characterized, sometimes even by themselves, as neo-luddites opposed to 
technology and progress. Even anarchism has become characterized in the 
popular imagination as a negative rejection of government, rather than an 
alternative logic of governance founded on mutual aid and autonomy. Whether 
this oppositional logic is attributed from outside these movements, by 
politicians and the media, or is actively embraced by those within the 
movements, as in some of the anarcho-primitivist literature, there is a danger 
that such positions slide into destructive nihilism, at worst, or become a form of 
‘militant lobbying,’ at best. If it is the former, then protest can easily be 
dismissed through the stock conservative response that, whilst what we have 
may not be perfect, it is the best we can hope for and there is no real alternative. 
If it is the latter then the hierarchies of government are reinforced as those who 
seek a voice in protest articulate their concerns to those in power, expecting 
them to solve political, economic, social and environmental problems. This 
effectively reproduces disempowerment and political disenfranchisement so that 
when politicians and business-people fail to solve these problems, cynicism sets 
in and, again, we are left with an acceptance of the status quo.  
In contrast to these positions, many protest organizations have moved in 
recent years toward a more ‘constitutive’ form of politics. This approach, as the 
quote above from the Leeds May Day Group suggests, moves beyond an 
oppositional form of critique to actively engage in the recreating the world and 
bringing alternative social, economic, political and organizational forms into 
being. There is an enormous and diverse range of constitutive political strategies 
adopted by organizations within the radical political milieu. The Leeds May Day 
Group were referring to the organization of the protests against the G8 and 
other institutions of global governance, and how that had spilled over into 
political organization and dialogue through social forums around the world, as 
well as in the internal organization of the protest movement and its camps. 
Another example, specifically focused on the environment, is the Climate Camp 
movement, now a global phenomenon whereby environmental activists get 
together to protest against particularly powerful ‘climate criminals’, for example 
Drax coal-fired power station or Heathrow airport, but in doing so create a 
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temporary eco-village, with its own, lo-tech, sustainable systems for grey-water 
and sewage treatment, power generation, communication and community 
policing. Rather than trying to examine the full range of constitutive politics, 
however, the rest of this paper focuses on the role of the bicycle within such 
movements, and how it has come to be a tool not only of protest, but for 
forging alternative socialities and cultures. 
Critical Mass: Constitutive Politics Reclaims the Streets 
During Critical Mass we pedal out the kinds of lifestyle and society we want, in 
the present.15  
Critical Mass is a movement that started in San Francisco in 1992 and has since 
spread around the globe. The basic form is a regular, monthly bicycle ride, often 
including walkers, skateboarders and roller-bladers as well as cyclists. 
Participants ride en-masse around a city, usually at rush hour on a Friday 
evening. For a short period this mass of riders can reclaim the streets, asserting 
the value and significance of ‘other’ forms of mobility that, in the daily run of 
transport and road planning, are marginalized by cars and an ideology of 
‘efficient’, point-to-point transportation which subordinates the process of 
travel to its destination. 
The idea behind Critical Mass is to reclaim the public space of the streets and 
use it for a different purpose. In part, it can be seen as a protest or 
demonstration: a protest against the domination of urban space and transport 
by the automobile; a demonstration to assert the right of cyclists to the roads, to 
make their presence – often rendered imperceptible to drivers and transport 
planners alike, with fatal consequences – visible, audible and impossible to 
ignore. As a form of protest, Critical Mass has been used to attract public 
attention or prevent access to specific locations by slowing or preventing the 
passage of vehicles. For example, Critical Mass style rides have become a regular 
part of protests against London’s biannual arms fair, Defence Systems and 
Equipment International (DSEI). Even on regular Critical Masses, fliers for a 
range of political causes, protests and events are handed out to both participants 
and passersby, suggesting that the ride is a forum for contentious politics or a 
protest tool of the new social movements. 
As the oft-used catchphrase – ‘We aren’t blocking traffic, we are traffic!’ – 
suggests, at least part of the function of Critical Mass is to raise the visibility of 
cycling as a viable form of everyday transport with a right to a place alongside, 
or instead of, cars. Despite this, Critical Mass is an event without a distinctive 
political purpose. There is no clear attempt to lobby government or promote a 
particular political agenda or even a specific transport policy. In this sense it 
departs from the strategy of ‘militant lobbying’. As a collective, Critical Mass has 
no leaders, no spokespeople, and presents no demands to politicians and the 
press. Whilst this makes it difficult to pin-down as a political movement, and 
easily leads to accusations of being an incoherent rabble, this refusal to articulate 
demands to a political body runs hand in hand with a refusal to wait. The 
demand for safer streets for cycling and a more people friendly city is put into 
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practice by reclaiming the streets for people and bicycles right here, right now, 
not in some distant utopia.  
In this sense both a new idea of how the city could be, and of how non-
representative, democratic social organization could be, this is performed and 
brought into being by the simple act of riding bikes en-masse, with no clear 
direction and no leaders. The ride follows whoever happens to be at the front. 
The steady pace of riding ensures that no one is left behind. The tactic of riding 
as a bunched mass, taking up the whole street, clears the road ahead of cars, 
producing, if only for a fleeting moment, a safe space for pedestrians and 
cyclists, or an empty space for experiment and play, rather than the 
instrumental-rational conduct of transport.16 This sense of carnival or festival, of 
pleasure and play over regulation and rule, is added to by the regular appearance 
of bikes and bike-trailers carrying powerful, battery powered sound systems, 
flashing lights, and fancy dress, especially on occasions like Halloween. These all 
contribute to the general feel of a mobile party, positioning the pleasure of 
cycling as a social activity against the isolated alienation of the commuting car-
driver.  
Critical Mass thus sets the immediate sociality of cycling against the illusory 
autonomy of driving; pleasure, play and creativity against instrumentality and the 
subordination of means to ends; non-hierarchical, spontaneous and immediate 
democracy against subordination to external rule, leadership and authority; the 
deferral of utopia to a point ‘after the revolution’, or once the politicians have 
acted, to the autonomous creation of the desired reality right here, right now. At 
best, however, this is an example of what Hakim Bey has called a ‘temporary 
autonomous zone’.17 It creates a space in which experimentation and utopia can 
flourish, but only for a short while. It enables the active creation of alternatives 
to the dominant order of automobility but is not in and of itself a sustainable 
order, in part because it remains tied to a logic of protest and demonstration, 
but also because, as a festival, it is dependent upon the order that it inverts. 
Despite this though, the existence of Critical Mass has enabled new social 
relations and networks to emerge that exist beyond the regular monthly bike 
rides and generate more stable and long-lived forms of association that have 
taken the bicycle as an emblem of an alternative, more socially and 
environmentally just, reality. One such organization is Bicycology.  
From Automobility to Bicycology 
Governments obviously have a key role in both causing and aiding solutions to 
Climate Change. Just as clearly, companies that are particularly damaging must 
change their ways and help to reduce the threat. However, we cannot rely on 
these institutions to do this out of goodwill: we must take action ourselves, both 
by pressurizing governments and companies, and by changing our own 
lifestyles.18 
In the summer of 2005 a group of between 60 and 80 cyclists rode from 
London, England, to the site of the G8 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland. Climate 
change was high on the agenda for the G8 that year and the riders were joining 
Upsetting the Offset 
  329 
with thousands of other people in Scotland to lobby, protest and demonstrate. 
Their concerns were diverse. Some wanted to lobby the leaders of the G8 to 
take the environment more seriously and adopt contraction and convergence 
policies to mitigate what they saw as an imminent climate catastrophe, others 
saw the G8 itself as part of the problem and incapable of offering effective 
solutions to this or any other problem of late capitalism. As the G8 consists of 
the leaders of the most polluting, and advanced capitalist, nations, these 
protestors saw little hope that they would be able to do anything to solve the 
problems that were a product of the very system they oversaw and which gave 
them their authority. Instead, they saw a need for a more radical change in 
which people took direct responsibility for the problems of climate change and 
sought to create a more egalitarian world in which the rapacious economic 
growth of the affluent capitalist nations was challenged both through protest 
and through a strategy of selective disengagement: a process of creating 
alternative ways of organizing, and developing alternative technologies, in 
everyday life.  
Following the G8 summit, many of those involved in the protests were 
asking themselves what effect their demonstrations had. Much of the press 
coverage was negative and focused exclusively on the relatively few examples of 
property destruction that had taken place. Attempts to influence the politicians 
involved in the talks were minimal as celebrities like Bob Geldof assumed the 
role of unelected spokesmen for the protest movement and ended up lending 
legitimacy to Blair and the other politicians involved in the talks. Any direct 
articulation or grievance was prevented by the rows of riot police and fencing 
surrounding the Gleneagles venue. Attempts to disrupt the proceedings met 
with police blockades and violence. They had limited impact on the talks as the 
main delegates were flown in by helicopter, straight over the heads of the 
massed protestors. At a more general level concerns were raised within the 
movement that mobilizing around events like Davos, the G8, WTO and IMF 
gatherings was unwittingly ceding the initiative to the politicians and business 
leaders. By protesting against these organizations, and the systems they govern, 
the agenda that they set was itself left unchallenged. Against this many groups 
sought a more positive way of organizing; a way of bringing into existence the 
kind of world they wanted to see, in which concern for social and 
environmental justice was a part of everyday life. 
One such initiative was Bicycology. Growing out of the G8 cycle caravan, 
Bicycology was a conscious effort to create an on-going organization that would 
take the forms of association found in summit protests – for example non-
hierarchical affinity groups, participative justice and principles of consensus 
decision making – and to ground those principles in a more permanent 
organization dedicated to the promotion of sustainable alternatives to 
automobility, understood in the broad sense outlined above.  
In the most immediate sense, Bicycology set bicycles against cars. Whilst cars 
pollute, kill and literally ‘cost the earth’, bicycles are relatively cheap and low in 
their environmental impact. Whilst cars foster a sense of separation, whereby 
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the world appears on a screen (only a windscreen rather than television screen), 
bicycles put riders into immediate contact with their environment, with other 
road users and with their bodies. Where cars are elitist, insofar as not everyone 
can afford one, and if everyone did drive then no one would ever get anywhere 
because of the congestion, bikes are relatively democratic.  
Crucially, from an environmental perspective, the bicycle is embraced in 
Bicycology as part of a broader environmental strategy of treading lightly on the 
planet, of reducing consumption, re-using what is already available, and 
recycling what must be wasted. In this Bicycology, and similar groups, have a 
distinct take on the bicycle. There is nothing inherent in a bicycle that can make 
it challenge global capitalism. Indeed, it is all too easy to find bikes that cost 
thousands of pounds and are made from carbon-fibre, titanium or other costly 
materials with a significant environmental impact in their production. A visit to 
a specialist bike store will quickly reveal a massive range of performance-
enhancing dietary supplements, lightweight bicycle components, and sport-
specific clothing, mostly made from petrochemical-derived synthetic fibres,. In 
such a context cycling can easily become part of a consumerist fantasy, with 
Dollars, Euros and Pounds being exchanged for a few grams off the weight of a 
bike, or a slightly more streamlined helmet. Indeed, mountain-bikes regularly 
appear on the roof-racks of SUVs in car showrooms, with BMW even 
producing a range of own-brand mountain-bikes. There is thus no essential 
tension between capitalism, consumerism, or even automobility, and the bicycle. 
But here it is necessary to distinguish between different uses of the bicycle. 
Whilst commercial and sports oriented cycling sees the bicycle as another 
commodity, subject to strategies of built-in obsolescence and disposability,19 
what Chris Carlsson refers to as the ‘outlaw’ bicycling scene, ‘is distinctly anti-
consumerist. It is a tinkering culture that spontaneously re-uses and recycles in 
ways environmental advocates of recycling can only dream about’.20 
This environmental concern, and its anti-capitalist, anti-consumerist stance, 
is thus connected to a wider, anarchistic, anti-authoritarian, DIY culture.21 
Bicycology, like other ‘outlaw’ bicycling groups, distances itself from the high-
tech, high-cost end of bicycle technology for two reasons. One, as already 
discussed, is its rejection of consumerism. The other is more concerned with 
autonomy and independence. In its basic form, the bicycle is an easy machine to 
operate, maintain and repair. Without costly hydraulic disc brakes, sealed 
bearing units, or complex hub-gears, all of which require specialized tools, a 
basic bicycle can be repaired and maintained with only a small amount of 
training and a handful of everyday tools. This makes it possible to recode the 
bicycle as a simple tool that can liberate personal transport from dependency 
upon the, predominantly male, mechanics found in car garages and most 
professional bike workshops. By taking bicycle maintenance and repair skills 
into the community, and providing people with access to tools and equipment, 
‘outlaw’ bicycle groups can foster individual and community independence, 
rather than dependence upon commercial products, and individual helplessness. 
Bicycology continue this tradition by organizing events and road shows that 
include workshops on bicycle maintenance and repair, as well as sessions on 
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how to build and pedal powered electricity generators and other low-carbon 
technologies. Their pedal powered and bike-mounted sound systems and 
cinema projectors, as well as their portable workshop, have also become a part 
of the infrastructure that enables more conventional protest events like Climate 
Camps. 
Cycles of Conviviality 
Groups like Bicycology, or Carlsson’s ‘outlaw’ bicyclists, show that the bicycle 
can be what Ivan Illich called a ‘tool for conviviality’. Illich defined conviviality 
as a term 
to designate the opposite of industrial productivity… to mean anutonomous and 
creative intercourse among persons, and the intercourse of persons with their 
environment.22 
Illich contrasts the industrial system of production, which produces 
homogeneity and allows personal expression only through consumption, with 
‘conviviality’, which combines human interdependence and individual freedom. 
For Illich, industrial machinery is much more than just a ‘tool’. Precisely because 
it measures the value of a tool in quantitative terms – how fast, how many, how 
cheaply – industrial capitalism can only recognize a tool as a means to the 
efficient achievement of ends. Illich’s ‘convivial’ approach to evaluating tools, in 
contrast, emphasizes the kinds of relations they make possible and the kinds of 
human beings and social relations that they presuppose. Mass industrial society 
necessitates disciplined, docile subjects and has developed a complex system of 
compulsory schooling in order to produce these subjects23, who, in turn, are 
able to fit unproblematically into an efficient tool of production: the 
manufactory, bureaucracy or business corporation. In order to maximize utility, 
individual, or collective autonomous, expression and desire must be 
subordinated to the broader goals of a pre-determined system.  
As automobility is the exemplar of industrial production, requiring 
disciplined producers to man the factories and disciplined consumers to 
purchase and drive cars, so bicycology is opposed to this industrial system, 
inculcating individual independence from impersonal systems of production and 
transport by actively producing interpersonal forms of free association, with 
direct intercourse with the environment. As part of a broader network of social 
and technical relations, the bicycle can become a tool for conviviality but this 
potential is not essential to the technology itself. It depends upon a much 
broader set of social relations to actualize it. 
Conclusion: From Technical Fix to Conviviality 
What this chapter has hopefully demonstrated is that technologies are never 
straightforwardly technical. Attempts to solve the problem of climate change 
with innovations like carbon capture and storage, off-setting, hybrid and 
hydrogen-powered automobiles, or even bicycles, will not change the 
fundamentally social dynamics that have created the current climate crisis. This 
crisis is the product of a broader technical and social system in which the 
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environment is an ‘externality’, human beings are ‘consumers’, justice can only 
be conceived of in terms of the distribution of goods, and economic growth is 
the unquestionable measure of success. To counter such a system we do not 
need new markets, new products, and more government. What is required, and 
is already happening in communities and social networks around the world, is a 
new form of evaluation: A way to measure the desirability of a technological 
artefact, organizational form, or economic system, in terms of its consequences 
for the environment and quality of human association. As Illich put it, what is 
needed is: 
A methodology, by which to recognize the public perversion of tools into 
purposes [but which will inevitably encounter] resistance on the part of people 
who are used to measuring what is good in terms of dollars. Plato knew that the 
bad statesman is he who believes that the art of measurement is universal, and 
who jumbles together what is greater or smaller and what is more fit to the 
purpose. Our present attitudes towards production have been formed over the 
centuries. Increasingly, institutions have not only shaped our demands but also in 
the most literal sense our logic, or sense of proportion. Having come to demand 
what institutions can produce, we soon believe that we cannot do without 
them.24 
To challenge climate change requires precisely this new kind of logic. It means 
challenging the social, economic systems that have produced climate change. 
This can be done through a focus on technologies and mechanisms but only so 
long as we recognize that technologies and mechanisms are never just technical 
or mechanical. It is not, therefore, simply a case of replacing petrol cars with 
electrical cars, or diesel engines with hydrogen fuel cells. It is not even a case of 
replacing cars with bicycles. But this does not mean that technologies and 
mechanisms do not matter. Markets reproduce social isolation and quantitative 
calculation rather than ethical recognition and community. Automobiles 
produce dependence on impersonal systems of government, policing and 
expertise, as well as a global system of production, warfare and the 
expropriation of resources25 whilst bicycles can foster self-reliance, community 
and a convivial austerity which may make us all richer, as well as weigh less 
heavily upon the environment. But this will only happen if we can move beyond 
the search for technical solutions without questioning the broader social logics 
of which they are a part. It is in this broad sense of an alternative logic to 
industrial, capitalist automobility, that outlaw bicycle groups offer us bicycle-
logic, or bicycology.  
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Towards the Sustainable School: Social Accounts 
and Local Solutions 
John Fenwick, Jane Gibbon and Ann Marie Sidhu 
A public life develops only when a society realizes that reciprocity and mutual aid 
are worthy of cultivation both as good in themselves and as providing the basis 
of the individual self.1  
Introduction 
Concerns about climate change and sustainability raise questions around what 
can and must be done by society and the individual to ameliorate the damaging 
effects of overconsumption of the earth’s resources. It is evident that radical 
reductions in carbon emissions are required if we are to avoid dangerous climate 
change.2 Efforts are being made at global and international level to formulate 
policy and implement mechanisms to reduce carbon emissions. Unfortunately, 
the discourse on climate change and sustainability has privileged business and 
economics and our ecosystem has become a subset of the market economy. 
Valid perspectives on the environmental crisis such as social equity, ecological 
sustainability, ethics and moral belief3 have unfortunately been largely ignored. 
The formation of the emissions trading schemes (ETS) has, by placing a 
price on carbon, enabled business to capture the climate change agenda.4 
Research illuminates the extensive issues with mechanisms such as the 
European emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) and the carbon off setting 
schemes. Climate change is a global problem but not all countries subscribe to 
the Kyoto Protocol and developing countries are reluctant to restrain economic 
growth. The main purpose of the emissions trading scheme is to cost emissions 
into production output and motivate emitters to reduce carbon emissions as 
they would any other costs. However, there are many flaws with this solution, 
and many have already been covered within other chapters of this book. 
Companies can meet their emissions commitments without making major 
investments in clean technology and a fundamental shift from reliance on fossil 
fuels is hampered. At country level, emission targets may be met by using either 
or both of the two carbon offsetting mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, i.e. 
Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
Under the CDM Northern countries can earn Certified Emission Reducions 
(CER’s) from emission reducing projects implemented in developing countries 
(Southern countries). Renewable energy projects account for approximately 5% 
of the carbon market and empirical evidence highlights that 75% of all carbon 
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credits certified are projects for capturing landfill methane and 
hydrofluorocarbons (banned in OECD countries from 1987).5 
These projects do not contribute to sustainable development or the local 
communities within which they are located. In fact environmental injustices 
occur as local communities are not consulted, campaigns against such projects 
are ignored6 and local low-carbon community projects are undermined in favour 
of CDM projects.7 The voluntary purchasing of carbon offsets encourages a 
false assurance that company and individual activities have negligible impacts on 
the environment due to offsetting and reduces the impetus for any real change 
in behaviour. It is clear that carbon trading will not solve the current 
environmental crisis. A collective, comprehensive, holistic and multi-faceted 
approach is required where the environment is viewed as ‘a community issue 
which exhibits value not only for those participating in the market, but also the 
present and future generations and sentient life forms’.8 Community level 
approaches can advance the climate change agenda9 and it is within this context 
that we consider the potential contribution of the sustainable school to the 
current position. The sustainable school is a community of stakeholders 
(students, teachers, parents, suppliers, local business, local residents) with a 
commitment to shared values.  
The chapter discusses the sustainable school and the importance of local 
solutions in building broader responses to the climate change and 
environmental agenda in general. We argue that development of the sustainable 
school must be based in local initiatives at school level, drawing from mutual 
values and a co-operative ethos. Within these values we can identify patterns of 
accountability based on voluntary obligation in the public interest and a shared 
approach to the common good. In particular, social accounting provides a 
valuable way of collecting information about the relationship between school 
and community, and about environmental impact. The sustainable school has 
been defined by the UK Government as follows:  
A sustainable school puts the principle and practice of ‘care’ at the heart of 
everything it does and aspires to do. This includes: 
- care for oneself 
- care for each other (distant and near, as well as for future generations) 
- care for the environment (from the school grounds to the planet)10  
The Sustainable Schools initiative was launched in 2006 and ‘places the child at 
the centre of its concerns for a healthy, just and sustainable society. It paints a 
picture of the kind of place and the kind of school culture where each learner 
can be healthy, stay safe, enjoy and achieve, make a positive contribution, and 
achieve economic well-being – all within the earth’s environmental limits’.11 The 
charity Sustainability and Environmental Education (SEEd) has sought to 
enable more of the education sector to engage with education for sustainable 
development and environmental education. The work of SEEd suggests that 
schools that have embedded sustainability report a range of positive outcomes. 
Schools that have successfully engaged with sustainability take a whole school 
approach and are outward looking, with their students actively involved in 
Alternatives 
 336 
decision making and practice in the context of a broader understanding of 
sustainability.12 
The barriers to sustainable schools, however, include time and money, the 
lack of priority given to sustainability from central government or the inspection 
regime, a knowledge gap, a lack of training, too many overlapping initiatives, 
school buildings and a lack of evidence of impact.13 The enablers to the 
development of a more sustainable school include the time to create a shared 
vision as a whole school community, a joined up approach, distributed 
leadership, embedded sustainability in policy, curriculum, budgets and staff, 
local authority support, external partnerships (local business, community, 
NGOs and international), student participation and leadership, and training for 
active citizenship.14 All these factors point to the value of a wider participatory 
approach in developing the sustainable school.  
The difficulty of embedding sustainability requires schools to focus on more 
than one area and to develop an understanding of where their greatest impacts 
lie, for example through procurement. A focus can be achieved through a 
school policy on sustainability embedded in the schools’ strategic plans along 
with an understanding of the eight doorways to sustainability.15 Local clusters of 
schools can share knowledge, working together with the local authority, NGO 
representatives and the community in order to share ideas and plans toward 
establishing best practice.16  
The collective nature of sharing knowledge internally – by working across 
the whole school – and working externally – in local clusters – is consistent with 
a communitarian approach underpinned by cooperative values. These values are 
readily stated. They include commitments to democracy, self-help, self-
responsibility, equality, equity and solidarity alongside a strong ethical sensibility. 
The overall co-operative principles are those of voluntary and open 
membership, democratic control by members, members’ economic 
participation, autonomy and independence, the provision of education and 
training for members, co-operation with other co-operators, and a concern for 
the broader community.17 These seven widely-agreed principles are the basis of 
the co-operative identity, defined by the International Co-operative Alliance as 
follows:  
A co-operative is an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to 
meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through 
a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise.18  
While the broad values of co-operativism are well established and largely agreed, 
the application of these values and principles to schools is in its early stages. The 
Principal of the Co-operative College has talked in the following terms:  
Look back at our co-operative principles and what it says about education. It 
talks about educating the wider public, and young people in particular about co-
operation. What way of doing that than by giving young people the opportunity 
to be directly engaged in running a co-operative at their school and reinforcing 
that by a whole series of experiences of co-operation throughout the 
curriculum...just think how our Movement can be reinvigorated if, in years to 
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come, thousands of people are leaving school each year having spent the whole 
of their school lives in co-op schools, putting values into practice, and wanting to 
work for organizations that share those values.19 
Sustainability and Carbon Reduction in the School  
National bodies in the UK have a role to play. The Sustainable Development 
Commission reports that England’s schools system is responsible for 9.4 million 
tons of carbon emissions per year and recommends the UK government works 
with schools to halve emissions by 2020. The government is seen as a catalyst 
for carbon reduction whilst empowering and enabling local authorities and 
individual schools. The case study of the Government Office for Yorkshire and 
the Humber demonstrates how regional Government Offices are charged by the 
Department for Children Schools and Families (DCSF) with promoting 
sustainable schools at a regional level through networking good practice, as well 
as locally through improved support and helpdesk functions for schools. 
Government Office for Yorkshire and the Humber (GOYH) has established a 
Sustainable Schools Coordination Group to help fulfil this objective also. The 
Group facilitates sharing of good practice within and across DCSF Sustainable 
Schools doorway themes, helps connect schools in the region with organizations 
engaged in sustainable development, advises and challenges schools and other 
organizations as they develop their Sustainable Schools programmes, and 
signposts funding and support opportunities for Sustainable Schools activities.20  
At local level in the UK, a number of initiatives have sought to address the 
specific carbon reduction agenda. In the North East of England, for instance, 
the Government Office for the region and other regional organizations have 
produced a Climate Change Adaptation Study and associated Action Plan, and 
are now working on a study of how to achieve economic growth within carbon 
targets.21 Other organizations, such as the North-East Strategic Partnership for 
Sustainable Schools,22 have sought to work toward achievement of government 
targets for sustainable development at regional level. 
Alongside this, the Carbon Trust has a message firmly based upon the hard-
headed business benefits of low carbon products. It describes its ‘mission’ as 
being ‘to accelerate the move to a low carbon economy, by working with 
organizations to reduce carbon emissions now and develop commercial low 
carbon technologies for the future.’ It places emphasis on the cost savings to be 
achieved by taking carbon reduction seriously, for instance through using fuel-
efficient equipment and low-energy lighting. Specifically, it has produced an 
action plan for energy efficiency in the school23 together with guidance on a 
‘whole school approach’ to reduction of the school’s carbon footprint.24 The 
whole school approach places emphasis upon involvement of different 
stakeholders within the (internal) school community, including students and 
staff, to address sustainable development and carbon reduction in particular. 
This includes impact within the curriculum itself.  
Recent political debate has by no means been confined to the Left and those 
with a critical political stance. From the Right, a prospective parliamentary 
candidate for the Conservative Party argues that schools can do five things ‘if 
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the current crop of children is to emerge as a generation that cherishes the 
environment’, including provision of ‘good food’, skills in ‘cooking and 
growing’, tackling the ‘school run’, saving energy and dealing with waste.25  
We would argue that specific suggestions for what schools can do must be 
set within a context that brings together sustainability, accountability, 
governance and the local community. We see the key to success as deriving 
from local initiatives, based firmly upon:  
! Social reporting and accounting as a means of gathering information and, 
more importantly, of establishing real patterns of accountability within the 
school’s internal community (staff, and students) and (a neglected aspect) its 
local external community  
! A framework of governance which gives priority to values of co-operation, 
mutuality and the common good rather than models of governance based on 
private sector ‘partnership’ and the values of the marketplace  
! A focus on sustainability in practice through all aspects of the school life: the 
curriculum, the school ethos and the school as producer and consumer of 
resources.  
Within this approach, we see the school as being a local solution to global issues 
of climate change, environment and sustainability. For such local solutions to 
succeed, they cannot be seen as isolated target-based activities: their basis in 
shared values needs to be addressed, made explicit and agreed.  
Social Reporting and Accounting  
The process of social accounting can inform the school and its stakeholders of 
the community and environmental impact of the school. The main advantage of 
this is to generate information on the relationship between school and 
community. This largely qualitative information provides a meaningful 
alternative to the restricted performance data demanded by government. Value-
driven social accounting can provide the empirical basis that is an essential 
foundation for developing sustainability. 
Social accounting provides a way for co-operatives to implement their 
principles and also to be accountable. The Social Audit Network (SAN) defined 
social accounting as a framework which uses existing information and patterns 
of reporting to account for ‘social performance’, to report upon this 
performance, to plan for future actions, to understand impacts on the 
community and to be accountable to ‘key stakeholders’.26 This is not a 
mechanical process: values are central. Social accounting can provide an 
approach to understanding and appreciating co-operative associational qualities 
using a flexible framework to develop the relations between members.  
Social accounting is flexible. As well as producing specific outcomes, it 
reinforces the value-base of the school community by contributing to learning 
and self-awareness: participation in the process cements the recognition of what 
is important to the school. In the UK, Launceston College in Cornwall has 
demonstrated the use of social accounts in secondary education. Launceston is a 
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comprehensive school with approximately 1400 pupils aged 11-18. On the basis 
of their social account, the school formulated local policies with a central 
objective being ‘the environmental impact of the college’ for any future cycles of 
accounting.27 School values – ‘a community college that values achievement, 
provides opportunity and promotes responsibility’28 – are expressly referred to 
within the accounts.  
The school’s 2006 social accounts included:  
Scope: investigation of impacts based on the key factor that ‘…pupils make a 
positive contribution to the community’29  
Stakeholders: a concern with internal and external stakeholders including 
students, parents, staff, local residents, other local schools, retailers, and 
employers30  
Environment: including projects including recycling, care of the environment 
through Citizenship within the curriculum, and project work on sustainability 
with the younger students  
Sustainability: projects included designing a bicycle store and recycling bins, 
tree planting and a ‘Citizenship Day’ 
Strengths and Weaknesses: stated strengths included renewal of the focus on 
social objectives and building on the self-assessment process, and 
development of the relationships between a broad range of stakeholders, but 
social accounting also involves challenges: it takes time, and it needs support. 
We would add that it may also provide surprising and perhaps unwelcome 
results: its findings cannot be assumed at the outset. There is also value in 
seeing social accounting as a longitudinal commitment rather than a one-off 
exercise, and Launceston repeated the process in 2008.  
 
Consistent with this approach, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) provides a 
further way forward in its development framework for good practice and 
‘learning for sustainability’.31 The WWF emphasizes whole-school working, 
expansion of capacity amongst adult stakeholders within the school community 
in promoting sustainability, and creating the conditions where education for 
sustainable development may grow. The approach is explicitly ‘non-
prescriptive’, matching its methodology to specific needs within each school. 
Whatever specific approaches might be advanced in particular circumstances, 
we argue that the social account provides a local solution: a qualitative 
perspective based upon values, not just another quantitative measure imposed 
by government. Additionally, the strength of this ethos may be reinforced by 
governance arrangements that take seriously the values of mutuality and co-
operativism that provides the basis for a truly sustainable school. Recent moves 
toward establishing the co-operative trust as a model of school governance 
provide a promising way forward.  
Co-operative Governance  
Co-operatives the world over share the values of self help, self responsibility, 
democracy, equality, equity and community solidarity. In the UK all types of co-
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operative enterprises are increasingly keen to work with schools to ensure that 
young people have the skills and experience they need for the workplace and to 
show that an ethical approach to business works. They are also keen to show 
that through the adoption of these values, children and young people can gain a 
better understanding of their role as citizens and how they can help build a fairer 
society.32  
Within patterns of governance can be located the real practical opportunity for 
enhancing sustainability. This is particularly so within the co-operative/mutual 
model. While secondary schools have always been free to make links with co-
operative organizations, central government is currently encouraging something 
more in the shape of the co-operative trust school. Such schools are run by a 
foundation trust and are given a greater degree of autonomy, while remaining 
part of the state sector. Co-operative trusts stand in contrast to existing trust 
schools which normally have formal partnerships with business and private 
sector companies. The first co-operative trust school was announced in 2008: 
Reddish Vale Technology College, an 11-16 comprehensive school in Stockport. 
Its trust is a ‘membership based organization which shares the international co-
operative movement’s values and principles’. Partners are the local authority, 
local college, the Co-operative Group and the Co-operative College.33  
A second co-operative trust school was established in 2009 when 
Campsmount Technology College in Doncaster became a Foundation Trust 
School, with partners from education and the co-operative movement. During 
2009 a small number of other schools have established co-operative foundation 
trusts, including Bebington High Sports College in the Wirral. ‘The co-operative 
or mutual model is based on open membership, equal democratic participation 
(one member, one vote) and the clear accountability of those in charge to those 
for whom services are provided’.34 Again, partners are drawn from educational 
and charitable organizations. ‘Equal’, ‘democratic’, ‘open’ and ‘accountable’ are 
words that have not been commonplace within the recent vocabulary of 
educational policy. These draw from current government thinking where there 
is an intention to create 100 co-operative trust schools ‘owned and controlled by 
the local community’.35  
The co-operative trust is a charitable foundation. Partners are likely to be 
mutual, community, charitable or educational organizations: hence, the 
dominant values are those of co-operativism. A ‘council’ or forum represents 
community members, staff, students and other stakeholders. This council 
appoints trustees to the trust, and the trust appoints some governors.36 The 
Head Teacher of Reddish Vale school said: ‘We are very pleased to be drawing 
upon the values and principles of the international co-operative movement to 
deliver a real mutual dividend...This is more than one schools’ development – it 
is about empowering the whole community towards self regeneration’.37  
Governance, accountability and sustainability are closely entwined in all these 
processes. We would suggest that strong relationships of accountability reside 
within governance processes, and that within effective governance and 
accountability can be identified the bases for sustainability. Values are at the 
heart of sustainability and this has several dimensions: the curriculum, the 
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physical operation of the school (eg, as a building consuming resources), its 
links to the community, and its prevailing pattern of governance. The mutual 
trust is a powerful alternative to the private-sector model in secondary 
education.38 It is also a strong platform for the development of local solutions 
to the problems of the environment.  
Conclusions: Carbon markets, Sustainability, Values and Social Accounts  
Carbon markets are advanced as the key solution to the climate change 
dilemma. This is evidenced by government policies and the willingness of big 
business to participate in a pseudo market (and its derivative activities) for what 
is in reality ‘the commons.’ Carbon markets operate at the international, 
governmental and institutional level keeping the climate change discourse 
mainly within the purview of the political and economic elite. Carbon trading is 
unlikely to deliver the required emissions reductions due to the various 
weaknesses outlined in this book. Approaches which create awareness, enable 
action, cooperative behaviour and community initiatives to lead low carbon 
lifestyles are likely to be more effective. The co-operative school is such an 
approach as it emphasizes values of equity, mutuality and democracy. It is 
precisely these values that are a necessary precondition for the development of 
the sustainable school, equipped to deal with climate change and the 
environmental agenda in general.  
We recognised the potential to lock a values driven ethos into schools in the long 
term. One of the key aspects of the trust is that it not only holds the land and 
assets on behalf of the community, but also its ethos. We see a national network 
of schools sharing Co-op values driven and global perspective as a critical 
contribution to bringing about greater diversity in education provision.39 
We argue that – potentially – the mutual model is significant: it depends upon 
the local community, the balance of local political forces, and upon who is 
setting the agenda. Genuine co-operativism can be enacted through active 
representation of local people in governance arrangements and the use of 
processes such as those of social accounting. This links to broadly 
communitarian approaches to participation and the public good. This can be an 
effective basis, a precondition, for promoting awareness of carbon footprints 
and advancing sustainability, based on the crucial link to values. The received 
tradition of managerialism can be subverted by promoting alternative values. 
These values need to engage with the lived experience of internal and external 
members of the school community, within a shared mutual culture that is the 
prerequisite of sustainability.  
Based firmly on local initiatives, a broader accountability can create better 
relationships between individuals and the state, using a critical accounting 
framework in civil society ‘through practical reasoning to regain a glimpse of the 
goals that can be pursued by communities. These are the very values which have 
been submerged by instrumental political structures which contend that a 
globalizing world market will solve our social and environmental dilemmas’.40 
The school community stakeholders will be empowered to participate in the 
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sustainability agenda at local level and have a platform to take specific actions to 
reduce carbon emissions and promote sustainability. 
We have suggested that sustainability and accountability within the secondary 
school are strengthened by reporting based on social accounts and by 
governance based on co-operative values. Social accounts and the mutual co-
operative trusts are practical vehicles for enacting the values of sustainability. 
This is an alternative to the dominance of neo-liberalism and the drift toward 
private-sector values throughout education. Accountability, the common good 
and mutual values are the basis for practical action on sustainability in 
education. A concern with sustainable ways of living places education for young 
people at the centre of enquiry, and local solutions as the way forward.  
The concern to reform school governance in order to link more closely to 
citizens and communities is not confined to the United Kingdom. Lessons can 
be learned from grassroots projects in the South grappling with sustainability. In 
contrasting political conditions, for instance, Nicaragua has sought to 
‘democratize’ school governance41 and no doubt different countries will move 
toward different solutions in the light of local conditions. In the UK, the 
government says it wants every school to be a ‘sustainable school’ by 2020.42 
With the global economic and environmental crisis leading to a rediscovery of 
mutualism in many spheres, the relevance of these debates to sustainable 
education is clear. Clearly, sustainable schools can advance and even 
revolutionize the way we treat our environment and connect with our 
community.  
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Inspiring Examples: Sustainable Living" 
Sally Andrew 
Introduction 
Political organizations, actions and technology are all crucial in ensuring climate 
change mitigation. But organizations and technology will not take us far, unless 
we know where we are going. We need to be clear not only about what we want 
to destroy (e.g. fossil-fuel dependence) but also about what we want to create. 
There are people who have already begun developing and practicing sustainable 
ways of living. They are creating real examples of what is possible. They are 
building tomorrow, today. On an economic level, I believe it is the practice of 
gender-sensitive and environmentally-conscious democratic socialism that can 
best meet the needs of the Earth and the people on it. Unfortunately, I do not 
think that we will be able to achieve this goal in time to save the Earth, so we 
also need to see what is possible within the current system. We need to find 
ways of reducing the fossil-chomping nature of the wealthy; and we need to 
look at ways of improving the quality of life of the poor majority on this planet 
– without spewing out more greenhouse gases. In this chapter I present specific 
sustainability projects that set examples for us. However, there is also a lot to 
learn from the practices of the millions of working class and rural poor whose 
destruction to the Earth is very small relative to their numbers. It is also worth 
studying indigenous hunter-gatherer societies, who developed tools and 
practices (social, technological and spiritual) to live productively, in harmony 
with the Earth. Some of this knowledge is still alive and practiced today. Many 
of the governments of the developing countries argue that they need fossil fuels 
to ‘develop’. Some of the examples below illustrate that renewable energy can be 
a far better option for development – for both the poor and the planet. It is up 
to governments to regulate and enforce emission reductions, but these examples 
of sustainable living practice give us some idea of how life can be lived in a 
friendlier way to the Earth. Here are some of the stories of the fire dogs that are 
not just barking, but doing… 
Findhorn eco-village 
The Findhorn Community is one of the oldest, wisest and freshest examples of 
an eco-village. At Findhorn, people address sustainability not only as an 
environmental issue, but also in social, economic and spiritual terms. Their 
values are manifest in their beautiful buildings and gardens, wastewater 
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treatment, organic food production, consensus decision-making, wind turbines 
and solar PV panels.  
As well as sustaining a 500-strong resident community, Findhorn is a 
humming hub of international spiritual and environmental conferences, 
networking and education projects.  
According to a 2006 study, Findhorn has the lowest ecological footprint for 
any settlement ever measured in the industrialized world – at about 50% of the 
UK national average. In specific areas it is even lower: the ‘home and energy’ 
footprint is 21% (feed-in renewable energy systems – it sells electricity to the 
grid); the food footprint is 37% (largely home-grown, organic, vegetarian and 
seasonal diet); and car mileage is 6% of the national average (car-pooling and 
high employment level within the community). 
To check out some of the marvellous happenings at Findhorn, go to 
Findhorn’s website and to Jonathan Dawson’s weekly blog.1  
Findhorn is one of many eco-villages across the world. Have a look at the 
Global Eco-village Network to read more about the numerous ‘centres of 
innovation and inspiration, introducing new technologies and social systems that 
spread out into the wider society’.2 
Transition Towns Network 
You never change things by fighting the existing reality. To change something, 
build a new model that makes the existing model obsolete.’  (Buckminster Fuller, 
cited on Transition Town Totnes website) 
The Transition Towns network provides a model of change for towns 
responding to the challenges of peak oil and climate change. They suggest 
mechanisms by which a community can work together to ‘unleash the collective 
genius of their own people’ to drastically reduce their carbon emissions. The 
founder of the UK-based movement, Rob Hopkins, outlines their approach in 
The Transition Handbook: From oil dependency to local resilience. The subject of their 
website is serious, but their style is lots of fun. 
Already there are over 60 communities around the world that have been 
inspired to become an official Transition Town, City, Village or area, with 700 
others mulling it over. Community representatives in my own coastal suburb of 
Muizenberg, Cape Town are amongst the ‘mullers’.  
Totnes became the first Transition Town in 2006. Totnes have a number of 
groups looking at everything from ‘buildings’, ‘energy’ and ‘local government’, 
to ‘education’ and ‘heart and soul’. Their ‘Energy Descent Action Plan’ involves 
finding ways to reduce the current nine barrels of oil per person per annum 
(current UK average) down to one barrel (or less) per person by 2030.  
They are implementing a range of projects including: their own local 
currency, composting toilets, low energy street-lighting, promoting local 
produce, effective garden use, renewable-energy electricity, nut tree planting, 
cycling paths, and ‘story-telling the future to educate and inspire’.  
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‘Transition Town Totnes believes that only by involving all of us – residents, 
businesses, public bodies, community organizations and schools – will we come 
up with the most innovative, effective and practical ideas, and have the energy 
and skills to carry them out. Our future has the potential to be more rewarding, 
abundant and enjoyable than today, and by working together we can unleash the 
collective enthusiasm and genius of our community (that means you!) to make 
this transition’.3 
Urban Carbon Management  
In addition to Transition Towns, there are numerous climate change initiatives 
in urban areas around the world. For case studies of strategies and programmes 
from Mexico City to London to Shanghai have a look at the urban and regional 
carbon management website.4  
Feed-in Tariffs give you a Check Instead of a Bill  
A strategy that has been implemented in many European countries is ‘feed-in 
tariffs’, that allow households and RE companies to sell their renewable energy 
back into the central electricity grid. At the end of the month, households and 
companies receive electricity checks rather than bills. Tariffs can be used to 
subsidize and encourage renewable energy use and production.  
One of the countries to recently implement this practice is Switzerland. In 
2008, Swiss federal government launched a full system of feed-in tariffs 
differentiated by 108 technology, size, and application. There are tariffs, or 
payments per kilowatt-hour (kWh), for solar photovoltaics, wind, hydro, 
geothermal, and biomass. The Swiss system, like those in Germany, France, and 
Spain, pays a renewable energy generator for every kWh of electricity 
generated.5  
Institutions Sharing Ideas and Training 
There are a number of inspiring individuals, institutions and networks that are 
sharing ideas and practices about how to live well, and in accord with the Earth. 
Some of them are educational institutions. I list a few of them below: 
Gaia Education and the GEESE 
Gaia Education develops courses on sustainable community design and 
development. The team of eco-village-based educators are known as the 
GEESE: Global Eco-village Educators for a Sustainable Earth. They draw on 
the experience and expertise of some of the most successful eco-villages and 
community projects across the Earth.6 
Wiser Earth 
Wiser Earth is a community directory and networking forum that maps and 
connects NGOs and individuals addressing the central issues of our day: climate 
change, poverty, the environment, peace, water, hunger, social justice, 
conservation, human rights and more. Their website features over 100,000 
organizations, groups and individuals involved in aspects of sustainable living.7 
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Bioneers 
Bioneers is a forum for connecting the environment, health, social justice and 
spirit with a broad progressive framework. They are committed to finding 
practical solutions for people and planet.8 
CIFAL Findhorn 
CIFAL Findhorn – the only UN-affiliated training centre in Northern Europe – 
is based at the Findhorn Eco-village. It operates as a hub for training, capacity-
building and knowledge sharing between local and regional authorities, 
international organizations, the private sector and civil society on all aspects of 
integrated sustainable development, and other global goals of the United 
Nations.9  
Ocean Arks 
The mission of ocean arks is to disseminate the ideas and practices of ecological 
sustainability throughout the world. Their motto is ‘To Restore the Lands, 
Protect the Seas and Inform the Earth’s Stewards’. See their list of new 
publications on ecological design and Dr. John Todd’s Comprehensive Design 
for a Carbon Neutral World.10 
Worldchanging 
Worldchanging was founded on the idea that ‘real solutions already exist for 
building the future we want. It’s just a matter of grabbing hold and getting 
moving’.11  
Centre for Alternative Technology 
CAT aims to offer practical solutions to ‘some of the most serious challenges 
facing our planet and the human race, such as climate change, pollution and the 
waste of precious resources.’ The key areas they work in are renewable energy, 
environmental building, energy efficiency, organic growing and alternative 
sewerage systems. They aim to show that ‘living more sustainably is not only 
easy to attain but can provide a better quality of life’.12  
Schumacher College: Transformative Learning for Sustainable Living 
Many of the inspiring projects around the world have the participation of 
people who have trained at the Schumacher College, in the UK. ‘The College is 
renowned for the excellent teachers that lead its courses. People come to 
Schumacher College, in the heart of the Devon countryside, to discuss 
sustainability. What and how they learn stays with them for a lifetime’.13 
New Economics Foundation: Living well need not Cost the Earth 
New Economics Foundation (NEF), an ‘independent think-and-do tank’, was 
founded in 1986 by the leaders of The Other Economic Summit (TOES), which 
forced issues such as international debt onto the agenda of the G7 and G8 
summits. They are creating an economics in which ‘people and planet matter’.  
They aim to improve quality of life by promoting innovative solutions that 
challenge mainstream thinking on economic, environment and social issues. 
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NEF combines rigorous analysis and policy debate with practical solutions on 
the ground, often run and designed with the help of local people. They believe 
that ‘living well need not cost the Earth’.14 
Ideas Worth Spreading 
‘TED, ideas worth spreading’ collects inspired talks by the world’s greatest 
thinkers and doers.15 
Diet for a Small Planet 
The books and website of Frances Moore Lappe, US author of Diet for a Small 
Planet have inspired many people.16 
Hope Building 
Hopebuilding Wiki was created ‘to share stories of achievement by ordinary 
people who are doing extraordinary things to make their world a better place to 
live in, but whose stories are not as widely known as they should be’.17 
Award-winning Climate Change Projects  
Ashden awards celebrates and rewards ‘visionary champions who are finding 
solutions to climate change that are also bringing real social and economic 
benefits to their local communities. Across the UK and developing world, our 
award winners are inspirational examples of simple, practical ways to cut CO2 
emissions while also improving quality of life. Whether harnessing technology, 
energy efficiency or renewable sources such as solar, wind or biomass they’re all 
beacons that we use to encourage others to take the sustainable energy path’.  
Examples of these include a ‘Fruits of the Nile’ solar fruit-drying project in 
Uganda, a Technology Informatics Design Endeavor (TIDE) project making 
wood-saving stoves in South India, and a community wind project in Scotland.18  
Poor to Sell (Biogas) Electricity to the Rich 
Energy Forum is using biogas to generate cheap off-grid electricity for villages 
in the Dry Zone in Sri Lanka. They hope to model this technology for wider 
replication.  
In Bangladesh, the University of New South Wales is using a new finance 
model for RE technologies. ‘An implementation agency will assist rural poor 
villagers in the business to sell electricity to wealthier members of the village. 
Poor people will get ownership of the technology after the payback period of 
the technology. In this project, small biogas plants connected to latrines will 
produce methane to generate the electricity for the rural costumers.’  
The poor selling to the rich? This makes a refreshing change from the usual 
patterns of the fossil fuel industry.19 
Water Wheels in the Amazon to Provide Electricity 
An organization in the Amazon is installing Low Head Micro Hydropower in 
two villages in the Tapajos region. ‘The principle of this innovative technology 
is to apply broad water wheels with a small diameter to the low water levels of 
creeks on the river.’  
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This could provide electricity 24 hours a day, and will replace the expensive 
and polluting diesel generators that currently provide energy three hours a day.20  
Handbook on Participatory Development of Micro-Hydropower 
Many others are using micro-hydropower to provide hydro-electricity. This is 
much friendlier to people and the environment than large dams. For example 
ADEID (Action pour un Dévelopement Équitable, Intégré et Durable) has had 
15 years of experience in the participatory development of micro hydropower 
plants in rural areas of Cameroon and other African countries. They are 
producing a handbook to share the lessons they have learned.21 
Non-profit Coop to run Wind Energy Project on Pacific Island 
In Vanuatu, an island country in the South Pacific Vanuatu Renewable Energy 
and Power Association (VANREPA) has initiated a range of renewable energy 
projects, including wind power, solar power, solar desalination and micro-hydro 
technologies.  
Vanrepa has launched its project ‘The Answer is Blowing in the Wind,’ on 
the islands, Aneityum and Futuna. It will begin with providing electricity for 
schools and other institutions, with a longer-term goal of 100% renewable 
energy on these islands. Vanuatu is classified by the UN as a ‘least developed’ 
country, and most of its 200,000 population live in remote rural areas, and are 
engaged in subsistence agriculture.  
VANREPA aims to establish a Renewable Energy Service Cooperative that 
will provide the necessary technical and management support. The coop as a 
non-profit will sell renewable energy to end-users. This organization is seen as 
essential to ensure the sustainability of the project, as it is ‘by strength of its 
management and support, rather than by strength of its technology’ that a 
project succeeds.22 
Practical Action to Reduce Poverty 
Practical Action (an initiative of The Schumacher Centre for Technology & 
Development) uses sustainable technology to reduce poverty in developing 
countries. They are currently implementing over 100 projects worldwide. 
Combined with their consultancy and educational work they outreached to 
about 664,000 people in 2006/2007. In 2008 they won a UNEP prize for a 
project in the Eastern Andes, Peru, in which they set up 47 micro-hydro 
schemes bringing clean power to about 30,000 people.23 
Barefoot Rural Woman make Great Solar Engineers 
The Barefoot College in Rajasthan, India trains rural women and youth in a 
range of practical technical and ecological skills. One of their projects is the 
training of women as ‘barefoot solar engineers’ to fabricate, install, maintain and 
repair solar PV systems.  
So far, they have solar-electrified at least 300 adult education centres, 870 
schools and 350 villages (12,000 households). Their own college (which spreads 
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over 80,000 square feet) was built by barefoot architects and is completely solar-
electrified.  
The Barefoot approach to solar electrification ‘identifies indigenous 
knowledge and vastly under-utilized practical wisdom of the poor, upgrades 
their basic skills, builds up their confidence (they already have the capacity), and 
applies it for their own development. It builds the confidence of villagers from 
the very beginning, in a non-hierarchical learning environment based on 
learning-by-doing.’  
Women are preferred to men because they are generally more stable, more 
likely to stay in the villages, and they usually teach other women what they have 
learned.  
Barefoot College trains women not only from India, but also from Africa. 
These women have shown that language, illiteracy, and culture are no barriers to 
practical mastery of solar PV systems. ‘As the College ramps up its solar 
electrification projects across India and Africa, these women are leading by 
example – showing how the skills of the rural poor can drive their own 
development’.24  
World Bank Projects 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund policies have wreaked social, 
environmental and economic destruction for decades, so I found myself balking 
at looking at the World Bank’s list of ‘inspiring and replicable’ examples of 
sustainable energy projects. The World Bank is notoriously full of 
contradictions. Nevertheless, they may at times fund people and projects that 
get up to good things, so go to their website, and see for yourself. Have a look 
at the book (mentioned on this site) by Paul Osborn: Sustainable Energy: Less 
Poverty, More Profits.  
One promising project, which the World Bank initiated (together with US 
Aid, the US Department of Energy, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 
Winrock and other private companies) is the Global Village Energy Partnership, 
which is currently hosted by Practical Action (UK). GVEP helps developing 
countries to set up energy action plans.25  
BEN and the Bicycle 
Adding highway lanes to deal with traffic congestion is like loosening your belt 
to deal with obesity. (Louis Mumford, city planner, cited in BEN report, 2007) 
Bicycles are healthy for your legs, heart, pocket and planet. Inexpensive and easy 
to repair, you can ride them to work and ride them to play. There are many 
organizations around the world that promote the use of bicycles. One of them is 
the Bicycle Empowerment Network (BEN) in South Africa. The mission of 
BEN is poverty alleviation through the use of bicycles. Together with local and 
international partners, BEN gets (often second-hand) bicycles from Europe, the 
Americas and Asia to Southern Africa; establishes community-based bicycle 
workshops; and sets up bicycle paths.26 
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No Till Farming Reduces CO2 Emissions 
Agriculture is a significant contributor to CO2 emissions. One of the reasons 
for this is the CO2 released into the air by land disturbance.  
Repeated tillage also destroys the soil resource base, causing adverse environ-
mental impacts. Tillage degrades the fertility of soils, causes air and water 
pollution, intensifies drought stress, destroys wildlife habitat, wastes fuel energy, 
and contributes to global warming. The no till (or zero till) ‘conservation 
method’ is increasingly being used by big farmers because it improves soil 
quality, producing better crops.  
South African Dirk Lesch, Swartland Canola Farmer of the year, produced 
more than double the yield of the average farmer in the same district. ‘Ja,’ he 
says, ‘the plough died in 1989, when Pierre Matthee… beat my yield on my own 
land with a no-tillage experiment block of wheat.’  
The carbon content in Dirk Lesch’s land is more than three times the level in 
neighbouring farms that practice ploughing.27 
In a properly designed no-till system, pest (weeds, disease, and insect) 
control is accomplished primarily with the following cultural practices: rotation, 
sanitation, and competition.28 
Organic, Free Range and Permaculture Farming  
There are many other agricultural techniques, technologies and methods that are 
productive, friendly to the Earth and reduce CO2 emissions. Many of these 
have been developed in the practice of free-range, organic, biodynamic and 
permaculture farming. These practices work together with nature, and do not 
use (petroleum-based) fertilizers and toxic herbicides and pesticides. They 
minimize waste, GHG emissions and energy use. They also challenge, and 
provide alternatives to, the existing methods of (feed-lot) meat farming. Earth-
friendly technologies have been used for centuries by farmers around the world, 
and have been developed and documented in modern literature.  
For a great overview of agricultural practices that can reduce GHG 
emissions, see the chapter ‘You the Farmer’, by Linda Scott and Leonie Joubert, 
in Bending the Curve, edited by Zipplies.29  
In her book Animal, Vegetable, Miracle, Barbara Kingsolver documents her 
own family’s experience of growing and buying local, seasonal organic foods. 
Her book and website have a wealth of farming and food related links (mostly 
USA based, but they will have links to organizations across the world).30 
Farmer Managed Natural Regeneration 
Tony Rinaudo, of World Vision, Australia, sent me an interesting story of an 
African reforestation programme. I will go into this in some detail, as it provides 
important lessons for sustainable development practice, and reforestation.  
Rinaudo’s article on Farmer Managed Natural Regeneration states: 
‘Conventional methods of reforestation in Africa have often failed. Even 
community-based projects with individual or community nurseries struggle to 
keep up the momentum once project funding ends. The obstacles working 
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against reforestation are enormous. But a new method of reforestation called 
Farmer Managed Natural Regeneration (FMNR) could change this situation. It 
has already done so in the Republic of Niger, one of the world’s poorest 
nations, where more than three million hectares have been re-vegetated using 
this method.’  
Similar programmes are being initiated in other African countries. The Niger 
was an area hit hard by desertification, as people chopped down trees and 
vegetation for firewood, and because they believed that trees competed with 
their crops. Trees provide us with many benefits in addition to reducing CO2. 
For the farmers, the ecosystem of the trees provided: natural predators – which 
reduced the insects that ate the crops; fertilizer from the creatures that sheltered 
in their shade; as well as protection from extreme heat and wind. With the trees 
gone, crops were devastated by drought and insects, and famine spread across 
the land. Programmes across Africa attempted deforestation programmes that 
involved growing the trees from seed and planting them in the damaged areas. 
However, despite investing millions of dollars and 116 thousands of hours 
labour, there was little overall impact. The conditions were harsh for the trees, 
not only because of the elements and the animals, but because people continued 
to cut them down.  
The FMNR programme had two crucial allies in the success of their project: 
the one was the earth and the other was the local farmers. By observing the 
shoots that came out of some of the felled stumps, Rinaudo became aware of 
the ‘underground forest’ that could be harnessed. Careful pruning could support 
the trees to regenerate. These ancient methods (coppicing and pollarding) were 
taught to small-scale local farmers; and accompanied by support and education 
programmes, as well as laws that both protected trees and allowed farmers to 
harvest them in a sustainable fashion.  
‘The benefits of FMNR quickly became apparent and farmers themselves 
became the chief proponents as they talked amongst themselves. FMNR can 
directly alleviate poverty, rural migration, chronic hunger and even famine in a 
wide range of rural settings. FMNR contributes to stress reduction and nutrition 
of livestock, and contributes directly and indirectly to both the availability and 
quality of fodder… The environment in general benefits as bio-diversity 
increases and natural processes begin to function again’. Malatin André, a 
Chadian farmer practicing FMNR for just two years reported: ‘Food production 
has doubled and many people who were laughing at us, have also adopted the 
techniques for soil regeneration. As a result, there is always good production, 
the soil is protected from erosion and heat, and women can still get firewood’.31  
Malatin Andre, a Chadian farmer practicing FMNR for just two years 
reported: ‘Food production has doubled and many people who were laughing at 
us, have also adopted the techniques for soil regeneration. As a result, there is 
always good production, the soil is protected from erosion and heat and women 
can still get firewood’.32 
The FMNR programme is an example of how appropriate sustainable 
practices offer climate change mitigation as well as adaptation benefits.  
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It reminds us of a truth that is at the core of most successful sustainable 
living practices (including those discussed in this chapter): the solutions to a 
problem are usually right in front of us – in the Earth and in the people. We 
should work closely with these resources, rather than imposing programmes 
that go against the grain. 
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Afterword 
On the Road to Copenhagen:  
Urgent Action is Required 
Ida Auken 
Being – as we are – just weeks away from the Copenhagen climate summit, it is 
almost impossible to come up with new words to stress the urgency of our 
present situation and the disaster awaiting humankind if we fail to meet a 
substantial agreement. World leaders have pledged their commitment to the 
enormous task which lies ahead. Yet even so, and despite the stakes being as 
high as they are, we find ourselves in a political deadlock: if developed countries 
have delivered neither their fair share of reductions as agreed in the Kyoto 
Protocol, nor the already-agreed money for helping the poorest developing 
countries, why should the less developed nations trust us this time around? 
Especially considering that the climate problem is created by many decades of 
enormous emissions of greenhouse gasses by the richer nations. 
While it is hard to see what could ease the situation, this is not the first time 
in history that things have looked extremely gloomy on the eve of international 
agreement (think Rio or Kyoto). Moreover: there is no time for despair. We 
should instead mobilize all the pragmatism, optimism and action so badly 
needed at this time. In a spirit of idealistic realism we must keep the ultimate 
goal of global transition to a low carbon path in our sights, while we work with 
the tools and realities we have at our disposal.  
While there is broad agreement on the science, economics will be the battle 
ground. Whereas the developed world needs to invest large sums in its 
transition to a low carbon economy, the developing world needs to do much 
more even than that. It must simultaneously adapt to accelerating climate 
change and pursue the imperative of tackling devastating poverty. To do this the 
developing nations require help from the developed world.  
While other methods of global financial transfer will be necessary, carbon 
markets are currently one of the most important financing mechanisms already 
in some kind of existence. Large developing countries like China and India who 
are benefiting most from the CDM system at the moment are unlikely to accept 
a system where there are no project-based mechanisms for transferring money 
from North to South. The least developed countries, many of them African 
nations, have an interest in CDM too. At the Nairobi meeting a pledge was 
made to Africa that changes would be made to the CDM rules so that they 
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would also benefit from CDM projects. Moreover, the UN Adaptation Fund 
has hitherto primarily been financed by a 2 percent share of proceeds from the 
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) issued for projects of the CDM. Not a 
lot of money at the moment, but the share of proceeds could be increased to, 
for example, 5 or 15 percent. For all its faults it remains one of the only 
financing sources for the developing countries already agreed upon and one they 
are not going to want to remove or reform until another credible financing 
mechanism has been launched.  
This, however, is probably one of the best things to be said of the CDMs. 
Many critical voices – including that of my party – have been raised against the 
existing project-based CDM system. And the harsh and well documented 
critiques presented in this book cannot be ignored and should not be taken 
lightly. If the use of CDM projects by the wealthy countries is not to harm the 
climate, it must be 100 percent additional. This book illustrates that many 
projects are patently not; they would have been carried out anyway. Tragically, 
the CDM may even have caused severe harm to the global climate by directing 
attention away from domestic CO2 cuts in rich countries without providing 
additional cuts in the global South. This hinders innovation in turn making 
‘business as usual’ more, not less, likely. As many cases in this book show, even 
the CDM’s social and economic impact could be negative, as there is no 
guarantee that new jobs are created for local people. And then there are the 
claims of ‘sustainable development’. If the CDM props up big polluters in the 
developing world that have all sorts of negative impacts on the environment, 
then is it worth trading this in for often spurious claims of ‘additional’ 
greenhouse gas cuts? As this book shows, the problems with the current CDM 
are manifold. The question is whether reforming it will be possible or not. 
As a politician I have to be practical. So, we need to realize that, despite all 
the flaws of project-based CDM, it’s still very much on the table in the 
negotiations. This means we need to make the best of a bad deal and reform 
rather than abolish it. Several solutions have been floated. Firstly, the CMD 
rules could be supplemented by a project /technology based discount factor in 
order to reduce or eliminate the problem of additionality.  
Secondly, the CDM could also be divided into geographic sectors to give e.g. 
Africa a fair share of projects. This can be done in the negotiations, even if it 
seems very complicated. It could also be done simply by setting rules for the use 
of CDM in the rich countries. The EU could do that using its Emission Trading 
System rules – thus getting much more climate for the same money – and 
respecting the need for deviation from business as usual in developing 
countries.  
Thirdly, the CDM system could be supplemented with a sector-based CDM 
where targets could be set for large sectors such as the steel and cement 
industries. Such a system has to respect the principles of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and capabilities and could be initiated by using the 
so-called no-loose targets. This implies setting a business as usual emissions 
baseline for plants in developing countries, rewarding those plants that go under 
Upsetting the Offset 
  359 
that baseline and not punishing those that do not. At the moment we have 
concocted a ‘carbon poverty trap’ whereby a country limits its availability for 
getting CDM projects if it improves its emissions reduction policies. A policy 
giving credits to countries that improve their policies and enforce them – such 
as by strengthening the national building codes – could change that. 
Finally, an exciting new instrument is now on the table. Its aim is not to help 
rich countries to avoid making sufficient reductions at home but to help finance 
voluntary reduction actions in developing countries. The NAMA’s (National 
Appropriate Mitigation Action) was introduced by South Korea a couple of 
years ago. It is a voluntary system where developing countries can report to a 
register which projects they are going to carry out. These NAMA are eligible for 
up front support from credit-short rich countries which in turn are able to 
purchase credits achieved by documented resulting reductions.  
Let this book bring home to the world the huge problems created by the 
CDM and spur the effort to reform it. We must get away from business as usual 
in the way the CDM works. Just as importantly, let it be remembered that CDM 
can only be one aspect of the architecture of managing climate change. We must 
also continue to work on real sustainable development involving changes in 
lifestyle, production forms, housing, transportation, forestry and agriculture. 
Instead of offsetting its responsibilities, the richer countries need to take a lead 
in bringing about real changes at home. This is their historical duty, given that 
they are mostly responsible for creating the problem of climate change in the 
first place. But of course there is no point for the rich world to clean up its act, 
if the developing world just reproduces a development model that literally will 
‘cost the earth’. 
My hope is that the Copenhagen conference will bring the world closer 
together and back on a track that leads us not to chaos, but to a brighter, more 
equitable and sustainable future. 
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Afterword 
Time to Breathe 
Zoe Young 
So one element – carbon – has been transmuted from neglected-priceless-
connected to exploited-tradeable-separate. 
Underlying its newly invented ‘market’ in imaginary units seems to be the 
continued lust for more growth in available ease and goodies, backs still turned 
to other ripples of impact resulting. A fragile alchemy now quantifies certain 
environmental value and defers responsibility for its transformation; 
reproducing to some degree bankers’ shifting of responsibility for financial debt. 
Symptoms of such beguiling and destructive practices have long been actively 
countered by far-sighted social movements of intelligence and compassion. But 
these patterns sustain nevertheless, partly due to suppression, and partly perhaps 
to widespread ignorance/naivety of some environmental activists about geo-
politics, enclosure and/or the nature of complex corruption; plus some 
preference among privileged greens for experiments in self-peasantification, 
gesture politics and/or protest culture that simply reproduces impotence, 
instead (for example) of moving strategically to cut off the most dangerous 
flows of large-scale fear and finance at source.  
In 1972, my father Wayland Young told a meeting for the UN Conference 
on the Human Environment that our species ‘as a whole must now slightly alter 
course. Industry everywhere must build pollution control measures into its 
planning, both political and economic’. I was three years old back then, and 
grew up with a kind of knowing, at some level, that something was wrong with 
the rules of Western economies that fetishized the claims of ‘objectivity’ in 
economics, but did not listen to many actual scientists, and pursued ‘growth’ 
always without awareness of maturity, decline and death. My parents argued that 
democratic governments should adopt systemic preservation of what people 
need and value – peace, beauty, fertile ecology, justice etc – and enforce the 
principle of ‘polluter pays’ to prevent or clean up any mess or damage caused. 
They also argued that governments should never pay people not to destroy 
something that people need, because that would simply reward destructive 
intent. But in the following decades of international ‘greed is good’ consensus, 
such rewards often became the last resort of a marginalised and co-opted 
conservation movement. The Yasuni proposal to pay Ecuador not to sell the oil 
from under rich biodiversity has excited much interest but promises nothing 
really new. Inter-governmental preparations for a new ‘financial mechanism’ for 
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climate action are also not about finally directing all our billions of international 
public investment into cleaner development options, instead they are once more 
about how much ‘additional’ money can be found for environmental funding as 
an ‘additional’ extra and, by now, this has to include adaptation and mitigation – 
because sufficient effective action was not taken in the past four decades, when 
there was still lots of time to change. 
Nearly 40 years on from the first UN environment conference in Stockholm, 
institutionalized environmental protection at the global level is all about 
sustaining ‘growth’ – production, education, media, science, even waste disposal, 
must work harder, better, faster, stronger – and most all of it fired still with dark 
materials drilled from the earth’s crust. From the 70s until lately, North Atlantic 
elites aggressively pushed neo-liberal ‘free market solutions’ to resource 
allocation questions both new and old, including environmental protection. 
Maintaining growth in profits for some by disembedding and privatizing ever 
more, while quietly maintaining subsidy and tariff regimes that benefit their 
allies, they were able to counter the late 1960s disturbances and transformation 
to science, culture and democratic politics from peace, popular liberation, 
ecology, gay and women’s movements. The emerging freedoms and 
adventurous engagement with life of the people involved in those movements, 
had fed a growing perception in this West at least that Earth and all those 
dwelling with her may in some sense be alive. My beloved father, aka Lord 
Kennet, who lies not long in his grave, as author of ‘Eros Denied’, helped 
spawn this resurgence of the erotic connection with life. He and my mother Liz 
were friendly with fellow author Bill Golding, who suggested the goddess’ name 
Gaia for scientist James Lovelock’s ‘earth feedback hypothesis’. The insights 
from these developments in experimental science and culture seem to have been 
marginalised by economic ideologies adopted by North Atlantic elites for 
narrow political reasons. The UN Environment Programme set up in the early 
1970s was exiled to Nairobi, underfunded, and given no power to make 
international institutions like the World Bank invest their influential funds for 
broader public good. The UN’s office on regulating multinational corporations 
was shut down under corporate pressure at the end of the 1970s. Now 
corporations that do something ‘good’ for culture, science or the environment, 
say sponsor an art exhibition or well-known groups like Conservation 
International and WWF, gain kudos even as they carry on strip mining, 
deforesting, extracting oil and polluting somewhere else. 
Scientific unease about growing environmental destruction rose again during 
the late 1980s, leading to important UN treaties on protecting biodiversity and 
preventing climate change in 1992. But still the modality of implementation was 
limited to a small percentage of public finance targeted to sweeten investments 
in environmental protection: and next to nothing for the very difficult and 
complex process of setting fair, effective and flexible international standards for 
using resources sustainably. So it was that in 1995 I found myself with a job 
researching the Global Environment Facility, a World Bank-UN fund intended 
to create ‘global environmental benefits’ – effectively supporting expensive 
islands of publicly paid-for clean-up, in a sea of continued resource extraction 
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and pollution from unregulated sources – few of which even pay their share of 
tax. To be fair, some players in big business have called for clear and binding 
standard regulations to make their global business simpler – but professional 
communities interested in ‘environmental’ investment now understandably 
guard their own scarce resources too. 
As we have seen, it was in this context that ‘carbon markets’ were created. 
The sale of climate-related ‘indulgences’ for energetic and emitting ‘sinners’ 
certainly opens up lucrative new streams of products for devotees of the kind of 
magical thinking embodied in financial sector-dominated economies: if the work 
of a Goldman Sachs employee can be valued a thousand times more highly than 
that of a nurse or farmer, then it is not much of a stretch to believe that the 
value of CO2 sequestered in a monoculture pine, eucalyptus or oil palm 
plantation really is worth more than the complex old growth forest grubbed up 
to lay it out. This logic that defies scientific understanding can be extended to 
biodiversity – of course it makes sense for a company to drown or poison a 
valley full of endangered wildlife with a mine or dam, as long as you can claim 
that nobody will do the same to the next valley too on your watch. Makes total 
sense – as long as you are not a tree, beast or mycelium in that first valley. Or a 
scientist, tourist, or local resident who studies, or loves, or gardens, hunts, and 
gathers in that valley sustainably. In fact, only as long as you somehow do well 
out of mines or dams, whether from your pension fund’s investments, or the 
minerals and energy to make the products you choose to consume, it makes 
sense. But otherwise, not much. Watch out if anyone tries to apply this logic to 
your family. ‘OK, let me torture your little boy, and I’ll pay for your girl’s 
education.’ This appeal to the desperate, could only come from the unethical 
mighty – who may well do something that starves you and your little girl later 
anyway... if it benefits the bottom line. 
In 2009 Prince Charles and the World Bank were among those declaring 
‘war’ on climate change – a little sibling perhaps for the existing pretend ‘wars’ 
to disguise failure in our governments' policies on poverty, cancer, drugs, ‘terror’ 
etc? So who is supposed to be the enemy this time – Gaia? Profit maximizing 
CEOs and the shareholders they report to? Opponents of energy efficiency 
regulation? An ubiquitous atmospheric gas called CO2? Winning a real war with 
an engaged enemy demands troop numbers, strategy, preparation, luck, 
intelligence, learning from history, taking territory and indulging the 
confrontational machineries of violence. Real war leaves fighters and victims 
mutilated, shellshocked, grieving and displaced. War of any kind lies, breaks 
hearts and minds, and benefits few. Oh dear, not more... 
Like bankers’ bonuses, critical researchers’ grants and the World Bank’s 
Carbon Investment Funds, the costs of any war must be conjured out of debt 
and/or extracted from taxes on the surplus of others’ increasing ‘productivity’. 
Most production is still not regulated for energy efficiency, so the money to 
wage a climate ‘war’, as for salaries of consultants etc in the ‘carbon market’, will 
likely be derived from activities generating greenhouse gases. To protect the 
(energy) ‘security’ of their enduring freedom to grow their markets, ideological 
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and armed militarists suck trillions from society; while good food, clean air and 
water, and spiritual, ecological and job security are neglected. So to live well on 
this bright gem of a planet, is it not now time to turn our backs on these priests 
and warriors of old gods too greedy for tribute? 
Breathe.. Take a moment just to breathe,  
(illness and injustice thrive on our crude reaction)  
I turn my back, step away, and make time to reflect.  
To look over what has passed and seek a place of graceful action..  
Breathe, connect, and move... 
Swaying, walking, dancing, loving life and the understanding that everything 
changes, passes away. 
Still, taking action to reduce, reuse and recycle, to confront, stop, and reverse to 
causes of environmental destruction in whatever form they arise. And always, 
building and supporting what gives sustenance to many in the long term, and 
sanctuary where it’s needed now. Seeking where possible to be fair and kind to 
self and others. Learning to forgive those in government, big business, army, 
police, even bankers for the years ongoing of pain and sorrow and loss and 
struggle of so many. It’s hard.  
Stepping through fears of failures and futures into fuller self-responsibility, 
exploring old/new ways of living and dying – whatever happens – that give as 
much as we take from the web of life, and love it all the more.  
And this I can only do for myself... not for others. We each choose. 
Turning down the volume not only of produce/consume but also of the 
emergency climate crisis nature destruction panic injustice activist mode. For 
too long, too long now, some of us who feel and study and labour with 
compassion for all beings have been driven by cycles of stress and sorrow and 
strain, so now I try to turn my back on that too.... To listen to the earth, the air, 
the fire, the water, to hear and experience what is needed now, to break the 
cycles of pollution, inside and out... moving always onwards, offering thanks, 
completely facing up to and grateful for what is... taking time, making space to 
break outdated norms and laws and reimagine values, where practicable in 
council circle, with scientists advocates and ancestors and brave fools to shake 
us up with laughter. That’s a different challenge. 
Drawing to a close ‘the great fracture’ between bull-headed children growing 
fast and furious and our bearlike mother earth who will not give humans any 
more than she can give. Only connecting with what is, as it is, before seeking to 
change or make demands of it so that maybe one day, three year old offspring 
of engaged environmentalists need no longer grow up haunted by the fear of big 
mama Gaia turning on her babies and refusing any more goodies, ever, at all.  
